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- summary -
This thesis outlines a constructivist account of what has come to be known as ‘thin 
universalism’. It makes the case for a substantively minimal account of universalism 
as a response to the facts of pluralism understood in a particular normative way. 
Following G.A. Cohen, it challenges conventional constructivist arguments about the 
privileged role of facts in the construction of normative principles and suggests that 
construction must be aimed not at ‘first principles’, which cannot be responsive to 
factual considerations, but at ‘principles of regulation’, which can.
These principles are not fixed transcendental algorithms, but rather contingent and 
reflexive responses to a rapidly changing world, designed to have an impact upon it. 
This enables them to repel many of the traditional critiques of universalism and 
provides grounds for thinking that there is still a space and a need for universalism in 
the modem world.
The thesis proposes a bicameral construction and considers firstly how such ‘thin 
universal regulatory principles’ might be constructed, and secondly how a basis of 
consent to them might also be constructed. Far from being distinct, there is 
significant overlap between the two constructions. Finally, the thesis suggests that a 
thin universalism can be expressed in two key political debates, which highlight its 
significance and assist in the construction process. First, as a more sensitive and yet 
more powerful human rights doctrine; one which recognises and celebrates 
pluralism, but which sets clear limits on the kind of society in which humans can 
exist. And, second, as a conception of toleration with limitations which prevent it 
from descending into a hollow relativism.
Ultimately, the thesis seeks to establish and justify the plausibility of retaining 
universal principles which, while substantively thin, still resonate strongly and 
widely in and, as such, continue to be relevant to a modem plural world.
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- introduction -
Pluralism and Universalism
‘Universalism’ has traditionally posited that principles of justice or morality, and the 
social and political institutions that issue from them, should be valid and applicable 
universally. It posits that there are some valuational judgements -  judgements of 
right or wrong, good or bad -  which hold meaning in all times, places and 
circumstances. By extension, justifications for these principles and the reasons 
provided for endorsing them should be equally universal, in that they should extend 
beyond any particular set of political arrangements, social circumstances or cultural 
norms. The principles by which social life is organised must apply to all, and be 
justifiable to all.
By contrast, ‘particularism’ has typically posited that principles of justice or 
morality are only valid within particular social contexts, under localised institutional 
arrangements, or by reference to contingent historical experiences. Valuational 
judgements hold meaning only within the social contexts in which they arise, and 
cannot, therefore be ‘universal’ in the sense intended by universalism. Equally, 
particularism has posited that the reasons given for endorsing those principles will 
always be, and can only ever be, tied to that context.
Furthermore, universalism has, in the past half a century, had to come to 
terms with ‘the fact of pluralism’: that there is a wide diversity of cultures, which 
adhere to a diversity of seemingly incompatible values. The values people hold are
Introduction
many, pluralised and diverse and, at the same time, appear local, particular and 
culturally-dependent. Different societies have different principles and this, so the 
claim goes, is evidence enough to suppose that no values are universal and in fact 
that all values are relative. After all, would there be such a widespread plurality of 
beliefs if there were a single ‘best’ or ‘correct’ belief system?1 ‘Universalism’ 
suddenly seems worryingly ethnocentric -  tied to and relevant only for a particular 
time and place and therefore not universal at all. The notion that the underpinnings 
of, for example, liberal democracy are universal implies, for many, disregard for 
other cultures. Persistent attempts to justify liberal principles universally, let alone 
establish (or worse, impose) liberal democratic institutions on others, looks like 
cultural and moral imperialism -  a legacy the West has sought, with varying degrees 
of success, to leave behind.
But the idea that we ought to renounce all claims to universality seems 
equally worrisome. The idea that all values are relative, that we can say nothing to, 
or about, the die-hard Nazi, the genocidal maniac, or the sneering rapist, seems 
obtuse and debilitating. However one seeks to approach the fact of pluralism, the 
idea that all values are relative and that ‘anything goes’ morally speaking is 
something few people could readily accept. This leaves deeply contradictory feelings 
about universalism. Onora O’Neill comments:
Our generation has a love-hate relationship with ethical universalism. On the
one hand we want to respect cultural diversity, to allow that different people
may rightly hold different ethical views ... On the other hand, our generation
1 Gilbert Harman, ‘Moral Relativism’ in Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thompson, Moral 
Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p.8; See also J.L. Mackie, Ethics: 
Inventing Rights and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977)
2 See Steven Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals: The Implications o f  Diversity (London: Verso, 2003), 
ch.2; Seyla Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), ch.2
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takes claims about human rights seriously: we want to insist that all people of 
whatever background and wherever they are have certain basic rights. ... This 
position is thoroughly uncomfortable: we are left insisting that there are no 
universal ethical standards and that there are such standards.3
Concern at the prospect of imposing moral judgements on others is, in part, also a 
symptom of the Western imperialist inheritance and a desire to see no repeat of past 
mistakes. Yet the complexities of pluralism raise concerns over the capacity of 
particularism to make important judgements in a world whose boundaries are 
increasingly open, porous and whose people are increasingly interconnected and 
interdependent.
Universalism still looks ill-equipped to deal with the modem world; 
appearing, at best, naive and out-dated, and at worst imperialistic, even tyrannical. 
Particularism looks equally ill-equipped; at best hesitant and self-interested and, at 
worst, indifferent to, even apologists for cruelty and suffering.
For many commentators, pluralism leaves little within universalism worth 
salvaging. But for others this is not the case and Steven Lukes has contended that 
universalism needs defending, but in a way that takes seriously the charges against 
it.4 As a way of doing just that, the idea of a ‘thin’ universalism is becoming more 
and more prevalent, most explicitly within Anglo-American political thought, but 
also within other strands of social scientific and philosophical inquiry. The 
underlying idea is of a ‘principled pluralism’:5 a way of comprehending cultural 
diversity that deflects the absolute relativity of values, that regards some actions as
3 Onora O’Neill, ‘Kantian Universalism in a Culturally Diverse World’, speaking on the BBC World 
Service in May 1999, Cambridge University Website (http://www.phil.cam.ac.Uk/u grads/Tripos/ 
Ethics/course material/ la  kant s ethics 05.pdfNovember 1st 2004)
4 Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, p. 12
5 See Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch, ‘Introduction’ in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts 
and Peter Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order: The Challenge o f  Diversity (London: 
Routledge, 2006), p.2
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unacceptable or some forms of social organisation as unsuitable for the living of a 
worthwhile life, and that posits principled and reasoned limits to moral and cultural 
diversity. If we seek to respect, even promote pluralism, to take seriously charges of 
ethnocentrism and imperialism, and at the same time resist claims of absolute 
cultural relativity and retain the capacity to make principled, reasoned, justifiable 
moral judgements, perhaps a ‘thin universalism’ is the best way forward.
In most accounts of thin universalism, pluralism is not taken to be a problem 
requiring a solution. It is not a hurdle that humanity must overcome or a dead-end on 
the path to ‘perfection’, ‘reason’, or ‘reality’. It is not something that must be 
eradicated or fixed, nor is it something that can be; it is even a good in itself.6 
Pluralism is here to stay. It cannot be ignored, and must be treated carefully and 
sensitively.
Similarly, many thin universalisms share the idea of a terrain of common 
ground upon which certain judgements can cross cultural boundaries. That terrain is 
itself open to contestation, as are the judgements themselves. Whether through 
cultural convergence, shared experience, universal procedures or political 
mechanisms, or a diversity of political forms, the derivation, character and 
justification of thin universal principles is the subject of much dispute. In all 
instances thin universalisms seek to navigate a pluralised and contested world. Some 
seek consensus, others dissensus. Some attempt to establish a purely political 
conception, while others seek a moral or legal path. Some begin from a conception of 
the particular and seek commonalities. Others begin from some conception of the 
universal and strive for a principled diversity. Some stand up to scrutiny better than
6 See for example the final chapters o f Taylor’s Sources o f  the Self. See Charles Taylor, Sources o f  
the Self: The Making o f  the Modern Identity (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992)
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others. The derivation and defence of a coherent thin universalism is the subject of 
this thesis.
‘Thin Universalism’: Perspectives and Approaches
Explicit and implicit in their presentation, thin universalisms can be found both 
within and beyond analytic philosophy. Both ‘thinness’ and ‘universalism’ are old 
ideas -  at least as old as philosophy itself -  and have existed in tandem almost as 
long. Thin universalisms are frequently classified along continuums and within 
typologies according to how thin they are, which of their characteristics constitute 
‘thinness’, their focus of concern, and their conceptual context. Continuums running 
from thin to thick can be compiled with ‘strong’ relativists, particularists and 
communitarians at one end and thick universalists, cosmopolitans and absolutists at 
the other. Similarly, thin universalisms can be categorised according to their thin 
characteristics: whether that is a set of thin or basic moral principles, a set of thin 
procedures, the minimum content of morality, justice or rights, or how human actions 
and societies are understood, characterised and interpreted (and the kinds of human 
action and society condoned or condemned by it).
Thin universalisms can also be categorised according to their universal 
qualities: whether that is universal ‘human’ characteristics, universal capacities, 
vulnerabilities, dispositions or requirements, access to universal procedures or 
concepts, or judgements about the moral (perhaps even legal) status of all human 
beings. Each of the perspectives below posits a thin universalism on some level, 
though they vary enormously in their focus, content and presuppositions. Reference 
to thin universalism can denote one or a number of distinct yet intertwined ideas
Introduction
about the qualities, capacities, needs, requirements, rights and duties of humanity as 
a whole.
Not all thin universalisms necessarily employ, explicitly or implicitly, 
thinness in all of its dimensions. Many of them connect thin epistemic or cognitive 
universalisms and thin conceptions of morality; many reject such connections on 
various grounds. It is claimed by many that one cannot defend thin moral 
universalism without adhering to a thin cognitive universalism, while others suggest 
that a far thicker, strong cognitive universalism is required to underpin any moral 
universalism, thin or otherwise.
David Hume suggests that ‘mankind are so much the same, in all times and
n
places’ and ‘thin universalism’ may firstly refer to a thin or minimal conception of 
‘human nature’. A thin conception of human nature may seek only to assert that there 
is some minimal or limited understanding of what constitutes a human being, or of 
what it is to be human. That there could be any generally ‘human’ traits remains the 
source of some universalisms. But the idea of thinness urges that only certain limited 
capacities, capabilities and vulnerabilities can be identified which can genuinely be 
considered ‘human’. Even thin universalisms premised on radical accounts of 
socialisation, such as relativism, and strong conceptions of particularism, tend to start 
from at least a ‘barebones’ conception of human nature.
In his Discourse on Inequality Rousseau talks of a distinction between man as
Q
created by nature and the parts of man that are the product of circumstance. Human 
beings possess a set of culturally encoded norms or mores, as well as tastes, 
preferences and attitudes that are not the product of ‘human nature’. There are also at 
least a set of biologically encoded human needs (such as air, food and shelter) and
7 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section VIII, Part l,p.61
8 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘A Discourse on Inequality’ in The Basic Political Writings (London: 
Hackett, 1988), p.33
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experiences (such as aversion to pain9) that human beings also possess, and these
characteristics, while being grounded in them, are not defined by cultural and
historical boundaries. Such attributes are often referred to as ‘common humanity’.10
A thin conception of human nature, which recognises the pluralism of
modem societies, may seek to underdetermine what defines a ‘human being’ in all
times and places. From such minimal starting points it may be possible to identify,
not a fixed and comprehensive structure of empirically observable human traits and
dispositions, but a minimal set of genuine human potentialities, capacities,
capabilities and vulnerabilities.11 It may seek only to identify, for example, a
capacity for rational self-interest, a potential for altruism, or a vulnerability to harm.
These in turn serve to delimit acceptable and legitimate courses of action and modes
of social organisation. It may be prudent to deny that all human beings behave in a
certain way, but it may still be possible to assert that human beings are capable of
certain categories of behaviour that all have access to. The clash of ‘nature versus
nurture’ is, on this account, a false dichotomy. Biological and psychological
imperatives generate a set of human needs, capacities and capabilities and
socialization generates a set of culturally particular values, preferences and attitudes.
Martha Nussbaum, in Sex and Social Justice, and later in Women and Human
Development, forwards a universalism based on what she claims are just such a
10minimal set of assumptions about universal ‘human’ characteristics. Hers aims to 
be a thin universalism in the sense that it rejects culturally specific characterisations
9 Or being fed in early life through a teat. For a biological account o f grounding morality in human 
nature see Robert A. Hinde, Why Good is Good: The Sources o f  Morality (London: Routledge, 2002)
10 This notion is adapted, in part, from Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, p. 13; and Benhabib, The 
Claims o f  Culture, p.26
11 To make use o f the language employed specifically by Onora O’Neill in Towards Justice and 
Virtue: A Constructive Account o f  Practical Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996) and Martha Nussbaum in Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
12 See Nussbaum, Women and Human Development and Sex and Social Justice, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999)
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of human agents and of women in particular. The thinness she develops is grounded 
in a set of human requirements which she calls ‘the capabilities approach’:
Certain universal norms of human capability should be central for political 
purposes in thinking about basic political principles that can provide the 
underpinning for a set of constitutional guarantees in all nations ... these 
norms are legitimately used in making comparisons across nations.13
In so doing, Nussbaum also recognises an objection to any project which pursues 
‘basic’ principles. ‘The suspicion’, she claims, ‘uneasily grows that the theorist is 
imposing something on people who surely have their own ideas of what is right.’14 In 
order to avoid this, she pursues only those ‘functional capabilities that are vital for 
any human life to be regarded as truly human’.15 Andrea Baumeister identifies 
Nussbaum’s thin universalism as those core human capabilities required for such 
regard.16 The problem within Nussbaum’s work is that the realisation and 
progression of some of these basic human capabilities may, in practice, be rejected in
1 7favour of cultural norms which deny that development. In many cases such 
approaches are hard to reconcile with a genuine plurality of actually held views 
without the kind of imposition of values that Nussbaum seeks to avoid. Many end up 
looking either far too thick or far too thin to possibly fulfil their remit.
There is also a tendency amongst opponents of traditional universalisms to 
grant that these capacities, capabilities and vulnerabilities can rightly be called 
‘human’. John Gray, a fervent critic of liberal Enlightenment universalism, offers a
13 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p.35
14 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, p.35
15 Andrea Baumeister, ‘Gender Equality and Cultural Justice: How Thin is Nussbaum’s 
Universalism?’ in Haddock, Roberts and Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order: The Challenge 
o f Diversity, pp. 147, 149
16 For a full list o f Nussbaum’s ‘Central Human Functional Capabilities’ see Baumeister., ‘Gender 
Equality and Cultural Justice’, p. 149; and Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, pp.41-42
17 Baumeister., ‘Gender Equality and Cultural Justice’, p. 155
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minimal and universal conception of human beings grounded on the notion of 
‘universal human evils’. Humans, he says, have a stock of needs which do not 
change much across time and place and which are not dependent on particular 
systems of value or belief. The thwarting of such human needs, and thus the 
rendering of a worthwhile life unattainable, reveals a universal evil. While there is no 
definitive list of what makes a worthwhile life and hence no definitive list of what 
prevents the attainment of one, it is possible to imagine a number of scenarios 
(torture, humiliation, persecution, poverty, the threat of death or genocide) which 
constitute universal evils, and as such any conception of the good which does not
1 ftconfront them is defective.
Richard Rorty, also an Enlightenment critic,19 rejects a common human
nature. He contends that within a pluralistic world it is of no use to take the ‘Kantian’
road and attempt to reconcile moral differences by asking people to relate to each
other through shared human characteristics. It is clear, he claims, that followers of
many moral doctrines would contend that no such characteristics exist.20 Yet Rorty
also makes use of a whole series of seemingly ‘human’ commonalities and
capacities, from the evils of humiliation and torture, to our responses to poetry and
01sex, to the importance of identity. Such a gamut of universal attributes suggests 
‘thin universalist’ underpinnings to Rorty’s political philosophy.
18 John Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism, (Oxford: Polity, 2000), p.66
19 And anti-foundationalist and perhaps a provisional moral non-cognitivist. See Mark Evans, 
‘Pragmatist Liberalism and the Evasion o f Politics’ in Mark Evans (ed.), The Edinburgh Companion 
to Contemporary Liberalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), pp. 148-161
20 Richard Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality’ in Truth and Progress: 
Philosophical Papers Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 178
21 See Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, p. 19; See also Norman Geras, Solidarity in the Conversations 
o f Humankind: the Ungroundable Liberalism ofRichard Rorty (London: Verso, 1995)
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Some of the thinnest universalisms are so because of the (lack of) foundations upon 
which they are premised. Two prominent examples of ‘anti-foundational’ thin 
universalisms can be found again in the works of Gray and Rorty.
Gray’s approach can be viewed most clearly in his conception of agonistic 
liberalism and in his advocacy of a politics of modus vivendi, which are central to his 
critique of Enlightenment liberalism.22 Modus vivendi is premised on an assertion 
which is in some way both a universally held value and a universally sought good: 
that of peace. Gray claims that ‘nearly all ways of life have interests that make 
peaceful coexistence worth pursuing.’23 Peace is good for all human beings; all 
human beings want peace. As such there is at work here at least a thin universal 
imperative to avoid conflict, violence and war. Gray may well be, in part, correct in 
this assertion 24 But some might equally advise caution on the extent to which peace 
is heralded as a supreme value. Brian Barry, for example, suggests that ‘peace at any 
cost is a curious universal value’.25 Nonetheless, Gray can maintain that peaceful 
coexistence is only worth pursuing if it advances human interests.26 His agonistic 
liberalism rejects concrete foundations for toleration and modus vivendi and asserts 
contingent justifications for moral principles. These justifications are changeable and 
subject to political conflict and value incommensurability, irresistible features of
97modem life. We have reason to seek modus vivendi in order to secure the 
conditions to peacefully pursue our own contingent goals.
22 That is Gray’s current critique. His perspective has shifted across his intellectual development.
John Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism (Oxford: Polity, 2000), and Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and 
Culture at the Close o f  the Modern Age (London: Routledge, 1995), ch.6
23 Gray, however, does not commit himself to the assertion that all ways o f life explicitly seek peace. 
See Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism, p. 135
24 Testament to this might be seen in the increasing hostility to the war in Iraq shown by the British 
public between 2003 and 2008. The full repercussions have yet to be seen, but this aversion may well 
impact all future conflicts, as well as the structure and role o f the armed forces.
25 See Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), p. 135 [Emphasis added]
26 Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism, p. 135
27 See Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, ch.6
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Problematically, and perhaps counter to Gray’s objectives, the establishment 
of modus vivendi may well require a minimal universal consensus concerning shared 
goals, institutions and even values. We must all value peace over expansion and 
power. In order to demonstrate to those who do not accept peaceful coexistence as a 
value worth pursuing, it must be shown that such a scenario is in itself valuable and 
advantageous.
Rorty meanwhile also asserts, separately from his claim of minimal shared 
human capacities, a second thin universalism grounded in his anti-foundationalism. 
He asserts both the historical contingency of our culture of human rights and the 
need to extend that culture internationally. Its validity is therefore not dependent on a 
foundation of superior moral knowledge. Without foundations the task of political 
philosophy becomes to develop more convincing arguments for, not to seek 
endlessly to justify the underlying principles of, our practical commitments. The task 
at hand becomes developing new ways of drawing more people into the category of 
people with whom we associate. This has led to scepticism, primarily because 
Rorty’s approach is so thin. Bruce Haddock has commented that Rorty celebrates the 
de facto extension of a human rights culture globally, without supplying arguments 
that might justify that enthusiasm.29 Lukes also levels this criticism, claiming that 
Rorty defends the human rights culture on the basis of extending the ‘we’ of human 
rights advocates to wider acceptance. But this expansion of solidarity, to paraphrase 
Norman Geras, either stops somewhere or it doesn’t. If it does, then human rights are 
not things which we wish to apply to all human beings, they are not universal and
28 Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’, pp. 170-171
29 Bruce Haddock, ‘Practical Reason and Identity’ in Bruce Haddock and Peter Sutch (eds.), 
Multiculturalism, Identity and Rights (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 10-24 at pp.21-22
-11-
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they do not represent the kind of commitment to all human kind that human rights
•7 A
are intended to be; they are, Geras suggests, ‘strange human rights’.
Because of this, Rorty has been called a ‘framework relativist’ by Seyla
o 1 t
Benhabib, a position which is also implicitly premised on its own extremely thin 
universalism. Cultural relativism is premised on the (descriptive) notion that moral 
evaluations are relative to the cultural background out of which they arise and the 
(prescriptive) notion of respect for diverse systems of value. The descriptive 
statement is premised on an absolute description that all descriptions are relative, 
while the prescriptive statement is premised a universal value judgement of respect. 
Relativism, then, is in fact premised on a thin universalism, and may even be 
foundational in its justifications.
This is also true of communitarianism. The explicit thin universalism 
developed by Michael Walzer in Thick and Thin,32 is derived from critiques of the
' X ' Xarguments of the earlier Spheres o f Justice. Concern was that Walzer was simply 
advocating moral relativism disguised as justice, pluralism and equality. While 
Walzer’s primary concern was to advocate a strong politics of difference, Spheres o f  
Justice can be shown to be premised on a thin universalism of sorts, and need not 
advocate absolute relativism. ‘Justice’, Walzer argues in his concluding chapters, ‘is 
relative to social meanings’ and, relatedly, ‘every substantive account of distributive 
justice is a local account.’34 And yet, Walzer also claims that ‘we are, (all of us), 
culture producing creatures; we make and inhabit meaningful worlds.’ He seems to
30 Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, p. 19 (emphasis added)
31 See Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, pp.31-33
32 To which I turn shortly. See Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and 
Abroad (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, 1994)
33 See Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f  Philosophy (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1985),p.l29: Michael Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice: A Defence o f  Pluralism and Equality (New 
York: Basic Books, 1983)
34 Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice, p.312-4.
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be proposing a thin ‘human’ characteristic in acknowledging that the activity of 
cultural creation is common to all. In a footnote he comments that ‘it may be the case 
that certain internal principles ... are reiterated in many, perhaps in all human 
societies’. This, he maintains, is an empirical, not a philosophical matter.35 From this 
he derives in turn at least one ‘universal’ predicate:
We do justice to actual men and women by respecting their particular 
creations ... Justice is rooted in the distinct understandings of places, 
honours, jobs, things of all sorts, that constitute a shared way of life. To 
override these understandings is (always) to act unjustly.36
The ‘universalism’ of Walzer here is perhaps the thinnest of the universalisms I 
identify that is directly concerned with justification. A universal principle of respect 
for the cultural creations of others is thin indeed, and thinner than Walzer’s later 
examination of thin universalism.
In Thick and Thin, Walzer asserts that thin, or minimal, moral terms are 
inherently embedded in thick, or maximal, moral descriptions; they share the same 
means of expression and the same cultural orientation. Walzer is critical of what he 
calls procedural minimalism, a thin, shared morality, a small number of ideas, which 
supplies the generative rules of engagement for different maximal moralities.
Walzer identifies two key problems with the procedural minimum. Firstly, 
the minimum is seldom minimal. The thin morality tends to reflect a particular set of 
values, leaving little open to debate and interpretation. Thin procedural morality is 
simply abstracted from democratic culture, and not abstracted terribly far. Secondly,
35 Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice, See note p.314. This reiteration comes to feature in Walzer’s 
universalism strongly later on.
36 Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice, p.314
37 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad  (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p.l 1. Walzer is, I believe, thinking o f  Rawls’ political liberalism in 
particular here, but also perhaps o f Stuart Hampshire’s procedural justice.
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by extension, minimalism precedes maximalism. Walzer argues that it is rather 
maximalism that precedes minimalism and that no one maximal morality is the 
source of the moral minimum. There is no neutral starting point from which a variety 
of moral cultures can emerge and there is therefore no procedure that can yield
' I Q
them. This means that a thick morality is not worked out from a set of core 
universal principles; our particular thick moralities are thick from the beginning, we 
do not build them up out of thin principles. Justification is not the same as genesis.
Walzer, by contrast, forwards a thin universalism that is not ‘everyone’s 
morality because it is no-one’s in particular; [where] subjective interest and cultural 
expression have been cut away’, but is particularist and bound up with the moralities 
of cultures and societies. Instead of locating commonalities on the way to difference, 
he suggests that we first acknowledge diversity and then seek overlapping 
outcomes. Pluralism, as a condition of society, is a motivating feature of a thin 
universal morality and pluralism, as an attitude towards institutional arrangements, 
will inevitably be an outcome.
Minimalism, for Walzer, only appears independently of maximalism in times 
of personal, social or political upheaval and in such cases particular expressions may 
take on wider, even universally accessible meanings that generate ‘common’ 
responses. In these circumstances the expressions used by those affected have 
common resonance across cultures. Without this resonance, a shared response would 
fail.40 Minimalism, Walzer stresses, is ‘morality close to the bone’. While thickness 
is linked to disagreement, discourse and compromise, thinness is linked to
38 Walzer, Thick and Thin, pp. 13-14. Such starting points, the constructivist would argue, do exist, 
they simply need to be identified correctly and suitably abstracted.
39 Walzer, Thick and Thin, pp.7, 15
40 Walzer uses the example o f pro-democracy demonstrators in Prague in 1989, who carried banners 
demanding ‘justice’ and ‘truth’, and others such as ‘freedom’ and ‘life’ for example. See Walzer,
Thick and Thin, pp.2-3, 16
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intensity.41 The commonality of occasion and response may yield a set of standards 
to which all societies can be held -  against murder, torture, oppression and tyranny 
and which for Western societies may well be expressed in the language of rights. A 
language Walzer supposes must be, on some level, translatable. Any morality that 
cannot allow for such responses to the pain and suffering of others is deficient, and 
this provides his thin universalism with a critical perspective.
His minimalism is not a ‘full-blooded’ universal doctrine, a prominence, he 
believes, only our maximal moralities can possess. It is not about persuading others 
of our point of view, but about mutual recognition and commonality of response by 
protagonists of different moral cultures. Minimalism, he says, is not foundational; it 
is not about different groups of people who all find they have the same set of 
ultimate values. It is not the foundation for the maximum; it is merely a piece of it.
The notion of ‘contextualist universalism’ is given shape by two further 
thinkers: Shane O’Neill and Thomas Pogge. O’Neill’s aim is to utilise the positive 
aspects of liberal impartiality found in Rawls, given a domestic plurality of 
comprehensive conceptions of the good, and marry it to a Walzerian communitarian 
contextualism grounded in an international plurality of legally recognised states. This 
he calls ‘impartiality in context’.42 He shares this space with Thomas Pogge, whose 
World Poverty and Human Rights outlines his ‘contextualist moral universalism’ 43 
He rejects monistic universalisms (positing single or sets of transcendent universal 
principles) and ‘dogmatic contextualism’ (rejecting the justification of diverse 
principles) in favour of a rights-based approach that takes its lead from both the 
Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, and from a thin conception of human
41 Walzer, Thick and Thin, p.6.
42 See Shane O’Neill, Impartiality in Context: Grounding Justice in a Plural World (New York: State 
University o f New York Press, 1997), Introduction
43 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms 
(Oxford: Polity, 2002), p. 107
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flourishing. This in itself is grounded in ‘the minimal requirements needed for the 
just and even handed treatment of persons within the same context.’ By way of 
example, Pogge contrasts his general account of human flourishing with more 
specific accounts that emphasise positive goods such as pleasure. He 
underdetermines ‘human flourishing’ to achieve this thinness and generality. 44
Thin universalisms can also be determined according to conceptions of reason and 
reasoning. These reflect two distinct considerations: the first refers to the universality 
of the human capacity for reason and rationality; the second refers to the procedural 
notion of a good reason being a formally universal concept. Proponents assert that 
the focus and scope of reasoning can be universal. Reasoning, they maintain, is 
attainable by all and its procedures of inquiry, evidence and questioning are 
universally valid, and therefore need not be relative to context or culture.45
Opponents have sought to reject the universality of reason in moral 
deliberation on the grounds that moral judgements are based solely on acculturated 
customs or personal preference. From this they draw one of two further conclusions: 
first that reason either plays no part, or has only a secondary or minor role in ethical 
thinking, or, second, that reasons themselves can only ever be local and contingent. 
This leads to a rejection of universal reason in favour of relativism or emotivism. But 
those who engage in this critique often find themselves deploying procedures of 
rational persuasion, inquiry and justification which they intend others to be receptive 
to. Such procedures assume or require minimal levels of logical consistency and 
rational comprehension to be intelligible, leading many to comment that reasons 
against reasoning is a contradiction-in-terms.
44 Peter Sutch, ‘Thin Universalism: Moral Authority and Contemporary Political Theory’ in Haddock, 
Roberts and Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order: The Challenge o f  Diversity, pp.47-48
45 Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, p. 13; Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p.27
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Several ‘Kantian’ universalists have sought to address the universal validity 
of reason in light of pluralism and have moved towards ‘thinness’, and the idea of 
multi-layered moral commitments. Onora O’Neill’s focus on practical reasoning 
highlights this:
Different stretches of (practical) reasoning may be aimed at or relevant for 
distinct and differing audiences, who may find different principles of thought 
or action followable. This is part of the thought behind, and part of the appeal 
of, particularist reasoning. The failings of the particularist conception of 
(practical) reasoning lie ... in their assumption that reasoning need be 
followable only by a restricted audience who already share quite specific 
norms or practices46
O’Neill agrees that ‘some stretches of practical reasoning have a restricted scope, in 
the sense that they are taken to be followable only by a restricted and homogeneous 
audience.’ But ‘in reasoning, in justifying what we do, in criticising what others do, 
we constantly appeal to a wider group, of whose boundaries we lack any very 
definite conception.’ Such boundaries, she suggests, ‘must be capacious in a world of 
multiple and diverse audiences ... linked by porous state and regional boundaries, 
global telecommunications and interlinking and overlapping practices and polities.’47 
Hence, in some cases the features of ‘finite and connected’ others mean that they 
cannot be excluded from our ethical consideration, making some stretches of
AQ
practical reasoning ‘more-or less cosmopolitan’ in the sense intended by the Stoics.
Here the line between notions of universal human capabilities or 
predispositions and what are often referred to as thin conceptions of ‘moral 
universalism’ become blurred. The latter conveys the idea that
46 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, pp.52-53
47 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.53-54
48 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p .l 13
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all human beings, regardless of race, gender, sexual preference, ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic or religious background are to be considered moral equals 
and are therefore to be treated as equally entitled to moral respect.49
Such views, it has been claimed, can be detached from notions of human nature, 
human capacities, or reason, however thin. Thin universalism, they go on, is best 
understood as a minimal moral egalitarianism which treats all human beings, and not 
just those of immediate moral concern, as morally relevant. Thin moral universalism 
is also prescriptive and has implications for all manner of principles. The extent to 
which this kind of thin moral universalism can be detached from accounts of human 
nature or requirements is deeply contentious, and many moral universalisms are 
grounded in conceptions of basic needs, dignity, or the like.50 And indeed, it makes 
implicit claims about the conditions of human well-being and about the ideal or good 
society.
Thin moral universalisms tend to be comprised of a thin or minimal set of 
action-guiding principles. These principles might be captured in an ethic of basic 
rights or duties, in the minimal actions and dispositions that constitute a virtuous life 
or in what actions generate the best outcome for an agent or group.51 Perhaps the 
most easily envisaged thin moral universalism, or thin moral cosmopolitanism, is a 
minimalist human rights ethic, where only the most basic and fundamental rights are 
defended, but for all human beings without qualification. How the principles of a thin 
moral universalism cohere, and how they are justified is of course an important part
49 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p.27
50 See, for example, Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus 
Relativism (London: Sage, 1990), p.49
51 One could, for example, imagine thin Kantian systems of ethics, thin consequentialisms, or minimal 
Aristotelian ethics.
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of their viability, but for now it is enough to make the distinction between several 
varieties of moral universalism.
Firstly, liberal thought over the past twenty-five years has been concerned 
with ‘thinning’ down ‘comprehensive’ or ‘Enlightenment’ liberal doctrine, motivated 
specifically by acknowledgement of the ‘fact of pluralism’ within and between 
societies. Pluralism leads liberal universalism towards greater sensitivity towards 
culture and difference, accepting and at times celebrating pluralism’s permanence 
and depth. The ‘thinness’ of an explicitly thin universalism is therefore reflected in 
the underdetermination of any form of human life, including liberal forms of life, by 
any moral principles that a universal morality might posit.
John Rawls is the paradigmatic liberal who has sought to ‘thin’ his 
universalism as a response to pluralism. Political Liberalism saw Rawls attempt to 
recast ‘justice as fairness’, first outlined in A Theory o f Justice, as a ‘political 
conception of justice’. The most significant development between the two works is 
Rawls’ acknowledgement of a plurality of numerous, incompatible, yet reasonable, 
comprehensive moral, religious and philosophical doctrines. Rawls calls this ‘the fact 
of reasonable pluralism’,54 which is the outcome of public reason over time in 
modem democratic societies.55 ‘Political Liberalism attempts to work out a 
conception of justice for a constitutional democratic regime that a plurality of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious and non-religious, liberal and non-
52 The ‘fact’ o f pluralism, used in various forms by Kantian liberals such as Rawls, has often been 
derisively identified by communitarian, Aristotelian and quasi-Nietzschean thinkers as simply the 
reason identified by liberals for their failure to answer the questions o f the enlightenment. See 
Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue Second Edition (London: Duckworth, 1985), ch.5 and 6 in particular.
53 See John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Political Liberalism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and, for a rare insight into the development o f the 
latter position, see his Collected Papers (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999)
54 Rawls, Political Liberalism pp. xix, 36 (emphasis added)
55 In A Theory o f Justice Rawls envisaged the outcome o f public reason as the adoption o f two core 
principles o f justice by every rational individual, which he refers to as a ‘comprehensive philosophical 
doctrine’. See A Theory o f Justice p. 60
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liberal, may endorse for the right reasons’.56 The ‘thinness’ of Political Liberalism 
relies on the establishment of a consensus regarding only the basic structure of 
society. It asserts that, while citizens of a democratic polity are unlikely to agree on a 
conception of the good, they will be able to agree on a set of principles that establish 
their main political, social and economic institutions. Political Liberalism requires 
citizens to regard themselves as part of an overlapping consensus; as both adherents 
of a particular religious, philosophical or moral doctrine, and as citizens of a political 
community which exists through time.
Following Political Liberalism Rawls’ attention turned to international 
politics in The Law o f Peoples, which is also ‘thin universalist’ in several respects.57 
It does not seek to establish a global or cosmopolitan state, nor does it take as its 
primary focus human beings, individuated and de-contextualised, nor does it seek to 
comprehensively account for political organisation in its domain of concern. It does 
not envisage global prerogative over all matters considered in Political Liberalism 
and A Theory o f  Justice. Rather, from the outset Rawls takes the Law of Peoples to 
refer to ‘a particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the
co
principles and norms of international law and practice’. Further ‘thinness’ is 
glimpsed in receptivity to the diversity of valid interpretations of the eight -  and 
there are only eight -  principles of the Law of Peoples. As Haddock, Roberts and 
Sutch suggest, ‘rather than specify a single form of political organisation it 
legitimates a wide diversity of political forms.’59 The aim of the Law of Peoples is 
framed in part by parties (now being the representatives of well-ordered peoples who 
are free and equal) choosing different interpretations of the eight principles.
56 Rawls, Political Liberalism, xli
57 John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999)
58 Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples, p.3
59 Haddock, Roberts and Sutch, ‘Introduction’ to Haddock, Roberts and Sutch (eds.), Principles and 
Political Order: The Challenge o f  Diversity, p.2
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Recognition of differing interpretations is in the spirit of the idea of thinness that 
underpins a number of the other projects outlined here.60
Like Rawls, Stuart Hampshire offers a procedurally grounded thin 
universalism.61 Because conflict is the likely outcome of reasoned discourse both 
‘within the city and within the soul,’ ‘justice cannot consist in any kind of harmony 
or consensus’ without coercion. For Hampshire, fairness in procedures for resolving 
conflicts is the fundamental kind of fairness. This fundamental fairness that must be 
upheld is a value that is ‘acknowledged in most cultures, places and times: fairness in 
procedure is an invariable value; a constant in human nature’. While justice in 
substantial matters varies according to culture, the justice and fairness associated 
with procedures does not. This, he claims ‘is the place of common rationality of 
method that holds together both the divided and disruptive self and the divided and 
disrupted state.’ Thus, Hampshire’s ‘procedural universalism’ reflects both a thin 
empirical claim about actually held values in a plurality of cultures and societies and 
a thin normative claim about how one ought to address problems that arise from that 
plurality.
Seyla Benahbib offers a different account which remains grounded outside of 
the realm of substantive issues. Benhabib’s universalism is also minimalist, grounded 
in what she calls the ‘weak transcendental conditions’ of unforced agreement. She 
refers to
norms of universal respect and egalitarian reciprocity ... [which] are in a
minimal sense necessary for us to distinguish a consensus, rationally and
60 See Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples, p.86. The principles o f the Law o f Peoples include observation of 
treaties, respect for human rights, as well as other rights and duties including a right to self defence 
and a duty o f non-intervention. See ch.4, thought the 8 principles are laid out on p.37.
61 See Stuart Hampshire, Justice is Conflict (London: Duckworth, 1999); and Innocence and 
Experience (London: Penguin, 1989), pp.54-62
62 Stuart Hampshire, Justice is Conflict (London: Duckworth, 1999), pp. 18-19
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freely attained among participants, from other forms of agreement that may 
be based on power and violence. ... The minimal norms of universal respect 
for each other as conversation partners, and the fairness and equality of 
procedures for reaching agreement ... are bound up with the pragmatics as 
well as semantics of what we understand by free and rational agreement.
‘Weak transcendental conditions’ are necessary for the practices of reaching 
reasoned agreement. A ‘weak transcendental argument’, for example, would 
establish that ‘without an equal distribution of the rights to speak, interrogate, and 
propose alterations, we would find it hard to call the agreement reached at the end of 
a conversation fair, rational or free.’ The ‘Habermasian’ orientation of her required 
conditions is in fact comparatively ‘thick’ and is potentially rebutted by a ‘Rawlsian’ 
argument concerning the plausibility of their acceptance by all reasonable people.
Secondly, distinct from these procedural forms, and alongside the 
development of ideas of pluralism, the notion of a moral minimalism, or a ‘moral 
bottom line’, underpinning most value systems, and underpinning pluralism, has 
grown in popularity. H.L.A. Hart makes reference to ‘the minimum content of 
natural law’64:
Law and morals should include a specific content. The general form of the 
argument is simply that without such a content laws and morals could not 
forward the minimum purpose of survival which men have in associating 
with each other. ... unless certain physical, psychological or economic 
conditions are satisfied, e.g. unless young children are fed and nurtured in 
certain ways within the family, no system of laws or code of morals can be 
established.65
63 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, pp.37-8
64 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law, Second Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
pp. 193-200
6 Hart, The Concept o f  Law, pp. 193-4
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Hart outlines several ‘truisms’ regarding these minimum conditions. He asks ‘If there 
were not these rules what point could there be for beings such as ourselves in having 
rules of any other kind?’ They include ‘human vulnerability’, pertaining to 
prohibitions against bodily harm and forming the basis of all other legal or moral 
rules. Hart also suggests that human beings are ‘approximately equal’ in terms of 
overall capacities, highlighting the need for cooperation and forbearance. He posits a 
limited human capacity for altruism: ‘Men are not devils ... neither are they 
angels.’66 And, because of basic human need combined with limited access to 
resources, some institution and rules of respect for property is required. Finally, 
human beings have limited strength of will, and often fail to comprehend the long­
term consequences of their actions.
Hart does not seek to detach his moral minimalism from a thin cognitive 
universalism, and his truisms underpin a set of basic moral prohibitions that must 
underpin all legal systems. They are of natural necessity, if the minimal protections 
of the body, property and promises (indispensable features of municipal law) are to 
be maintained.68
This notion of a moral minimum is also taken up by Isaiah Berlin and 
William Galston, both of whom address the idea of a moral minimum in relation to 
conceptions of ‘value pluralism’.69 In his discussion of ‘value incommensurability’ -  
the rational incompatibility and agonism of values -  that underlies pluralism, Berlin 
asserts that ‘Relativism is not the only alternative to universalism ... nor does
66 Hart, The Concept o f  Law, p. 196
67 Though Hart makes no reference to distribution, or degree o f private ownership.
68 Hart, The Concept o f  Law, p. 199
69 See Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber o f  Humanity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 
pp.70-90; William Galston, ‘Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory’ in The American Political 
Science Review, Vol.93(4), 1999, pp.769-778. Value pluralism, I will demonstrate in chapter two, is 
quite distinct from the kind social pluralism that I have thus far been describing.
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70incommensurability entail relativism.’ Galston agrees, stating that pluralism is not
71to be equated with relativism, being premised on a ‘floor of basic moral decency’. 
While the sources of value are many, for Berlin and Galston and other proponents of 
value pluralism, some things simply are not valuable. There are limits to those 
actions and social configurations that are actually possessive of value. Within value 
pluralism, then, is an in-built thin universalism in the form of a moral minimum. 
Critically though, there is little mention, of how this minimum is ascertained, leaving 
an important gap for justificatory strategies looking to make use of it.
John Gray’s work is, as I have shown, replete with ‘thin universalisms’. Here, 
Gray utilises Hart’s and Berlin’s conceptions of the minimum content of morality to
• 77delimit the liberal agon set out in Enlightenment’s Wake. He concedes, as Berlin 
suggests, a ‘minimum universal content to morality’, a fundamental set of moral 
values existing across cultures, which stave off moral relativism. A reliance on ‘the 
reality of goods and evils that are not culture-specific but generally human’, serves 
adequately to deflect such accusations.74 He also refers, in Two Faces o f  Liberalism,
7  c
to ‘a benchmark of minimal legitimacy for societies whose values are different.’ 
This benchmark he broadly associates with human rights.
The third strand within moral universalism is what Lukes refers to explicitly 
as ‘moral cosmopolitanism’. This systematic standardisation and theoretical 
embodiment of this kind of moral universalism can be traced from the Greek Stoics,
76through Kantian Enlightenment ethics to the modem, globalised, era. The Stoics 
proposed a moral cosmopolitanism in which local and universal aspirations could
70 See Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber o f  Humanity (London: Fontana, 1990), p.85
71 Galston, ‘Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory’, p.770
72 See John Gray ‘Agonistic Liberalism’ in his Enlightenment’s Wake, ch.6
73 Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake p.81
74 Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, p.80
75 John Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), p.22
76 Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, p. 14
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exist side by side. Where, Martha Nussbaum notes, ‘each of us dwells, in effect, in 
two communities -  the local community of our birth and the community of human 
argument and aspiration that “is truly great and truly common.”’77 This ‘duality’ is 
echoed by Bikhu Parekh:
Common humanity is the basis of moral universality and cultural diversity of 
moral plurality. ... A coherent account of moral life must recognise both 
moral universality and moral plurality and explore their complex
78relationship.
Cosmopolitanism emphasises membership of a fundamental and essential global 
moral community; membership which is not decided by chance, as membership of a 
national community is, but by simple virtue of being bom human. It is this 
community, the Stoics argue, which is the primary source of our moral obligation to
70others. They hold that ‘we should give our first allegiance ... to the moral
O A
community made up by the humanity of all human beings.’ For this reason Stoic 
cosmopolitanism is rather thick, as thin universalisms go, requiring allegiance to 
humanity as a whole is a particularly thick concept to require others to take on board. 
Nonetheless, Stoic cosmopolitanism emphasises both facets of a universalism of 
human nature and thin moral universalism and, as such, the Stoics were perhaps the 
first to capture the essence of a thin universalism.
Moral universalism had taken on many guises and is represented in a great 
many moral, social and political cultures, in conceptions of religion, race, class and
77 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ in Martha Nussbaum and Jean Cohen (eds.), 
For Love o f  Country: Debating the Limits o f  Patriotism (Boston MA, Beacon, 1996), pp.3-17 at p.6
78 Bikhu Parekh, ‘Pluralist Universalism and Human Rights’ in Rhona K.M. Smith and Christien van 
den Anker (eds.) The Essentials o f Human Rights (London: Hodeder Arnold, 2005), p.285
79 Nigel Dower, An Introduction to Global Citizenship (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2003), p.22; Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’, p.7
80 Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’, p.7
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gender. The modem, Western understanding of thin moral universalism can be 
glimpsed in aspects of human rights discourse, which tend to be Western, liberal 
expressions of moral universalism.
Human rights debates have become prominent since the inception of the 
United Nations Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights in 1948. Accusations of 
strong cultural bias, including presuppositions about economic structure, property 
and family life led to questions over which rights are genuinely ‘human’ rights and
n i
which embody the norms of particular cultures. Recent debates have examined 
questions of human rights alongside notions of moral minimalism. Michael Ignatieff 
recently proposed human rights be pared back in order to preserve the ones that we 
care most about protecting; a position coined as ‘human rights minimalism’. In this 
sense the issue of thin universalism can be seen in terms of a dilemma about human 
rights: ‘we can be tolerant of fundamentally different outlooks on life, or we can be 
ambitious in our understanding of what human rights demand, but we cannot ... be
87both tolerant and ambitious.’ Ignatieff argues that we must be minimal in our 
human rights claims in order to ensure the most fundamental negative liberties -  life, 
liberty and bodily security -  can be secured through consensus. More expansive lists 
of economic or social rights may require a less tolerant approach, hampering
84consolidation of more fundamental rights.
Alison Renteln makes a similar case. Beginning from consideration of human 
rights relativism she argues that only some evaluations are relative to the moral 
framework from which they are derived. What Renteln advocates is a ‘thinning’, this
81 See United Nations Office o f Public Information, Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights (New 
York, United Nations, 1980), Articles 16, 17 and 23
82 See Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2001)
83 Joshua Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most we can Hope for?’ in Journal o f  
Political Philosophy, Vol. 12 (2), 2004, p. 192
84 Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, p. 173
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time of relativism, to incorporate what she calls ‘cross-cultural universal standards’. 
Relativism does not prevent the identification of transcultural moral viewpoints that 
are not necessarily universal, but are shared by a wide enough variety of cultures to 
be considered almost universal. Even if relativism implies no limits to tolerance there 
is nothing inherent therein which denies that frameworks can converge. These have 
often been called ‘cross-cultural universals’, which could, as Walzer has suggested, 
be uncovered through sociological and anthropological research. They may be
* • oeminimal, or relate only to general principles based on human needs or the like, but 
they may in turn provide the relativist with the resources required to uphold their 
position whilst also defending human rights.
John Gray also employs minimal human rights language. He cautions against 
assuming that it must be liberal human rights that provide the benchmark of
o /r
legitimacy mentioned earlier. And yet the resounding tone of Gray’s analysis is that 
a ‘worldwide regime of rights is a legitimate project’, hinting strongly at a human
• 87rights universalism which recognises the limits of liberalism. This is a more
minimal approach to human rights that those contained within, for example, the
Universal Declaration. He suggests that some of the rights contained therein protect
fundamental human interests while others are inherently bound by time and place. As
88human needs and interests change, so too must human rights.
Many advocates of a thin moral universalism, and of ‘thin’ human rights, also 
claim that the idea can be expanded into the stronger assertion that all human beings 
are entitled to certain basic legally recognised rights, including perhaps, minimally 
the rights to life, liberty, security, due process before the law, freedom of speech and
85 Alison Dundes Renteln International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism (London,
Sage, 1990), pp.68-79
86 Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism, pp.21-22
87 Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism, p. 115
88 Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism, pp. 110-114
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association, including freedom of religion and conscience which are, or ought to be,
QQ
accorded universal respect by all legal systems. This stronger, legal aspect of thin 
universalism, were it to be properly implemented, might constitute nothing more than 
the codification or standardisation of its moral position.
Very few thin universalisms are thin in one respect only. Very few simply 
take, for example, a thinned down conception of human nature, or a minimal account 
of human needs without also developing specifically thin prescriptive arguments out 
of them. Similarly most accounts of moral universalism that profess to be thin are 
reliant on at least some thin assumptions about human beings. None of the examples 
outlined here fully detach the two.
The thin universalist disposition can be characterised as a ‘commitment to the 
idea that there is a minimal but nevertheless determinate morality with a universal 
domain of applicability’.90 It represents the idea that at least some of our moral 
principles ought to take regard of the universal category of ‘human being’. At least 
some of our moral commitments, or our practical reasoning, or our deliberative 
procedures, or our understanding of people, should contain some universal, 
cosmopolitan or common components. Thin universalism recognises the differences 
in people, cultures and societies, but also that those different people, cultures and 
societies must confront one another in the global age. It therefore recognises the need 
not for a rejection of the local, but for a universal perspective that can justifiably 
accompany it.
In short, thin universalism has taken many forms, all of which aim short of a 
fully comprehensive conception of the good life. Their functions vary enormously, 
but all seek some context-transcending element that could still be called ‘universal’.
89 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p.27-28
90 See Mark Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” of Justification’ in Haddock, Roberts and 
Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order: The Challenge o f  Diversity, pp.76-96 at p.76
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The various ‘tasks’ of thin universalisms can be seen in the extension of the language 
of minimalism and thinness to more tangible concepts such as multiculturalism, 
human rights and toleration. This universalism, while it still lacks the circulation it 
warrants in contemporary theory, is a concept that is here to stay.
A Universal Imperative?
Many of the above accounts make the case for inclusive universal principles 
grounded in a conception of persons which attributes to them certain characteristics 
that determine the conditions of conduct towards them. Universalism appeals to 
criteria, standards or principles that are intended to hold for all like cases across all 
situations in a given domain. This formal claim is often combined with the assertion 
that the principal domain for those standards is cosmopolitan, encompassing all of 
humanity.91 Universalism in Western moral and political thought finds its roots in the 
Platonic account of the universal and objective Good. It can be traced through the 
history of Judaeo-Christian ethics, the Natural Law tradition, the Enlightenment 
project of Kant’s categorical imperative, Bentham and Mill’s principle of general 
utility and Marx’s account of alienation, finding its contemporary point of reference 
in liberal ideas of democracy and human rights.
Western liberal democracies have thus sought to premise the legitimacy (and 
occasionally the supremacy) of their modes of social organisation on such universal 
standards. This stems from the classical demand to provide an objective basis for 
making comparative value judgements about human endeavours. This took the form 
of the Good (as in Plato), God (as in Christianity), and Natural Law (as in Aquinas). 
Since the Enlightenment, it has come from more humanistic, though, it is argued, no
91 See O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p .l 1
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less objective sources. These include reason (as in Kant), the social contract (as in 
Rousseau) and human rights (as in the Universal Declaration). Motivations behind 
this emphasis on objectivity range from suspicion of the legitimacy of a wholly 
context-dependent basis for judgement, to a burdensome psychological paternity 
complex reflecting a perpetual need for a God- or father-figure. Yet, the 
displacement of the religious, metaphysical and rationalist certainties that formerly 
oriented Western universalism has, as Alasdair MacIntyre observed, left behind a 
moral system comprised primarily of disjointed fragments of a predecessor morality
• * 09 •which lacks foundations. Universalism remains, but seemingly without justification 
or warrant.
And yet, at the same time, the universal impulse seems to stem in no small 
part from the experiences of real people living real lives. We might consider the 
accounts of survivors of the Holocaust, the Stalinist purges, the two World Wars, 
those who experienced totalitarianism in the form of communism and fascism, those 
displaced by guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and ongoing civil wars which have led to 
millions of refugees worldwide, the victims of biological, chemical and nuclear 
weapons, and, of course those who have fallen victim to genocide in Rwanda, Sudan 
and Kosovo. It is not hard to see why Eric Hobsbawm referred to the twentieth 
century as an ‘age of extremes’. Nor is it hard to see why there might be an 
imperative to find a perspective capable of comprehending, addressing, and attending 
to these moral issues and empowering people against them. When confronted by the 
‘moral experience of humanity’, a strong and often emotional response is provoked94,
92 See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue Second Edition (London, Duckworth, 1985). See particularly 
chapters 4-6 on the Enlightenment Project and its predecessor culture.
93 See Eric Hobsbawm, Age o f  Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 (London: Abacus, 
1995)
94 See Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History o f  the Twentieth Century (London: Pimlico,
2001)
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and universalist arguments retain a resonance because of this. Take, as an example, 
the retelling of an incident involving the treatment of a 19 year old Kuwaiti boy, 
before his parents, at the hands of Iraqi occupying troops. Upon hearing of his 
impending release
[t]hey were overjoyed, cooked wonderful things, and when they heard cars 
approaching went to the door. When Ahmad was taken out of the car, they 
saw that his ears, his nose and his genitalia had been cut off. He was coming 
out of the car with his eyes in his hands. Then the Iraqis shot him, once in the 
stomach and once in the head, and told his mother to be sure not to move the 
body for three days.95
The sense of injustice and cruelty in this account is deeply evocative. One’s initial 
and lingering reaction is that such actions are simply wrong, and that nothing could 
justify such malice and cruelty.96 Underpinning this reaction is a commitment which 
may take any number of forms, but which has universal characteristics. It is felt that 
without universal standards or principles we may lack the capacity to account for our 
social landscape. Without the ability to appeal to the kind of wider audience sought 
by universal justifications we risk blinding ourselves to the realities of the twenty-
07first century. It is, however, these realities that most deeply problematise those 
universal principles.
95 Glover, Humanity, p.32. The incident is taken from a report by Julie Flint in the Observer from the 
3rd o f March 1991.
96 Kant’s consideration of the question o f truth-telling is brought sharply to mind. One might, perhaps, 
suggest that if  ever certain actions, such as torture perhaps, were to occur, then at the very most they 
could only ever be described as the lesser o f two evils -  never as a good -  and yet we may even be 
repulsed by the idea o f this suggestion. See Immanuel Kant ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie because of  
Philanthropic Concerns’ in Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics o f  Morals (Cambridge: 
Hackett, 1993), pp.63-67.
97 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.20
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The Fact of Pluralism
Members of different cultures and societies often have very different beliefs about a 
great many things; among them are different beliefs about what is right, good and 
valuable. These differences result in further differences in patterns of behaviour and 
principles of acceptable conduct. More importantly, these differences occur not just 
between cultures and societies, but within cultures and societies. Within most 
societies over a certain size, population movement, religious upheaval and 
secularisation, cultural diversification, fitful increases in literacy and education, 
fluctuating affluence and economic interdependence, persecution, war, climate 
change and any number of other factors have unsystematically thrown members of 
different socio-cultural groups into the same context. Domestic and international 
society are now characterised by a plurality of national, ethnic, religious, political, 
social, economic, cultural and intellectual groups. Pluralism and its causes are not 
new; this is an old story which stretches back as far as recorded history, but which 
has never been so acute.
What is also acute is the extent to which diversity is now observable, some 
might say obvious, even omnipresent. Forms of mass media and communication, 
aided by new technologies present to us this array of cultures and the various ways in 
which they conflict. One need only open a newspaper, turn on a television or a 
computer, attend a play or read a book to experience something of it. Furthermore, 
the increasing porous nature of national boundaries through globalisation, mass 
travel, migration and population displacement, make far more prevalent first-hand 
interaction with and experience of those differences. In opening one’s front door one 
experiences diversity at work.
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Pluralism need not be a deep, timeless truth about the fabric of reality. To 
take on board these claims requires no huge leap of faith, no traumatic reversal of 
how one views the world, no challenge to one’s entrenched notions of reality, or 
right and wrong. It is rather an observable fact, one which is perhaps unreasonable to 
deny. To do so would be to reject the vast evidence to the contrary and to make a 
reductionist claim about human beings and how they behave. Take, for example, the 
diverse structures governing the entire gamut of human behavioural patterns, ranging 
from the etiquette of the meal-table to the deeply entrenched social conventions of 
marriage and property. Many are observations to which access is universal. They do 
not require acceptance of tenuous starting points, they require no inference, and they 
make no normative or evaluative assumptions. People simply differ as a matter of 
fact.
This ‘fact of pluralism’ does not just encompass particular aspects of life and 
the specific practices therein, such as mealtimes, relationships, property relations and 
the like; it can encompass entire lifestyles and identities, whole ways of life, and 
complete modes of existence. Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom have diverse 
approaches to the institution of marriage, but if one looks more closely it becomes 
clear that this reflects further diversity concerning the role of religion in public life, 
the concept of private property, approaches to work, hygiene, old age, children and 
the outside world. Steven Lukes and Martin Hollis ask us to consider the implication 
of the aphorism ‘liberalism for the liberals; cannibalism for the cannibals’ and 
indeed, it would all too often seem that it is not just specific practices but entire
QQ
cultures and societies that diverge from our own. But we must all share the same
space to a certain extent. After all, we live on a bounded sphere, limited in terms of
98 Martin Hollis, ‘Is Universalism Ethnocentric?’, in Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes, Multicultural 
Questions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.27-43 at p.36; Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, 
ch.3.
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space and resources and divided by more and more porous boundaries. And such 
contrasts, while perhaps rarely so extreme as that of ‘liberals’ and ‘cannibals’, are 
even more pertinent when two cultures must coexist in the same society, interacting 
daily. Recent history teems with examples of such contrasts.
Pluralism is everywhere and it is comprehensive and it is largely undeniable. 
Far from being recent and temporary, it has been around for thousands of years and 
we have no good reason to suspect that it will not be around for thousands more. 
Given this, two further sets of questions emerge which, when taken together, lead 
this preliminary discussion into the main subject-matter of the thesis. Firstly, how are 
we to explain, account for, or make sense of the pluralism, or moral diversity, of the 
societies and of the world in which we live? Is diversity to be explained by difference 
in situation or circumstance, or difference in belief about non-moral facts, or 
differing extents to which information is available, or some moral error theory?
Secondly, how are we to react or respond to it, what type of principles and 
courses of action does it lead us towards and, to follow Lukes, what theoretical and 
practical conclusions should we draw from it? Can and should we have any universal 
standards at all? Should we abandon any universal impulses, should we give up on 
ideas such as moral objectivity? Is there any way to bridge the gap between diverse 
cultures, can we ever transcend our own point of view? Is, perhaps, scepticism the 
best response, or at least the most reasonable inference we can derive from 
pluralism? If some of these latter questions concern us, do we need some kind of 
‘cure’ for pluralism; should its root causes be identified and eliminated?
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Thesis Structure
The thesis will proceed as follows. In chapters one to three I outline the core 
theoretical arguments concerning a thin universalism. In this introduction I outlined 
an account of the ‘fact of pluralism’, which establishes the problem addressed by a 
thin universalism: In a world marked by an observable plurality of views, is it 
possible to establish grounds for thin yet determinate universal moral principles?
In chapter one I consider the theory of moral constructivism in light of G.A. 
Cohen’s evaluation of the relationship between facts and principles. I do this in order 
to establish and frame the thin universalist project; to identify precisely what that 
project is and how I understand it. This, I claim, places the project not amongst 
accounts of morality, but rather amongst mechanisms for resolving conflict; not 
amongst totalising conceptions of human conduct but amongst their regulatory 
frameworks. Thin universalism cannot be an all-encompassing account of right and 
wrong or good and evil, nor can it offer guidance in all situations and circumstances. 
It is, I argue, not possible to make such demands of thin universal principles, given 
its factual considerations and normative motivations, it can only provide a 
framework of regulatory principles which are intended to bear upon a particular set 
of the interactions of a plurality of differently situated human agents.
I go on to outline what a procedure of constructing regulatory principles 
might look like. Including from where such a procedure might begin, how it might 
go about the process of construction and what the outcome of that construction might 
look like. I also argue that the preoccupation of most constructivists with acceptance 
of principles of justice by all to whom the principles are to apply hampers the 
successful construction of regulatory principles.
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This established, I attempt in chapter two to expand my account of pluralism 
into an account of what I call ‘complex pluralism’. I first draw a strong distinction 
between the ‘fact of pluralism’, and the ‘truth of value pluralism’ and posit that the 
latter is the inappropriate point of departure for the thin universalist project. I go on 
to elaborate the complexity of pluralism, including its many layers, dimensions and 
concomitant pluralities. Ultimately I argue that justificatory priority should not be 
placed upon pluralism itself, but on the violent conflict that often ensues from it.
In chapter three I suggest that this evaluation of pluralism commits me to 
certain first principles which, upon closer inspection, can be justified as non-arbitrary 
and reasoned starting points for the construction of thin universal regulatory 
principles. The chapter therefore offers an account of the ‘first principles’ of a 
constructivist thin universalism and of their justification suggesting that it is not non- 
reducibility, but rather fact-independence that denotes a first principle.
In chapters four and five I set about characterising my thin universalism 
itself. In chapter four I draw together the theoretical considerations of the first three 
chapters in order to develop more fully the character of thin universal regulatory 
principles. Where chapter one considered the concept of construction, and chapters 
two and three considered the materials of construction, chapter four seeks to 
construct regulatory principles through consideration of the facts of complex 
pluralism in conjunction with first principles. I suggest that the outcome of 
construction is heuristic, political, regulatory principles which are universal in scope, 
but thin in content. These principles are capable of deflecting the most common 
criticisms against them because of the characteristics they exhibit as a result of 
construction. Finally, I establish the construction of principles as the first of two
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interconnected constructions which must be weighted equally in validating 
regulatory principles.
In chapter five, therefore, I consider the construction of consent to 
constructed thin universal regulatory principles. Consent, I argue, must also be 
constructed on the basis of facts and principles and is equally important in validating 
regulatory principles. I go on to suggest that constructivism has, as part of its focus 
on the construction of first principles, rather than on the construction of regulatory 
principles, come to be overly preoccupied with the conditions of ‘acceptability’ when 
faced with complex pluralism. Consent, then, can be achieved through a critical 
reassessment of procedures such as bootstrapping, redescription and what I refer to 
as ‘patchworking’, all of which, I suggest, must engage sufficiently critically with 
those with whom they engaged in discourse. The purpose of construction, I suggest, 
is not solely to have people agree, but also ensure that certain basic moral standards 
are met.
Chapters six and seven consider two contemporary debates in which thin 
universalism can participate. Chapter six considers human rights as a platform for the 
expression and instantiation of thin universal regulatory principles. It suggests that, if 
we come to regard human rights as expressions of constructed, fact-dependent 
principles which are thin and universal in character, they are firstly immune to 
accusations that they are lofty principles with other worldly qualities inapplicable to 
the ‘real world’. They can secondly be used to reassess many contemporary human 
rights doctrines which, I suggest, fail to live up to the first principles in light of 
which we examine pluralism. I distinguish between these truly human rights and less 
pressing human aspirations, which, while universal, lack the deep moral significance
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of thin universal principles. As a consequence, I close the chapter by considering the 
debate over the status of democracy as a human right.
Finally, in chapter seven, I assert that there is more to ‘morality’ than simply 
a list of thin universal human rights and it in fact incorporates space for a number of 
moral and ethical dispositions. These dispositions will include a conception of 
toleration. This I do alongside a consideration of the legitimate and reasonable limits 
of toleration and the relationship those limits have with the notion of a thin 
universalism. The second half of the chapter is concerned with the relationship 
between this thin universal conception of toleration and rival conceptions of how to 
view the ethical space it occupies. On the one hand more traditional liberal 
conceptions, I argue, are excessively critical and pessimistic about the virtue of 
toleration. Other conceptions, specifically Charles Taylor’s ‘politics of recognition’ 
and William Connolly’s ‘ethos of pluralisation’ are actually too thick to demand of 
people universally, and are too thick to form a part of the practices of a thin 
universalism.
The primary aim of this thesis is to explore the derivation -  the origins, 
sources and motivations -  and the defence -  the clarification, justification and 
fortification -  of the idea of a thin universalism, understood as a set of minimal 
political principles with a universal domain of applicability. The chapters, then, 
consider how one arrives at a thin universalism, what shape that thin universalism 
can or must take, how it might be defended, both philosophically and politically, and 
how it might be applied in practice. Ultimately, I aim to demonstrate that 
universalism, understood thinly, can still offer guidance within the context of 
complex pluralism.
- one -
Constructivism and the 
Role of Facts and Principles
The world in which we live is, as a matter of fact, marked by a plurality of social, 
cultural, ethnic, religious and national groups. The prevailing consideration 
confronting the thin universalist project is that this pluralism engenders a number of 
problems -  both for individuals and groups living their lives and for pluralism itself -  
but is fundamentally valuable and in need of preservation. Securing the conditions in 
which pluralism can thrive is the task that the thin universalist project sets itself. That 
task is firstly to preserve as completely as possible the diversity which pluralism 
affords, and secondly to ensure that pluralism is not threatened by those within who 
would seek to destroy it or who would use it to rationalise, justify and excuse the 
destruction of others.
Given the recent ascendancy of pluralism as an academic concern, the 
response in Anglo-American philosophy has tended to reflect a greater sensitivity to 
that pluralism, to real world conditions, to facts. This sensitivity is particularly 
evident in the political tradition that has arisen in the wake of John Rawls’ A Theory 
o f Justice and has come to be known as ‘constructivism’.1 In this chapter I consider 
constructivism as means of retaining universal moral principles in a world 
characterised by complex pluralism. I suggest, however, that objections raised by its
1 See John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). Onora O’Neill, 
herself a prominent ‘constructivist’, identifies Rawls as the originator o f this contemporary use of the 
term ‘constructivism’ in Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f  Practical Reasoning 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.44
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critics, led by G.A. Cohen, are indicative of serious problems in constructivist 
thought, at least while the object of construction remains the very notion of 
‘morality’ or ‘justice’. I will suggest how, given these objections, one might maintain 
a modified yet fundamentally ‘constructive’ position, which can still secure universal 
moral principles which properly respect, and secure, pluralism.
Constructivism in Moral Theory
1 begin by characterising constructivism, identifying its theoretical antecedents and 
establishing why it is worth taking seriously. Constructivism is, at its core, a 
metaethical theory which is typically situated in opposition to moral realism, which 
itself still occupies a hegemonic position at this level of debate.2
‘Realisms’ broadly state that moral concepts, principles or propositions 
constitute moral facts which exist independently of our understanding of them. Moral 
claims are therefore to be taken literally and the moral properties of people and of 
actions can be described in factual terms. These moral facts are ‘out there’, waiting 
to be discovered in the world through moral, even scientific, inquiry. They are 
‘mind-independent’ in that they are metaphysically, and/or conceptually independent 
of those beliefs or propositions that constitute our evidence for them. Moral facts are 
therefore genuinely objective, even true, and our descriptions of them parallel 
descriptions of scientific facts or truths.4 David Brink presents moral realism thus: 
‘(1) There are moral facts or truths, and (2) these facts or truths are independent of 
the evidence for them.’5 Christine Korsgaard agrees: ‘Moral realism is the view that
2 It is considered by many to be a reaction to and a rejection o f that tradition. Although, while it may 
be both, it need not be either, and this is an important factor in its rhetorical appeal.
3 There are several accounts o f realism, and it is prudent to talk o f them in the plural.
4 David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations o f  Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), pp.5, 7, 9, 14-15
5 Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations o f Ethics, p. 17
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propositions employing moral concepts may have truth values because moral 
concepts describe or refer to normative entities or facts that exist independently of 
those concepts themselves.’6 Realism is appealing, even compelling: if we wish to 
remain committed to a notion of ‘morality’, realism seems most likely to secure it 
against nihilism, relativism and emotivism.
If, however, we take the claims of pluralism seriously, and recognise different 
moral claims, there is cause to ask whether moral propositions do in fact correspond 
to independent facts. And if, at the same time, we do not wish to reject the very 
notion of morality, we may have cause to seek an alternative which retains a sense of 
the moral but which recognises that there is more to the function of moral concepts 
than simply describing reality. Various moral constructivisms have sought to attend 
to these concerns. They question nihilism, relativism and emotivism, but also realism 
and its reliance on an independent order of moral facts. While constructivism asserts 
that it need not dispute that moral principles or propositions may possess truth 
values, it diverges from realism on several fronts. The first is in its rejection of the 
objective existence of moral facts waiting ‘out there’ to be discovered. As the name 
suggests, morality is in some sense ‘constructed’, perhaps ‘built’, rather than 
‘discovered’. Moral concepts can take on characteristics of objectivity, and can be 
objective, but this objectivity is set by those who construct and is therefore not mind- 
independent. As Brink suggests, ‘constructivism agrees with moral realism that there 
can be moral facts and true moral propositions but disagrees with realism about the 
status and nature of these moral facts and truths.’7 While realists and constructivists 
can (though they need not) agree that moral propositions may have truth values, they
6 Christine M. Korsgaard, ‘Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth Century Moral Philosophy’ in 
Philosophy in America at the Turn o f  the Century, special supplement to The Journal o f  Philosophical 
Research (Centennial Edition), 2003, pp. 99-122 at p. 100
7 Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations o f  Ethics, pp. 19-20
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disagree about how and why moral propositions may have truth values. If moral 
philosophy is not the search for knowledge about the world, Korsgaard asserts, it can 
be a part of the practical task of moral problem solving, often associated with the
• Qsocial contract tradition.
In its modem form, ‘construction’ is one of a number of concepts to emerge 
from the work of John Rawls and any moral theory that does more than simply 
provide a plurality of unranked principles, Rawls calls ‘constructive’.9 But it is the 
notion of construction as a mechanism for problem solving upon which I wish to 
focus. Korsgaard suggests that practical philosophy’s task is to solve problems (of 
justice or morality) ‘by constructing an account of the problem reflected in the 
concept that will point the way to a conception that solves the problem’.10 For 
Immanuel Kant that problem is one of negative freedom: what am I to do given that I 
have free agency insofar as nothing determines my actions? For Rawls the problem 
‘is what we might call the distribution problem: people join together in a cooperative 
scheme because it will be better for all of them, but they must decide how the 
benefits and burdens are to be distributed’.11 The ‘problem of justice’ is addressed 
and reflective equilibrium reached only ‘after a person has weighed various proposed 
conceptions and he has either revised his judgements to accord with one of them or 
held fast to his initial convictions.’ The problem to which the thin universalist is 
addressed is perhaps: can we secure a basis for boundary-transcending moral
8 Korsgaard, ‘Realism and Constructivism’, pp. 100,112,115
9 As Onora O’Neill notes, on these terms many theories offer ‘constructive’ criteria for morality, 
including Rawls’ primary target, utilitarianism. See O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, pp.44-45. 
See also Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 39-40. The trajectory o f  Rawlsian constructivism was set in 
place and can be seen from as far back as his 1951 article ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics’, 
in The Philosophical Review, Vol.60(2), 1951, pp. 177-197.
10 Korsgaard, ‘Realism and Constructivism’, p.l 16
11 These examples are put succinctly by Korsgaard in her discussion o f these issues. See Korsgaard, 
‘Realism and Constructivism’, pp. 115-116
12 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p.48
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judgement in a plural world? For the constructivist, practical philosophy is all about 
building a social world, a political society, even an identity.
This outline of what it is to ‘be constructive’ might appear to be insufficient 
or at best insubstantial and a number of the important questions remain unanswered 
unless a more substantive account of constructivism is developed. The key 
motivations, characteristics and suppositions of constructivism need to be 
established.
Rawls offers a more substantive account of constructivism in his later work,
1 'Xand particularly in Political Liberalism. Therein he addresses the reframed problem 
of how fair terms of social cooperation can be determined within modem democratic 
societies.14 Should such terms be laid down by an external authority, such as God? 
Or should they be established by an undertaking among the persons themselves? 
Given conditions of pluralism, what Rawls calls ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism,’15 
people or groups are unlikely to agree on a single source of authority or on which 
values ought to take precedence in a given situation. It is only by adopting 
constmctivism, Rawls believes, that citizens can hope to find principles which all can 
adopt.16 The idea behind ‘being constructive’, then, is the notion of a decision­
making procedure amongst citizens, the outcome of which is a set of genuinely 
shared moral principles, or principles of justice. A whole subset of subsequent work 
in Anglophone moral and political philosophy -  deemed to be in the Rawlsian 
tradition -  has come also to be referred to, and has come to refer to itself, as
13 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). His most 
comprehensive account can be found in his ‘Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory’, in The Journal 
o f Philosophy, Vol.77(9), 1980, pp.515-572
14 For present purposes ‘fair terms o f social cooperation’ can be equated to ‘principles o f justice or 
morality’. This thesis will concern moral principles, or a particular kind o f politically enforceable 
moral principles, rather than ‘principles o f justice’, or ‘fair terms o f social cooperation’.
15 The ‘fact o f reasonable pluralism’, identified by Rawls as the central motivation for his revisions o f  
A Theory o f  Justice, is perhaps a little problematic when considered in detail, but serves as an 
adequate illustrative point for present purposes. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.xvii
16 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp.97-98
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• 17‘constructivist’. Its most prominent proponents aside from Rawls are Onora O’Neill
1 ftand T.M. Scanlon, and Christine Korsgaard.
Both Scanlon and O’Neill make use of a ‘basic standard’ of constructive 
justification. O’Neill’s is a constructivism which begins from a critique of Rawls and 
is oriented around an account of practical reasoning. It is modal in character, but 
universal in scope, and rooted in a rejection of strenuous metaphysical justificatory 
claims, demanding instead that ‘anything that is to count as reasoning must be 
foliowable by all relevant others’.19 She asserts that ‘actions, policies and characters’ 
are deemed to be reasoned by showing that ‘they embody certain types or principles 
of action’. She goes on,
for anything to count as practical reasoning it should, presumably, meet at 
least certain quite simple standards. It should, in particular, at least aim to be 
followable by others for whom it is to count as reasoning. ... Those who 
organise action and thinking about action in ways which they take not to be 
followable by some of those who are to follow, even be convinced by, their
7ficlaims offer those others no reasons.
That a principle is reasoned only if it aims to be followable by those to whom it is to 
apply reflects this ‘basic standard’. It is only by following this standard that we can, 
in Rawls’ words, ‘find principles which all can adopt’. For O’Neill, construction 
must reject answering hypothetical questions about the principles agents would
17 And, in spite o f the reverence for Rawls within the Anglo-American tradition, constructivism does 
not yet enjoy particularly wide recognition and, indeed, the entry for ‘Constructivism in Ethics’ has 
only recently appeared in the 2005 edition o f Ted Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)
18 See O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue; T.M. Scanlon, What we Owe to Each Other (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard, Belknap, 1998); Christine Korsgaard, The Sources ofNormativity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996)
19 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.3
20 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.51
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91accept, and must instead look to what they could accept. Her account fixes the 
domain of ethical consideration using the assumptions agents make about the agency 
and the subjecthood of others with whom their lives are connected. It takes pluralism 
as part of the background conditions to a series of practical problems to which 
solutions are constructed.
While O’Neill’s constructivism is very much an exercise in vindicating an 
account of practical reasoning, Scanlon’s constructivism is more explicitly grounded 
in the social contract. Scanlon formulates a form of ‘contractualism’ which is 
premised on the notion that ‘an act is wrong if its performance under the 
circumstances would be disallowed by a system of rules for the general regulation of 
behaviour which no-one could reasonably reject as the basis for informed, unforced
99general agreement.’ For Scanlon justification is grounded in consent rather than 
reason and is more explicitly political than O’Neill’s ethical account.
What is immediately noticeable in these accounts is a common set of 
grounding concepts evident in them all. In the first instance, each asserts a moral 
theory that addresses itself, as Korsgaard suggests, to a practical problem. That 
problem is, broadly understood, the one to which I address myself: how to establish 
general principles for a pluralistic world, when it is unclear what consideration we 
owe and to whom we owe it. Each acknowledges a background of moral, cultural 
and doctrinal pluralism, Rawls most explicitly of all. Political Liberalism opens by 
noting that the idea of a well-ordered society in A Theory o f Justice is unrealistic and 
that a plurality of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines is an
21 Onora O’Neill, ‘Constructivism in Ethics’ in Constructions o f  Reason: Explorations o f  Kant's 
Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.212-213
22 T.M. Scanlon ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ in The Difficulty o f  Tolerance: Essays in Political 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 132-133 (emphasis added)
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essential characteristic. Scanlon stresses ‘the plurality of values that morality in the 
broader sense can include’, to which he adds texture by identifying the diverse nature 
of morality and the importance of reasons.24 O’Neill, too, acknowledges ‘a world of 
multiple and diverse audiences who are linked rather than separated by porous state 
and regional boundaries, global telecommunications and interlocking and 
overlapping policies and practices’.
It is the conditions of pluralism and the uncertainty of moral obligations that 
urges the affirmation of a basic standard. While they assert different grounds for 
doing so, Rawls, Scanlon and O’Neill place importance on the validity of the reasons 
and justifications offered to others. Each emphasises qualities of ‘followability’, 
‘acceptability’ or ‘non-rejectability’, which ought minimally to be present in the 
principles we can reasonably expect others to respond to. They proceed from some 
conception of, as Rawls states, ‘what can be held in common’ ; from the idea that, 
be it for pragmatic or moral reasons, we owe each a basic standard of justification.
Emphasis, then, falls upon the significance of pluralism for justificatory 
moral philosophy. If we take pluralism as an ‘ontic’ fact, we might feel that there are 
strong grounds for seeking a moral position that can comprehend it. Constructivism 
seemingly makes sense of pluralism, and directly responds to it; it places ‘the facts’ 
centrally. We are asked by Rawls, Scanlon and O’Neill to consider what principles 
would be followable by actual people in actual circumstances.
Not everything is constructed; we must have some material, as it were, from 
which to begin. In a more literal sense, only the substantive principles 
specifying content of political right and justice are constructed. The
23 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.xvi
24 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, pp.9-13, and ch.4
25 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.53
26 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp.99-101 (emphasis added)
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procedure itself is simply laid out using as starting points the basic 
conception of society and the person, the principles of practical reason, and 
the public role of a political conception of justice.27
A conception of justice is built upon facts about the person, about society and about 
reasons. The motivation to ‘be constructive’ in this way is a common one in analytic 
thought and has particular prevalence in the social contract tradition. Consider the 
opening of Rousseau’s The Social Contract: ‘My purpose is to consider if, in 
political society, there can be any legitimate and sure principle of government, taking 
men as they are and laws as they might be’.28 Drawing and expanding upon this, 
Rawls comments:
Following Rousseau’s opening thought in The Social Contract ..., I shall 
assume that his phrase ‘men as they are’ refers to persons’ moral and 
psychological natures and how that nature works within the framework of 
political and social institutions.29
Joseph Raz notes that liberals in the Rawlsian tradition are attracted to the idea that 
‘political principles must be accessible to people as they are.’30 The ‘moral and 
psychological nature of persons’ is permeated throughout contractarian thought from 
Hobbes onwards and indeed, the very idea of a ‘contract’ (right down to its legalistic 
label) seems to imply the need to solve a problem of the kind I have been
27 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 104
28 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), Book 1, p.45 
(emphasis added)
29 John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.7
30 Joseph Raz, ‘Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs 
Vol.19 (1), 1990, pp.3-46, atp.46 (emphasis added)
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considering; one which is the product of the human psyche and society as they 
currently are.31
It is unsurprising that characterisation of the facts features prominently in 
constructivism, given its distinctly moral yet equally practical concerns. Its attempt 
to retain a moral point of view (against the necessity of relativism and emotivism) 
which is grounded in the actual conditions of human life orientates the moral 
dimension. At the same time, the more pragmatic aspiration to secure agreement to 
that moral point of view underscores the drive to minimise controversial justification. 
As a result constructivism tends to pursue uncontested terrain upon which to premise 
its arguments and tends therefore to emphasize the uncontroversial nature of the 
points from which it begins its procedures of construction. ‘A convincing conception 
of practical reasoning’, states O’Neill, ‘must start from the gritty realities of human 
life’. It must do so precisely in order to make the kind of morally legitimate and 
pragmatically uncontroversial assertions that it seeks to make. Indeed, what could be 
more uncontroversial than ‘the facts’? They are, after all, acknowledged constants, 
truths even, that simply cannot reasonably be denied.33 An appeal to the ‘gritty 
realities of human life’ -  the realities of pluralism if you will -  is intended to be akin 
to an appeal to the laws of gravity or to the Pythagorean Theorem. We might turn 
again to O’Neill for a grasp of what it is to construct:
31 Hobbes, for example - in Book 2, Chapter 17 o f Leviathan - outlines how the commonwealth is 
firstly formed as an inevitable product o f our human nature and our desire to escape the state of war, 
and secondly as the solution to the problem of the state o f nature (where life is ‘solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish and short’, as described in Book 1, Chapter 13). See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.86-90, 117-121
32 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.61
33 Entry 4.a. under ‘fact’ in the Oxford English Dictionary defines a fact as follows:
fact, n. 4. a. Something that has really occurred or is actually the case; something certainly known to 
be o f this character; hence, a particular truth known by actual observation or authentic testimony, as 
opposed to what is merely inferred, or to a conjecture or fiction; a datum o f experience, as 
distinguished from the conclusions that may be based upon it.
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To construct is only to reason with all possible solidity from available 
beginnings, using available and followable methods to reach attainable and 
sustainable conclusions. ... It may be thought of rather prosaically as starting 
from available materials ... assuming only an abstract account of others’ 
capacities, capabilities and vulnerabilities that is appropriate ... taking 
account of the degree of coordination possible between ‘builders’, and 
working towards ‘buildings’ which all in the relevant domains can help 
‘build’ and ‘inhabit’.34
Rawls sums up the constructivist outlook in the now well-used statement that 
‘conceptions of justice must be justified by the conditions of our life as we know it or 
not at all’. This rejects metaphysically demanding foundationalisms which, 
constructivists argue, struggle to justify the foundational first principles on which 
their conceptions of morality are premised. Many of them appear to be, so say the 
constructivists, ‘reasonably rejectable’ by some, or ‘not acceptable’ to all of their 
intended recipients.
The constructive approach may have broad rhetorical appeal both to realists 
and to relativists, but there remain many ambiguities which must be clarified before 
constructivism can be rendered fit for purpose. If constructivism is to live up to its 
self-appointed task of moral ‘problem solver’, some clarification and revision is 
required. Is starting from a concept grounded in ‘the facts’ quite as unproblematic as 
constructivists believe? There seems to be some degree of ambiguity as to whether 
the facts are the starting point, or whether some normative orientation is where 
construction actually begins. Can the need for some form of basic, first or
34 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.64
35 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p.454. This line is taken by both the Rawlsians and their opponents. 
Importantly, it provides the context for G.A. Cohen’s critique and as such forms the basis for what is 
to follow.
36 In this way constructivism emerges as a key theory in both those debates in metaethics concerning 
moral realism and its contenders, and those debates in justificatory moral philosophy concerning 
foundationalism and its alternatives (namely, coherentism, and the constructivism at work here).
37 See Scanlon, What we Owe to Each Other, ch.5; and O’Neill, Towards justice and Virtue, pp.51-52
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foundational principles be done away with all together? Can those principles be 
constructed? Can one construct a conception of morality that is sturdy and, to quote 
O’Neill, ‘inhabitable’ without any normative foundations? Can one instead construct 
from the facts alone? That one can construct, from those facts alone, ‘morality’ or 
‘justice’ in their entirety seems problematic. It is to a more thorough 
problematisation of these questions that I now turn.
Facts and Principles
In a 2003 issue of Philosophy and Public Affairs G.A. Cohen published an article 
entitled ‘Facts and Principles’.38 Therein Cohen lays out the thesis that, contrary to 
the common view in Anglo-American philosophy, facts do not play a role in 
grounding normative principles. If correct, Cohen’s thesis has a significant impact on 
the validity of the constructivist position as I have set it out -  as starting from 
uncontroversial facts about the world. If it is not the case that conceptions of justice 
or morality ‘must be justified by the conditions of our life as we know it’, where does 
this leave constructivism? If morality does not rest on appreciation of the facts of 
pluralism, where does this leave the thin universalist project? What I suggest is that 
Cohen’s argument holds enormous practical significance, but that this significance is 
felt by constructivism only if it maintains that the object of construction is the 
concept of justice or morality itself. Once this error has been dispelled, I argue, a 
constructivist thin universalism emerges as a valid means of addressing the questions 
posed by pluralism.
38 See G.A. Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol.31 (2003), pp.211- 
245. Cohen has since amended his thesis in certain areas and as such I am working from the somewhat 
revised version available online at The UCL Politics Department website at 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/download/seminars/0304/Facts and Principles.pdf. Because the revised 
edition does not correspond exactly to the original pagination o f the article I shall apply all references 
both to the section o f the revised thesis which corresponds to my reference and to the Philosophy and 
Public Affairs page number, where appropriate.
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Cohen, then, puts forward the argument that, contra constructivism, it cannot be 
true that all principles are sensitive to or dependent upon fact. His thesis itself states 
simply that ‘a principle can reflect or respond to a fact only because it is also a 
response to a principle that is not a response to fact’. In other words, principles that 
are described as fact-sensitive are in fact only fact-sensitive because of other, higher 
fact-msensitive principles. The structure of his arguments can be shown as follows:
1. Let F  equal a factual claim
2. On the basis of F, I affirm principle P
3. It is then reasonable to ask: Why does F  affirm PI
4. Any answer to why F  affirms P will include the affirmation of a more 
ultimate principle Pi
5. Pi holds regardless of whether P holds
6. Pj also holds regardless of whether F  is true
7. Pj is therefore insensitive to F
8. Pi may, however, be sensitive to other facts, hence
9. Pi may be sensitive to factual claim Fj
10. But Fi only supports Pj in light of more ultimate principle P2
11. P2 may not be grounded by fact
12. If it is, the process recedes until a more ultimate principle than all that 
precede it is revealed, be it P3, P4 or Pw -40
Let me illustrate Cohen’s point with the broad example drawn from the subject- 
matter under examination here. Let F  equal the factual claim that the world is marked 
by a plurality of human agents (individuals and groups), whose moral or regulatory 
systems are diverse and who will tend generally to disagree on overarching moral or 
regulating principles. Call this the ‘fact of pluralism’. On the basis of the fact of
pluralism, affirm notion P , namely that only a limited number of principles should be
39 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (d), p.214
40 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (e), pp.215-6
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‘universal’ in scope. Call this the ‘principle of thinness’. Now we ask: why does the 
fact of pluralism affirm the principle of thinness? Why does the fact that the world is 
marked by a plurality of human agents affirm the need to be thin with regard to our 
universal principles? Any answer to why the fact of complex pluralism (F) affirms 
the principle of thinness (P) will include the affirmation of a more ultimate principle 
P/, namely that we ought to respect the diversity of human cultures and societies and 
therefore only a limited number of practical principles that uphold that respect should 
be deemed ‘universal’ and apply to them all. The notion that we ought to respect 
human cultures and societies (Pi) holds regardless of whether the principle of 
thinness (P) holds. The notion that we ought to respect human cultures and societies 
(Pj) also holds regardless of whether the fact of pluralism (F) is true. The notion that 
we ought to respect human cultures and societies (Pj) is therefore insensitive to the 
fact of pluralism (F).41 The notion that we ought to respect human cultures and 
societies is not sensitive to the existence of a plurality of human agents.
The notion that we ought to respect human cultures and societies (Pj) may, 
however, be sensitive to other facts. For example, the notion that we ought to respect 
human cultures and societies (Pi) may be sensitive to the factual claim Fj that 
‘culture’ is an integral part of human identity and a vessel through which human 
beings express themselves and understand one another. But the integral value of 
‘culture’ for human identity (Fj) only supports the notion that we ought to respect 
human cultures and societies (Pi) in light of the more ultimate principle P2 that we 
should respect and cultivate human identities. The notion that we should respect and
41 It is what Cohen calls ‘fact-insensitive’ in that it is not dependent upon, a response to, grounded by 
or justified by the facts. See Cohen, ‘Facts and principles’, (c) and (e), pp.213,215. This 
terminological variance presents what Robert Guay describes as ‘a muddle’, which in itself raises 
issues that I shall not go into here. See Robert Guay, ‘On Being Constrained by the Facts: Cohen on 
Facts and Principles’, Columbia University Website (http://www.columbia.edu/~reg28/cfp.pdf January 
31st 2005), forthcoming.
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cultivate human identities (Pi) may not be grounded by fact. If it is, the process 
simply recedes until a principle, more ultimate than all that precede, is revealed, be it 
P3, P4 or P /0.42
Cohen is therefore asserting that ‘constructed’ principles are themselves the 
product of other principles, which do not reflect fact. Those principles that do not 
reflect fact can be equated to ‘first principles’, or Amartya Sen’s ‘basic principles’,43 
in that they inform our more substantive choices whilst remaining unaltered in light 
of changing empirical circumstance44 What this suggests is that it is not only 
through consideration of the conditions of pluralism that we might construct a thin 
universalism, in fact it is not through a consideration of pluralism, or facts of any 
kind that we arrive at any particular conception of morality. These considerations 
have a profound impact on constructivism, and on the status of the principles of a 
thin universalism.
Firstly, focus must be on how pluralism is normatively evaluated, not simply 
on the ‘fact of pluralism’ itself. We might assert that we are drawn to ‘thin’ moral 
principles because of the plural world we inhabit. But, if Cohen’s thesis is correct, it 
is not ‘pluralism’ that draws us towards thin or universal conclusions but rather a 
prior normative commitment, the upshot of which is a specific normative evaluation 
of pluralism. On close reflection it becomes clear that it is recognition of pluralism in 
combination with a ‘higher’ or more basic commitment that leads to thinness. There 
is insufficient normative material to begin a procedure of construction from the facts 
alone. The principles that issue from construction are thus ‘normatively dependent’.
42 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (e), pp.215-6
43 As in Amartya Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San-Francisco: Holden-Day, 1970), 
p.59; See Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (d), p.214, fii.5. Rawls too refers to them both as ‘first 
principles’ and as ‘fundamental principles’. See A Theory o f Justice, pp. 158-159
44 How we arrive at those principles (for example, whether they are the product of pure reasoning 
about belief), how we select them, and what justifies our selection, are matters that I will consider 
later on.
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Without more basic commitments, sensitivity to pluralism within thin universalism is 
meaningless and lacks the capacity to inform the kind of principles we construct.45
This leads to a second and more significant consideration. The idea that one 
can construct ‘morality’46 is misplaced; the object of construction is not morality 
itself in its entirety; it is not a set of first principles. In the first instance ‘morality’ is 
not simply a set of constructed fact-dependent principles at the end of the procedure 
of practical reasoning. Rather, some notion of morality is already at work within the 
underlying fact-independent principles from which those principles and that 
procedure are derived. These two considerations are connected. One does not begin 
construction from the facts precisely because there are, already at work, a whole set 
of prior moral principles which must be applied to those facts to give them normative 
leverage. Some aspect of ‘morality’ is therefore not constructed. Viewed holistically, 
morality is not and can never be a set of principles constructed on the basis of the 
facts of pluralism.
Cohen is of course not claiming that what people come to believe is not in 
some way the result of their experience of (the facts of) everyday life. Rather, he is 
claiming that these experiences include and depend upon principles that are 
independent of anything they believe about facts.47 If Cohen is correct, it is the 
principles by which pluralism is evaluated that provide the starting points for 
construction of a thin universalism, not the facts of pluralism alone. Those principles 
therefore cannot be the ‘object of construction’ which I now examine more closely.
45 For a brief elucidation o f ‘normatively dependent concepts’ see Rainer Forst, ‘Toleration’ in 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy, Winter 2003 Edition, 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/toleration/ June 30 2007)
46 Or ‘justice’ for that matter. Many constructivists refer to ‘justice’, but the focus o f the thin
universalist project is ‘morality’, rather than ‘justice’.
47 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (o), p.231
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What is Being Constructed?
If the claim that ‘principles which reflect facts also reflect principles which don’t 
reflect facts’ fundamentally undermines constructivist projects, where might this 
project go from here? Is it possible to proceed along constructivist lines towards a 
thin universalism any longer if, to ‘be constructive’, one must rely on potentially 
more controversial premises than simple ‘facts’? In accepting Cohen’s thesis must 
we commit to a form of realism or foundationalism, or resign ourselves to relativism 
or emotivism? Can we still be constructive and if so, how?
Construction can still yield ‘problem solving’ outcomes. A constructive thin 
universalism can be understood as one or more of several philosophical projects. The 
project one pursues will be determined both by its moral content and its practical 
applicability but these depend on how one understands the object of construction -  
on what is being constructed. There are three ways to understand what is being 
constructed:
1. The object of construction may be basic, first moral principles themselves.
2. The object of construction may be a set of ‘principles of regulation’, 
established specifically to regulate our affairs.
3. Alternatively, the object of construction may not be ‘moral’ principles at all, 
but rather consent, either to a set of first principles, or to a set of principles of 
regulation.
Each requires some consideration. One may, firstly, pursue a project that aims to 
establish thin universalism as a set of moral ‘first principles’. The object of 
construction in such projects is the very principles of morality we hold. These are the 
principles that Cohen regards as ‘ultimate’, ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’. They are
48 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (t), p.242
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essentially independent and non-derivative. It is within metaethical projects of this 
kind that constructivism is juxtaposed with realism and antirealism and that thin 
universalism is sought as a ‘meta-theory’ of morality.49
There are several ‘constructivist’ approaches to such a thin universal meta­
theory. The first may take the form of a project designed to establish morality itself, 
including characteristics of ‘thinness’ of content and ‘universality’ of scope. Rather 
than ‘discovering’ morality out there in the world, the constructivist may want to 
suggest that even the very concept of morality must on some level be constructed.50 
It must be based on uncontroversial, factual premises; for thin universalism these are 
the facts of pluralism. Hence the concept of morality is constructed as a higher or 
basic commitment, as a direct response to those facts, and thin universalism is 
morality itself in its entirety.51 But these metaethical approaches need not be so 
holistic. One might pursue a second project designed to construct first principles, but 
perhaps not all first principles, merely a specific set intended for a specific purpose. 
What is constructed is more substantive than the ‘concept’ of morality; but which 
remains thin universal, and which is constructed from the facts of pluralism.
Meta-projects, which take as their object of construction some notion of basic 
or first principles, can be contrasted with projects that aim at the construction of what 
Cohen calls ‘principles of regulation’. These are principles which represent ‘a certain 
type of social instrument to be legislated and implemented, whether by a government
e*y
itself or within social consciousness and practice.’ While first principles might be
49 Cohen uses the term ‘meta-theory of ju stice ' [my emphasis] but the distinction is o f limited 
consequence for our present purposes. See Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (t), p.243. Projects of this 
kind seek to make claims as to what morality is. See Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations o f  
Ethics, p.l
50 See again Korsgaard, ‘Realism and Constructivism’, pp. 115-116
51 In that, according to this account, thin universalism presumably encompasses all judgements 
deemed to be moral. Those that fall outside could not properly be called moral judgements, but might 
instead be relegated to matters o f courtesy, or preference, or prudence.
52 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (s), p.241
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centred upon questions such as ‘what is morality?’ and ‘what principles formulate 
our fundamental convictions?’ principles of regulation address the question ‘what 
principles should we adopt to regulate our affairs?’53 Because principles of regulation 
do not profess to be basic, they can be responsive both to the facts of pluralism and 
to more ultimate first principles.54 Facts are used to ‘help to constrain the 
possibilities of implementation and determine defensible trade-offs at the level of 
implementation.’55 Constructed thin universal principles of regulation are still moral 
principles, but they are more pragmatic, and because we may want them 
implemented and enforced, importantly political also.
While both are ‘constructive’, there are important differences between 
constructing a set of thin universal first principles and a set of thin universal 
principles of regulation. There has been a tendency within the constructivist camp to 
talk explicitly of constructing first principles. But the distinction is central to the 
further progress of the thin universalist project and I argue that a thin universalism 
can only be constructed at the level of principles of regulation, and that this is so for 
two important and interrelated reasons.
Before that, however, I want briefly to discuss the final answer to the 
question of what it is that is being constructed. In contrast to the above approaches, 
the object of construction here is a basis of consent for a set of thin universal 
principles. The construction of the principles themselves, closely interrelated to their 
philosophical justification in the first two approaches, is here more distinct. 
Construction is here closely related to public justification -  to constructing a public 
basis of consent through discourse, debate and argumentation. This project, perhaps 
more explicitly political than the others, utilises facts because pluralism leads to
53 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (s), p.241
54 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (s), pp.241-3
55 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (t), p.244
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scepticism about the viability of ‘consensus politics’. Construction consists in 
argumentative strategies designed to build on the views already held by people, with 
the intention of showing that a plurality of people can endorse the same set of 
principles by ‘arguing them up’ to a shared view.56 Principles themselves are not 
necessarily at stake in constructivist projects of this kind and the construction of 
consent can presumably be focussed on first principles or principles of regulation, 
though such projects will differ.
Which of these constructions is at work in any given project is important to 
clarify, as the aims, objectives, justification, and plausibility of any such project rests 
on recognising what is being constructed.
First Principles and Principles of Regulation
The object of construction within thin universalism is a set of ‘principles of 
regulation’ and it is therefore a constructivist project of the second kind outlined 
above. However, there is also a need to pursue a basis for agreement to those 
principles. The object of construction must also be consent and it is therefore also a 
project of the third kind. The thin universalist project will therefore demonstrate two 
interconnected constructions. The first construction concerns principles of regulation 
and not first principles. This is so, as I mentioned earlier, for two interrelated 
reasons, which are best highlighted by outlining more carefully the distinction 
between first principles and principles of regulation. This distinction is key to 
understanding the relationship between facts and principles, between construction 
and justification, and ultimately between pluralism and thin universalism.
56 As such, argumentative strategies such as ‘bootstrapping’ may be part o f a constructive approach. 
See Barbara Herman, ‘Bootstrapping’ in Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.), Contours o f  Agency: 
Essays on Themes from Harry Franhfurt (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2002), pp.253-274.1 will 
consider this in more detail later on.
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Cohen asserts that Rawls fails to distinguish between first principles and 
principles of regulation. First principles amount to basic value judgements, 
fundamental convictions that every person who makes statements of value holds. 
These are, crucially, fact-mdependent: Cohen describes them as fact-free, altogether 
fact-insensitive, fact-independent and ‘not a response to the facts of the human
cn
condition’. Essentially, first principles are not ‘devices for achieving effects’, they 
are not principles that we can adopt in our lives in order to get things done, they are 
not responses to problems, and most importantly they are not constructed. Rather, 
they are simply ‘statements’ of our higher convictions; one does not choose to adopt
co
one’s first principles. The basic, fact-independence of first principles can be shown 
through the inferential justificatory procedures outlined above and I will not return to 
them again.
Principles of regulation, rather than being statements of basic belief, describe 
the rules we adopt in order to regulate our affairs. They are adopted through choice 
and therefore reflect both the first principles that we might hold and those facts that 
have been deemed sufficiently relevant to feature in moral deliberation. A principle 
of regulation is a ‘device for having certain effects’, which we adopt, or not, after 
evaluating its likely effects and, therefore, in light of an evaluation of the facts.59 
Because they are not ‘basic’ or ‘ultimate’ in the way that first principles are, they can 
therefore be sensitive to (responsive to, or dependent upon) the facts and, moreover, 
they can be the product of construction -  they can be constructed.
Cohen does not deny that facts play a crucial role in moral deliberation. He 
agrees that facts are indispensable to the justification of principles of regulation,
57 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (d), p.214, (e), pp.215-216, (q), p234-235, (t), p.244
58 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (s), p.241
59 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (s), p.241
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constraining possibilities and determining defensible trade-offs.60 The facts help, in 
part, to decide which principles to adopt and, moreover, which principles we judge 
others could adopt.
The object of construction within a thin universalism is a set of thin universal 
principles of regulation for two interrelated reasons. Firstly, using analysis of Cohen, 
a procedure of construction cannot begin from fact alone. To get such a procedure 
off the ground it must have some normative points of reference which orient analysis 
of the facts and provide leverage for construction. A constructivist thin universalism 
cannot start with the facts of complex pluralism alone; it will begin with basic 
commitments evaluated in light of the facts of pluralism. Secondly, and 
consequently, the object of construction cannot be a set of fundamental, basic moral 
first principles. First principles cannot be constructed from the facts because there 
will always be an underlying higher principle, and ultimately a genuine first 
principle, already at work to provide normative orientation for the analysis of the 
facts and the purchase required to begin construction. Construction therefore 
involves developing and choosing principles of regulation on the basis of more basic, 
higher, first commitments in light of the facts. Thin universalism is therefore a set of 
regulatory moral principles that display certain characteristics (thinness and 
universality) based on the facts pluralism.
Cohen’s key critique of Rawls is that he expressly states that fundamental 
principles of justice are those principles chosen, in light of certain facts, to regulate 
society. The critique of constructivism proceeds from its amalgamation of 
fundamental first principles and adopted principles of regulation. Because 
constructivism conflates the two, it claims that both, rather than only the latter, are
60 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (t), p.244
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grounded in fact and as such constructed. In the original position, Rawls claims, it is 
fundamental principles of justice that are chosen. However, what emerge are not 
fundamental first principles but principles of regulation.61 The constructivist might 
be tempted to assert that thin universal principles are first principles chosen in light 
of the facts of complex pluralism. The amalgamation of first principles and principles 
of regulation leads to confusion as to the role of the facts of complex pluralism in the 
procedure of construction. Thin universal first principles are not principles we can 
adopt after surveying the facts of pluralism.
Taking Cohen’s thesis as correct, the constructive meta-theory cannot be right 
in insisting that first principles are constructed responses to ‘practical problems’ or to 
factual conditions. If this were the case, there would be something ‘higher’ than first 
principles, which informs how we determine the solutions to the problems to which 
they are attached. This is clearly not the case; such higher principles would 
themselves be first principles. But if there is no normative content prior to 
construction, this further implies that what is constructed in thin universalism is 
‘morality’ in its entirety.
But should we be so ready to conclude that the whole of morality consists 
only of thin universal principles? We may be concerned that a whole class, perhaps 
even the majority of moral judgements would not be classifiable as ‘moral’, if they 
were not deemed to be universal and fundamental to human needs. Genuinely moral 
matters are often very much context-dependent (such as marital practices, including 
same-sex marriage, polygamy etc.), or highly subjective (concern for our own 
children will always naturally outweigh concern for other people’s children) and 
hence would not be considered ‘universal’. Still others are of only minor significance
61 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (s), p.243
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(etiquette, for example), while others might be moral but judged not to be politically 
enforceable (such as adultery) and would certainly fall outside of the ‘minimum 
standards’ on which a thin universalism is premised. There are many significant and 
important moral judgements that would not fall within a thin universalism.
The idea that we ought to conceive of morality in minimal terms due to the 
observable fact of pluralism contains an implicit commitment to respect that plurality 
of human social, cultural and political creations. This implicit commitment grounds 
the commitment to minimalism, not to mention the commitment to engage in 
justificatory arguments in defence of our propositions. We would not concern 
ourselves with such matters as justification and argument if we did not implicitly 
endorse something akin to respect for those who disagreed with us. If thin universal 
principles amount to ‘morality’ as a whole, there is no scope for such prior 
commitments and the idea of ‘constructing morality’ collapses into incoherence. 
Thin universalism is one aspect of morality; it is an aspect that is constructed and 
adopted. Both our fact-independent first principles and the principles of regulation 
we adopt in light of the facts of complex pluralism are parts of ‘morality’. Only a 
part of it is constructed, and it is that part to which a thin universalism is addressed: 
those principles designed to regulate societies. What is constructed, then, is a set of 
fact-dependent regulatory principles, and a basis of consent to them. I now offer an 
overview of the procedure of construction.
Conditions of Construction
The chapters that follow will be concerned with the question of what establishes as
valid the constructed principles of regulation which are the outcome of this
62 It is perhaps pertinent to note that the conception o f morality o f which thin universalism is a part 
(the ‘regulatory’ part) is itself pluralized. Moral judgments are not all o f the same kind -  they do not 
all have the same scope, or form, or content.
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procedure. It is answered through a discussion of the procedure o f  construction by 
which those principles emerge. That procedure will unfold over subsequent chapters, 
‘building’ carefully on what is established before it. Construction therefore falls into 
the categories of ‘justificatory philosophy’ and ‘critical expository philosophy’. 
Initially, the requirements of satisfactory justification will have to be met. What 
establishes as valid certain first principles as starting points for construction? What 
establishes as valid the facts construction takes as ‘given’ and from which it 
proceeds? What validates them as materials to be used in constructing regulatory 
principles? But ‘justificatory philosophy’ refers both to the justification of first 
principles and to the justification of their consequences. Hence, once first principles 
are established, construction concerns what follows from them in light of relevant 
facts about the world. This is the critical expository element, it is a form of 
constructive critical exposition. Regulatory principles, therefore, are justified in 
light of those procedures -  the conditions of construction -  by which they are 
reached.
The process is one of constructing from a basis of appropriate starting points, a 
theme repeated across key constructivist positions. For Rawls, for example, 
construction proceeds through ‘practical reason in conjunction with conceptions of 
society and the person’.64 What are missing from this account, as I have argued, are 
the normative standards by which those conceptions of society and the person are 
considered. Constructivism is reasoning towards principles of morality from the facts 
only in light of our higher moral convictions. A careful modelling and examination 
of the ‘conditions of construction’ can help to establish, characterise and validate the 
thin universal regulatory principles that are the outcome of this constructive
63 In contrast to the form o f reflective critical exposition by which our first principles are illuminated, 
and which I considered earlier.
64 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.93-94
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procedure. But, how exactly does one go from  these considerations to thin universal 
principles? How do we construct? The ‘conditions of construction’ can be separated 
out thus:
1. Starting points. Those features of the modem world, and of our first 
principles that can legitimately be considered relevant to a procedure of moral 
inquiry. These are the materials of construction.
2. Procedures. Those processes by which materials are developed into 
outcomes which reflect the implications of the materials. This is the 
procedure of constmction.
3. Outcomes. Those principles of regulation which are the end product of valid 
processes that have proceeded from valid starting points and which fulfil 
criteria established by the materials and procedures. This is the end product -  
the structure.
This revised constructivism asserts that justified, reasoned or valid regulatory 
principles are the outcome of a procedure of constmction. In other words, those 
principles that emerge from a consideration of the facts in light of considered first 
principles and which are developed by the procedures of constmction into principles 
that fulfil the criteria implied by the procedure itself. O’Neill states that ‘the 
metaphor of construction may seem appropriate enough for an account of the way in 
which ethical principles might be built on the basis of a certain conception of 
practical reason.’651 proceed from an account which models a constructive argument 
as one that works specifically to reform already-held beliefs66; one that applies new 
criteria, or newly illuminated facts, to beliefs that already exist in order to develop 
them into more substantive, more particular, or substantively new beliefs. A 
constmctive argument ‘builds’ principles out of a set of available ‘materials’. But,
65 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, pp.59-60
66 See Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification, p.83
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while the ‘gritty realities of human life’ provide many of those materials, they lack 
the normative content required to get a constructive account off the ground.
Materials of Construction
Constructed thin universal regulatory principles are thin and universal because they 
are sensitive to certain considerations about the world. Construction begins with 
‘materials’, which must provide sound starting points in order to secure legitimate 
outcomes. Materials of construction will be the subject matter of chapters two and 
three and the constructivisms thus far critiqued can still offer guidance here. 
Materials include understandings about the world and the people that inhabit it, 
including the facts of pluralism, and the first principles or considered judgements 
about the world, without which there exists nothing to animate consideration of those 
facts. The facts must be consistent with available evidence about the world. Peri 
Roberts suggests that ‘our reasoning, if it is to be practical, must avoid inconsistency 
with available information about the world however that is presented to us ... As 
such we are required to offer reasons that are at least possible ’. He goes on to 
suggest that reasons function ‘within particular environments and so reasoning could 
not be practical if it proceeded from assumptions or expectations of these 
environments that were untrue of them.’67 While a constructivist account of moral 
principles cannot proceed solely from the ‘conditions of our life as we know it’, the 
construction must proceed from an accurate model of ‘the world’.69
The world is pluralistic and, in order to construct from an accurate model of 
the world, construction must include a characterisation of pluralism. It is a
67 See Peri Roberts, ‘Why Thin Universalism Needs Conceptions o f Society and Person’ in Haddock, 
Roberts and Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order, p. 113-4
68 See Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p.454
69 Roberts, ‘Why Thin Universalism Needs Conceptions o f Society and Person’, p. 113-4. And in this 
sense it is worth noting how ‘Humean’ constructivism can sometimes appear to be.
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background feature which must be recognised in order to yield valid conclusions. 
The modem state is not ‘easily identified with a single nation, tribe, ethnic, cultural
70or political grouping’. We cannot assume social or cultural homogeneity, and we 
must recognise the radical hybridity and diversity of most cultures.71 Constmction 
must begin from where we are and Roberts states that, ‘faced with plural 
environments we can start only with the resources available to us, our convictions or
• 77intuitions or basic judgements’. Our considered judgements help to point us 
towards our first principles, which must be shown to be valid. Only then do they 
constitute our available and justifiable starting points.
For Rawls, beginning from ‘the facts’ and ‘where we are’ takes the form of 
conceptions of the person and of society.73 Both Rawls and O’Neill suggest that 
assumptions ‘about what people are like and what societies are for’74 are already at 
work in our thinking about politics, justice and morality. Procedures of constmction 
already contain assumptions about a plurality of others, the societies they inhabit and 
the capacities, capabilities and vulnerabilities that they possess. For O’Neill, this 
account of people and their social organisations is necessarily abstract or ‘limited’ in 
its intended reach. She suggests that we can only assume very general ‘capacities, 
capabilities and vulnerabilities’ about any given domain of human agents. The kinds 
of considerations that moral principles respond to only arise when, to quote O’Neill 
we are connected to a plurality of finite others.75 Because we can recognise a 
plurality of finite others, and other societies, to whom we are connected we have
70 Roberts, ‘Why Thin Universalism Needs Conceptions of Society and Person’, p .l 14
71 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp.25-26
72 Roberts, ‘Why Thin Universalism Needs Conceptions o f Society and Person’, p.l 15. For Rawls this 
is our ‘considered convictions’. See Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, p. 19
73 The former Rawls describes as possessive o f the two moral powers (o f justice and the good) and 
more, and the latter as ‘a fair system o f social cooperation over time’. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 
pp.93-94
Roberts, ‘Why Thin Universalism Needs Conceptions o f Society and Person’, p. 119
75 See O’Neill, Towards justice and Virtue, p. 100-106
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cause to take them into the scope of our moral consideration. This provides us with 
reason to account for some domain of moral thought which incorporates that entire 
plurality as a universal or cosmopolitan domain. Where there is no plurality or where 
we have no connection to others, questions of politics and morality lie dormant. 
Pluralism occupies a privileged position in construction for this reason.
Within an account of ‘where we are’ must also be contained a set of 
necessary facts about others, illuminated by considering Rawls and Rousseau and the 
idea of ‘taking people as they are’. This idea has four distinct dimensions, which 
serve to delimit possible outcomes of construction. It firstly refers to the proper role 
of ‘fact’ and its representation in moral deliberation. If the intention is to construct 
principles in part form the facts, then it is important that those statements presented 
as fact represent (with as much intellectual honesty as possible) demonstrable 
features of the external world or the genuine human condition, which will invariably 
feature factual claims about people ‘as they are’.
Second, ‘taking people as they are’ refers to the plausibility of establishing 
any regulatory principles to govern a plurality of individuals or groups. Rousseau 
suggests of the ‘legislator’ that ‘the wise creator of institutions will not begin by 
drafting laws good in themselves, but will first consider whether the people for
77whom they are intended is capable of receiving them’. Taking people as they are, 
therefore, necessitates those basic standards of justification and ‘followability’,
70
captured by previous constructivisms, in any principles intended for a plurality of 
agents.
76 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p.45; Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples, p.7
77 Rousseau, The Social Contract, p.79-80
78 See, again, Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp.97-98; O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.51; 
Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’, pp.132-133.
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The third, related, sense is that taking people as they are is connected to and 
has implications for questions concerning who is to be incorporated into procedures 
of construction. For Joseph Raz, ‘it is not enough ... that those who are totally 
rational ... will be persuaded.’79 What are we to make of those groups who would 
reject, or are incapable of accepting, the principles we might ask them to?80 If we are 
committed to ‘taking people as they are’ we must decide upon who is to be included 
in the process of construction. However, just as importantly, we must be cautious not 
to exclude those groups whose views are not to be incorporated from the category of 
‘people’.
Fourthly, ‘taking people as they are’ also implies that moral arguments 
should ‘not confront those it seeks to persuade with arguments which they could only 
accept by abandoning their own religious, cultural and ethical convictions’.81 This, in 
turn, suggests questions concerning the nature of thin universal principles of 
regulation that we are to adopt. Must they be ‘neutral’, ‘impartial’ or ‘objective’? 
How do they relate to claims to moral truth and must we, within principles of 
regulation, abstain from such claims? Is ‘taking people as they are’ best responded to
Q<n
with a form of ‘epistemic abstinence’?
These dimensions will be explored as my thin universalism develops. That 
principles can be thin affirms respect for the plurality of human societies and social 
arrangements. That principles can be universal recognises respect for individual and 
collective well-being. Both must reflect facts about people and societies ‘as they are’. 
Thin universal principles, in being both thin and universal, are not inseparable but
79 See Joseph Raz, ‘Facing Diversity: The Case o f Epistemic Abstinence’ in Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Vol. 19(1), 1990, pp.3-46
8 These are often referred to as the irrational, unreasonable, amoral, immoral, fanatical and mad.
81 Colin Bird, ‘Mutual Respect and Neutral Justification’ in Ethics V o l.l07(l), 1996, pp.62-69
82 See here Rawls, Political Liberalism pp.xx, 94, Thomas Nagel, ‘Moral Conflict and Political 
Legitimacy’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 16(3), 1987, pp.215-240
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are, in this context, inherently intertwined. Thin universalism makes the most sense 
not as two separate notions, but as two aspects of the same set of normative 
considerations. One cannot have truly ‘thin universal’ first principles because 
thinness and universality are partly grounded in the facts of pluralism. Thin universal 
principles are adopted principles to guide us in organising our affairs. They are 
principles of regulation which can and ought to incorporate aspects of the 
‘conditions of our life as we know it’. Facts reflect considerations of people as they 
are, which impacts the kind of principles that can be based on fact, how those 
principles are presented, the agents or groups who are party to their construction, and 
what we ask of those agents. It is clear both that the facts inform the moral and the 
pragmatic concerns of the constructivist project and that the facts themselves make 
use of strong value judgements.
Dimensions of Construction
While the object of construction must be a set of thin universal principles of 
regulation to meet the moral and practical demands of the project, those demands can 
only be met if consent to those principles is constructed also. There are then two 
distinct dimensions to construction at work here. The first concerns certain kinds of 
moral principle, about how they are constructed, what they are for, and why; the 
second is about how those principles can be justified, about how consent to them can 
be constructed, and why consent is practically and morally important.
Because the project is not metaethical, and does not profess to construct 
‘morality’, operating rather at the level of moral philosophy, it is capable of 
deflecting the most damaging critiques of emotivism and relativism without needing
83 Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p.454
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to reject them. Constructivism does not contradict our moral experience and it does 
not run uncomfortably counter to many fundamental moral judgements.84 Nor is the 
thin universalist project about constructing eternal, transcendental truths. Its concern 
with the facts of pluralism, starting from and taking people as they are, means that it 
is not fixated with an unchanging human nature or a static conception of human 
needs. It is not determined to impose rigid uniformity on the human race through 
unbending algorithmic moral directives.
The thin universalist project, in so doing, is motivated by the need to be 
responsive to a changing world. This does not weaken the principles that are 
constructed; an emphasis on contingency and on recognition and celebration of 
pluralism do not threaten their validity. ‘Principles’, writes Berlin, ‘are no less sacred 
because their duration cannot be guaranteed’.85 These sensitivities are simply part of 
what shapes the thin universalist response to ever-changing real-world conditions. If 
the aim of the thin universalist project is to establish, through construction, shared 
principles of regulation and, in turn, consent for those principles, these concerns are 
best described as both moral and pragmatic. This pragmatism is important because, 
under the conditions of complex pluralism, an approach pragmatically sensitive to 
historical contingency is more likely to be successful, in circumstances where moral 
issues are often pressing, sometimes urgent.
Pluralism means that people adhere to numerous, varied and often 
incommensurable moral codes, regulatory practices, linguistic constructions and 
situational limitations. People are therefore unlikely to agree on any single set of 
substantive regulatory principles, which most of the time is not a problem. 
Convergence of regulatory principles on many moral issues is simply not required,
84 In the way that, perhaps, certain forms of utilitarianism do.
85 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts o f Liberty’ in his Four Essays on Liberty, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1969), p. 172
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because the practices involved are restricted in scope or applicability, or because the
degree of severity or locality does not demand broader involvement. There remains
cause to make value judgements from time to time about events, situations, courses
of action and principles which are governed by regulatory principles which are not 
86our own.
The thin universalist’s sensitivity to pluralism in taking people as they are is 
reflected first and foremost through engagement in argument, justification and 
discourse. In order to secure pluralism, it is likely that a common set of principles of 
regulation are needed which are applicable in those cases where broader judgement 
is required. Construction of thin universal regulatory principles provides adherents of 
differing moral, philosophical and political frameworks grounds for shared standards, 
that they may or may not already possess, and allow certain judgements to hold 
validity across those frameworks. But, in order to accord proper respect to human 
beings and their cultural creations they must come to any moral framework through 
consent, which will always be sought and for which ‘construction’ can be employed.
Thin universalism, then, involves two interconnected yet distinct 
constructions. There is firstly a stage of initial theorising which is a broadly 
philosophical task, in which hypotheses are scrutinised, problematised, justified, 
defended and perhaps altered in light of new facts, new arguments and new 
objections. But the procedure of construction is also a dialogical task, which takes 
place between actual human agents, in the forum of public debate, where ideas are 
contested and trade-offs negotiated. The first concerns critical reflection -  the 
examination of reasons and justifications in favour of and against a particular
86 In cases of, for example, cruelty, torture, genocide and the like, such as those highlighted by 
Jonathon Glover in Humanity: A Moral History o f  the Twentieth Century (London: Pimlico, 2001)
87 Be they individual people, cultural units, races, nations, states, religions or any faction or fragment 
thereof.
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principle. It is here that relevant materials and considerations are identified, clarified 
and justified. It is also here that the content for those principles is worked out with 
the aim of making it morally acceptable, logically coherent and structurally sound. It 
establishes how and why a thin universalism is both thin and universal in the relevant 
senses. The second dimension concerns public justification, of making regulatory 
principles morally and politically appealing, and of working towards the construction 
of consent to those principles. The two stages are inseparable; the reasons and 
justifications offered in the initial construction are coloured by the necessity of 
public justifiability. Similarly, public justification reflects heavily the commitments 
that are brought to bear in the monological construction.
Constructing Fact-Dependent Regulatory Principles
The outcome of construction is a set of moral principles that are situated in order to 
address one dimension of our moral and political discourse. Thin universalism 
asserts, however, that the principles that it constructs, being the product of 
particularly powerful considerations, are not only moral principles, but political 
principles also. Here, political principles are understood to be those moral principles 
that are deemed to be enforceable by the state, or relevant coercive body. The 
distinction is important because principles which are the outcome of the thin 
universalist project are perhaps those that ought, potentially, to be imposed upon 
others, and are consequently political in the above sense. Moral principles, on the 
other hand, we may be more reluctant to act upon, especially given our moral 
sensitivity to pluralism. Thin universal principles are as such political principles.
The principles that issue from construction are fact-dependent. They are not 
basic, ultimate or first principles, but rather they are principles of regulation. They
Construction
are not considered judgements about the world, illuminated and codified after an 
examination of concrete instances; rather they are specifically intended to have
oo
certain effects. They are in short intended to regulate human affairs, given the facts 
of the world in which we live and the way in which we evaluate it. They are, as such, 
adopted. They are chosen or selected on the basic of evidence and argument, rather 
than arrived at, stumbled upon, discovered or handed down from a higher authority.
They are a set of moral principles. They are not morality in its grand and 
complex entirety -  everything that we call ‘moral’ is not made up of constructed 
principles. Just as one might expect, moral judgements are not limited to those that 
are universally applicable, or only those so important as to be included in a minimal, 
moral ‘bottom line’. As O’Neill comments, there are many stretches of practical 
reasoning, some of which will be universal and some of which will be of a more
OQ #
restricted domain. The Stoics, too, saw human beings as walking both in the society 
of their birth, and in the universal domain of all human beings.90 So, while 
constructed principles are fundamentally moral, they do not encompass the entire 
moral realm.
Principles, then, are the ‘structure’ that is the outcome of a procedure of 
construction and its form and content will depend substantially upon the materials 
and procedures used. A structure based on an account of the facts, and which has 
responded to them suitably is more likely to be sound and therefore able to withstand 
the elements. Such a structure, notes O’Neill, must be inhabitable; the builders must 
be able to ‘live with what they have built’.91 We must be able to live with the
88 See Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (s), p.241 (He is here paraphrasing Robert Nozick.)
89 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.57
90 See Martha Nussbaum, ‘Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism’ in Martha Nussbaum and Jean Cohen 
(eds.), For Love o f  Country: Debating the Limits o f Patriotism (Boston MA, Beacon, 1996), pp.3-17 
atp.7
91 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.62
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principles we construct which means considering carefully the genuine capacities, 
capabilities and limitations of real people and the genuine conditions of political 
society. What we are to do with these principles, what role they fulfil or purposes 
they can serve -  whether they are intended to resolve conflicts, to generate social 
cohesion and longevity or simply to guide human beings in certain interactions -  will 
unfold as the thesis progresses.
Constructing Consent
The strong link between careful consideration of the intended recipients of the 
constructive argument with the formulation of the argument itself is central to a 
proper understanding of the moral commitments that underpin construction, how the 
construction itself works, and what it is to make a regulatory principle ‘justifiable’. 
The intended recipients of constructivist arguments have therefore been central in 
constructivist accounts of justice and morality.
Rawls, for example, stresses the criteria of acceptability or followability of 
the principles that are generated by construction. Indeed, a crucial consideration for 
constructive justifications is the ability of the constructed principles to gain support 
from their intended audience. Similarly, he insists that any fundamental ideas must 
be ‘familiar and intelligible.’ This might include the relationship between facts and 
principles, or the recognition of pluralism. In fact, Rawls’ political constructivism 
goes further aiming specifically not to oppose any reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine. From within any given comprehensive view (such as a religion, or other 
moral doctrine), endorsement of the constructed principles is possible. A Rawlsian 
thin universalism aims towards the backing of the values of each comprehensive
92 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 14, 143
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view. As such, Rawls’ later constructivism uses an idea of ‘the reasonable’ and 
remains silent on the notion of ‘truth’ which accords to an independent order of 
moral values. The motivation behind this is pragmatic, in order to generate wider 
acceptance with a diverse audience.
Scanlon also stresses this dimension of construction. Scanlon’s 
contractualism94 is premised on basic ‘justifiability’. An act, for Scanlon, is right 
only if it can be justified to others and valid principles are ones that no one, if 
suitably motivated, could reasonably reject. Implicit herein are the require steps of 
acceptability or non-rejectability which in turn place emphasis on the audience once 
more. For Scanlon, this is also the source of moral concern for others: because we 
must find principles that others could not reasonably reject, we are prompted to 
consider perspectives other than our own.95 O’Neill, too, insists on the conditions of 
followability, suggesting that action could be viewed as reasoned merely by virtue of 
being based on principles that are followable by others. For her, fundamental 
questions of justification revolve around what it is for a principle grounded in 
practical reasoning to be followable.96
The result is a pragmatic dimension to construction; a pragmatism evident not 
only in the commitment to all dimensions of taking people as they are, but also in the 
commitment to construction of consent to the principles at stake. The concern of thin 
universalism is not only with principles themselves, but also with how principles can 
be justified, philosophically and publicly. Where the construction of consent is the 
aim, questions of the truth of moral judgements can for the most part be separated
93 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.95
94 Scanlon refers to his variety of constructivism as ‘contractualism’. See Scanlon, ‘Contractualism 
and Utilitarianism’ and What We Owe to Each Other. For a contention as to the distinction between 
them, and to the status o f Scanlon’s contractualism as contrasted with Rawlsian constructivism see 
Onora O’Neill, ‘Constructivism Vs. Contractualism’ in Ratio Vol.16 (4), 2003, pp.319-331.
95 Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, pp. 189-191
96 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.52, 57
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• 07from questions of how justifiable they are. Colin Bird suggests that citizens ‘are not 
presumed to endorse a particular public morality because they think that it is true: the 
question of the truth or falsity of moral judgements ... becomes irrelevant to the
• Oftquestion of whether citizens should accept it or not.’ To make such an assertion is
not to deny that such an epistemically abstinent theory can be correct, even true, but
in taking people as they are a thin universalist argument need not confront those it
seeks to persuade with arguments which they could only accept by abandoning their
own religious, cultural and ethical convictions." This separates out, as Rawls does,
plausible claims of acceptance and acceptability, from the claim that something is
true ‘of an independent metaphysical or moral order.’100 If a constructed thin
universalism is intended to be authoritative in a given moral domain, it must be
premised partly on the grounds that it can command consent from those who dwell in
that domain.101 None of this, of course, detracts from the requirements of public
debate over all such moral questions, it simply asserts that there is still a basis for
agreement, even if adherence to ‘truths’ is pluralised. Moral problems, to retrieve
Korsgaard’s point, remain practical at root.102
The practical motivations of the constructivist project echo Alexander Wendt
in his assertion that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’, suggesting that pluralism is
10^simply what agents make of it. To be constructive is simply to assert that we are
97 To quote Gaus, ‘although we can put aside disputes as to whether ethical judgements are true or 
refer to moral facts, I suppose they can be justifiable, fitting, appropriate, mistaken and so on’. See 
Gerald F. Gaus, Justificatory Liberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.7. See also John 
Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 14, 
1985, pp.223-251 atp.230; Charles Larmore, ‘Political Liberalism’ in Political Theory Vol. 18, 1990, 
pp.339-360 atpp.354-355.
Colin Bird, ‘Mutual Respect and Neutral Justification’ in Ethics Vol. 107(1), 1996, pp.62-96, at p.69
99 Bird, ‘Mutual Respect and Neutral Justification’ pp.62-69
100 Larmore, ‘Political Liberalism’, p.354
101 See Raz, ‘Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence’, pp.9-10
102 See Korsgaard, ‘Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth Century Moral Philosophy’, pp.l 15-116
103 See here Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make o f it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics’ in International Organisation, Vol.46 (2), 1992, pp.391-425. It is fundamentally important
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faced with the circumstances of pluralism, from out of which we must build a life 
that we regard as worthwhile. Part of such a ‘project’ as it were would include the 
establishment of moral guidelines which will incorporate expressions of a thin 
universalism. To be constructive in this way is perhaps to understand it in a more 
‘developmental’ sense. As such, a ‘constructive’ argument is one which seeks not 
only to develop principles of regulation but also to persuade the justifiee to develop 
and reform his or her beliefs.104 A genuinely constructive argument is one whose 
aims must include the development or realignment of the views of those justifiees 
whose view are incompatible, and not simply seek to empirically highlight a 
common moral thread between all justifiees.
Pluralism renders it unlikely that all people will arrive at the same conclusion, 
and this sets limits on what can reasonably be justified to others.105 But even this 
assertion is made by reference to a prior normative commitment: it is not pluralism 
that sets these limits, it is how we morally conceive of people and our conduct 
towards them that sets them. The constructivists’ motivation, and their concern with 
acceptance, is fundamentally moral. We can imagine many political grounds for 
rejecting acceptance, which would involve the objectionable use of force.
The kind of consent that thin universalism seeks will, as such, be as 
pluralized as the domain for which it is intended. As Evans points out, the level of 
acceptance that construction, and indeed thin universalism, seeks ‘ranges from 
“outright actual agreement” to the little-more-than-notional conceptions of “what one 
might accept under some counterfactual ideal condition’” .106 For some, only actual 
acceptance of thin universal principles will suffice, anything less suggests that the
not to confuse the constructivism advocated by the Rawlsians and Wendt’s social constructivism -  but 
the notion o f ‘building’ common to both is a helpful and oftentimes illuminating concept.
104 See Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification’, pp.81-86
105 See Roberts, ‘Why Thin Universalism Needs Conceptions o f Society and Person’, p .l 16
106 Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification’, p.78
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principles have not been sufficiently worked out. For others, reasonable acceptability 
will suffice, for example in situations where acceptance is not possible, such as with 
those unable to care for themselves. For still others, even acceptability will be 
impossible, because of the nature of their beliefs. In the case of the Nazi, for 
example, engagement, reform and perhaps even coercion will be required. We come, 
on this understanding, to regard construction not as creation, but rather as 
development and as progression. If we are to preserve pluralism as something which 
at times poses a threat to stability and peace, but which is intrinsically and 
instrumentally valuable, a part of a constructive procedure must surely involve 
dynamic processes. Part of the process of construction will sometimes inevitably 
involve attempting to persuade people, as difficult as it may often be, to see the 
world anew, to see the world as somehow pluralized.
The Reflexivity of Regulatory Principles
Construction requires deeper engagement with and between real people than a 
philosophical procedure alone can provide. Similarly, requirements of construction 
extend further than simply pursuing a broad basis of consent. They are more 
restrictive, too, because the requirements implicit within a commitment to 
construction constrain the uninhibited pursuit of acceptance. We construct because 
we believe that acceptance on the basis of aggression or violence is not genuine 
acceptance at all. At the same time, the aims and requirements of construction are 
extended. The demands of consent are an important aspect of the construction of 
regulatory principles; after all, we cannot offer reasons for a principle that simply 
cannot be followed by those who we ask to do so. This is so both for pragmatic 
reasons and for moral reasons that are derived from our own basic principles.
Construction
Although acceptance is an important aspect of justificatory argument, construction is 
not simply a matter of getting as many people as possible to agree.
Regulatory principles will inherently be broad heuristic guidelines and not
107strict algorithmic directives. They must be subject to reflective critique and 
changing circumstance as the elements of construction -  the materials, procedures 
and even principles -  are not fixed or static but are continually undergoing change, 
revision and reflective reconsideration. Thin universalism, and particularly 
constructive thin universalism, takes seriously the contingency of its own normative 
assumptions, and of the facts themselves. First principles and other normative 
assumptions may be regarded as fixed points, though it must be recognised that all 
fixed points are provisional, even where they seem obvious.108 It may be possible to 
express far greater confidence in certain moral judgements than others purely 
because no compelling reasons to revise them have yet emerged. Our judgements 
concerning genocide, slavery, paedophilia, rape and torture, for example, may 
provide compelling fixed points.109 But questions to which only one answer seems 
acceptable are still open to reflection and revision in light of new evidence. And the 
convictions of the ‘fanatic’110 perhaps persuade us that an unwillingness to recognise 
that basic assumptions may become inappropriate in the face of change, leads to 
dogmatism.111
Just as basic assumptions are not fixed, reasons, arguments and justifications 
are not fixed either. Because they are partly dependent on context, and no context is 
permanently fixed, they will by definition be provisional. No principles, reasons,
107 See here O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, ch.3.3 and 3.4
108 In, for example, instances o f racial or gender bias.
109 See John Rawls, ‘The Independence o f Moral Theory’ in Proceedings o f  the American 
Philosophical Association, Vol.48, 1975, pp.5-22 at p.8
110 See, for example, R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1963), ch.9
111 Roberts, ‘Why Thin Universalism Needs Conceptions of Society and Person’, p.l 17; See also 
Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” of Justification’, pp.89-92
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justifications, or assumptions are static and all are subject to critical reflection. 
Genuine construction therefore embodies a commitment to ongoing critical 
reflection. This can be illustrated clearly by Rawls’ notion of ‘reflective equilibrium’ 
which is reached by matching the conclusions reached through construction against 
our considered judgements. For Rawls, a judgement is correct because it issues from 
construction which, correctly followed, is reasonable. A correct model of practical 
reason will therefore yield reasonable principles, and once reflective equilibrium is 
reached, these will be the most suitable action-guiding principles to adopt. The 
constant state of flux in which reasoning operates, however, means that the search for 
reflective equilibrium continues indefinitely. A permanently settled account of our
119constructed principles is never actually reached. As Scanlon notes, ‘we are not in a
position to know once and for all what these terms [of justification for principles]
1 11
should be. Working out the terms of moral justification is an unending task.’ And 
O’Neill reminds us that
Constructivism ... is not a novel philosophical method or procedure. To 
construct is only to reason with all possible solidity from available 
beginnings, using available and followable methods to reach attainable and 
sustainable conclusions for relevant audiences.114
One cannot construct first principles; a project which seeks to construct thin 
universal first principles from nothing more than the bare facts of pluralism will fail. 
It will fail because, as Cohen states, any normative principle which is dependent on 
fact is dependent on another principle which is not dependent on fact. Moreover, 
facts alone lack any catalyst to motivate the construction of normative principles.
112 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.96
113 Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p.361
114 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, pp.63-64
-80-
Construction
One can however construct principles o f regulation that are thin and universal using 
the facts of pluralism and a set of fact-independent first principles. This is how the 
thin universalist project must be framed if it is to succeed. Thin universal principles
n
must be principles of regulation if they are to be responsive to that which they assert 
that they are.
Thin universal principles are responsive to facts about pluralism but they are 
also responsive to higher moral considerations. These include not only respect for 
and sensitivity towards that plurality, but also the conviction that there are certain 
basic standards of treatment which must be accorded to all human beings. Because of 
these moral considerations but also because of the sheer fact of pluralism, 
construction must also concern itself with the idea of consent to any principles it 
advocates. This consent must also be ‘constructed’ through argumentation and 
discourse and is a matter both of moral importance and practical necessity.
Ultimately, principles that emerge from construction are the product of their 
materials; one category of constructed regulatory principles will therefore be thin in 
content but universal in scope. While I have sought here to consider the contexts, 
materials, procedures and outcomes of construction more abstractly, the chapters that 
follow will examine in more explicit detail the process of construction and how it 
results in thin and universal principles. The discussion of constructivism found 
herein is part of an increasingly specific examination of thin universalism. In the first 
part of this chapter I considered the conceptual question of the relationship between 
facts and principles. In the second part I have sought to outline an abstract procedure 
for determining certain kinds of principles based on certain criteria. Chapters two and 
three consider in greater detail the materials from which construction proceeds. 
Later, through closer examination of those materials and criteria, I explore what a
Construction
particular category of constructed fact-dependent regulatory principles will look like, 
and how consent to them is constructed. Following this, the thesis examines how 
those principles might impact upon current debates in international moral and 
political theory.
Ultimately, the process of construction is intended to direct consideration of 
the facts in light of basic normative commitments towards a set of outcomes. 
Construction itself is intended to perform a reformative role upon already held 
beliefs, subjecting agents’ views to careful scrutiny in order to more fully and 
appropriately develop them. The intended outcome of construction is a set of 
principles which reflect the facts of actual human lives, but also reflects the 
awareness of the normativity that is brought to bear on those facts. Through 
arguments designed to fit a plurality of political worlds, construction aims to posit 
regulatory principles that are, in effect, designed and built by people themselves and 
adopted on their own terms.
- two -
Complex Pluralism and 
Violent Conflict
When an action is said to be right or wrong, what kind of statement is being made? 
What assumptions are implicit therein? By whom can they be made and to whom can 
they apply? Moreover, can there only be one set of answers to these fundamentally 
important moral questions? Western philosophy and Western society, throughout 
their long history, have often perceived or sought such singular answers. From 
Socrates to the present day there has been the recurring assumption and/or assertion 
that what is right is right, in all times and places. Thin universalism is premised in 
part on recognition of a tendency towards the contrary: that human beings, in fact, 
seem especially prone to differ in their answers to those questions. It is motivated by 
the idea that, on some of those answers (and on some of the questions) they simply 
do not agree, on others they will not agree, and on others they cannot agree.
Thin universalism is premised on at least two further inclinations. The first is 
that this human tendency towards diversity or disagreement is very real and is, most 
likely, not simply a matter of perception, misunderstanding or antagonism. And, in 
order to properly deal with this diversity or pluralism, no assertion about its 
epistemological status need be made. It may or may not be the case that people 
simply appear to differ; pluralism may be equivalent to the treatment of the dead by
Complex Pluralism
the Greeks and Callatians.1 It may or may not be the case that pluralism is premised 
on the assumption that the values held by one of the parties must be so held in error; 
it may or may not be the product of human imperfectability, incomplete knowledge, 
or defective reasoning. It may or may not be the case that people are simply inclined 
to disagree about what is good, right, or virtuous; it may or may not be that people 
seek disagreement. These all may be true of the ways in which people differ on 
normative matters. They are frequently perceived to be the root of all diversity and 
this is something that cannot be ignored by any theory that wishes also to take 
pluralism and its consequences seriously.
The second inclination is that there is no compelling reason to be troubled by 
this pluralism per se. The sheer fact that two people disagree is not a matter for 
concern; it is rather something that is worthy of respect, perhaps celebration. This is 
not to say that it will never amount to a cause for concern, given the all-too-common 
consequences of necessary and voluntary coexistence. Pluralism has a tendency to 
harbour potential for conflict which is at various times more or less explicit, and 
which on occasion has degenerated into violence. Thin universalism is concerned, 
therefore, to safeguard pluralism and see it flourish, whilst recognising that its 
dynamics often result in its own existence being threatened. Importantly and 
problematically the very fact of pluralism seems to raise questions about the 
plausibility of a ‘universal’ conception of morality from the outset. Given the 
plurality of moral viewpoints which will tend to drive human beings into conflict
1 See Herodotus, Histories (London: Penguin, 1996), Book III. ‘For if  one were to offer men to choose 
out o f all the customs in the world such as seemed to them the best, they would examine the whole 
number, and end by preferring their own ... Darius .. called into his presence certain Greeks who were 
at hand, and asked- “What he should pay them to eat the bodies o f their fathers when they died?” To 
which they answered, that there was no sum that would tempt them to do such a thing. He then sent 
for certain Indians, o f the race called Callatians, men who eat their fathers, and asked them, while the 
Greeks stood by, and knew by the help o f an interpreter all that was said -  “What he should give them 
to bum the bodies o f their fathers at their decease?” The Indians exclaimed aloud, and bade him 
forbear such language.’
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with one another, how might we secure legitimate conditions for a common 
morality? This chapter establishes the thin universalist project through a 
characterisation of pluralism, and how it can be understood.
Pluralism?
John Rawls’ conception of pluralism has informed much of the political theory on 
the topic in the last fifteen years. Pluralism, as understood by Rawls, alters his 
conception of ‘justice as fairness’ as seen in A Theory o f  Justice, resulting in a 
‘political conception of justice’. Part of Rawls’ reasoning for this is grounded in the 
anti-universalist critiques of Enlightenment liberalism mentioned earlier. His 
response can be glimpsed in certain aspects of Political Liberalism, most notably in 
the emphasis on context. Rawls’ ‘political liberalism’ asserts the following:
A modem democratic society is characterised not simply by a pluralism of 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a 
pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of 
these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that 
in the foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will 
ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens. Political liberalism assumes 
that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible 
comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the free exercise of human 
reason within the framework of free institutions of a constitutional 
democratic regime. Political liberalism also supposes that a reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials of a democratic regime. 
Of course, a society may also contain unreasonable and irrational, and even 
mad, comprehensive doctrines. In their case the problem is to contain them so 
that they do not undermine the unity and justice of society.
2 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp.xvi-xvii
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Rawls appears to have cleared away many of the misapprehensions in the twenty or 
so years since Theory, recognising above all the diverse and pluralistic nature of the 
modem world. The influence of his work has led to resurgence in theorising 
pluralism on a number of levels.
The characterisation of pluralism for which I will make my case I refer to as 
‘complex pluralism’, so named because to describe pluralism is to describe 
something multifaceted in character, exhibiting many differently pluralised 
dimensions. For the sake of clarity, however, I begin by outlining an important 
differentiation between two concepts which, though distinct, are commonly 
confused. Complex pluralism is one characterisation of the concept of ‘pluralism’, 
defined as the existence of diverse ethnic or cultural groups within a society or state,
■5
or beliefs or attitudes within a body or institution. It is a social condition 
demonstrating ‘diversity’, ‘difference’ or ‘disagreement’. However, pluralism must 
be disentangled from the similar but distinct concept of ‘value pluralism’, which 
describes not a social condition but a theory of value.4 Charles Larmore has observed 
that these two distinct notions have at various times been the source of much 
confusion when it comes to matters of justice and morality. The source of this 
confusion is clear: both have been referred to or regarded simply as ‘pluralism’ and
3 ‘Pluralism (3b)’, Oxford English Dictionary Online, Second Edition, 1989, (http://www.oed.com 
September 11th 2005)
4 ‘Pluralism’ itself is a term o f relatively recent coinage when considered in the context o f the history 
of thought. Mentions o f ‘pluralism’ can be found in a theological context in Jeremy Bentham’s 
Church ofEnglandism and its Catechism Examined, dated 1818. Philosophically, William James 
considered the notion o f ‘pluralism’ in a letter dated December 1882. See R.B. Perry, The Thought 
and Character o f  William James (London: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996). It is Isaiah Berlin, 
though, who provides the grounding for our modem notion o f pluralism. Berlin spoke o f a ‘pluralism’ 
of values in the closing section of his famous essay ‘Two Concepts o f Liberty’, first delivered as his 
inaugural lecture at Oxford in October 1958, though his treatment o f pluralism seems to date to his 
1953 work The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View o f  History (London: Widenfield 
and Nicholson, 1953). The term ‘value pluralism’ has been seized upon by a number o f subsequent 
thinkers, for example: William Galston, ‘Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory’ in The 
American Political Science Review, Vol.93(4), 1999, pp.769-778 and Liberal Pluralism: The 
Implications o f  Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); George Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (London: Continuum, 2005); John 
Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake (London: Routledge, 1995), particularly ch.6.
-86-
Complex Pluralism
both utilise a common definition of the term: ‘the character of being plural or 
many’.5
The political doctrine of modem liberalism exemplifies this confusion. The 
use of the phrase ‘reasonable pluralism’ by Rawls in Political Liberalism to describe 
the natural tendency for reasonable people to disagree about the comprehensive 
nature of the good life is, Larmore claims, more suitably referred to as ‘reasonable 
disagreement’.6 This, in turn, positions it amongst those claims to the social 
condition of observable moral diversity that I am characterising here as pluralism, 
rather than amongst those that characterise pluralism as a theory of value.7 In spite of 
this, it is all too often taken for granted that modem liberalism is responsive to value 
pluralism. This has led to the assumption that any doctrine that seeks to posit action- 
guiding principles in a diverse society must also be so responsive, thin universalism 
included. This is, I claim, not the case, but because of this pervasive confusion, it is 
worth examining the doctrine of value pluralism in order to draw out two points. 
Firstly, the distinction between the two concepts that are commonly called 
‘pluralism’; and, secondly, to establish why a constructed thin universalism is reliant 
on an account of one and not the other.
Value pluralism is typically contrasted with monism; a theory is monistic or 
pluralistic depending on whether it accepts one or many ultimate principles or values. 
Value pluralism describes a theory or a system of thought which recognises more 
than one ultimate principle, value or good, multiplicity of moral belief and value, or
5 Indeed, Larmore assert that liberalism has been modelled as a doctrine which is both sensitive and 
responsive to value pluralism when it might more accurately be described as sensitive and responsive 
to pluralism as diversity. See Charles Larmore, The Morals o f  Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), ch.7. Larmore cites Thomas Nagel and Joshua Cohen as prime culprits in this 
tendency to conflate the two concepts, though William Galston and George Crowder also speak o f  
value pluralism and liberalism in the same breath.
6 See Larmore, The Morals o f  Modernity, p. 153; and John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1993), Introduction.
7 Larmore, The Morals o f  Modernity, p. 153
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the plausibility of many sources of moral authority. When we speak of a pluralism of 
values we are not referring to observable variations in the moral practises of human 
societies or individual human beings, but rather to a feature of the nature of value. 
On this account, those things that are valuable are not always compatible with one 
another. The term is typically identified with the writings of Isaiah Berlin, who 
conceives of it as describing ‘a deep and controversial account of the nature of the 
good’ whereby ‘objective value is not of a single kind, but of many kinds’. He goes 
on:
This doctrine is called pluralism. There are many objective ends, ultimate 
values, some incompatible with others, pursued by different societies at 
various times, or by different groups in the same society, by entire classes or 
churches or races, or by particular individuals within them, any one of which 
might find itself subject to conflicting claims of uncombinable, yet equally
o
ultimate and objective, ends.
‘Value pluralism’ does not denote cultural diversity or socially drawn moral 
disagreement. Rather, it characterises our ultimate ends, basic commitments, or 
fundamental values; it is a theory about the nature of our first principles. Because 
value can exist in different things, and different things are valuable in different ways, 
there is no single common barometer of value and there is no one source of moral 
authority. Goods, values and ends cannot be reduced to a single unified whole.
Value pluralism thus makes a number of assertions about the structure of the 
normative universe. To assert value pluralism is therefore to make a kind of realist 
claim about moral truth. When the claim is made that, as a matter of fact, the world 
in which we live is pluralistic, a metaethical truth claim is being made. When one
8 Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber o f  Humanity (London: Fontana, 1990), p.79-80
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asserts there to be a plurality of basic moral principles a factual assertion is being 
made about the nature of principles themselves. William Galston remarks:
Value pluralism is offered as an account of the actual structure of the 
normative universe. It advances a truth-claim about that structure, not a 
description of the perplexity we feel in the face of divergent accounts of what 
is valuable. Value pluralism is not to be confused with emotivism, 
noncognitivism, or Humean arguments against the rational status of moral 
propositions. As does monism, it advances a “realist claim about the 
metaphysical structure of value”9
Value pluralism, if correct, is to be accepted as a truth about the world in which we 
live. It is, rightly, not to be confused with many of the other accounts of value which 
challenge concepts of the universal and even the moral -  such as relativism, 
scepticism, subjectivism or emotivism. While it might appear that a thin universalism 
that takes seriously the facts of pluralism would be committed to affirming value 
pluralism, I assert that to do so constitutes a serious error on the part of any 
constructivist theory that emphasises the importance of consent. Firstly, however, I 
sketch the contrasting definition of pluralism as moral diversity in order to draw the 
distinction out more fully.
What I refer to above as ‘value pluralism’ must be demarcated from 
‘pluralism’ denoting a diverse array of individuals and groups within a society. A 
‘plural society’ then, is one characterised by diversity, difference and disagreement 
over an equally wide array of social, moral, political and economic issues. To speak
9 William Galston, ‘Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory’ in The American Political Science 
Review, Vol.93(4), 1999, pp.769-778 at p.770. The phrase in inverted commas is used by Galston and 
is quoted from Glen Newey, ‘ Value-Pluralism in Contemporary Liberalism’ in Dialogue Vol.37(3), 
1998, pp.493-522 at p.499
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of pluralism in the sense of moral diversity, moral difference or moral disagreement10 
is to refer to the demonstrable phenomena that people hold diverse moral views. 
Human societies tend to produce different moral, legal and socio-economic 
frameworks designed to regulate citizens’ conduct and the contrasts between 
different practices and customs, perspectives on life and judgements about what 
make it valuable, are growing ever more visible.11 ‘Pluralism’, then, describes a 
contrast between dissimilar human practices, customs, traditions, and cultures. 
Following more detailed exposition of its character, I come to refer to this 
characterisation as ‘complex pluralism’. This latter conception of pluralism is 
becoming more and more widespread in both academic and popular discourse.
The two concepts are not competing accounts of the same phenomena; they 
in fact function within different orders of moral enquiry. Value pluralism is a second 
order, metatheoretical doctrine about basic moral principles, while pluralism is a first 
order moral theory about those principles that differently situated individuals and 
groups adopt to regulate their affairs. Pluralism is a about the social, cultural and 
moral diversity that is entailed by a diversity of principles of regulation. Doctrine, 
Larmore points out, and disagreement about doctrine can hardly be the same thing;12 
there is a conceptual difference between pluralism as moral diversity and pluralism 
as a theory of value. Indeed, and I move on now to my second point, we can 
acknowledge the fact that people disagree about the nature of value without having to 
say anything substantive about value itself.
10 Terms which are in fact interchangeable in this context. Each features in the definition o f the other 
in the Oxford English Dictionary and each describe at root want o f agreement, discrepancy, or 
dissimilarity. For the purposes of style and clarity, I refer to them collectively as ‘moral diversity’.
11 See Steven Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals: The Implications o f  Diversity (London: Verso, 2003), 
p.l
12 Larmore, The Morals o f  Modernity, p. 154
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The concern to practice sensitivity towards the differences of those people 
with whom we interact may explain the ongoing conflation of the two concepts. 
Sensitivity towards different beliefs and practices may lead to acknowledgment of a 
plural social world but this doesn’t really get to the heart of the matter. What I assert 
is that in order to talk of the observable social conditions of pluralism, one need not 
go further and acknowledge the more fundamental doctrine of value pluralism. The 
account in chapter one of the relationship between first principles and principles of 
regulation recognises that it is coherent to begin either with a single first principle or 
a plurality of first principles. When exposed to different factual conditions, even a 
single first principle may result in a plurality of principles of regulation and hence 
moral diversity. It is not necessary to insist upon a plurality of first principles and the 
constructive thin universalist says nothing about the first principles of others, be they 
monistic or pluralistic. But the value pluralist will cite this as a flaw in an account of 
moral diversity, failing to take proper account of the genuine plurality of human 
ends, values and goods, and thus failing to take proper account of the existence, 
nature and credence of other points of view.
The intention behind asserting value pluralism is often to avoid insisting that
t ^‘our’ morality is the ‘right’ one. As Joseph Raz has suggested, pluralism is not a 
sign of imperfection in our understanding or of the imperfectability of human things 
as one might find in Aristotle. ‘Genuine’ pluralism and value incommensurability are 
for Raz, just as they are for Berlin, an ‘ultimate truth’.14 So through an assertion of 
value pluralism, a kind of ‘moral error’ theory -  where it is claimed that diversity is
13 This is something John Gray highlights throughout Two Faces o f  Liberalism  (Oxford: Polity, 2000)
14 Joseph Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p.327. It must be noted that 
Raz refers to value incommensurability rather than pluralism, but the two terms are often run together. 
For example, Galston’s account o f value pluralism incorporates value incommensurability. See 
Galston, ‘Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory’, p.770. John Gray makes a similar move in 
his conception o f ‘agonistic liberalism’; see his Enlightenment’s Wake (London: Routledge, 1995), 
ch.6
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the product of some kind of mistake -  is avoided.15 Moral philosophy is therefore not 
simply about correcting this error. Similarly, avoiding the assertion that social 
pluralism is in some sense illusory, or transitory, or only skin deep, or that human 
beings have some kind of ‘natural’ tendency towards disagreement, seems part and 
parcel of this concern to respect the genuine character of diversity. This is a valid 
concern and any universalist moral theory that claims sensitivity to real world 
conditions, and in particular the conditions of pluralism, cannot lightly toss it aside. 
Asserting value pluralism seems to recognise the legitimacy of moral difference and 
of the objective validity which most moral frameworks hold for its adherents and of 
the contingency of our own views.
But a thin universalism that asserts value pluralism in order to take proper 
account of moral diversity forces it to court inescapable and potentially immobilising 
controversies. First amongst these controversies is that to cite a ‘fact’ of value 
pluralism seems to assume a Nagelian ‘point of view of the universe’ a ‘view from 
nowhere’ from which this fact can be observed.16 The criticisms that theories such as 
this are lofty, aloof, and disconnected from ‘real’ people are troubling and thin 
universalism seeks to confront them. Indeed, the majority of thin universalisms, 
particularly those which use construction have, by their very nature, been concerned 
to be connected to and derived from the authority and consent of those to whom they 
are to apply. They follow Michael Walzer in pursuing a thin universalism that is not 
‘everyone’s morality because it is no-one’s in particular’ where subjective interest
15 As described by J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977), ‘Part 
One: The Status O f Ethics’
16 See Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Nagel’s view 
is far more subtly nuanced than is required to get my point across here, but many critics have raised 
powerful objections to the very concept o f Nagel’s ‘nowhere’ argument, and for good reason.
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and culture have been cut away, but that remains bound up within the plurality of
1 7moralities, cultures and societies.
One might, then, assert that one can stand within diversity, regard an 
observable plurality of regulatory principles and conclude that such diversity cannot
1 ftcome from a single source, from error, or simple antagonism. It must come from a 
plurality of ultimate values or first principles. This leads to a second and, for a 
constructed thin universalism, more significant controversy. This is the inescapable 
fact that many moral cultures make truth claims which purport to be universally valid 
and which are grounded in broadly monistic conceptions of value. Protagonists of 
moral standpoints, Alasdair MacIntyre tells us, are almost never relativists; at the 
same time, rarely are they pluralists. Truth claims, he suggests, encompass a set of 
further claims about rational justification, which includes the assertion that all rival 
claims are in some way false (in that they proceed from false premises or make 
invalid inference or the like).19 Most moral cultures encompass some claims to truth, 
making them, by-and-large, hostile to the genuine recognition of value pluralism. 
The vast majority of moralities, be they religious or philosophical have, throughout 
human history (from Christianity to Buddhism, from Plato to utilitarianism), asserted 
a single source of value or authority in matters of moral concern. Pluralism, our 
socially diverse world, is made up primarily of monisms. Part of what makes that 
pluralism ‘complex’ is that the nature of value and the nature of pluralism are deeply 
contested.
17 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, (Notre Dame: University 
o f Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp.7, 15
18 Perhaps through, for example, the use o f Cohen’s thought experiments. See G.A. Cohen, ‘Facts and 
Principles’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol.31 (2003), pp.211-245. See also, chapter one above, 
pp.51-53
19 Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification’ in Kelvin Knight (ed.), The 
MacIntyre Reader (Oxford: Polity, 1998), pp.202-220 at p.204
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Value pluralism, Larmore reminds us, is ‘a deep and certainly controversial 
account of the nature of the good.’ It must therefore be presumed that the concept of 
value pluralism is itself likely to be a source of disagreement among people, 
‘reasonable’ or otherwise. And, as a consequence, adherents of many monistic, 
determinist or universalist moral doctrines would need to radically change their 
comprehensive world-views in order to accept pluralism as a theory of value. 
Requiring them to do so signifies two further failures. It is a failure firstly to ‘take 
people as they are’ in that relevant facts about them were not taken into account. To 
fail in this regard signifies a failure to fulfil the practical and moral demands made by 
construction. It signifies a failure to follow ones own rules. It is secondly a moral 
failure, in that the moral character of those persons was not properly regarded. To 
fail in this regard is to fail to respect those normative characteristics of human beings 
deemed earlier to be significant. Such failures open up space in which the kind of 
unjustifiably homogenising, perhaps even unjustly coercive moves, which 
constructivism and thin universalism reject, can flourish.
If value pluralism is indeed a deeply controversial account of the nature of 
good, it seems clear that, practically speaking, one cannot assert a ‘truth of value 
pluralism’ as a simple fact, because this deep controversy renders it widely 
problematic. It is so controversial, in fact, that most would probably reject it. Morally 
too, one must question the assertion of any truth, whose acceptance would force such 
radical change in individuals’ and groups’ worldviews that from no point of view 
could one be said to have respected the beliefs, values or practices of others. 
Insistence on a principle that no one can accept, scarcely reflects sensitivity and 
respect!
20 Larmore, The Morals o f  Modernity, pp. 154, 168 [(emphasis added)
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As a result, a form of epistemic abstinence may be available to balance the 
concern to respect social pluralism (by not adhering to a theory grounded in error or 
perception) with the practical task of seeking consent (by avoiding premises that are 
inherently and deeply controversial). This can be done by ‘bracketing o ff the notion 
of value pluralism. By remaining silent on pluralism as a conception of value and 
asserting instead the observable fact of pluralism as diversity, persons are not asked
91to take on board premises they simply cannot accept. If the construction of thin 
universal principles of regulation is to proceed from some conception of our first 
principles in conjunction with ‘the facts of pluralism’, those facts need not be 
metaphysical in nature but ought rather to be observable, practical facts about the 
social world in which we live. Value pluralism does not constitute such a fact. What I 
come to call complex pluralism does. While this might appear to weaken my case in 
one respect by removing a strong metatheory, which seemingly supports both 
constructivism and thin universalism, it actually strengthens it in another. To abstain 
from making judgments about the ‘true’ nature of value is to embrace a more 
contingent and shifting basis for a thin universalism. It is to cast doubt on 
foundations of an ahistorical and transcendental nature and it is to demonstrate a 
sense of self-critique and reflexivity which is integral to the character of a thin 
universalism.
In sum, then, value pluralism is a contested notion, the truth of which will 
forever be in dispute, and which cannot therefore be a ‘fact’ in the sense of an 
uncontroversial premise from which to construct moral principles. The ‘fact’ to 
which my constructivism is to appeal is therefore the plurality of moral systems and 
cultural norms and philosophical and religious doctrines in the world. This is an
21 Larmore, The Morals o f M odernity, p. 173
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observable fact, which reflects a genuine condition of domestic societies and the 
global social, economic and political arenas. To glimpse this fact one need do little 
more than open a newspaper, or turn on a television. It could reflect the truth of a 
plurality of values, but it could just as easily reflect some theory of error, or a 
transitory state of human affairs. The fact of pluralism does not have to reflect the 
truth of value pluralism.
Complex Pluralism
Given this distinction, one may be tempted to take up Rawls’ notion of ‘a pluralism 
of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines’. Indeed, the ‘fact of 
reasonable pluralism’ seems congruent with the approach to pluralism favoured by 
thin universalism. Rawls borrows the distinction from Joshua Cohen, between ‘the 
simple fact of pluralism’ wherein the protection of basic liberties results in moral 
‘pluralism’, and ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism’ wherein that protection leads to a 
pluralism where some moral conceptions fall within the set of fully reasonable
99conceptions. However, we are constantly reminded that beneath reasonable 
pluralism lies a simple pluralism. This issue arises noticeably when Rawls’ struggles 
to address the problem of those elements of a plurality that are unreasonable from 
within the framework of his political liberalism. At the start of this chapter I began 
by quoting Rawls in stating that ‘a society may also contain unreasonable and 
irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines’ and ‘in their case the problem is 
to contain them.’ 23 Rawls fails to do so within his own political conception of 
justice. Where violence is invoked as a means to a political or social end, Rawls 
advocates falling back upon a comprehensive liberal doctrine in order to reject it.
22 Cohen, ‘Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus’, p.282
23 Rawls, Political Liberalism , pp.xvi-xvii
-96-
Complex Pluralism
When certain members of a society deny what Rawls calls ‘the fact of reasonable 
pluralism’, he is forced to resort to a comprehensive liberalism, which of course is 
not endorsed by citizens generally. It reminds us again, that beneath reasonable 
pluralism is a simple pluralism that cannot be addressed from within Rawls’ political 
liberalism.24
That the fact of pluralism does not necessarily reflect the truth of value 
pluralism does not itself make for what I call ‘complexity’. It is rather the 
multifaceted nature of the diversity that constitutes pluralism that makes an adequate 
account of it difficult and contestable. This characteristic of complexity manifests 
itself in several ways. Firstly, as I have already suggested, value pluralism is itself a 
pluralistically contested concept; there is little to no agreement about the ‘source’ of 
pluralism in society and there is still less agreement about the more fundamental 
values that may or may not give rise to it. Pluralism in this way demonstrates what I 
call ‘meta-complexities’. Secondly, pluralism exists in three or more distinct socio- 
psychological domains. These cover three sometimes synchronised, oftentimes 
competing, social and mental realms in which frameworks of principles interact. I 
refer to these as ‘complexities of domain’. Thirdly, when we speak of a plurality of 
social groups, we are not referring solely to a plurality of groups who adhere to 
moral frameworks; there are many more systems of group affiliation and competition 
which pay very little regard to moral questions. Similarly, pluralism is made up of 
groups and individuals, states and regions, sub-groups, factions and sects. Not all 
groups are the same size or of the same kind -  they can range from single people to 
countries of billions. These I call ‘conceptual complexities’. Because I have already
24 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 152-153
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considered the complexity of the relationship between pluralism and value pluralism, 
I focus primarily on the complexities of the second and third kinds.
How might we characterise ‘complexities of domain’? Shane O’Neill, in 
Impartiality in Context, identifies two distinct domains of pluralism upon which I 
intend to focus. Following the Rawlsian characterisation, he argues that pluralism in 
the internal or domestic domain encompasses the inability of reasonable people to 
agree on comprehensive conceptions of the good (‘reasonable disagreement’). The 
focus here is on the plurality of groups within a political society, and this can be 
usefully drawn upon and incorporated into this more complex understanding of 
pluralism. Typically, O’Neill argues, this has been the context in which liberal 
conceptions of impartiality and egalitarianism have been invoked as a means of 
arbitrating the potential consequences of this plurality.25 However, various theories 
of multiculturalism, particularism and prescriptive accounts of pluralism have 
emerged in recent years and now stand as fervent critics of strict liberal impartiality 
and egalitarianism, especially on questions of cultural equality and disadvantage, in 
its address of domestic pluralism.
In the international or global domain there also exists a plurality -  here a 
plurality of differently constituted political societies, states, nations, religions and
25 Shane O’Neill, Impartiality in Context: Grounding Justice in a Plural World (New York: State 
University o f New York Press, 1997)
26 See, perhaps most notably, Bikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and 
Political Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); and Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A 
Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995)
27 Theories of ‘pluralisation’ such as those of Nicholas Rescher and William Connolly have emerged 
to urge that pluralism is not simply a background condition to which we must respond, but which is 
also a state o f affairs, which ought to be pursued and brought about. See Nicholas Rescher, Pluralism: 
Against the Demandfor Consensus (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993) and Connolly, Pluralism
28 The literature here has burgeoned in recent years, perhaps in part due to Brian Barry’s thorough and 
entertaining yet somewhat bullish address of this issue. See Brian Barry, Culture and Equality 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2001); Paul Kelly (ed.), Rethinking Multiculturalism: Culture and Equality and 
Its Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 2002)
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90cultures. The notion of an international plurality, described by Rawls as ‘the 
diversity among reasonable peoples with their different cultures and traditions of 
thought, both religious and nonreligious’, seems similar but not totally symmetrical 
to domestic pluralism. It is notable that, again, Rawls’ conception of pluralism makes 
no metaethical demands: he cites not value pluralism, but a conception of reasonable 
disagreement: ‘Even when two or more peoples have liberal constitutional regimes, 
their conceptions of constitutionalism may diverge and express different variations of 
liberalism.’ Focus, however, should remain on Rawls’ assertion of three points. 
First that pluralism is indeed an external, international issue; second that the concerns 
of any principles (in this case of justice, but also of morality) are to secure justice, 
peace and stability between the members of that plurality; and third that the best 
means of doing so is not through comprehensive unity of religious, moral or
91philosophical doctrine.
The communitarian tradition has long since been concerned to address 
questions of international pluralism, an approach that O’Neill refers to as 
‘contextualism’. Communitarians such as Michael Walzer have argued for 
‘immanent’ or ‘connected’ critique, established as a form of social criticism as 
opposed to so-called ‘external’ critique. Walzer is deeply opposed to the idea of a 
supposedly objective, impartial and external spectator, who has access to allegedly 
advanced universal or transcendental principles and whose goal is ‘conversion’ not 
‘criticism’. A connected critic on the other hand makes use of ‘standards ... that are 
internal to the practices and understandings of his own society’.32 Further, criticism 
is a first order activity and not a second order reflection on activity. In other words,
29 O’Neill, Impartiality in Context, Introduction
30 John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 11-12
31 See Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples, pp. 17-19 on ‘The Law o f Peoples as a Realistic Utopia’
32 See Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Pres, 
1993), p.38-40
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criticism, if it is to be so called, must be context-dependent; it must be a social 
activity in itself with a distinct social purpose. The critic takes sides and occupies a 
distinct position with regard to the prevailing forces within a society.33 It is therefore 
insufficient, on this account, simply to examine and criticise social practices from 
outside, problematising again a Nagelian ‘view from nowhere’.34 Construction must 
engage with internal, connected practices of critique, if it is to take proper account of 
pluralism.
The ‘international’ domain is thus characterised by a plurality of recognised 
states, societies and territories and by a plurality of groups which transcend the 
boundaries of those states, societies and territories. The ‘complexity’ is generated 
because the latter account of international pluralism is further problematised by the 
assertion of a ‘domestic’ pluralism, characterised by a plurality of groups within a 
recognised state, society or territory. This is so primarily because there are very few 
societies over a certain size that can be considered to be genuinely univocal or 
homogeneous because they are constituted by no single societal group. As such, 
asserts Seyla Benhabib, cultures are in fact polyvocal, multilayered, decentred and 
fractured systems and it is no longer plausible, or even possible, to speak coherently 
of seamless, monistic, homogeneous, internally coherent and hermetically sealed 
societal or cultural wholes. Attempts to make such claims essentially ‘fetishise’ 
cultures in a way that attempts to place them beyond any kind of critical analysis, in a 
way perhaps implied in Walzer’s insistence on the validity only of the connected 
critic. They in fact proceed from a false assertion about human society, referred to by
33 Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism, pp.51, 55
34 A similar notion can be found in the writings o f Richard Rorty. Rorty’s philosophical pragmatism 
leads him to conclude that commitment to liberalism is the product o f contingent historical 
circumstances, rather than o f an understanding o f some set o f profound metaphysical truths or 
transcendental values. The conclusion that this leads Rorty towards is that it is not possible to question 
and challenge any culture from an external perspective. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and 
Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.59
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Benhabib as the ‘reductionist sociology of culture and knowledge’.35 The 
interconnectivity and interdependence of the modem world prevents, to a large 
degree, the formation of coherent and socially universal, Rortyean ‘we attitudes’, 
where the ‘we’ is genuinely uncontroversial.36 The central cultural experience of 
modernity for a vast number of people is, therefore, the experience of pluralism 
itself. Shared cultural life is experienced, even at its strongest, concurrently with the 
experience of pluralism.
Furthermore, all societies face the issues of pluralism because, in the age of 
modernity and globalisation, all societies must confront one another and participate 
(to whatever extent) in a global plurality of states, societies, nationalities, ethnic 
groups, religions, cultures, classes and corporations; each possessive of a contingent 
history that has given rise to a relatively distinctive, often pluralised, framework of 
principles. What has been demonstrated by the modem age, more poignantly than 
any other historical era or epoch, is that human social relations, cultural creations and 
moral frameworks demonstrably differ both according to, and within the same time 
and place. It is worth emphasising ‘demonstrably’ because it is this new ability, 
however unwillingly, to observe moral difference that has so categorically confirmed 
this diversity. The growth in communication and transportation technologies, and the 
ease and speed with which information, goods and people can cross vast distances, 
and transcend natural and man-made boundaries, are characteristically modem 
phenomena. Again, the experience of an individual and collective cultural life is 
shared with an experience of the plurality of every level of those collective lives.
35 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims o f Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), pp.4, 25-26
36 See Rorty, Contingency Irony and Solidarity, p.59 for his identification o f moral predicates 
formulated as so-called ‘we-attitudes’; and Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, pp.24-25
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Of course, pluralism as understood here is not just limited to the international 
and domestic spheres. Pluralisation tends also to occur within groups and even within 
those subgroups. Hence, to these domains of international and domestic pluralism 
must also be added an unspecifiable number of other domains of pluralism on 
various levels reaching all the way down to the individual human being. This 
‘individual’ domain, which is primarily psychological rather than social, is derived in 
part from the consideration of value pluralism and the multiplicity of values held by 
individuals. Yet surely, if we must abstain from a metaphysical account of value 
pluralism, what part could such a domain play in a characterisation of pluralism as 
complex? One might view the individual person as at least in part constituted by a 
complex network of overlapping, interacting and oftentimes conflicting group 
commitments. I could be after all a father, a grandfather, a Christian, a Catholic, 
British, English, an academic, a student, a Marxist, a member of the labour party, a 
trade unionist, a member of the local golf club, and a member of Weight Watchers, 
all at the same time. These various affiliations, memberships and commitments 
reflect a plurality of individual commitments which must be taken seriously. Very 
few people have no such plurality and even the most ‘fanatical’ individuals often 
have families, or consider themselves part of a community or state which is not 
directly related to their cause. Overall, part of the complexity of pluralist society is 
its many layers. Individuals with a plurality of commitments live in plural and 
diverse societies which in turn are part of a plurality of legal, national, moral, 
religious and ethnic communities which exist in a broader plural world.
37 Which in turn may be part o f an even broader plurality o f worlds’, but which, as ought to be clear, 
should not feature in a discussion of pluralism as an observable phenomenon. As I have stated, one of 
the key features o f pluralism that permits its use as fact is its self-evidence. O f course, the notion o f a 
plurality o f plural worlds remains the purview o f science-fiction, and the lack o f any evidence o f other 
worlds which would constitute such a plurality is reason enough to be unconcerned about this 
potential dimension o f the question. Onora O’Neill makes a similar comment concerning the societies
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This brings me now to the notion of ‘conceptual complexity’, which 
completes my account of complex pluralism. It is important to examine more closely 
what is ‘plural’ within pluralism and how pluralism functions as a system of 
conflicting organisational frameworks. The kind of conflict that tends to emerge 
from pluralist societies does not always turn on the basis of a plurality of purely 
moral dispositions. Here we might consider William Galston:
Not all goods are moral ... goods of the body, material resources, family and 
friends, a long and fortunate life -  are also genuine goods. The effort to 
designate a single measure of value either flattens out qualitative differences 
or (as in John Stuart Mill’s version of utilitarianism) embraces these 
differences in all but name.38
Galston of course is referring to value pluralism; that the genuine plurality of human 
goods and values is not exclusively confined to those in the moral realm. But, if an 
account of pluralism is to remain silent on the question of a plurality of values, must 
we be silent on this dimension of complexity also? The problem of conflict 
associated with pluralism need not be premised only on value conflicts. Rather, as 
should be clear, regardless of the source of the conflict, that conflict is undeniably 
‘social’ and social conflict does not revolve solely around moral questions. Conflicts 
exist in the personal, social, cultural and economic realms and they amount to more 
than simply a plurality of moral viewpoints. The economic issues raised by leftist 
and libertarian critics, the gender-oriented issues raised by feminist critics and queer- 
theorists, and the cultural issues raised by communitarian and multiculturalist critics
of the T ang Chinese and the Anglo Saxons during the middle ages. Being unaware o f one another’s 
existence it would be a pointless exercise to consider whether one society acted justly or morally 
towards the other, just as there is little point pondering excessively the extent to which we may be 
acting morally or justly within a plurality o f worlds. See Onora O’Neill, Towards justice and Virtue 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 105-106
38 William A. Glaston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications o f  Value Pluralism for Political Theory 
and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.30-31
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of the dominant liberal tradition form part of the complexity of the pluralist model. 
Economic conflict, over material issues such as property or territory,39 for example, 
is clearly not coextensive with moral conflict. They have different features, cover 
different spheres of disagreement, and concern different values. Yet each amounts to 
a substantive framework, and cultures are partly constituted by the interactions, 
clashes and compromises of such frameworks. It might be prudent to ask, therefore, 
how it might be possible to tease out and elucidate a moral framework or perspective 
from people’s commitments, be they economic, social, or cultural. One might, for 
example, be able to discern a commitment to liberty, or equality, or to rights and 
duties, based on a person’s economic status, commitments and judgements. 
Similarly, one’s cultural values will almost invariably inform one’s more explicitly 
moral commitments. Even categories of gender and sexual orientation are constituted 
by acceptance of or challenge to a set or system of values which are evident 
implicitly in the choices we make on the basis of those categories. An account of 
pluralism, then, will need to take account of its conceptual complexities. How and, 
indeed, the extent to which these other systems of value inform agents’ systems of 
moral value will of course vary.
These conceptual complexities are further stretched by the diversity of the 
nature of these frameworks. Some comprise domestic socially-situated groups, while 
others are international economic organisations. Some are legally recognised states, 
while others are disenfranchised individuals. No two groups are exactly alike, and 
there are sufficient differences to posit that, even if we were able to categorise the 
groups that comprise pluralism, those categories would themselves be sufficiently 
different to constitute a dimension of pluralism all of its own.
39 On this aspect see, for example, David Delaney, Territory: A Short Introduction (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2005)
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As one might expect, pluralism in the modem age can be shown to be 
tremendously complex. The Oxford English dictionary definition of pluralism cited 
earlier specifically cites ‘ethnic or cultural groups’.40 Given this, the phenomenon I 
am describing is rightly characterised as ‘complex pluralism’ as it incorporates not 
only a plurality of ethnic and cultural groups, but also of religious, philosophical and 
moral groups, as well as economic and ‘social’ groups. It exists not only within ‘a 
society or state’, but also within ‘a body or institution’, and within international 
society generally. Its source is unclear, but again, I stress that this need not concern 
us. What ought to concern us is first the extent to which this complexity entails a 
relativity of values. Why doesn’t cultural relativism follow from complex pluralism? 
The second and more important concern is the enormous potential for conflict, and 
moreover, violence, that pluralism contains. Ultimately, these two concerns will 
determine the form and scope of a procedure of construction and of a thin 
universalism.
Complex Pluralism, Relativism and Universalism
The complexities of the diversity that human beings and human societies face as a 
matter of fact may seem to be leading in one direction. It seems reasonable to affirm 
that the most plausible explanation for moral diversity is that pluralism affirms 
relativism: ‘there is no single true morality. There are many different moral 
frameworks, none of which is more correct than the others’.41 But this need not be 
the case. To assert complex pluralism, one is committed neither to an absolute 
cultural relativity of all principles nor to some metaethical relativity of value. 
Pluralism and relativism, while similar, are in fact distinct, and it is important to
40 See again, ‘Pluralism (3b)’, Oxford English Dictionary Online
41 Gilbert Harman, ‘Moral Relativism’ in Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thompson, Moral 
Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p.8
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outline how. An account of the distinction between pluralism and relativism must be 
developed in two stages. The first stage must distinguish again between first 
principles and principles of regulation, between value pluralism and complex 
pluralism, and between metaethical and cultural relativism. This is done in order to 
prevent conflation of two different arguments, with only one of which the thin 
universalist need engage. At the second, the answer takes the form of a constructed 
thin universalism itself.
The key to deflecting the claims that pluralism is simply relativism 
redescribed, or that it necessarily entails relativism, begins with grasping three 
fundamental distinctions. In chapter one I considered the distinction between 
fundamental first principles and adopted principles of regulation. First principles are 
statements of higher convictions, which one does not select or adopt in order to solve 
problems and which are independent of ‘the facts’. Principles of regulation, by 
contrast, are those adopted in light of certain facts and are addressed to a concrete 
problem and are therefore intended to have certain effects. To assert ‘pluralism’ in 
this context is to assert one of the two concepts I have outlined above. In asserting 
value pluralism, one is making a claim about the nature of first principles, a truth 
claim that higher conviction are numerous, ultimate ends are varied, and first 
principles are many. By contrast, in asserting a form of social pluralism, of which 
complex pluralism is an account, one is making a factual claim, not about first 
principles, but about principles of regulation. It is to claim that the regulatory 
principles that various groups have adopted in, light of their own circumstances, can 
be seen to differ as a matter of fact.
Similarly, to assert relativism in a metaethical sense is to make a claim about 
first principles; to assert that they are not only many, but that they are entirely
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context or framework dependent. In this context relativism is an absolute form of 
value pluralism. It describes an absolute, unchecked, unrankable, incomparable, 
incommensurable and unlimited plurality of values and goods, none of which can be 
compared alongside others, or alongside an independent moral barometer, in order to 
discern meaningful judgements or comparisons between them.42 For the relativist our 
first principles, our sense of ‘moral right and wrong (good and bad, justice and 
injustice, virtue and vice, etc.) are always relative to a moral framework.’43 No single 
standard therefore exists by which one can assess the truth of a moral proposition. 
Like pluralism, metaethical relativism describes the structure of the normative 
universe -  it is an account of the nature of value. Cultural relativism, on the other 
hand, is the different claim that one’s values or principles make sense only within the 
context of one’s own culture. What follows is the prescriptive assertion that ‘you’ 
cannot make judgements about ‘our’ principles or practices, because they are ‘ours’ 
and not ‘yours’. Cultural relativism is a claim to the relativity of adopted, fact- 
dependent, regulatory principles and not of basic, fact-independent first principles.
For the thin universal theorist of pluralism, the first task is then to 
demonstrate how and why asserting complex pluralism (which functions at the 
regulatory level) does not entail a relativity of values (at the level of first principles). 
This is done in a manner similar to the epistemic abstinence forwarded in the earlier 
discussion of value pluralism. To characterise modem society as being pluralistic is
42 Again, the value pluralist may wish to turn to Berlin for two means o f revealing how a conception 
of value pluralism rejects relativity. He asserts firstly, in a line o f thought derived from J.G. Herder, 
that ‘members o f one culture can understand, and enter the minds of, and sympathise with, those of 
another’. This assertion is made on the basis that while there are many (potentially incommensurable) 
kinds o f happiness, they ‘all respond to the real needs and aspirations o f normal human beings’. See 
Berlin, The Crooked Timber o f  Humanity, p.84. Secondly, Berlin, to quote John Gray, ‘always 
affirmed the reality o f goods and evils that are not culture-specific but generically human’; pointing to 
a universal minimal content o f morality by which some cultures would be condemned. See John Gray, 
Enlightenment’s Wake (London: Routledge, 1995), p.81. For Berlin, pluralism denotes a distinctly (if 
not unproblematically) finite diversity o f societal organisations.
43 Harman, ‘Moral Relativism’, p.3 (emphasis added)
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to advocate no prima facie rejection of the plurality, the universality or the relativity 
of first principles. One makes no claim about the plural, universal or relative nature 
of first principles, basic judgements, or ultimate values by asserting complex 
pluralism. This I have already established. The pluralism which characterises modem 
society is one of observable, actually-held views of human agents;44 it is a plurality 
of principles of regulation. To suggest that complex pluralism therefore implies a 
relativity of values is to make a ‘category’ error -  to confuse two orders of moral 
inquiry in such a way as to glean something of the nature of first principles from the 
principles of regulation that different societies adopt to regulate their affairs. At this 
point, the moral sceptic will want strongly to suggest that while it is not necessarily 
the case that a complex plurality of regulatory principles has higher order 
implications (i.e. implications regarding our first principles), it is perhaps the most 
reasonable thing to infer from the observable fact of diversity. Indeed, J.L. Mackie 
and Gilbert Harman have suggested that the fact that there is widespread ethical 
disagreement provides enough reasonable evidence to suggest that there are no 
objective moral facts -  if there were, surely there would not be widespread ethical 
disagreement!45 The question of why this does not imply a relativity of principles of 
regulation, in the same way that one might suggest a plurality of first principles 
implies a relativity of those principles, will be dealt with in due course.
Firstly, though, it is worth mentioning where universalism fits into this 
picture. In all of its key conceptions, value pluralism also presupposes and makes use 
of a thin conception of universalism. This is done precisely in order to reject the 
accusation that it is indeed a variety of metaethical relativism. A basic plurality of
44 By ‘agent’ I refer simply to a morally relevant individual or group of individuals who posses 
‘agency’ in that they are capable o f holding and acting upon a framework o f  values. It assumes that 
people are capable o f acting on a collective or individual basis towards a wide diversity o f goals 
informed by a plurality o f value frameworks.
45 See Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, pp. 15-25; Harman, ‘Moral Relativism’, pp.8-14
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fact-independent values, in order to resist relativism must make use of such a thin 
universalism. The pluralisms of Berlin, Galston, Crowder and Gray stress this need, 
as can clearly be seen in Galston’s five ‘basic premises’ of value pluralism:
1. Pluralism is an account of the actual structure of the normative universe -  it is 
‘true’.
2. Pluralism is not relativism. It is premised on a floor of basic moral decency.
3. Above this floor there is a multiplicity of heterogeneous goods that cannot be 
reduced to a common measure of value.
4. These qualitatively distinct values cannot be ranked.
5. There is no single overriding good or value.46
The second of these concerns the moral minimalism that key value pluralists assert. 
According to Berlin, Galston et al, part of how we are to define pluralism and 
distinguish it from other accounts of the nature of value (and specifically relativism), 
is the in-built moral minimalism that underpins it. Can this truly be the case? Galston 
is keen to assert that the distinction between right and wrong is non-arbitrary, but he 
goes on to say very little about how that distinction is drawn, who draws it, and the 
extent to which cases close to the line are to be determined, or what criteria could be
used to decide. Attaching addendums to pluralism such as a ‘floor of basic moral
decency’ seems to set the concept of pluralism a partly prescriptive and not purely 
descriptive task. Either there are many sources of value or good or there aren’t and 
surely, even without a moral minimum pluralism still describes a plurality of ultimate 
ends, values, or first principles. But by adding the idea of a moral minimum into an 
account of pluralism, some conception of value is ascribed to pluralism itself. Rather 
than it being a theory which simply describes the nature of the moral universe, 
Galston wants it to be, it becomes a partially normative theory.
46 Galston, ‘Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory’, p.770
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On the other hand of course, it can reasonably be claimed that there are 
simply some things that are not valuable, for example, wanton cruelty, torture, 
slavery or genocide. It could quite reasonably be established that there are simply no 
grounds for making the claim that such actions are justified. Pluralism is, we must 
remember, avowedly not a form of subjectivism or emotivism and the pluralist is not 
committed to the crude empiricist claim that everything that people value as a matter 
of fact must in some sense be valuable. This, it will be claimed is precisely where the 
moral minimum comes in. But how is one to determine where to draw the bottom 
line? And how would one demonstrate that that such a bottom line was not in some 
sense culturally biased?47
This approach, then, seems simply to be a form of thin universalist project. 
One of the key features of a thin universalism is the idea that some actions are not 
acceptable in any context, that there is a limit to diversity, or that there is a moral 
bottom line of acceptable treatment of human beings. This assertion of ‘pluralism’ 
with an implicit moral minimalism therefore seems simply to ‘beg the question’. It 
presupposes that which is to be elucidated and justified, a moral bottom line, 
precisely because citing pluralism in a justification of thin universalism still leaves 
the question of where the ‘moral floor’ of pluralism is and how one establishes and 
justifies it. It is, after all, determination of those very limits to legitimate pluralism 
towards which a thin universalism strives.
The theorist of complex pluralism, however, not being embroiled in these 
debates, need say nothing about the relativity or plurality of first principles because it 
is a descriptive term which simply stresses that there is a diversity of social and 
ethnic groups in society. Such a conception is quite compatible with the rival claims
47 Which would, o f course, be both morally problematic for, and practically pervasive to, the 
objectives o f pluralists, constructivists and thin universalists.
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that all values are of a single source, all values are relative to a particular culture, that 
values are universal, or that values are many. One need not be a pluralist, monist, 
relativist, or universalist to acknowledge a plurality of social groups.
Seeking to characterise this plurality is to appeal to the validity of the claim 
that different people in different times and places hold at times radically different 
views. Such views are contingent, historically grounded and highly contextualised. 
Different values, principles and ways of life are regarded by different human beings 
and human societies as good. It is reasonable for them to do so in the sense that 
agents will hold strong, at times deeply powerful and justifiable reasons for 
following them. The strong emphasis on difference has been taken by many to mean 
that all evaluations are dependent upon the social context in which they arise and that 
culture, and indeed morality itself is therefore characterised by an inescapable and 
irreducible relativity of value.48 A key task of the theorist of pluralism, and indeed, 
the task of the thin universalist, is to show that we need not accept the claim that all 
evaluations are necessarily context-dependent.
Cultural relativism, as such, can be countered on several fronts. Firstly it can 
be asserted, as I have done, that the kind of political, cultural and moral frameworks 
that are assumed by absolute pluralism do not exist in the way it is supposed that 
they do. They are not each single, homogeneous, closed systems. Rather, they are 
porous and changeable, connected and interdependent49 This raises two questions: 
Can these frameworks be considered frameworks in any meaningful sense? And 
how, if they do exist, can such frameworks, interdependent as they are, operate
48 The literature here is vast, but the place to begin is with the most concise statement o f cultural and 
moral relativism. See, therefore, Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation o f  Cultures (London: Hutchinson, 
1975)
49 See, again, this assertion made by Benhabib, that cultures are not ‘internally coherent seamless 
wholes; many are in fact polyvocal, multilayered, decentred and fractured systems’. See Benhabib,
The Claims o f  Culture, pp.24-25
- 111-
Complex Pluralism
without any kind of shared judgements? The consequences of this critique are 
instructive. They seem to echo Berlin’s assertion that members of a community 
ought to be able to understand and sympathise with those of another because that 
which we might seek to understand is premised on something that is not culturally 
particular.50 Similarly, Benhabib seeks to assert that, at the very least, it is possible to 
identify ‘framework transcending criteria of evaluation’ without which it would be 
impossible even to recognise and individuate those other frameworks.51
Second, the notion of ‘absolute’ plurality implied in relativism seems to be 
self-refuting. According to Melville Herskovits, ‘evaluations are relative to the 
cultural background out of which they arise’. The longstanding critique here is that 
this poses immediate problems for the relativist because, if by ‘evaluations’ 
Herskovits means all evaluations of any kind (which he seems to), then the thesis is 
self-refuting. If the statement is correct then by its own virtue it must be contingent 
upon whether a particular cultural or moral framework accepts it, and not all do. In 
essence, relativism destroys the objective basis upon which it posits itself and hence 
cannot be a ‘truth’ that holds for all cultures; ‘it asserts an absolute prescription that 
all prescriptions are relative’.52 Of course, it might be asserted that many, perhaps 
almost all, evaluations are relative, but that crucially some or many more are not. But 
it would seem that to make such an assertion is to stray from an absolute, relativistic 
pluralism and into, perhaps, a more complex understanding of it.
Third, even if relativism does not destroy its own objective basis then it is at 
least committed to one universal value judgement: that one ought to respect the 
integrity of and not interfere with the value systems of other cultures. Even absolute
50 Berlin, The Crooked Timber o f  Humanity, p.84
51 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p.28
52 Melville Herskovits, Man and His Works: The Science o f  Cultural Anthropology (New York:
Knopf, 1949), p.63; also Alison Dundes Renteln, International Human Rights: Universalism versus 
Relativism (London: Sage, 1990), pp. 68-69, 72
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pluralism is, on this reading, premised on a very thin universalism grounded 
ultimately in some conception of respect or equality (just as the ‘early’ Walzer’s
• • C lstrong contextual communitarianism is ). The thin universal principle at work within 
relativism and its fellows is simply one of respect for other cultures, or the assertion 
that all evaluations are relative.
Cohen asserts that ‘you cannot think a first principle right for one society but 
not for another without embracing relativism’.54 For Cohen, it seems there can be no 
assertion of value pluralism without the assertion of relativism on some level. This 
relativistic concern may or may not be the case. This thesis does not speak to this 
issue and seeks actively to abstain from any kind of commitment such as this for the 
reasons outlined earlier. It must be noted, however, that Cohen has no such concern 
with a plurality of regulatory principles. Problematic as it is, absolute cultural 
relativity need not concern us if the object of inquiry and construction are principles 
of regulation. One can endorse different regulatory principles for different societies 
without being any kind of a relativist. Indeed, one can imagine that anything 
constructed will almost certainly differ according to variables within the procedure of 
construction with or without reliance on the plurality, universality or relativity of first 
principles in general. A plurality of principles of regulation, then, does not lead to the 
automatic dismissal of the thin universalist project before it gets off the ground. 
Complex pluralism can accommodate a metaethical relativism, that is, one can be a 
metaethical relativist, or reject it outright, and still regard complex pluralism as fact, 
without having to accept an absolute relativity of regulatory principles. This is in part 
due to the nature of the project and in part due to the nature of relativism itself.
53 See Michael Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice: A Defence o f  Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic
Books, 1983). See also, my introduction, pp. 12-13
54 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (s), p.243
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Relativism retains a great deal of practical import for the thin universalist once 
precisely what ‘relative’ describes is established.
Pluralism and Violent Conflict
I have thus far attempted to establish that i f  the thin universalist project aims to 
establish and justify minimal but universal principles, capable of making judgements 
that are not contextually limited, it must account for complex pluralism. Complex 
pluralism must be distinguished from value pluralism if it is to serve as the basis for 
a procedure of construction intended to establish and justify universal principles. It is 
characterised by many dimensions and domains, as one might expect given that is 
both ‘complex’ and ‘plural’.
However, while the fact of pluralism is a source of concern and consternation 
for many (however justifiably), it may also be the case that that concern lies not with 
pluralism itself but with the seemingly enormous capacity for conflict, even violence 
that it carries with it. This conflict and violence in turn poses a threat not just to 
human life and human societies but to the very existence of pluralism itself. Within 
the normative commitments that drive a thin universalism is the assertion that respect 
for human beings entails respect for their cultural creations in all their concomitant 
diversity. This in turn implies (using Cohen’s method of illuminating our higher 
commitments) that pluralism itself is something to be valued and respected. While 
not all may agree with this assessment (arguing instead that all ought to be brought 
into the fold of a particular religion or way of life), part of what a thin universalism 
urges is the practical sense in which pluralism is an enduring state of affairs.
Where two frameworks offer contradictory accounts of the course of action 
one should take, but must also exist in the same context (they must exist both at the
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same time and in the same place), conflict, and we must ultimately assume violent 
conflict, is often the unhappy result. This is not, of course, to follow the sceptical 
Platonic line of thought that popular political deliberation leads invariably to 
violence.55 It is, however, to suggest that clashes frequently occur, and that they 
occur for a variety of reasons. Steven Lukes asks:
What theoretical and practical conclusions should we draw from the ever 
more visible contrasts between ways of life -  between different practices and 
customs, between divergent perspectives on life and judgements about what 
makes it valuable, between divergent ways of responding to common 
problems that generate countless misunderstandings and conflicts that can 
end in war?56
It is the potential for war that seems most unsettling about moral diversity. This 
might seem somewhat pessimistic, or perhaps an exaggeration of the extent to which 
diversity can lead to violence. But consideration of recent history reveals examples 
of disagreements degenerating into value conflicts and then further into armed 
clashes, wars and genocides. Conflict is perhaps as observable a fact as diversity 
itself.
It is often assumed that the source of this conflict must be a plurality of 
values, that value pluralism generates the conflict which poses this threat both to 
human lives and to pluralism itself. Berlin notes:
If, as I believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of them are in principle 
compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict -  and of tragedy -  
can never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or social.57
55 See here Plato, The Republic (London: Hackett, 2004), Book 8, Section 563a, p.260
56 Steven Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals: The Implications o f  Diversity (London: Verso, 2003), p.l
57 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in his Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University 
press, 1969), p. 169
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If indeed there is a genuine plurality of values, ongoing and perhaps devastating 
conflict seems inevitable and eternal. Two separate points now emerge. First, value 
pluralism falls short of a full explanation of human conflict. As I have discussed, 
very few people actually accept the premises of value pluralism. Hence in citing it as 
a root cause of everyday conflict the problem of its contested status resurfaces, 
stalling the project once more. Moreover, if pluralism is genuinely important, and 
violent conflict is something which is a threat to it, it is a problem that must be 
addressed. However, it is not clear that the factual occurrence of violence could 
threaten the existence of value pluralism. If value pluralism is an account of first 
principles -  of the structure of the normative universe -  could it really be threatened 
by conflict and violence? Surely, while conflict is widespread and occurrences of 
violence are prolific, they do not, and could never, threaten this structure of value. 
This of course does not mean that what is valuable is not threatened; merely that 
‘pluralism’ understood as a proposition about first principles is not what is at risk. 
Second, one can proceed with an account of conflict from the observable fact of 
complex pluralism without making assertions about value pluralism. It is complex 
pluralism and not a basic plurality of values (if one exists) that is actually at risk 
from violent conflict.
How does the question of violence therefore translate? John Keane suggests
• CQthat civil societies tend to generate two contradictory trends. On the one hand, 
socialising conflicts, which teach individuals and groups to live together and the 
meaning of concession and compromise, and on the other, vastly uncivil forms of
58 Meaning, here, not the idea o f societies that are in some way civil, but rather the (often times vast, 
often times minuscule) space between government and private life.
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violence ranging from vaguely threatening rudeness to ‘post-civilised barbarity’.59 
He goes on to stress that the ability of pluralistic societies to
enable groups to organise for the pursuit of wealth and power has made their 
capitalist economies and political institutions not only restlessly dynamic at 
home, but also prone to expansion on a global scale, one consequence of 
which has been the widespread exporting of violence .. .60
Keane is also aware of the multiplicity and complexity of a plurality of forms of life. 
He goes on:
The legal or informal freedom to associate in complex ways afforded the 
members of any civil society evidently also makes them prone ... to violence 
at home. ... Civil societies ... are complex and dynamic webs of social 
institutions in which ... citizens’ inability to conceive of and to grasp the 
horizons of social life, combined with the chronic uncertainty of key aspects 
of life (employment and investment patterns, who will govern after the next 
elections, the contingent identity of ones self and ones household) make their 
members prone to stress, anxiety, humiliation and revenge. ... Such fragility 
increases the probability that the customary moral sanctions and restraints 
upon the resort to violence can be rejected or avoided by some of the 
members.61
The fact that a pluralist society holds within it the potential for incivility, to 
paraphrase Keane, seems somewhat less surprising that it does at first sight. One can 
easily comprehend how a state of complex pluralism might develop into a state of 
conflict and even violence. This is not of course to insist that pluralist societies are 
inherently more violent, though that claim may be hard to resist and, at the very least,
59 See John Keane, Violence and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.91- 
92
60 Keane, Violence and Democracy, p.98
61 Keane, Violence and Democracy, pp.99-100
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it suggests that complex pluralism adds a new ingredient to the social mix which is 
itself a potential source of violent conflict.
However, given that conflict, incivility and violence do indeed pose a 
problem, there will be cause to seek resolutions to conflicts, often through arbitration, 
compromise or pursuit of common ground. Rarely does violence benefit where a 
peaceful resolution to conflict does not, and often the destruction of an enemy is 
counter-productive, even where unity, singularity and homogeneity are sought as 
ends. The common ground in question may vary from, at its strongest, deeply-held 
historical commonalities to nothing more substantive than recognition of the 
conditions and concomitant problems of diversity. In each case the connection will 
almost certainly be different. How the connection is established will also be 
different, as will the justifications for adopting certain courses of action -  the 
common ground will be akin to a patchwork quilt rather than a single strand of 
gossamer. But the content of that common ground will always embody something 
fundamental if not singular.
‘The Problem’
It is because of conflict, and not because of pluralism, that common ground is sought. 
It is not pluralism itself that drives the particular requirements of justification, the 
need for construction, or even the thin universalist project itself. Rather, it is that 
pluralism seems to impel us into conflict, often times violently, that provides this 
‘drive’. We offer reasons and justification and we attempt to construct consent to thin 
universal principles not simply because we want to agree, but because we want to 
minimise conflict and violence, a desire for which we may hold a number of good 
reasons.
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We have good reason to assume that we cannot and must not expect others to 
share our social, moral, political, religious or economic values. Complex pluralism, 
conflict and violence provide reasons to offer adequately intelligible, sufficiently 
accessible, and meaningfully applicable justifications for the principles, beliefs and 
endorsements of particular courses of action we may wish to claim hold 
universally.62 Violent conflict provides a factual or empirical point, to which the 
moral principles we endorse are sensitive and from which a motivation to construct is 
derived. It is from the perspective of complex pluralism, but which recognises that it 
is the violent conflict that ensues that constitutes a problem to which a solution is 
required, that the drive towards construction of principles of regulation, which are 
thin and universal in character, emerges. They offer means of dealing with the 
violent conflict that emerges. This is especially pertinent as pluralism stresses the 
multiplicity of answers to questions of violence and suggests that the causes of 
violence are rooted in cultural and social relations and that violence itself is therefore 
contestable and contingent.63
So, while it is perhaps perceived to be so, pluralism is not a problem per se, 
(though a perceived problem can admittedly be equally as dangerous, even then 
perception can be altered by experience). In some circumstance civility within a 
pluralist society breaks down, pluralism descends into violent conflict and a problem 
can be shown to emerge. This conflict, which reflects the complexities of pluralism 
itself can be of many kinds, be it crime, local rioting, minority persecution, war, 
civil-war, genocide or international terrorism.
62 ‘Adequately intelligible’ in that reasons must be posed in a language, form and manner which is 
intelligible to the recipient; ‘meaningfully applicable’ in that reasons must appeal to some authority or 
value which is genuinely applicable to recipients; ‘sufficiently acceptable’ in that the recipient must be 
physically, psychologically and socially able to accept reasons offered. I develop this further in 
chapter five.
63 See Keane, Violence and Democracy, p.97
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It is this, the potential for what Keane calls ‘uncivil violence’, that is the true 
‘problem’ here.64 Complex pluralism possesses an enormous and perhaps largely 
untapped potential for violence, kept in check by both pragmatic and moral concerns. 
When these checks fail, often in concert with any one of a number of other social, 
economic or political failures, and either within a society or between societies, 
violence ensues, and complex pluralism becomes a problem requiring a solution.
Of course, it may be argued that this problem of violence exists perpetually, 
but emerges only in certain context or as a result of certain actions or under certain 
conditions. Indeed, the potential for violence escalates at certain times, in certain 
places, and in certain circumstances. In certain contexts, for example in 
contemporary Baghdad, it is almost omnipresent. In others, in New York and
tfiWashington on September 11 2001, its expression is highly distinctive and deeply 
shocking, or, in the case of Rwanda in 1994, it is utterly devastating. In many places, 
however, it exists perpetually as potential; most societies and, indeed, most cities 
over a certain size harbour it. The violent potential of pluralism overflows in a 
variety of different ways, in a variety of places.
Pluralism, and the potential for violent conflict which it holds, is not just an 
issue that faces liberal democracies; it clearly faces all societies. This is so because 
there are very few societies over a certain size that can be deemed genuinely to speak 
with a single voice. Moreover, all societies face the issues that pluralism presents 
because, in the age of modernity and globalisation, all societies must interact with 
one another in an explicit and a global plurality of states, religions and ethnic groups, 
each possessive of a contingent history that has given rise to a characteristic, and 
itself pluralised, conception of value.
64 See Keane, Violence and Democracy, particularly chapters 3 and 6
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In sum, then, it is the violence which ensues from a complex pluralism which 
the thin universalist project takes as its factual starting point. Value pluralism simply 
cannot be taken as such; too many of the world’s comprehensive religious, moral, 
and social doctrines are too inherently monistic to accept such a fact. Value pluralism 
does not afford the complexities I have outlined in this chapter; one cannot posit a 
domestic and international plurality of ultimate values or ends, for this would 
confuse two separate orders of moral inquiry. What is more, value pluralism is not 
threatened by violence and conflict; if value pluralism is an account of the structure 
of the normative universe, such issues could have no significant bearing upon it. It is 
rather complex pluralism, as I have characterised it here, that interacts with the issues 
at hand and it is complex pluralism that is the proper focus of this project. What I 
shall demonstrate over the coming chapters is that complex pluralism is connected 
fundamentally to how one develops and justifies a thin universalism. It is from the 
fact of complex pluralism that we find the resources required to construct a set of 
thin universal principles of regulation; it is complex pluralism that impacts how that 
construction is to proceed and those agents and features that need to be considered. It 
imposes substantial limits on the kind of universal judgements one can make and has 
a profound impact on the form and content of those judgements. If universalism is to 
survive the recognition of complex pluralism intact, it must situate that pluralism, 
and the problems of conflict and violence associated with it, front and centre; it must 
acknowledge them, respond to them and revolve around them. It must, I shall argue, 
be thin.
So far I have outlined how one might go about developing a set of thin 
universal principles of regulation, through a constructive procedure, from (inter alia) 
the facts of complex pluralism. Such a project aims not to construct morality in its
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entirety, nor does it aim to establish ethical first principles. I turn my attention in the 
next chapter more explicitly to the moral motivations of a thin universalism, in 
conjunction with the procedure of constructing principles of regulation from the facts 
of complex pluralism. These motivations take the form of a set of prior moral 
commitments -  a principled commitment to respect the moral significance of human 
beings and their social worlds -  within the context of pluralism; they drive the thin 
universalist project and provide a point of departure for developing a ‘pluralistically 
enlightened’ universalism. It is these commitments that highlight the need to make 
moral arguments justifiable, firstly in the sense that they must be reasoned and 
coherent, and secondly in the sense that they must aim to be publicly justified -  they 
must aim to take account of the moral character of those who are to receive them. It 
is from these commitments that construction must proceed and it is these concerns to 
which I turn my immediate attention.
- three -
‘First Principles’ and Questions 
of Justification
How one characterises and defines pluralism will of course determine in part how 
one responds to it. The constructive thin universalism I develop in this thesis is a 
direct response to the complex pluralism outlined in the previous chapter and to the 
conclusions about the nature of principles developed in the first. Once 
misconceptions about the object of construction -  regulatory principles -  and about 
the nature of pluralism -  its complexity, interconnectivity and violent potential -  
have been cleared away, there remains one final task before it becomes possible to 
begin to characterise constructed regulatory principles which bear certain 
characteristics. If ‘principles of regulation’ respond both to facts and principles alike, 
given that the previous chapter considered the facts of complex pluralism, a 
discussion of the principles -  those pre-existing commitments, moral motivations or 
first principles -  at work in construction is now necessary.
As such, this chapter begins by considering the normative dimension of the 
materials from which construction and hence thin universalism proceeds. These 
normative materials I refer to as ‘first principles’ in accordance with the distinction 
drawn between fact-independent first principles and constructed, fact-dependent 
regulatory principles in chapter one. The chapter examines how one might establish 
them as starting points for the thin universalist project and explicitly how they might 
be justified in this role. This done, the features of the procedure which constitute the
rirst Principles
materials from which the construction begin are all in place. This chapter closes the 
gaps in my account of what I have called the ‘materials of construction’. Ultimately, 
it offers the first stages of my, at this stage, quite abstract account of construction -  
and specifically the construction of a thin universalism -  which will unfold in the 
chapters that follow.
First Principles
Analytic philosophy tends to make a distinction between the form, content and 
purpose of different kinds of principles. The outcome of the thin universalist project 
is a set of principles of regulation, which are a particular kind of moral principle. But 
because of the urgency and severity of the cases to which thin universalism is 
addressed -  those things that should be secured or prevented everywhere -  they are 
essentially political principles. Political principles are moral principles which are 
deemed to be enforceable by an empowered body such as the state. Principles of 
regulation are political principles. Principles of regulation also display, among 
others, three characteristics, which make them importantly distinct from and which 
they could not possess if they were first principles:
1. They can be the product of a procedure of construction.
2. They can therefore be regarded as fact-dependent, or fact-sensitive.
3. They could, therefore, but need not be ‘thin universal’ principles.
The justification of regulatory principles is heavily intertwined with these 
characteristics. They are said to be justified, at least in part, because they are the 
product of construction, because they respond to the facts, and because they respond 
to the facts in this particular way.
first Principles
However, in chapter one I established that they also respond to basic, higher, 
more ultimate commitments, which I characterise as our first principles, which do 
not bear these characteristics, which are not in this way justified and whose 
justification, as such, remains open to question. Cohen’s analysis of facts and 
principles does not address the question of how our first principles might be justified, 
only the question of how we arrive at them, and how we might reason from them. 
But a thesis with broader aspirations will need to concern itself with how one arrives 
at first principles, how one reasons from them and how one might justify them and 
thus how one might establish their validity, particularly over other possible first 
principles reached in a similar way. This task is crucial not least because the validity 
of constructed thin universal regulatory principles is, inter alia, a function of the 
validity of the first principles from which they are constructed. Just as one cannot 
construct from what appear as facts, but which actually amount to highly contentious 
claims about the nature of value, one cannot proceed without first offering some 
justifiable grounds for the first principles from which one begins.
The account of construction developed in chapter one asserted forcefully that 
first principles are not objects of construction but materials. They form part of that 
set of factors which shape those regulatory principles that we construct. The first 
principles which inform the construction of thin universal regulatory principles need 
not exhibit any of the thin universalist characteristics that their constructed 
counterparts’ posses (though this does not preclude the possibility that they may well 
do so). Following Mark Evans we can identify two powerful considerations that bear 
upon the thin universalist project:
hirst principles
[1] the belief that ‘being human’ has an invariable normative significance 
that places moral limits on the kinds of society fit for people to inhabit 
(the universalism);
[2] a respect for the plurality of human values, cultures and belief 
systems, which implies that a truly universal morality necessarily 
under-determines the full moral character of any particular form of 
society (the thinness)}
Redescribed as first principles we might posit:
[la] an imperative to treat those individuals with the characteristics
relevant to describing them as ‘human’ in such a way as to respect 
their existence, well-being and flourishing as individuals. And
[2a] an imperative to respect the broad plurality of human social and 
cultural creations in such a way that recognises their contribution to 
human existence, well-being and flourishing.
Principle [la] reflects the persistent belief that what it is to be human holds, and
continues to hold, a distinct normative significance which does not vary according to
particular attributes or characteristics or particular human societies or cultures.
Attached to this belief is the notion that there are, in fact, certain limits on the kinds
of society fit for human beings to inhabit; there are certain ways of organising social,
cultural and political life that are simply not conducive to the living of a worthwhile
life. This is the source of the ‘universal’ content of thin universalism. The view has
long since been the perspective of liberalism, but it has recently been adopted by a
number of universalism’s opponents as a response to noteworthy concerns that
theories of so-called ‘radical socialisation’ and ‘radical value incommensurability’
are unable to avoid a moral relativism untenable in the interconnected plural world
1 See Mark Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification’, in Bruce Haddock, Peri 
Roberts and Peter Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order: The Challenge o f  Diversity (London: 
Routledge, 2006), pp.76-96 at p.76
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described in chapter two. They fail to account fully for the complex nature of 
pluralism.2
By unpacking principle [la] a whole set of first principles which are equally 
basic and fact-independent, but which are less abstract, emerge. Respect for the 
‘existence’ of individual human beings implies a commitment to respect human life 
and to respect it on an individual basis, howsoever it might be socially situated. This 
respect might be further discharged through a commitment to provide for the basic 
needs that human beings possess, such as food and water, clothing and shelter. 
‘Being human’ entails biological imperatives which must be met in order for the 
status of ‘human’ to be maintained. A commitment to the normative significance of 
human beings might therefore prompt first principles prohibiting violations of the 
body, such as purposeful causing of harm and other brutalities. This may also include 
prohibitions on killing of certain kinds, or perhaps any kind.3 In order to respect 
flourishing we might posit a commitment to equality -  ‘rough equality between 
people is good’. We might seek to combine that with a commitment to ‘freedom’, 
again broadly conceived, prompting a prohibition on slavery and perhaps, 
conversely, an emphasis on education, as both freedom and equality provide for 
human flourishing. These may amount to a first principle that commits us to facilitate 
meaningful lives where possible.
Principle [2a] reflects an acknowledgement of, respect for, and sensitivity 
towards the complex plurality of human cultures, and of their concomitant beliefs, 
values and social systems outlined in the previous chapter. While it often leads to
2 Radical socialisation theories might include those outlined by Clifford Geertz in The Interpretation 
o f  Cultures (London: Hutchinson, 1975), and by Michael Walzer in Spheres o f  Justice: A Defence o f  
Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983). Radical incommensurability theories are 
considered by John Gray in his later work, particularly Enlightenment's Wake.
3 Though, it must be made clear, one could not identify first principles that prohibit torture, or murder, 
as these are, in a very distinctive way, fact-dependent principles.
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heightened social conflict and even violence, pluralism, it must be recognised is here 
to stay. Though this will be disputed, pluralism itself is, and ought to be regarded as a 
state of affairs that is in some way valuable and therefore worth sustaining. In the 
first instance, this commitment reflects the acknowledgement that two people can 
and will hold different views about a single issue. It secondly recognises that this 
conflict of views is most likely ineradicable. Even if pluralism could be eliminated, it 
would most likely be through a violation of the principle [la] above, and as a 
consequence we must conclude that it not temporary or transitory. Taken a step 
further, this second basic principle reflects the more problematic claim that pluralism 
aids in the development both of a wider view of the world, and of greater self 
understanding. From this is derived an understanding that if a morality is to be truly 
universal it will invariably underdetermine the full scope and content of morality in 
any society, including a liberal society, in which it holds. This is the source of thin 
universalism’s ‘thinness’. Typically the domain of the particularism it is universalists, 
and liberals in particular, who have come to regard pluralism in this way and have 
sought to adjust their theories of justice and morality accordingly.4
Following principle [2a], we might firstly restate the general inclination to 
respect cultural diversity, moral difference and social pluralism. Herein is contained 
a commitment to recognise and value human societies -  a recognition that, in order 
to respect what it is to be human, we must also respect that which constitutes them. 
First principles which express that importance and respect are also present. We 
might, at the same time, posit a commitment to peace -  we ought to pursue peaceful 
relations in all situations as a matter of priority and urgency. Unpacking this still 
further we might also therefore posit a commitment to non-interference towards that
4 Here the obvious candidates are those liberals in the Rawlsian tradition.
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with which we disagree or of which we disapprove. We might therefore value 
autonomy or recognise the importance of self-determination on the part of political, 
social and cultural structures and wish to recognise them as first principles.
These first principles are recognised through an examination of pluralism; 
they are not generated or created by that examination. That is, it is through an 
examination of the factual conditions of complex pluralism that we are able to 
illuminate our, perhaps hidden, higher convictions. This explicitly does not 
determine what those convictions are. However, it is through this careful 
examination of pluralism that the form of universalism present in the first 
commitment reasserts itself so forcefully. Similarly, it yields the equally strong 
second consideration: that we have good reason to respond sensitively and cautiously 
when confronted by a complex plurality. These two motivating principles are not 
derived from factual considerations about human beings, or about their societies. 
They are ways of orienting and organising normative thinking about facts. They are 
not fact-dependent, and would hold regardless of any changes in factual 
circumstance, specific attitudes, or local conditions. In recognising these ultimate 
principles through the kind of processes discussed by Cohen in ‘Facts and 
Principles’5 it is possible to regard them as starting points for a further procedure of 
construction and justification which yields thin universal regulatory principles.
They are illuminated and recognised through careful consideration of our 
initial responses or considered judgements about complex pluralism. When pluralism 
is examined and conclusions are drawn, that examination and those conclusions are 
drawn in light of those first principles. They are not fixed, nor are they 
transcendental or eternal truths -  though many of them may be true -  they are simply
5 G.A. Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.31 (2003), pp.211-245 at 
(e), pp.215-6. See also chapter one of this thesis.
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justified responses to the world as it stands. They form, alongside the facts, the basis 
of a procedure of construction designed to generate as outcomes fact-dependent 
regulatory principles which are intended to address, confront, critique, preserve and 
affect the complex plural world in which agents find themselves.
They may appear to be themselves constructed; indeed, they are powerfully 
linked to the facts of pluralism, but they are not dependent on those facts, and it is 
this that defines them as first principles. They may well be reducible to the two more 
abstract principles already considered and there is nothing in their expression which 
is not encapsulated by the commitments to respect for human beings and respect for 
pluralism. Indeed, ‘respect for human beings’ may even be able to absorb respect for 
pluralism; for how is one to respect human beings if one does not respect their 
diverse social creations? The core of the first principles which are illuminated by the 
examination of pluralism in the previous chapter is a single, what we might call 
‘homo sapiens-centric’ first principle. This first principle assumes human beings as 
our moral category, an assertion which of course requires further justification of its 
own.
It is important to begin by reasserting the exact wording of this first principle: 
‘homo sapiens-centric’. It uses the biological categorisation of human beings as a 
species to define its scope, to which it attaches powerful and unique moral 
characteristics. This is quite clearly apparent in the phrasing of the first motivating 
principle, ‘that “being human” has an invariable normative significance’. But, of 
course, this prompts the question: why treat ‘human’ as a category, and why should it 
take priority over others? What makes us distinct and why is this distinction 
possessive of such normative weight? Why must human beings be the basis for a 
universal morality of any kind?
First Principles
In answer to this it should firstly be noted that some conception of humanity 
as a principle category for addressing moral questions is a common move, and one 
that is certainly not limited to universalist or Western thought. Even anthropological 
relativisms and other theories of radical socialisation often begin from a barebones 
conception of a universal ‘human nature’, rational psychology, our capacity for 
reason, emotion or sensation or the like.6 Such accounts often struggle to find 
theoretical leverage without such conceptions. The notion of human beings as tabula 
rasa, encompassing no inherent characteristics or worth of any kind is implausible 
and extremely uncommon, and ‘nature versus nurture’ is a false dichotomy. While it 
is not my intention to move into a discussion on the relative weight of nature and 
nurture, of ‘humanity’ and ‘culture’, or of the universal and the particular in the 
development of moral characteristics, it is important to emphasise that neither fully 
makes sense, in this context, without the other.
As such, it is of course possible to ask that people regard themselves as part 
of a category called ‘human beings’, but is it reasonable to ask them to do so? Can 
they actually be provided with reasons to do so? It is certainly not treasonable to 
assert membership of the category ‘human being’. While it would perhaps be 
irrational to refer to oneself only as a member of the human race (and thus depriving 
oneself of all the material, spiritual, cultural and social benefits of group 
membership), doing so whilst at the same time affirming ones allegiance to a number 
of other groups would be perfectly reasonable. As Martha Nussbaum states, one 
needn’t give up on ones local affiliations to profess to also being a citizen of the
6 Particularly, here, see Steven Lukes’ suggestion that Rorty, who gives a supposedly foundationless, 
‘ungroundable’, account o f social life, which avows any common human nature. Yet at the same time 
he cites characteristics such as humiliation, poetry, sex, identity as distinctly ‘human’. See Steven 
Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, p. 19; and Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity.
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world. So, is it reasonable to ask people to think of themselves in universal terms on 
some level? To think of themselves as human beings, rather than as Welsh, black, 
Muslim, working class, liberal, Kurdish, conservative or the like? In chapter four I 
outline arguments that help to construct an impression of the necessity of ‘the 
universal’ as a tangible and important category. For now it is enough to assert that, 
given the complexities of pluralism, with its concomitant economic and political 
interconnectivity and social and cultural porosity, we have good reason not always to 
confine our moral thinking to restricted, ‘inside’ groups.
Nonetheless, are there dangers of treating human beings as a moral category? 
Does it advocate disregard for non-human things of value, such as non-human 
animals? After all, cruelty and disregard are as common in human relationships with
• oanimals as respect and compassion. Might it also generate a disregard for things 
which are important to human beings, but which lack the characteristics possessed by 
human beings and non-human animals. The natural environment, or constructed 
human environments, may come under considerable pressure if our moral category is 
taken to be human beings. Disregard for such environments could have 
immeasurable impact which would invariably spread to an impact on human beings. 
Indeed, high on the political agenda recently has been the debate over the climate 
change and carbon emission standards. A disregard for the environment has 
potentially existential implications. Constructivism need not be, and is not blind to 
this.9 Citing human beings as our principal moral category does not exclude moral 
reflection on non-human considerations. Just as asking people to view themselves as 
members of the human race is not the same as asking them to cast off their more
7 See Nussbaum, For the Love o f Country: Debating the Limits o f  Patriotism, pp.6-7
8 See here much o f Peter Singer’s work on animal rights, for example, In Defence o f  Animals: The 
Second Wave, Second edition, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). See also John Gray, Straw Dogs: Thoughts 
on Humans and other Animals, (London: Granta, 2003)
9 See O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, pp. 174-178
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particular affiliations, so citing the category of ‘homo sapiens’ does not mean that 
everything outside that category can or ought to be excluded from our moral 
thinking.
At the centre of this response to pluralism we find a core made up of fact- 
independent, homo sapiens-centric basic or first principles. Importantly though, what 
defines first principles as first principles is not their non-reducibility, but rather their 
explicit fact-independence. First principles could be further reduced to more abstract 
and more general principles, but they are still essentially first principles. Constructed 
principles on the other hand, which respond to facts about the world and agents and, 
crucially, other principles cannot be first principles precisely because they respond to 
fact. This I emphasised in chapter one and Cohen and Sen label those principles that 
don’t reflect facts as ‘basic’. While he does not press this particular point, it is clear 
that Cohen regards fact-independence as the key criteria for the label ‘basic’ or in 
this case ‘first’.10
But why not proceed simply from that single homo sapiens-centric first 
principle? The answer to this is that it may be too abstract. If we seek to cash out a 
principle which articulates nothing more than the sentiment that we ought to ‘respect 
human beings’ we may find that many doctrines which claim to respect them do no 
such thing, or even that moral atrocities are committed in the name of such a 
principle. We may call to mind the concern of Richard Rorty, that acts of sexual 
sadism by Serb soldiers upon ethnic Muslims involved no violation of respect for 
them as human beings because they were as beasts to them.11 Nor is it inconceivable 
that the Nazis believed that they were somehow ‘respecting human beings’ by
10 See Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (d), p.214, fii.5
11 Richard Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’ in Truth and Progress: 
Philosophical Papers Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 167-185 at pp. 167- 
168
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ridding the earth of the Jewish people. Showing ‘respect’ to infidels or non-believers 
may simply involve sending them to heaven. A homo-sapiens centric first principle 
would show such points of view to be in obvious error. One cannot follow through 
on such a first principle in any way that denies the normative significance of any 
human being. The homo sapiens-centric first principle, while it may afford too much 
interpretive flexibility on its own (or without further elucidation) is still vital for 
orienting how first principles are carried through. And as such, regulatory principles 
that deny the humanity of some human beings, and use this to exclude them from 
moral consideration, are faulty and have not been adequately scrutinised during their 
construction.
A single first principle then is abstract, so abstract, in fact, as to be hollow 
and open to almost unlimited interpretation. We might in turn consider Carl 
Schmitt’s claim that certain models of political thought press us to brand those who 
we count amongst our ‘enemies’ as ‘inhuman’: something less than ‘human’.12 But 
branding certain kinds of treatment as ‘inhuman’ is not simply about tackling a 
descriptive issue; it is far more normatively loaded than that. Referring to a course of 
action as ‘inhuman’, or referring to someone as ‘inhuman’ is to make a claim about 
the rightness and wrongness of that action, about how they should or should not act. 
To claim that someone has acted in a way that is inhuman is not to claim that the 
actor is in some way not human, but that they have acted in a way that human brings 
should not act. Referring to someone as ‘inhuman’ is different to referring to them as 
‘not human’. Again, a homo sapiens-centric first principle would preclude such an 
implication.
12 See Carl Schmitt, The Concept o f  the Political (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1996) and 
The Nomos o f  the Earth in the International Law o f  the Jus Publicum Europeaum, (London: Telos, 
2003)
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While the two principles outlined above can provide some safeguards against 
such accusations, there may still be too little substantive content therein to establish 
them as considered valid and justified responses to the facts of complex pluralism. 
The set of first principles I have forwarded above, while they are still notably 
abstract, are far less so than the two imperatives which encapsulate them. They 
properly reflect the wider considered judgements which we come fully to realise 
after examining the facts of complex pluralism. Nonetheless, it quickly becomes 
apparent that even they are still too abstract to be of any great use in practice. One 
can see how such abstract principles have little capacity to solve genuine moral 
problems. Indeed, it is partly because those principles are too broad, abstract and 
general to confront the world that we seek regulatory principles in order to navigate 
them and why we might employ methods of construction in order to arrive at them.
First principles, it becomes clear, will be inclined to conflict, contradict and 
compete. They are generalised statements which reflect our considered judgements 
about the facts of the world in which we live. It stands to reason that we would react 
to different events in ways that lead to considered judgments which in many cases 
are not logically compatible with one another. In preserving the welfare and 
flourishing of some it may be necessary to restrict the freedom of others (for 
example, in cases of violent or sexual crime). Peace is good, we may say, and to 
pursue peace is an honourable goal but, to return to Brian Barry, we might worry that
1 T‘peace at any cost is a curious universal value’. The balance between justice and 
mercy, between freedom and equality, between peace and security cannot be struck 
simply by weighing up these values or principles in abstraction. Indeed, it is 
precisely because they are abstract that we find ourselves in need of other principles
13 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), p. 135
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in order to navigate them. They will not solve our moral problems, and may in 
certain cases complicate them. They do, however, offer insight into the kind of social 
world in which we seek to live and it is this that motivates and shapes the 
construction of regulatory principles.
But this begs a number of further questions. Why these principles and not 
others? What grounds might we have for holding them, or for citing them as 
important features of how we organise normative thinking? What validates or 
legitimates them? It is all very well to cite these first principles as points of departure 
for a procedure of construction, but this leaves open the question of why we should 
depart from these points and not others. The principles themselves remain in need of 
justification -  a task for justificatory philosophy.14 Thin universalism appears, to 
supporters and critics alike, to be obsessed with the justificatory arguments that 
might defend it and thin universalists tend to approach questions of justification with 
some rigour. The issues raised here are far from settled and the emphasis on 
justification itself needs to be justified. I now turn to examine what justifies the first 
principles I have outlined above, and what validates them as starting points for a 
constructivism of this kind. Ultimately I will assert that the justification of first 
principles is the first stage of a legitimate procedure of construction and is itself a 
reflection of the commitments posited in the two first principles.
Justification
What does it mean to offer justification for a set of first principles? Where might 
such an argument begin and how might it proceed? What does it mean to offer
14 Here I follow Mark Evans again, in his understanding o f ‘justificatory philosophy’ as referring to 
the justification o f fundamental or first principles (and as distinguishable from ‘critical expository 
philosophy’ which takes certain principles as given and seeks to explore consequences that follow 
from them). See ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification’, p.82
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justification, to justify what one does, what one thinks or what one believes? Is it 
simply to provide good reasons or to have adequate evidence for holding a belief or 
principle, for expecting others to do likewise? Presumably, in order to justify the 
holding of a belief or principle one must demonstrate that one has warrant to hold it 
and that warrant is most likely provided by the holding of supporting reasons.15 This 
is the common view of ‘justification’, though it has been suggested that justification 
must be more discursive than the simple giving of reasons.16
While we might wish to seize on a more unequivocally ‘critical’ account of 
justification, providing ‘reasoned warrant’ in fact fulfils its necessarily critical 
function. The reasons provided that constitute a justification for a basic moral 
principle must ultimately be defended from the criticisms that it is bound to face, 
especially when confronted with complex pluralism.17 Justification is a monological 
and a dialogical task which takes place both within and between people, groups of 
people or their representatives. The justification of first principles and vindicating 
them as starting points for other philosophical and political projects must occur in 
this way. Only by examining alternatives, through criticism and critique, can reasons 
be shown to adequately provide warrant for the holding of a principle.
15 Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification’, p.77
16 Carl Wellman, has suggested that the reasoned warrant approach to justification is essentially 
‘uncritical’. Justification, he argues, is not simply about the giving o f reasons, but about answering all 
challenges that a given position (or principle) might actually face -  countering all objections and 
criticisms. He states: ‘On the challenge-response model o f justification, to explain how ethical 
statements can be justified is to explain how the various challenges to which they are subject can be 
met.’ See Carl Wellman, Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics (London: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1971), especially p. 171
17 And it may be objected that Wellman misunderstands what he calls the ‘uncritical’ model o f  
justification. We do not, by and large, provide the kind o f reasons required by justification unless we 
are challenged in our position and we might reasonably be said to be holding an unjustified position if  
we were unable to provide reasons when prompted. Furthermore, we might describe ourselves as 
justified in holding a belief until a valid objection or fault is identified, at which point we may be 
justified in discarding that belief. Moreover, Wellman’s insistence on a defence from all challenges 
may well render the task o f justification ultimately fruitless and nothing more than the endless pursuit 
of an unattainable point o f ‘rest’.
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The question that follows from ‘what is justification?’ will inevitably be ‘why 
justify?’ Although an answer is implicit throughout this project, the purpose of 
justification is still an important question to ask explicitly. Why might justifications 
be offered to agents at all? First and foremost, in a plural world, any view or 
principle is likely to face any number of challenges at any given time. A view may 
also seek to challenge the status-quo, or majority opinion on any given issue in any 
given context. Indeed, we may be inclined to say, with Don Herzog that:
Disagreement and doubt create the demand for justification. Unless we are 
willing to let political debate collapse into posturing and invective, we want 
to be able to provide reasons for our views, good reasons, terrific reasons if 
we can. We may even want to prove that our views are correct. We want, in a
152word, to be able to justify our views.
On closer inspection, however, it becomes apparent that it is not from the simple fact 
of pluralism that the concern for justification arises. Rather, it is the normative way 
in which that pluralism is evaluated, in conjunction with the threat of conflict which 
is engendered by it, that generates this concern. There is nothing inherent in 
pluralism that commits us to offering justification for our views rather than asserting 
them by threat of coercion. It is only through a particular normative evaluation of 
pluralism -  which regards both individual people and their cultural creations as 
things of value -  that we arrive at an understanding of why we offer justification. 
Herzog suggests we justify because we are unwilling to let political debate collapse 
into posturing and invective. Surely it is this and not simply ‘disagreement’ that 
prompts justification? Similarly, it is not just the fact that people disagree; it is the
18 Don Herzog, Without Foundations: Justification in Political Theory (London: Cornell University 
Press, 1985), p. 18 (emphasis added)
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fact that they will often violently conflict, that prompts the need to justify. Because 
we wish to avoid violence and invective, other routes and methods are sought.
Justificatory arguments may therefore provide one tool for settling conflicts. 
They can help to sweep away unnecessary barriers to acceptance and consent to an 
idea or principle, such as genuine error and misconstruction. This in turn leaves the 
problems and concerns associated with pluralism to speak for themselves, 
uninhibited by their associated misunderstandings.19 One need not take a stance on 
the desirability of agreement and consensus in general to suggest that unnecessary 
barriers to it ought to be removed to allow a more open and honest appreciation of 
complex pluralism. As Roberts states, ‘reasons ... a theory offers hold only insofar as 
the account of the circumstances of justice accurately reflects “the world’” .20 To 
endorse pluralism is to acknowledge the vastly divergent positions, moral and 
otherwise, that people hold and to acknowledge that consensus is neither a viable 
(nor, in many cases, a desirable) answer to many of the questions posed by 
modernity. But, one can surely be sensitive to pluralism without rejecting all forms 
of consensus. A de facto rejection of all agreement seems at best premature. Indeed, 
why insist on a rejection of consensus, if one genuinely exists but is obscured by 
misunderstanding?
Justification may also have a more personal role. Stanley Cavell has proposed 
that one purpose of justification is to ascertain where we ourselves stand on a 
particular issue. This, he argues, is vital in our ability to reason and offer reasons to 
other people. While participation in moral debates is indeed essential to develop 
one’s relationships with others, it is also a vital tool in clarifying our thoughts on our
19 Stephen Mulhall, Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting o f  the Ordinary (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1994), p.42
20 Peri Roberts, ‘Why Thin Universalism Needs Conceptions o f Society and Person’ in Bruce 
Haddock, Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order: The Challenge o f  
Diversity, (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 111-127 at p. 114
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own principles. How can we participate in dialogue with different and oftentimes 
opposing ideas, (which, may, in turn, be something that we value highly in itself), 
without being as clear as possible on the position we ourselves occupy? Cavell, in a 
well quoted passage, states:
I have described moral arguments as ones whose direct point is to determine 
the positions we are assuming or are able or willing to assume responsibility 
for; and discussion is necessary because our responsibilities, the extensions of 
our cares and commitments, and the implications of our conduct, are not
91obvious; because the self is not obvious to the self.
Such personal ambiguity, Cavell suggests, is itself of a number of varieties. It might 
concern the nature of the actual principles that we hold, their extent, content and 
scope and how far our ‘cares and commitments’, as he puts it, actually extend. It may 
concern what the nature of those principles ought to be: how far those cares and 
commitments ought to be extended. Or it may concern how the consequences of an 
action do not always track with the intended consequences. ‘In a world where the 
consequences of action can be multiple, complex, interwoven, and widely ramifying’ 
-  in a world of plural consequences -  ‘what we did can come as a complete surprise
99to us’. This is true of our principles. The consequences that flow from them cannot 
always be predicted in a world marked by complex pluralism and justification can 
help us to work through them thoroughly. Justification is a powerful tool, which 
helps to make known or explicit our commitments, both to others and to ourselves.
Justification, then, is intended in the second instance to uphold clarity of 
thought. To demand justification, of others and ourselves, is to demand critical 
engagement with the principles at issue when forming an opinion about them. To
21 Stanley Cavell, The Claim o f  Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p.312
22 Mulhall, Philosophy’s Recounting o f  the Ordinary, pp.43-45
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demand justification is to demand that minimal standards of logical coherence and 
reasoned argument are met. It is to demand the provision of good reasons for holding 
a belief or principle and for beginning philosophical work from it. To demand 
justification is also to demand that principles that are to have an impact on public life 
are to be submitted to public scrutiny. It is to demand that reasons be subjected to 
critical analysis by those for whom the reasons are intended to have meaning.
The Limits of Justification
Having emphasised strongly the importance of a commitment to justification, to 
providing upstanding legitimate reasons for the holding of first principles, it is 
important also to identify the risks of pervasive justificatory procedures. Any project 
concerned with justification must find a resting place, or a point of departure, in 
order to avoid the fruitless and potentially damaging justification of everything 
related to a particular principle, or the infinite regress of inferential or deductive 
justifications.
How then, does one reconcile a commitment to justification with the 
pragmatic need to identify its limitations? In response, the thin universalist project 
seeks not concrete, transcendental foundations upon which it might base the 
construction of regulatory principles, but rather justifiable and valid starting points 
for further procedures of moral inquiry. It is the concern with pluralism and the 
thorough understanding of the relationship between facts and principles towards 
which the thin universalist project aims, that places far stronger emphasis on these 
more modest and contingent goals. What is sought are not transcendental 
foundations, but reasoned limits of justification for first principles, in order to render 
them useful to a procedure of construction and hence to thin universalism.
First Principles
Firstly, only certain points of an expression of principle are subject to the 
requirements of the kind of justification I am referring to. We only need concern 
ourselves with justifying that which is morally relevant to the statement (rather than 
to the act of speaking itself) and are not necessarily required to justify that which
9Tdoes not make a claim about the facts of a given case. The necessities of 
justification do not extend to justifying discourteous expression, for example.24 But 
once demands for unnecessary, extraneous, and superfluous justifications have been 
ruled out, it is possible to begin to characterise where the limits of justification can 
be drawn. Evans notes that thin universalist arguments tend to be particularly 
concerned with their own justification. As a result they often become overly 
preoccupied with reconciling the implications of these justificatory commitments 
with other normative commitments, most notably with ideas of contingency and 
fluidity which resist the kinds of concrete foundations one might suspect justification
9 cis there to supply. The result is argumentation with no natural or discemable limits 
to where justificatory argument stops, or ceases to be effective; a constant insistence 
on justification which, many of its critics suspect, is in fact foundational, or which is 
simply circular.
23 Such challenges may, therefore, include: challenges to the truth claimed within the statement; 
challenges to the status o f the statement as a statement (where it might be claimed to be a command or 
exclamation in disguise); challenges its meaningfulness; challenges its validity or premise-conclusion 
relationship; challenges its validity-value, to challenge that it actually makes no argument at all; 
challenges to the competence o f its speaker; and finally, challenges to the ‘knowability’ o f the truth of 
it by anyone. See Wellman, Challenge and Response, pp.173-176.
24 Although, o f course, Wellman points out that features such as discourtesy must be justified for other 
reasons associated with uttering statements o f principle. Repeatedly shouting one’s point o f view, 
drowning out all others would o f course have to be justified, but does not call into question the 
validity o f the statement per se. Although it might suggest imperfections in the statement itself, 
imperfections such that diversions such as shouting are necessary to hide them.
25 See Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” of Justification’, p.77
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Without solid transcendental foundations, it is frequently suggested that 
scepticism must be the default position in all moral inquiry. Given the sensitivity 
and caution with which thin universalism approaches complex pluralism it would 
seem that doubt must be the default position. We must be provisional sceptics and 
suspend all of our convictions ‘until the verdict is in’, rendering all pre-existing 
normative content invalid. This practice appears to be the most epistemically sound 
starting point for construction and the safest means of asserting the validity of thin 
universalist argument. In turn, this also renders invalid the kind of constructivism I 
have been outlining thus far. Without normative content in the start-up assumptions 
which are present prior to construction, no such construction can take place. Nothing 
moves us to construct because we are not moved to respond in any particular way to 
the facts that surround us. If we wish to avoid the kind of foundations that make 
many of the convictions of thin universalism redundant, and yet if we also still wish 
to construct on the basis of how we confront the world around us, some alternative 
way of regarding the normative content is needed.
Hence, once it is established that what is required is justified, reasoned, valid 
starting points for moral inquiry, and not concrete transcendental foundations, it 
becomes clear that we need not be preoccupied with the justification of everything 
associated with moral argument. Those first principles from which we wish to 
proceed do not find themselves in need of the kind of inferential and ultimately 
strong foundationalist justification which is the source of the above consternation.
26 See, for example, J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1977) and 
Gilbert Harman, The Nature o f  Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977)
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First Principles as Non-Arbitrary Starting Points
This account of the limitations inherent in the justification of first principles may not 
be terribly persuasive on its own. It will appear to be nothing more than yet another 
foundational argument for some, while to others it will appear dangerously arbitrary 
and provide no grounds for constructing any kind of action-guiding principles 
however thin they may ultimately be. What is needed is a concurrent account of how 
and why the first principles identified at the start of this chapter (and which will give 
rise to the requirements of thinness and of universalism) can be considered valid, 
reasoned and non-arbitrary. What validates the particular first principles from which 
I begin?
The task at hand is to demonstrate how and why the two sets of first principles 
constitute legitimate, valid or justified moral motivations, or starting points for a 
procedure of moral construction. We will remember that they express two key 
sentiments: [1] the normative significance of ‘human beings’ which delimits the 
range of legitimate modes of social organisation and [2] respect for the complex 
plurality of human social and cultural creations which delimits the determinacy of a
77genuine universal morality. In chapter one I made the case, with G.A. Cohen, that a 
principle can reflect or respond to a fact only because it is also a response to a 
principle that is not a response to fact. In chapter two I suggested that constructed 
thin universal principles are particularly sensitive to the facts of complex pluralism. 
It is crucial to the coherence of a constructive account, therefore, that those first 
principles that are not a response to the facts of complex pluralism are correctly 
modelled and adequately justified. But the acknowledgement that pluralism poses a 
‘problem’ of some kind for social and political organisation itself provides some
27 These are adapted from Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification’, p.76
28 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (d), p.214 (emphasis added)
-144-
first Principles
leverage for the justification of those principles. Problematising pluralism in the first 
instance commits one to certain first principles; principles which may not be explicit 
either to oneself or to ones intended audience at the onset of the undertaking. In the 
course of examining concrete circumstances and offering such a problematisation, 
principles come to light as having bearing on those circumstances. When pluralism is 
examined as it is in chapter two it becomes clear than an account of pluralism 
illuminates two principal moral judgements: the two first principles stated above. 
Pluralism poses a ‘problem’ for social and political organisation only when examined 
with a concern for the normative significance of human beings and a concern to 
respect that plurality in mind. In the absence of either one of those concerns the 
‘problem’ is radically different and drastically reduced.
Without a concern for the significance of human beings we have no reason to 
pursue universal principles at all, nor do we find ourselves impelled to pursue 
reasoned arguments, or arguments of any kind! Without a concern for the 
significance of human beings, the best way to secure desired regulatory moral 
principles is surely through force, the most direct method of ensuring compliance. 
Similarly, pluralism may not even be considered a relevantly motivating factor in 
constructing moral principles if that plurality was not viewed as in some sense 
valuable, legitimate or valid. Without such a consideration, there would be no 
concern not to impose rigid uniformity and determinacy in the regulatory principles 
to be constructed. There would be little need for construction and coercion would 
again suffice. Pluralism only poses ‘problems’ because of how we normatively 
evaluate it.
Evaluation of the facts and the practice of justification provide for the kind of 
clarifying process advocated by Cavell. Indeed, Cohen, in his evaluation of facts and
first Principles
principles, suggests just such a process. It may be crucial to our understanding of 
where we stand on a particular issue to examine the facts and to engage in a process 
of uncovering our basic commitments. As such, it is worth briefly revisiting the 
example at hand, of which I made use in the first chapter.
Begin with the factual observation of a complex pluralism of human agents 
and groups. On the basis of this fact, assert that only a thin number of moral 
principles should be ‘universal’. Why does the fact of complex pluralism affirm the 
need for thinness? Any answer to this will include affirmation of a more ultimate 
principle: that we ought to respect human societies and their diversity. This notion 
holds regardless of whether the principle of thinness holds. It also holds regardless of 
whether the fact of complex pluralism is true. The notion that we ought to respect 
human cultures and societies is not sensitive to the existence of a complex plurality 
of such cultures. It may be sensitive to other facts such as the integral role of culture 
and social practice in constituting human identities. But the integral value of ‘culture’ 
and ‘socialisation’ for human identity only supports the notion that we ought to 
respect human cultures and societies in light of the more ultimate principle that we
7Qshould respect and cultivate human identities. And so the procedure goes on.
Rawls too suggests that we can ‘arrive’ at our first principles. Through 
careful examination of concrete instances and tracing our moral commitments back it 
is possible to uncover a set of considered underlying judgements which constitute 
those first principles. The process of reflective equilibrium is intended to develop 
principles of justice which either match our assessment of the world as it is, or alter 
and expand them in an appropriate manner. We cannot know, independently of 
consideration of our own moral circumstances, the exact scale of our own basic
29 See chapter one, pp.51-53
30 For Rawls’ consideration o f reflective equilibrium see A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 17-22
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principles. The identification of more basic principles provides for a more explicit
- j t
consideration of our gauged intuitions or ‘considered judgements’ which emerge 
from that identification. Both processes involve the exposition of and, if necessary, 
the revision of our basic judgements or first principles through an examination of 
concrete factual circumstances.
It is firstly important to note that this kind of procedure demonstrates how 
many of our moral commitments may be thoroughly opaque to us in the Cavellian 
sense. Upon examining complex pluralism, principles that may previously have been 
unknown to us become illuminated. When traced back carefully through the kind of 
inferential and critical exposition outlined above, our first principles become more 
explicit to us. By problematising pluralism, therefore, I am also outlining a 
commitment to a particular set of first principles and it may be that it is only through 
that problematisation that those principles are perceptible.
The case is similar with our history. Thin universalism is motivated in part by 
a recognition and celebration of the significance of pluralism and contingency. 
Within that recognition is acknowledgement that modes of social organisation cannot 
be viewed abstractly. Social relations, political institutions and moral principles 
cannot be viewed as disconnected from the history and experiences of the people, the 
society, to whom they belong. It is possible, then, to turn to this history, and to these 
experiences to provide some explanation and perhaps even justification for the moral 
commitments out of which thin universal principles are constructed. Upon 
examination, many events in recent history go some way towards an explanation, and 
even contribute towards a justification of those commitments that motivate both thin 
and universal justifications. In the West, some of these events are so deeply
31 To employ once again the Rawlsian phrase. See Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, p.47
32 See Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (d), p.214
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embedded in the popular psyche that it is hard to imagine how many identities could 
be constituted without addressing them. If there is indeed a moral imperative towards 
universal justifications some of the motivation to do so can be found in a shared 
moral history. If there is an imperative to temper universal justifications according to 
complex pluralism, the source of this may be found in that history also. By 
examining those aspects of experience that may help to identify first principles it is 
possible, in turn, to begin to account for why we hold them, and why they provide 
good reasons for engaging in constructive procedures. ‘History’ cannot give rise to 
first principles but it can help to enlighten us as to why we hold the ones we do, and 
may suggest why we are justified in doing so. Our history can provide clues about 
why we construct, what we construct, and why we construct what we construct: thin, 
yet universal principles.
The purpose of studying our history is to develop and cultivate our 
knowledge. This does not have to be the development and cultivation of our moral 
knowledge, which Rorty would want to reject.33 It is simply the expansion of the 
materials upon which we draw in order to help us formulate moral principles and 
make moral and non-moral decisions. We can therefore look at the moral history of 
our society, of our culture, our class or our religion alongside that of humanity as a 
whole in order to help us in this task. We may look at our recent history in particular 
detail, perhaps because it is more relevant or we have more information on it, 
perhaps because the values of our recent past most closely resemble our own,34 or 
perhaps because we can draw from it a more emotive response. Nonetheless, if we
33 Rorty, o f course, has sought to conduct political philosophy detached from a moral epistemology. 
The most pertinent example of this for present purposes is his ‘Human Rights, Rationality and 
Sentimentality’.
34 There is perhaps little value in making moral judgements about sexual practices in Ancient Greece, 
but a great deal o f value in examining and making judgements about the relation o f sex to the law in 
latter twentieth century Britain.
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characterise our present ‘condition’ as being connected to that history in such a way 
that allows for critical engagement with it, examination of history helps us to 
confront our moral insecurities. By confronting our history we temper our moral 
judgements accordingly, adding to the knowledge we possess that informs our moral 
decision-making and helping us to make better, more attuned moral judgements.
What should now be apparent from these accounts is that by problematising 
pluralism and our experience of it we come to understand our responses to those 
experiences, and the first principles that inform them, as fundamentally non- 
arbitrary. In this crucial sense our first principles, while they need not provide a 
foundation for thin universal regulatory principles, they may provide a valid point o f  
departure for the procedure of construction of which thin universal regulatory 
principles are an outcome. Our responses to pluralism and our responses to history, 
experienced or studied, are defensible as non-arbitrary in a way that is usefully 
applicable to a constructed thin universalism. Cohen, of course, is not interested in 
how we might go about justifying the principles that emerge from considering the 
relationship between facts and principles. Indeed, without further consideration, they 
look a great deal like a set of moral intuitions which we arrive at through reasoning 
theoretically and practically. The problem, of course, is that identified by Rawls: 
intuitions alone simply provide an unranked plurality of first principles which offer 
too little to go on. Furthermore, simply appealing to intuitions looks dangerously 
arbitrary; there are a great many intuitions that prove to be ill-advised or imprudent, 
others are simply mistaken, while many more may be illegal or positively dangerous. 
We might be concerned by the idea of simply ‘running with our intuitions’ in all
35 And, indeed, this is precisely why Rawls favours his own political constructivism to any form of 
rational intuitionism. See Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp.34-40; for a consideration of intuitionism in 
comparison to constructivism see his Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1993), pp.90-99
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circumstances as a default course of action. Any number of intuitive courses of 
action could be the wrong ones. The principles that issue from careful consideration 
of complex pluralism are, however, not simply intuitions of this kind. They are not 
moral gut reactions to observable features of the world. The principles that are taken 
here to be a point of departure for a procedure of construction are genuinely 
compelling, and have reverberated throughout history and society. We have good 
reason, therefore, to take these concerns seriously.
Doubt and Faith
In light of these assertions a de facto assumption of scepticism akin to that of the 
natural sciences starts to seem somewhat misplaced. As a starting point for moral 
inquiry it is regarded by many as intellectually unsustainable, morally imprudent and 
realistically impracticable. This seems borne out by experience: to suspend all beliefs 
prior to a conclusive intellectual outcome is to suspend indefinitely morality itself 
and all attempts to address the immediate problems that face us. What’s more, it 
seems naive to assume that simply because one endorses scepticism, that one can 
forgo the kind of requirements demanded by justification. It is surely the case that 
one must provide some justification for holding to a sceptical default position? Doubt 
requires as much justification as belief and to place a belief that we already hold into 
doubt requires reasons as deeply compelling as those we would need in order to 
adopt a new belief.36
The case might also be made that in order to justify everything one believes is 
burdensome to the extent that no end-point justification (of the actual principle at 
stake) could ever be made because there would always be something somewhere in
36 Matthew Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political Theory: From Dewey to Rorty (Cambridge: 
University o f Chicago Press, 1997), p.5
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the network of one’s beliefs that needs further justification. The obvious result is that 
the justification of any little thing I believe turns into the overwhelming demand to 
justify everything I believe. Anti-foundationalists of various kinds go further. 
Rorty, for example, suggests that, in a Western liberal context, Western liberal 
practices do not require foundational furnishing or ultimate, independent
• • • • q ojustifications, and can flourish more fully without them. This sentiment is reflected 
in Rorty’s pragmatist forbears. In The Will to Believe William James critiques what 
he characterises as a misplaced insistence on the requirements of evidence for the 
justification of all beliefs.39
We are often in some sense endowed with the ‘will’ of James’ title: ‘If your 
heart does not want a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never make 
you believe in one. ... When we stick to it that there is truth, we do so with our 
whole nature, and resolve to stand or fall by the results.’40 Questions of truth aside, it 
is correct to say that we frequently are, in one way or another, invested in the results 
of moral investigations. We are affected and moved by the possible outcomes and as 
a result moral questions tend to present themselves as ‘questions whose solution 
cannot (always) wait for sensible proof.41
The ‘problem’ of violent conflict that becomes apparent upon consideration 
of the complex pluralism of the modem world can certainly be regarded as urgent. 
Again, James asks: ‘Are there not somewhere forced options in our speculative 
questions, and can we ... always wait with impunity till the coercive evidence shall
37 Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification’, pp.78-79
38 Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political Theory, p.l 13.
39 William James, ‘The Will to Believe’ in The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular 
Philosophy (London: Longmans, 1917)
40 James, ‘The Will to Believe’, pp.22-23
41 James, ‘The Will to Believe’, p.22
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have arrived?’42 So we are sometimes forced to make choices prior to the elucidation 
of all available evidence. Many of these choices cannot be pre-empted, avoided, or 
delayed. We cannot afford to wait and see; we cannot afford to be sceptics in all 
things.
When faced with this kind of choice, we may not know why we ought to trust 
those moral intuitions or first principles in which we believe prior to the outcome of 
inquiry. James speaks of the ‘prestige’ of certain opinions, which grip us with a faith­
like appeal, such as scientific facts, political ideals, religious beliefs, economic 
values and such, without holding easily identifiable supporting reasons.43 How we 
arrive at such a sensation of prestige, and how it bestows authority on our moral 
beliefs I have sought to outline already. They are judgements that have reverberated 
through and been shaped by the conduct of society and history. They have emerged 
from a process of careful reflection and are tentatively posited as valid points from 
which further inquiry can begin. And it is not always the case that these basic beliefs 
are arrived at through the presentation and examination of all possible evidence. For 
James, then, there is something at least partially contingent and non-foundational 
about the location of our basic moral convictions.44
But James goes further. It may be the case that it is only with a faith in certain 
beliefs that those beliefs can be realised. There are, he argues, perhaps cases where a 
fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming.45 Society itself 
could not exist without a certain degree of faith in those others with whom we share
42 James, ‘The Will to Believe’, p.22. This sentiment is echoed by Bruce Haddock in his ‘Practical 
Reason and Identity’ in Bruce Haddock and Peter Sutch (eds.), Multiculturalism, Identity and Rights 
(London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 10-24
43 He states: ‘we all o f us believe in molecules and the conservation o f energy, in democracy and 
necessary progress, in protestant Christianity and the duty o f fighting for the “doctrine o f the immortal 
Monroe,” all fo r  no reasons worthy o f  the name.'' See James, ‘The Will to Believe’, p.9 (emphasis 
added)
44 James, ‘The Will to Believe’, p.l 1
45 James, ‘The Will to Believe’, p.25
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it. We tend to cooperate as individuals based on a certain degree of faith in others, 
and not purely out of a Hobbesian self-interest.
Faith in those first principles that emerge from an analysis of complex 
pluralism is far from blind faith.46 The first principles which inform the construction 
of thin universal regulatory principles are particularly sensitive to the justificatory 
requirements laid out here. Indeed, the relationship between the first principles from 
which construction proceeds and the justification of those first principles suggests 
that commitment to them is reasoned. It is surely the case that we would question the 
justification of principles that called upon us to reject justification in favour of 
coercion? It is not the case that we stumble upon our first principles and seize them 
as moral truths. In fact, the path by which those first principles are reached is closely 
examined and carefully chosen. The well-trodden path is not always the one taken, 
though it is always questioned as to why that way is most frequently chosen. There 
will often be much backtracking and sidestepping and, as I have sought to 
demonstrate, the destination is often unknown. Yet the path makes itself apparent, 
even if we are surprised still to find it, or taken aback at where it appears to lead.
Justification and Construction
It is important firstly not to overstate the extent to which faith can bolster our first 
principles and secondly not to assume that justification can be completely forgone. 
The idea of faith does not justify first principles; faith, I have sought to show, is 
justifiable when that in which we have faith is arrived at through reflective processes 
of examination and critique of the facts and our considered responses to them. Hence 
justification is not just something that is ‘nice if you can get if ;  it plays a far more
46 Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification’, pp.89-92
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substantial role in validating one’s position. I am not suggesting that justification of 
first principles be forgone, simply that it be understood in such a way as to free it 
from the constraints and misconceptions of common foundational accounts of what it 
is to justifiably hold a basic commitment. Without justification, accounts of and 
debate over our basic commitments quickly degenerate into empty rhetoric, 
invective, sound bites and slogans with little or no substance, and unchallengeable 
because all positions are held on the basis of dogmatic ‘faith’. And the victory of 
‘credulity’ over caution, we might be advised to remember, has been the source of 
many of those events in our past that inspire the first principles to which we continue 
to cling.47
It is possible that we are seeing the effects of a ‘weak’ commitment to 
justification in those offered by coalition governments regarding many aspects of the
40
‘war on terror’ since 9/11. The growing sensitivity towards the complexities of 
pluralism in Western moral and political philosophy has been accompanied by an 
ever increasing emphasis on the ‘clash of values’ in every-day political discourse. 
The rhetoric of ‘terror’ and of ‘fundamentalism’ in the United States has been 
accompanied by a campaign to ‘export’ the Western values of democracy, freedom, 
toleration and human rights to the rest of the world. Concerns over this campaign 
have been all too easily dismissed simply as Christian fundamentalism on the part of
47 See Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” of Justification’, p.91
48 This situation is identified quite succinctly by Slavoj Ziiek concerning the case o f the war in Iraq.
In Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle, ZiZek forwards a scathing critique o f the justification for the 2003 war: 
(1) Saddam Hussein possesses weapons o f mass destruction (WMDs) which pose a ‘clear and present 
danger’ not only to his neighbours and Israel, but to all democratic Western states. (2) Even if Saddam 
does not have any WMDs, he was involved with al-Qaeda in the 9/11 attack, so he should be 
punished. (3) Even if  there is no proof o f the link with al-Qaeda, Saddam’s is a ruthless dictatorial 
regime, a threat to its neighbours and a catastrophe to its own people, and this fact alone provides 
reason enough to topple it. Ziiek, in his inimitable style, proceeds to show how this trend seemed to 
be associated with almost every aspect o f the Iraq conflict. His point here is that, in the case o f Iraq, 
where numerous sundry justifications are offered and argumentation is inconsistent there are 
frequently other reasons, not part o f the justifications offered that lie behind them. This, in turn 
suggests that the justification that are offered in those cases are specifically intended to mislead and 
conceal. See Slavoj Ziiek, Iraq: The Borrowed Kettle (London: Verso, 2004), ch.l
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the Bush administration, but it reflects something more deeply rooted and more 
broadly acknowledged in much of Western culture. The belief that the West alone 
(and the US in particular) has ‘got it right’ and that the discourse of democracy, 
rights, equality and citizenship are the only means by which any society can 
progress, is more prevalent than ever. Where particular values are being touted as 
universal truths and imposed on others, oftentimes by force, and accompanied by 
disregard for the rigours of justification that prompts moral and social catastrophes 
such as the Iraq War.
Of course, the refusal to allow justification to become pervasive and to re­
examine and detail its limits certainly does not indicate a ‘weak’ commitment to it. 
But one can undoubtedly imagine the kind of abuse it might be subjected to -  the 
random and haphazard discarding of the requirements of justification in situations 
where providing them is problematic. Where justification is weak, inadequate or 
inconsistent, one often finds ulterior motives which are not as wholesome, and 
certainly not as adequately justified as they appear to be. The 2003 Iraq War is 
perhaps a case-in-point of this. There remains good reason to call for a reassessment 
of the procedures of justification, suggesting that it fulfils other roles than simply 
providing a concrete and transcendental foundation for our moral beliefs.
We may rightly be concerned, given the evaluation of complex pluralism, 
about asserting first principles which constitute an ahistorical, transcendental, eternal 
foundation for establishing further moral principles. The justification of first 
principles, however, is about identifying and establishing acceptable assumptions 
which constitute starting points for construction. It is not about discovering
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something that exists ‘beyond culture’49 and in this way is not reliant on claims about 
moral knowledge, or about transcendental moral foundations, or even about ‘human 
beings’. It is compatible with claims of contingency, even almost total moral 
relativity, and it is certainly compatible with complex pluralism.
If it is the case that one must be suitably justified in holding any basic moral 
commitment and that one must also be committed to justifying that fact, then one 
cannot help but assert some kind of starting point. Ultimately, by seeking to justify 
the first principles which are illuminated through a consideration of complex 
pluralism -  respect for individual persons, respect for their cultural creations -  
commits one to those first principles. The very giving of justifications and the act of 
justifying reflects a specific set of normative commitments, which themselves are 
reflective of the first principles I have identified. Justification reflects a basic 
commitment. It is, therefore, partly the commitment to justification that makes a thin 
universalism thin, makes it universal, and makes it the product of construction. It is 
the moral commitment inherent but not always explicit in justification that make it so 
important, both in moral discourse generally, and to a thin universalism more 
specifically. Simply committing oneself to justification is an expression of a 
particular set of ethical commitments. Importantly though, this does not damage the 
principles under consideration, but affirms them. It demonstrates the reflexivity by 
which they were reached and their considered nature. The first principles that inform 
a thin universalism are fundamentally non-arbitrary.
If we are to say, then, that our basic commitments are to underpin a procedure 
of construction of regulatory principles which are intended in some sense to be 
‘principles for all’, it will always be prudent to offer some justification as to why this
49 Clifford Geertz, ‘Anti Anti-Realism’, American Anthropologist Vol.86 (2), 1984, pp.263-278 at 
p.265
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is so. To proceed from the requirements of acceptability and other such basic 
standards of reason giving is to make an argument not for the imposition of moral 
values but to engage in a moral dialogue with others. This dialogue will of course 
involve persuasion, exchange and compromise, but the desired outcome is one of 
mutuality and accord, not necessarily concerning the intricacies of how a society 
ought to be run, but concerning the shared ethical standards according to which such 
debates take place.
This chapter has sought to establish as valid the first principles out of which 
regulatory principles may legitimately be constructed. It has sought to justify them, 
to show how they provide warrant to engage in the procedures of construction that 
follow and to show how they legitimately fulfil a role in that procedure. It is 
significant to understand, then, that the engagement in justification of first principles 
as starting points is itself part of the procedure of construction. Justification is one of 
the first stages of construction -  it seeks to establish as valid one of the materials of 
construction. Furthermore, it seeks to establish them as valid in the knowledge of a 
complex plurality of agents and so demonstrates a commitment to the first principles 
about which they are concerned.
The materials of construction in place, I go on in chapters four and five to 
discuss the construction itself. My attention in chapter five is focussed on the 
construction of consent, while I turn my immediate attention in chapter four to the 
construction of thin universal regulatory principles themselves.
- four -
Constructing Thin Universal 
Regulatory Principles
Chapters one to three have sought to establish that it is possible to construct 
principles of regulation understood as principles that can be adopted in order to 
regulate human affairs, to solve conflicts, and to meet some of the moral demands of 
modernity. They can be constructed from facts of the world, the facts of complex 
pluralism, and from our ‘first principles’, our considered basic judgements about 
those facts. Complex pluralism will tend to enrich our various social lives but will 
also tend to drive us towards violent conflict. Consideration of complex pluralism 
can highlight first principles, which in turn motivate and orient the character of the 
principles of regulation constructed from those facts, in order to address those 
conflicts.
Chapters four and five go on to suggest that through a constructive 
undertaking between social agents, from individual people to different societal 
groups, regulatory principles emerge that reflect both those facts and first principles. 
They establish more substantively, though still somewhat abstractly, what the 
outcomes of construction might be, given those facts and principles. Chapter four 
addresses how and why the principles of regulation that emerge from construction 
are ‘thin universal’ ones. It shows how complex pluralism demands that our first 
principles be followed through in a particular way, or that our first principles demand 
that we respond to complex pluralism in a certain way. That way is the construction
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of thin universal principles, which others can accept when we engage in the 
regulation of our affairs.
With the materials of construction in place, an account of the procedure of 
construction highlights why pluralism is so significant for moral discourse and why it 
compels a specifically thin universalism, but also why ‘pluralism’ alone does not 
provide a de facto compulsion to do anything. The chapter therefore examines how 
complex pluralism, considered in light of our first principles, provides reasons for 
adopting certain principles of regulation that ought to bear certain characteristics. It 
considers how, why and in what way constructed regulatory principles are 
‘universal’, and how, why and in what way they are ‘thin’.
Within this discussion the chapter considers the ‘ethnocentricity’ critique of 
‘universal’ principles: that they are not universal but rather an expression of 
particular cultural norms. If this is so then ‘universals’ are ethnocentric and are, by 
extension, disturbingly morally and culturally imperialistic in a way that not only 
logically contradicts the moral commitments of the thin universalist project, but that 
is morally inappropriate, even catastrophic, in its own right. As such, ‘thinness’ 
emerges as a response to these powerful concerns and the chapter contends that 
constructing universalism is less problematic that its detractors might think, but only 
if it is ‘thin’ at the same time.
Furthermore, chapters four and five establish the construction of thin 
universal regulatory principles as the first of a two stage procedure of construction, 
akin to Rawls’ ‘two stages of theory formation’.1 Thus far I have only alluded to, but 
will across these chapters flesh out more fully, these two stages whereby regulatory
1 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Jurgen 
Habermas, ‘Reconciliation Through the Public Use o f Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’ Political 
Liberalism’ in The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol.92 (3), 1995, pp. 109-131, at p. 121; and John Rawls, 
‘Reply to Habermas’ in The Journal o f Philosophy, Vol.92 (3), 1995, pp.132-180
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principles are constructed through open philosophical reflection, and consent to them 
is constructed through continuous engagement in public discourse. The two stages 
are strongly interconnected and, while distinct, each impacts upon the conduct of the 
other. It is through both constructions that validity is conferred upon regulatory 
principles.
Chapter five takes up the related question of how consent to thin universal 
regulatory principles might be constructed. What emerges in chapter four is an 
account of a constructed set of thin universal regulatory principles which serve a 
specific set of functions and address specific moral questions. The chapter forms part 
of the increasingly specific account of these principles that has been developing 
throughout the thesis and begins with a reconsideration of the character of thin 
universal principles.
Moral Minimalism as Thin Universalism
The thin universalist project is an attempt to secure the validity of certain moral 
judgements in a world marked by a complex plurality of viewpoints. Can we still 
maintain ‘principles in a plural world’? How can we make genuinely valid 
judgements about events or actions that take place in frameworks of value that are 
differently constituted to our own? A thin universalist project offers one way of 
pursuing these questions, but as my introduction showed, there are many ways of 
pursuing thin universalism. One method critiqued was the idea of a moral minimum 
applicable in all cases. This idea captures many of the requirements of securing 
principles in a plural world and endorses, critically, the plurality of social worlds in 
which we live.
2 See Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch, ‘Introduction’ in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts 
and Peter Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order: The Implications o f Diversity (London: 
Routledge, 2006), pp. 1-9 at p.2
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The idea of a moral minimum has emerged in connection with value 
pluralism. Because value pluralism presents a challenge to traditional religious, 
metaphysical and rationalist accounts of morality it provokes the suspicion that what 
logically follows from it is a form of moral relativism. If, as Isaiah Berlin argues, 
there are not one, but valuable human ends, if there is value in many ways of life, 
and if there is more than one answer to many moral questions,3 it seems likely that 
the variety of ends, ways of life, principles and values that human beings will pursue 
is limitless. Such a plurality will include some ways of life, some principles and 
some values that will be incompatible, even hostile to others. Some will appear 
downright abhorrent to others; some will actually be downright abhorrent.
As such, theorists of value pluralism have typically posited that it is premised 
on what William Galston calls a ‘floor of basic moral decency’ which is derived 
from Herbert Hart’s ‘minimum content of natural law’.4 Berlin is careful to assert 
that ‘relativism is not the only alternative to universalism ... nor does 
incommensurability entail relativism.’5 ‘Pluralism is not the same as relativism’, 
Galston claims.
Philosophical reflection supports what ordinary experience suggests -  a non- 
arbitrary distinction between good and bad or good and evil. For pluralism as 
for any serious position, the difference between (say) saving innocent lives 
and shedding innocent blood is part of the objective structure of the 
valuational universe. This provides a rational basis for defining a floor of 
basic moral decency for individual lives and for societies. ... As Hampshire 
... puts it, “there are obvious limits set by common human needs to the
3 See Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts o f Liberty’ in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University 
press, 1969), p. 169
Galston, William Galston, ‘Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory’ in The American Political 
Science Review, Vol.93(4), 1999, pp.769-778 at p.770; H.L.A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 193-200
5 See Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber o f  Humanity (London: Fontana, 1990), p.85
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conditions under which human beings flourish and human societies 
flourish.”6
However, it is far from ‘obvious’ what human needs must be fulfilled in order for 
human beings and human societies to ‘flourish’, and where one draws the line under 
a genuine plurality of human goods and values remains uncertain.7 It remains even 
less clear as to what kind of society would best serve those needs, or what kind of 
principles one might seek in order to secure them. To premise pluralism on a basic 
floor of moral decency, therefore, prompts the questions that motivate the thin 
universalist project, it does not provide answers to them.
It is important to remember that the thin universalist project is a response not 
to this kind of value pluralism but to the complex pluralism of actually held views. 
Its concern is not with what can be considered valuable and not valuable or where the 
line between them must be drawn. The concern is, however, similar. The 
development of principles capable of regulating our affairs, out of first principles and 
the facts of pluralism do take on a character similar to that of moral minimalism, but 
importantly do not make the strenuous metaphysical claims about the nature of value 
inherent in value pluralism. They do not presuppose either the existence, or the 
validity of any kind of ‘floor of basic moral decency’ outside of that laid out by the 
first principles outlined in the previous chapter.
As chapter two makes clear, complex pluralism does not demand the 
acceptance of a plurality of values. It does not posit an account of the objective 
structure of the ‘valuational universe’ but rather simply acknowledges a fact about
6 William Galston, ‘Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory’ in The American Political Science 
Review, Vol.93 (4), 1999, pp.769-778, at p.770. Galston’s reference to Hampshire is quoted from 
Stuart Hampshire, Morality and Conflict (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 155
7 Because the thin universalist project largely abstains from a comprehensive characterisation or 
exhaustive list o f first principles, it resists characterising them as ‘thin universal’. First principles, as 
chapter three posits, are characterised simply by their fact-independence.
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the broader social world -  that people’s evaluative views are observably diverse. As 
complex pluralism eschews any stance on the structure of the valuational universe it 
no longer begs the question with regard to a floor of basic moral decency. Because it 
sets aside the question of what is or could be valuable it does not presuppose any 
kind of limit on what can rightly be regarded as such. This then becomes one of the 
tasks of the thin universalist concerned with complex pluralism; it establishes the 
project, it does not suppose any kind of solution to it. So where can a line be drawn 
beneath the observable pluralism of views which surround us? How are we to decide 
upon which of these multifarious views are legitimate and which are illegitimate? 
The thin universalist project concerns the pursuit of a principled pluralism of actual 
views premised on a ‘minimum’ or ‘thin’ universalism of constructed fact-dependent 
regulatory principles; it does not presuppose one. The thesis thus far has sought to 
establish that such a project is plausible and desirable. I now take up the explicit 
workings of that construction.
My focus is now split between consideration of the ideas of ‘thinness’ and of 
‘universalism’. This segregation is necessary because, while the concepts are clearly 
interlinked, they reflect two distinct considerations and perform different tasks as 
characteristics of constructed regulatory principles. Nonetheless, certain questions 
will inevitably permeate both discussions. Given the complexity of the pluralism that 
characterises so many societies, what reason is there to suggest that moral 
universalism in any form is still justifiable? Given too that it would not be 
unreasonable to be pessimistic about the scale and extent of the conflict between 
agents that pluralism seems to engender, what reason is there to suggest that 
universal principles of any kind are still relevant? Conversely, if universalism is
constructing Kegulatory rrincipies
defensible, why concern ourselves with being ‘thin’ -  surely ‘right is right’ 
regardless of complex pluralism? Why do we need fact-dependent regulatory 
principles of any kind, why are fact-independent first principles alone insufficient? 
How and why is a thin universalism an appropriate response to the facts of complex 
pluralism? How do ‘thin’ ‘universal’ regulatory principles help to preserve that 
pluralism in a principled way?
What follows explores more extensively both the derivation and the defence 
of the thin universalist project. It explores the ideas of thinness and universalism and 
how they are constructed in response to the materials already established. In this 
way, suitable candidates for common moral principles are those which do not rest on 
strenuous claims which require agents to radically change their world-views to be
o
acceptable. Such a candidate will offer means of retaining a strong, coherent, 
‘pluralistically enlightened’ universalism; a universalism that ‘makes sense’.9
Universalism
I begin with ‘universalism’. At least some constructed regulatory principles will bear 
universalist characteristics; but there are many ways of understanding what it is for a 
principle to be universal. Before proceeding with an account of their construction, it 
is therefore important to clarify what exactly is meant by the term ‘universalism’ 
when used in reference to regulatory moral principles. The underlying notion of 
universalism at work within the thin universalist project reflects the complexity of 
many aspects of moral deliberation concerning pluralism. Just as many human
8 As Judith Butler suggests, simply making a convincing argument is not enough to persuade people to 
see the world anew. See Judith Butler, ‘Universality in Culture’ in Martha Nussbaum and Jean Cohen 
(eds.), For Love o f  Country: Debating the Limits o f  Patriotism (Boston: Beacon, 1996), pp.45-52
9 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Age (Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), p.36; Steven Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals: The Implications o f Diversity 
(London: Verso, 2002), p. 12
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societies contain a plurality of social, economic and cultural groups, just as human 
beings are likely to adhere to a diversity of views, just as there are likely to be 
numerous justifications and justificatory strategies for a variety of moral principles, 
so it seems obvious to assume that the scope, relevance and applicability of 
regulatory principles will not be the same in all cases. Some will be universal, while 
others will invariably be particular, perhaps even relative. Some considerations 
within the moral domain may require or demand a universal (or near universal) 
regulatory principle. Some actions prompt universal commendation, while others, 
universal condemnation.
On the other hand some considerations make little sense and are even morally 
unacceptable expressed in purely universal terms and therefore require more 
particular principles. Regulatory principles that are less than universal will be 
bounded in a variety of ways: along local, national, or regional lines, or according to 
religious, ethnic, cultural or social divides. For example, principles governing work 
and leisure, sexuality, health and hygiene, and any number of further aspects of day- 
to-day life will vary according to the character of the society.10 This plurality of 
moral domains precludes the contention that all principles must be universal and 
therefore uniform or homogenising, and the reverse claim, that morality is entirely 
culturally bounded and absolutely relative.11 Accusations, then, that universalism 
demands strict impartiality between all persons (that we must, for example, treat our 
own children with no more care and concern than anyone else’s), rigorous uniformity
10 Perhaps the most obvious proponent o f this kind o f pluralism is Michael Walzer. See his Spheres o f  
Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp.3-6 and throughout.
11 See Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, pp.52-54, see also ch.4 concerning the scope of  
ethical concern.
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(that universal implies denial of all differences between persons),12 the eradication of 
difference, or even those people who are different, are misplaced.
This however does not answer the questions with which we are concerned, it 
merely helps to frame them: In what way are regulatory principles universal and how 
and why does construction yield universal principles? Universalism can refer to one 
or more of a cluster of related concepts which refer variously to characteristics, 
dispositions and categories pertaining to human beings. It can, at the same time, also 
be established and understood conversely from a number of other concepts that have 
emerged in response to it.
‘Universalism’ is an empirical or cognitive concept that can describe some 
facet of ‘human nature’ as a whole, such as a capacity for reason, or a set of basic 
needs, potentialities, capacities, capabilities and vulnerabilities.13 But this can be 
distinguished from moral universalism or cosmopolitanism, captured in Kant’s 
categorical imperative that ‘I ought never to act in such a way that I could not also 
will that my maxim should be a universal law’.14 It is also captured by Seyla 
Benhabib: ‘All human beings, regardless of race, gender, sexual preference, ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic or religious background are to be considered moral equals and are 
therefore to be treated as equally entitled to moral respect’.15
Moral universalism can be contrasted with moral particularism which 
conversely asserts that
12 This well-established critique o f moral universalism can be found in various feminist critiques. See 
Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1990) and Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Dependence 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1982)
13 Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, p. 13 and Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, pp.26-27. See also 
O’Neill in Towards Justice and Virtue and Martha Nussbaum in Women and Human Development:
The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
14 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics o f  Morals (London: Hackett, 1993), pp.402,421, 
429 [Prussian Academy pagination]. Many contemporary liberals, such as John Rawls, Ronald 
Dworkin, Alan Gewirth, Onora O’Neill and T.M. Scanlon are deemed to be ‘Kantian’ universalists.
15 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p.27
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One ought to give preferential consideration to the interests of some persons 
as against others, including not only ones self but other persons with whom 
one has special relationships, such as, for example, the members of one’s own 
family or friendship circle or local community or nation or various other 
restricted social groups.16
Particularism claims a degree of moral inequality dependent on the nature of one’s 
relationships with others. On various particularist models we might see ourselves as 
having a stronger moral commitment to other, smaller, more particular groups of 
which we are a part, or to whom we have commitments, such as our own families, to 
members of our own community, state or religion.17 Universalism questions 
particularism’s claims in favour of a universal moral egalitarianism, often expressed 
through the language of justice or rights. While it is important to note that 
universalism need not totally deny the claims of moral particularism, it does reject 
the claim that the particular could completely usurp any sense of wider moral 
commitment.18
Some claim that this moral universalism can be extended into a universal 
human entitlement to certain basic legally recognised rights, securing the rights to 
life, liberty, security, due process before the law, and freedom of speech and 
association, including freedom of religion and conscience which ought to be
16 Alan Gewirth, ‘Ethical Universalism and Particularism’ in The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol.85(06), 
1988, pp.283-302, at p.283
17 David Miller uses the example of two students who are equally in need o f urgent medical attention 
-  one from his own Oxford College and one from another. It is only possible to take one to hospital 
and Miller makes the case for attending to the needs o f the student from his own college first. This 
kind o f preferential attendance to ones own inside group is the very essence o f particularism, and 
powerful and robust claims it often makes upon many o f us. See David Miller, ‘The Ethical 
Significance o f Nationality’, in Ethics, Vol.98 (4), 1988, pp.647-662
18 Indeed, it should be apparent that thin universalism is premised on the notion that many -  perhaps 
even a vast majority -  o f our moral commitments are justifiably particular, but that we cannot entirely 
do away with broader universal judgements.
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accorded universal respect by all legal systems.19 But of course the human race is 
subdivided into exclusionary nation-states, each of which has jurisdiction over a 
given population and territory. While there are a number of trans-, supra- and extra­
national legal bodies and instruments, it is still the nation-state that is formally 
recognised as sovereign in international law, which for now inhibit the realisation of 
a legal universalism. But many universalist theories, thin or no, have variously 
utilised all of these descriptive and prescriptive universalisms in their arguments. 
This establishes the question of what is universal about constructive thin 
universalism.
The ‘universal’ aspect of thin universalism can be viewed from two distinct 
points of view. Onora O’Neill suggests that universality can be a characteristic both 
of the form  and of the scope of a moral claim.20 ‘Formal’ universalism pertains not to 
the scope or domain in which principles are binding, but to the cases to which they 
apply. Hence a principle is formally universal if it applies to all like cases within a 
given domain. That domain could be any business, school, community, society, 
culture, nation, religion, class or gender. Once the domain is identified and fixed, a
principle can be said to be universal if it applies to all like cases within it. ‘Like
cases’ are held to be all given situations where the same criteria can be applied.21 For 
example, in the UK the extension of the franchise to women following the 
Representation of the People Act of 1918 granted ‘universal suffrage’ to all who 
fulfilled the criteria set by age and citizenship. Children were not enfranchised, nor 
were non-UK citizens, yet the Act is ‘universal’ within a given domain.
19 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p.27-28
20 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p. 11
21 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, pp. 11, 54
22 The Representation o f the People Acts were a series o f UK Acts o f Parliament from 1867 that 
extended voting rights, creating universal suffrage in 1928. The 1918 act gave the vote to men over 
the age o f  21 and women over the age o f 30, and the 1928 act extended the vote to women over the
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Universality of form is, in part, about logical consistency; about treating like 
cases in a like manner. Because of the emphasis placed upon construction of consent 
within thin universalism and constructivism, it seems likely that very many, perhaps 
the majority, of principles will be ‘universal’ but only within a limited domain. This 
is purely because coherent and consistent argument are important parts of moral and 
political discourse, but only rarely do the requirements of consistency extend beyond 
the boundaries drawn by human social systems. Universality of form is also only one 
dimension of the kind of universalism that the construction of regulatory principles 
pursues. It simply establishes minimum conditions of logical consistency, which 
alone do very little work within the thin universalist project.23 One needs first to fix 
and justify the scope of an argument before establishing the formal conditions of 
universalism.
Given that regulatory principles can be universal within a given domain, and 
with a plurality of relevant domains in mind, it follows some will be of only limited, 
while others will be of broader scope. Some principles that issue from construction 
will be of universal, inclusive or cosmopolitan scope. Principles can therefore be 
universal in form whilst being limited in scope. Indeed, particularism communitarian 
and even relativist thinkers need not deny that principles are formally universal, 
provided their domain is clearly defined. Many reject however, the plausibility of 
principles of genuinely cosmopolitan scope or universal inclusivity.24 In the 
vocabulary of thin universalism there is a strong connection drawn between universal
age o f 21. Certain people had the right to more than one vote; this was abolished by the 1948 act. The 
1969 act reduced the minimum age o f voting to 18.
23 What it does do is draw a line under what is an acceptable argument. We need not seek to take on 
board the position o f those who advocate equality in one breath whilst uttering racist remarks in the 
next.
24 Although thin universalist arguments tend to circumvent this rejection by constructing thin 
universal principles that aim to be acceptable to groups, or by showing how a thin universalism can 
cohere with their moral claims. In this way thin universalism resonates far more strongly with many of 
its opposition doctrines than it might first appear.
-169-
L.onsirucung Keguiaiory rrincipies
form and cosmopolitan scope. Those principles that it seeks to construct as 
‘universal’ are both universal in form and cosmopolitan in scope. Thus thin 
universalism is modelled as a form of cosmopolitanism, as a set of universal moral 
concerns which are intended to transcend legally defined or contextual boundaries.
Constructing Universalism
Thin universalism claims the need for at least some principles that are inclusive, 
cosmopolitan or universal and which can provide basic orientation for agents seeking 
to navigate a plural world. But how and why does construction yield principles that 
are universal? How does one proceed from an account of complex pluralism and a 
set of first principles grounded in ideas of respect for persons and respect for 
pluralism in order to construct regulatory principles that are universal in the way 
described? Given the conditions of complex pluralism, the first principles by which it 
is viewed, and the relationship between facts and principles, the scope of the 
principles in a constructive account of thin universalism will be, to paraphrase 
O’Neill, ‘more-or-less cosmopolitan’. To accept the complex plurality of views that 
exists within cultures and societies and to accept a plurality and interconnectivity of 
those cultures and societies is to accept that certain morally significant actions will 
have a broader impact than principles of restricted scope can accommodate. 
Justifications for the endorsement, prohibition, or requirement of certain actions, may 
need to have more than local or restricted force.
These assertions require further examination, beginning with the compelling 
notion of interconnectivity. In chapter two, I explored a dimension of pluralism 
referred to as ‘interconnectivity’. This was the claim that ‘in the age of modernity, all
25 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.68
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societies must confront one another and participate (to whatever extent) in a global 
plurality of states, societies, nationalities, ethnic groups, religions, cultures, classes 
and corporations.’ The world is made up of actors, some of whom have legal 
recognition, others seek it, and others do not. These actors have become increasingly 
obvious to one another and few societies can genuinely ignore or be ignored by 
others. What is more the relations between them are becoming ever more complex 
with vast movements of people, information, goods, services and ideas across 
traditionally defined territorial boundaries.
These issues have been addressed predominantly within the context of the 
globalisation debate. It is the mechanisms of global capitalism and the international 
system of market exchange that have had more impact than any other phenomena in 
recent times on how societies interact with one another. And globalisation implies an 
increasing sense of economic, social, cultural, technological, and political 
interdependence, integration and interaction. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
describes globalisation as a historical process:
It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world, 
particularly through trade and financial flows. The term sometimes also refers 
to the movement of people (labor) and knowledge (technology) across 
international borders. ... reflecting technological advances that have made it 
easier and quicker to complete international transactions -  both trade and 
financial flows. It refers to an extension beyond national borders of the same 
market forces that have operated for centuries at all levels of human 
economic activity ...27
26 See chapter two, above, p. 101
27 International Monetary Fund, ‘Globalisation: Threat or Opportunity’, International Monetary Fund 
Website, 2002, (http://www.imf.Org/extemal/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm#II November 23rd 2006)
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The debate over globalisation has shifted to that of its merits and there remains little 
debate over whether globalisation (however conceived) actually exists. One need not 
‘come out’ in favour of moral cosmopolitanism or universalism of any kind, to 
recognise the forces of globalisation at work on an unprecedented scale.28
This growing integration, perhaps even interdependence, is not simply 
confined to the market sphere. Conceptions of regional and global civil society have 
begun to develop, which point to networks of actors unbounded by the nation-state 
system. John Keane suggests we come to regard it as
a dynamic non-governmental system o f interconnected socio-economic
institutions that straddle the whole earth, and that have complex effects that
are fe lt in its four corners. Global civil society is neither a static object or a
fait accompli. It is an unfinished project that consists o f  sometimes thick,
sometimes thinly stretched networks, pyramids and hub-and-spoke clusters o f
socio-economic institutions and actors who organise themselves across
borders, with the deliberate aim o f drawing the world together in new ways.
These non-governmental institutions and actors tend to pluralise power and
to problematise violence; consequently their peaceful or ‘civil' effects are felt
everywhere, here and there, far and wide, to and from local areas, through
/^)
their wider regions, to the planetary level itself.
The empirical evidence for the existence of a ‘global civil society’ is strong. Keane 
suggests that in the past century, the number of institutions operating at a global level 
has increased two hundred-fold, and there are now several thousand agencies, 
groups, institutions, congresses, and organisations that employ hundreds of
28 See David Held and Anthony McGrew, Globalisation /Anti-Globalisation  (Cambridge: Polity, 
2002)
29 See, for example, John Keane, Global Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003)
30 Keane, Global Civil Society, p.8 (author’s emphasis)
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thousands of people and which channel billions of US dollars each year. Agents, 
who work within several different legal regimes often find themselves in a position 
where coordinating fundamental principles is required in order to act consistently 
according to their mandate. All are faced with a breathtaking complexity of actions, 
interactions, borders and channels which compete and constantly shift, leaving little 
knowledge sufficiently concrete as to truly establish and demarcate any given 
politically defined space. As Keane states:
The global circulation of books and magazines, internet messages, and radio 
and television programmes combine to spread the sense that this civil society 
resembles a kaleidoscope of sometimes overlapping or harmonious, 
sometimes conflicting and colliding groups, movements and non­
governmental institutions of many different and often changing colours. 
Perhaps it is better to speak of global civil society as a dynamic space of 
multiple differences, some of which are tensely related or even open to 
conflict.32
It may be prudent to ask what we might want to defend about civil society, and about 
pluralism, if they expose us constantly to potentially violent conflict. However the 
answer to such a question is mapped out, it cannot be denied that civil society 
organisations that exist beyond the boundaries of politically defined nation states are 
growing, albeit at different rates. Many work with explicitly ethical mandates in 
mind. Charity and development organisations, who work according to overtly 
normative guidelines to protect human rights or to alleviate poverty, typically operate 
in many geographical regions and act according to numerous sets of covenants and
31 Keane, Global Civil Society, pp.4-5, fii.5-8
32 Keane, Global Civil Society, p. 175
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laws. Furthermore, this interconnection has been present at ‘grass-roots’ level for 
decades, in the form of the international trade union movement. An official 
international union movement has existed since 1949, which now takes the form of 
the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)34 which in turn has 168 million 
members in 154 countries. Unions are now explicitly internationally-minded, and 
business is conducted with these connections, and a greater impact, at the forefront of 
proceedings.
All of this points to the fact that we are, matter-of-factly, confronted with a 
complex plurality of individuals, groups and societies. Our moral commitments to 
them may be a source of debate, but we are confronted by others. We therefore have 
what Benhabib calls a ‘pragmatic imperative’ to enter into dialogue with one
*2 fi
another. And as such we find ourselves with cause to pursue principles that can 
comprehend these new relationships and confrontations. It is this that most strongly 
prompts universalistic arguments. It is surely plausible to suggest that we do in fact 
‘share a world’ and that there is something inescapably ‘human’ about this. Agents 
are connected if they assume that they can act upon or be acted upon by others. 
Many problems faced by contemporary societies are not locally bounded and many 
are explicitly global and, in some cases, existential. The issues of climate change and 
environmental destruction, international drug- and arms-trading, terrorism, and 
poverty all constitute such problems. The facts of complex pluralism, when viewed 
in light of first principles that reflect our considered responses to them, lead us to
33 See for example the work o f Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or development agencies 
such as the LAED, the International Agency for Economic Development.
34 A union o f the International Confederation o f Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and World 
Confederation o f Labour (WCL)
35 See ‘General Information’, International Trade Union Confederation Website (http://www.ituc- 
csi.org/spip.php?rubrique57 November 23 rd 2006)
36 See Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, p.36 (author’s emphasis); O’Neill, Towards Justice and 
Virtue, p. 156
37 Hannah Arendt make claims similar to this in The Human Condition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago press, 1958) and O’N e ill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p. 101
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acknowledge and take account of these connections between ourselves and others. 
Such connections cannot be satisfactorily addressed by restricted regulatory 
principles and they draw us to construct regulatory principles that can accommodate 
a connected complex plurality.
Of course, not all that is within the scope of our moral concern so constructed 
comes ‘naturally’, in spite of this interconnection. We may therefore find ourselves 
challenged to fulfil what is owed to others within our scope of concern without the 
benefit of a pre-existing attachment to them. A common criticism of constructivist 
and other such moral projects is that they impose, implausibly, stringent and fatuous 
characteristics on ‘morality’. Richard Rorty in ‘Ethics without Principles’ makes the 
claim that to speak of morality in the language of principles -  as, for example, 
‘rights’, ‘ obligations’ and ‘duties’ -  is to misunderstand its true nature. Rather, he 
claims, morality comes naturally to the human animal. A mother feels no sense of 
artificial or imposed duty or obligation to her child or to the rights that that child 
possesses; rather, hers is a natural bond of love and care and this captures the true
2 0
essence of morality.
Rorty is correct in suggesting that the moral bond between a mother and child 
is not one ‘imposed’ by morality after rational deliberation on her part to determine 
the correct course of action with regard to her offspring. But this natural bond is 
naturally limited to relationships where such moral bonds exist. Ties between family 
members, friends and even countrymen could be described in this way; those who 
feel bound to and even constituted by those relationships may feel morally bound to 
them in this ‘natural’ way. But if this is the full domain over that which we call 
‘morality’ presides, all others in our interconnected and complex pluralistic world
38 Richard Rorty, ‘Ethics without Principles’ in Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin, 1999), 
p.78
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are connected to us by no such bond. Those in distant lands have no such natural ties 
to us. This issue is compounded by what Elaine Scarry calls ‘the difficulty of 
imagining other people.’ But we do have duties beyond these ‘natural’ bonds; 
actions do impact others with whom we have no natural connection. It is possible, 
given the nature of interconnectivity, to infer that we are not merely connected to 
those with whom we have ‘natural’ ties. We do have duties beyond our natural ties, 
which in no way detract from, but which add to them.
Proponents of an ‘ethics of care’, such as Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings, 
make similar claims against principle-based arguments.40 But, while we may not 
want to take a wholly impartialist approach and claim that we owe equal attention 
both to our own children and those of others, we might equally surmise that to 
suggest that we owe others nothing is troubling at best. Noddings’ relational ethics of 
care, for example, rightly asserts that one cannot truly care about the children of a far 
off country as much as one cares for ones own. And indeed, it seems problematic to 
suggest that we can easily come to have truly ‘caring’ feelings for the whole of 
mankind similar to those feelings we hold for our nearest and dearest. Such feelings 
are generated by actual encounters between specifiable real people, thus setting an 
impossible task prior to forming a conception of where ethical concern should lie 41 
Nonetheless, it is surely not the case that we owe nothing to those others with whom 
we cannot engage in a specifiable way. Where we perceive our actions to have some 
effect on unseen and ‘unspecifiable’ others, perhaps collectively rather than
39 Elaine Scarry, ‘The Difficulty o f Imagining Other People’ in Martha C. Nussbaum and Jean Cohen 
(eds.), For Love o f  County: Debating the Limits o f  Patriotism (Boston MA: Beacon, 1996), pp.98-102
40 Such as, for example, Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s 
Development (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine 
Approach to Ethics (Berkley: University o f California Press, 1984)
41 See Noddings, Caring, p.79-83; Rosemarie Tong and Nancy Williams, ‘Feminist Ethics’ in Edward 
N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopaedia o f  Philosophy, Winter 2006 Edition, 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2006/entries/feminism-ethics February 11th 2007)
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individually, we do have a connection with those others, however implicitly, which 
in turn has a powerful moral dimension.42
The construction of universal regulatory principles seeks to overcome the 
limitations imposed by what we ‘care’ for. It does so by bringing to light the duties 
we have towards things for which we could never be said to ‘care’ in the way 
conceived of by Rorty and Noddings. Constructed regulatory principles provide 
something beyond the natural bonds felt by us towards those with whom we are 
closely connected.
The construction of those principles, it may be suggested, is ‘unnatural’; 
something that requires overly complex and inaccessible justification, or perhaps 
even radical alteration of the way people in various societies think, and structure 
their thought. But, constructivism has a far greater resonance with the way the world 
seems to be, and universalism is not a characteristic of moral discourse that is 
particular to Western culture. This is borne out by the way in which many cultures 
and societies understand the characteristics of their moral frameworks, and the status 
of their moral statements.
People of all walks of life, from a wide variety of national, ethnic, religious 
and economic backgrounds, endorse universalisms of various kinds. Protagonists of 
moral standpoints which generate large and systematic disagreements, notes Alasdair 
MacIntyre, are never themselves relativists. The force of their claims is not merely 
relative to some local scheme of justification. Each make universal truth claims 
about what constitutes the good life, couched in the terms of their own conception of 
the good.43 And, as Brian Barry notes:
42 See O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p. 113-119
43 Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification’ in Kelvin Knight (ed.) The 
MacIntyre Reader (Oxford: Polity, 1998), p.204
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Liberalism rests on a vision of life ... like any creed it can be neither justified 
nor condemned in terms of anything beyond it. It is itself an answer to the 
unanswerable but irrepressible question: ‘What is the meaning of life?’44
Liberalism, like many political doctrines with moral underpinnings, is based on a 
universal conception of the good life. It is not Western liberalism alone that has 
sought to solve absolutely the riddle of what constitutes the good society. To argue 
that liberal universalism is inherently and uniquely ‘ethnocentric’ is to make over 
generalising and homogenising claims about Western liberalism and about other 
moral and cultural systems.45
There are three separate claims here. First, ‘the West’ is not a fully coherent, 
ideologically homogeneous body and so to identify the whole of ‘the West’ as 
universalist is unsustainable. Second, to make an argument which is grounded in a 
‘West versus the rest’ dichotomy is to fallaciously homogenise all other social and 
cultural systems into one group who seemingly think alike. Third, to reiterate, many 
of those other cultures themselves make, at times, strong universalist claims. So to 
claim that Western culture is in some sense uniquely universalist is a 
misrepresentation. ‘Universalism’ is far less problematic than many of its detractors 
suggest, not least because many of the cultures, societies, and practices that those 
detractors would wish to defend in the face of rampant Western universalism are 
themselves premised on universal truth claims.
Take, as an example, universalist trends in Indian Hinduism which, like many 
religions, shares a duality of images. One is pluralist-universalist -  tolerant of other 
religious systems, committed to the value, equality, even the truth, of those systems. 
The other is nationalist-universalist -  juxtaposing itself with Islam and equating
44 Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory o f Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 127
45 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, pp.24-25
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Hindu identity with Indian identity, and therefore a notion of Indian citizenship.46 In 
the first image, universalisms of a variety of thicknesses are at work. Indeed, the 
stressing of a plurality of equally valid religious systems has powerful universalist 
qualities in and of itself, and one that resonates closely, and perhaps most 
comfortably with the idea of a thin universalism. Further than this, though, many 
strands of thought on the subject of ‘religious diversity’ stress the idea that all are 
differing interpretations of the same truth. Gandhi, emphasising his own Hindu 
universalism, states:
Religions are different roads converging to the same point. What does it 
matter that we take different roads, so long as we reach the same goal? In 
reality, there are as many religions as there are individuals.47
Even in the second image, where commitment to the validity of other religious belief 
systems is not at the forefront, different universalising assumptions are made. Denise 
Cush suggests that ‘exclusivist’ claims to truth, which may seek to convert all others 
(referred to as ‘monoexclusivism’) or not (‘henoexclusivism’), are premised on a 
belief that the truths inherent in, in this case Hinduism, are universal.48
Similar currents can be glimpsed on other religious frameworks; the Jewish 
belief in their covenant with God, as described in the Torah, has similarly 
universalist underpinnings. Whether that is understood as a mission to be a Tight 
unto the nations’, and to exemplify the covenant with God, or whether God is
46 Denise Cush in 'A Suggested Typology o f Positions on Religious Diversity' in Journal o f  Beliefs 
and Values, Vol. 15 (2), 1994, pp. 18-21
47 M.K. Gandhi, All Men Are Brothers: Life and Thoughts o f  Mahatma Ghandi as Told in His Own 
Words (Paris: UNESCO, 1958), p.59; Denise Cush and Catherine Robinson, ‘The Contemporary 
Construction o f Hindu Identity: Hindu Universalism and Hindu Nationalism’ in The Internet Journal 
ofReligion/Diskus, Vol.2 (2), 1994, Oittp://web.uni-marburg.de/religionswissenschaft/ioumal/ 
diskus/cush&robinson.html February 9th 2007)
48 Cush and Robinson, ‘The Contemporary Construction o f Hindu Identity: Hindu Universalism and 
Hindu Nationalism’
-179-
constructing Keguiatory principles
understood to have a relationship with all peoples, Jews and non-Jews alike. Islam 
has a similar gamut of universalist underpinnings. Muslims believe that the Koran 
was sent by Allah to bring peace and harmony to all of humanity through Islam. The 
idea of universal peace for both Muslims and non-Muslims extends to tolerance of 
worship and securities of property and person for non-followers. Ideals of equality 
can be glimpsed in the performance of Hajj at Mecca. Those branches of Islam that 
do not stress this level of equality still demonstrate ‘monoextemalist’ universal 
qualities. These range from making claims to the truth of their faith, to professing the 
need to convert non-believers, in extreme cases through violence.49
Universalism is also visible in numerous other non-religious valuational and 
ethical frameworks, including utilitarianism and socialism. Construction and 
universalism resonate both with these doctrines and with the claims of their 
opponents. This view is reinforced when we remember that even the strongest claims 
of particularity or relativity are often couched in the language of truth, some 
conception of the absolute, or in explicit universal terms. As Alison Renteln notes, 
even relativisms tends to assert an absolute prescription that all prescriptions are 
relative.50
Even rejection or denial of universal standards often implicitly acknowledge, 
or perhaps even endorse in some sense, universal prescriptions. If justifications 
cannot be arbitrary then this is a pragmatic political concern, but also a more 
fundamental moral one which reflects a degree of de facto universalist thinking. 
Indeed, agents do, in their attempts to justify their own actions or criticize those of
49 See, for examples in Islamic thought, Abdul Qadir, Arab Nationalism and Islamic Universalism 
(New Delhi: Global Vision, 2006); Ira M Lapidus, ‘Between Universalism and Particularism: The 
Historical Bases o f Muslim Communal, National, and Global Identities’ in Global Networks Vol.l (1), 
2001, pp.37-55
50 Alison Dundes Renteln International Human Rights: Universalism Versus Relativism (London:
Sage, 1990), pp.68-69, 72
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others, appeal to wider audiences in various justificatory circumstances.51 Many 
agents recognize that reasoning has to be wider than those like-minded individuals 
who will tend towards agreement and it is only by casting a wider net that approval is 
‘legitimized’. For example, attempts to ‘cover up’ serious violations of human rights 
such as genocide or oppression suggest not only implicit acknowledgement of their 
existence (however understood) but also of their binding moral status and inclusive 
scope.
At other times, skewed, perhaps even abhorrent, conceptions of ‘the 
universal’ are articulated in order to defend certain practices. Others may be regarded 
not as agents but as something else; as less than human. Such tactics have been used 
in many societies to exclude certain members, often racial, ethnic and religious 
minorities, women and homosexuals, from cultural, social or political life. Richard 
Rorty highlights a story, taken from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the 
1990s, of sexual sadism by Serb guards on Muslim prisoners, in which the ethical 
standing of the Muslims was denied through an outright rejection of their status as 
human beings. Thus they were not violating human rights, because those they were 
assaulting were not human beings.52 In such cases, O’Neill argues, ‘there will be no 
way to convince them that those others fall within the scope of their ethical 
consideration’. While clearly incompatible with the variety of universalism at work
51 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.53
52 Richard Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality’ in Truth and Progress: 
Philosophical Papers vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 167
53 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.l 10. This issue is acute in most contemporary work on 
ethical consideration. Rorty’s provisionally non-cognitivist account o f sentimental education and 
discourse struggles to account for ‘the genocidal maniacs o f the world’; see Mark Evans, ‘Pragmatist 
Liberalism and the Evasion o f Politics’ in Mark Evans (ed.), The Edinburgh Companion to 
Contemporary Liberalism  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), pp. 148-161 at p. 156. 
Meanwhile Rawls comes close to pulling the rug from under his freestanding ‘political conception of 
justice’ by retreating to a comprehensive liberal doctrine in order to deal with doctrinal extremism; see 
John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 153. O’Neill faces 
a similar problem, she can offer nothing to say to those who truly seek to deny the ethical standing of  
certain others.
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here, it is clear that universal considerations feature in the structures of many modes 
of discourse. Invoking universalism to legitimate action, however barbaric, 
demonstrates its significance and appeal if, perhaps, nothing else.
Universal principles also possess strong psychological appeal, because they 
do not contradict how social actors typically view moral assertions. This proves to be 
particularly powerful in the construction of consent to thin universal regulatory 
principles. Universalism does not seem to contradict those intuitions that tell us what 
morality or moral principles ought to be, a problem faced by doctrines such as 
relativism, particularism, emotivism and nihilism. Each of them must contend with 
strong currents in popular sentiment which intuitively oppose their positions. While 
complex pluralism may appear to raise questions about what is right and wrong, true 
and false, it also compatible with what people believe these concepts to be by 
establishing and illuminating clear counterpoints to those dualisms. Thin 
universalism is sufficiently thin to allow it to comport with propositions that agents 
already hold to be ‘truths’. In other words, agents can comprehend and acknowledge 
thin universal principles as ‘true’, which they themselves hold as true, and which 
others recognise, though not necessarily as true (but as something else that gives 
them authority). In this respect, it offers a plausibly ‘realist-in-appearance’ approach 
to the truth-value of moral principles; this is a significant aspect of the historical 
appeal of universalism and it cannot be ignored. Because universal regulatory 
principles share many characteristics with realist positions, they are able to retain 
some of the appeal and connection to their subject held by Judaeo-Christian 
principles, and this is something that should be taken seriously, especially given the 
importance of consent for the legitimisation of constructed regulatory principles.
constructing Regulatory Principles
But why do people tend to search for and cling to universally applicable 
criteria, characteristics, norms, standards and requirements amongst fellow human 
beings? Provisional answers here might be based on the determination to have our 
own principles upheld. We hold people to certain ‘universal’ standards because we 
want to feel that if we treat others well, they will treat us well in kind. This has a 
number of functions including self-preservation. In Hobbes’ Leviathan, fear and 
mistrust, and imperfect knowledge about the capacities of others, drive individuals in 
the state of nature to adopt a ‘get them before they get me’ attitude.54 Similar lack of 
knowledge may lead to a ‘live and let live’ attitude; if you do not harm others they 
will have no recourse to harm you.
Examples of this are evident in the history of thought. It can be seen in the 
Golden Rule (‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’),55 the 
Categorical Imperative (‘so act that you treat humanity whether in your own person 
or any other person never merely as a means but as an end in itself),56 and the UN 
Universal Declaration o f Human Rights.57 It is this determination drives the idea that 
all human beings must therefore be entitled to basic rights to life, liberty, security, 
due process before the law and freedom of speech and association.58 The universal 
legal recognition of our status as human beings would be the final result of a 
determination to see our principles upheld.
This may simply be symptomatic of the psychological burden of a world 
‘without God.’59 Since the Enlightenment and the decline of religion in the West, the
54 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Part I
55 Matthew 7:12
56 Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics o f  Morals (Cambridge: Hackett, 1998), pp.429,
402 (Prussian Academy pagination)
57 United Nations Office o f Public Information, Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights (New York: 
United Nations, 1980)
58 Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, pp.27-28
59 Nietzsche, o f course, famously pronounced ‘God is dead’ in The Gay Science (New York: Random 
House, 1974), Section 125, pp. 181-182
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rise of empiricism and rational science has made us acutely aware of our physical 
existence. Knowledge of death and the fact that we must sooner or later die (some 
massive leap in our understanding of the human body notwithstanding) is a burden 
that has the potential for enormous psychological consequences. Without the 
guaranteed security of immortality (Heaven, Hell, Reincarnation, Salvation, 
Damnation, The Soul, Karma etc.), facing the acceptance of death is a necessity. We 
may therefore look at death as a universal and human experience, for comfort and a 
lessening of this burden. This attachment to things that remain universally ‘human’ 
acts as a powerful draw for many situated in a complex and pluralised world and 
various ‘humanisms’ retain prevalence and appeal.60
If consideration of complex pluralism leads us to begin from first principles 
which embody a notions of ‘respect for persons’, it is crucial to understand how and 
why those persons orient themselves in the way that they do. Many still think 
universally when it comes to moral questions and construction can help 
pragmatically and morally to see where this may lead. Pragmatically, of course, the 
fact that ‘the universal’ is still such a prevalent aspect of how agents structure moral 
thinking suggests that the procedure of constructing palatable universal principles is 
far from an impossible, if ultimately unending, task.
Ultimately it becomes clear that agents may need universal principles. They 
need them to orient, contextualise and coordinate other, perhaps more specific and 
perhaps more thickly conceived principles. It is a mistake to envisage a procedure of 
construction doing all of our moral work for us; we do not construct all of ‘morality’, 
and indeed we construct regulatory principles out of, inter alia, other principles. We
60 See, for example, Karl Marx’s ‘motto’: 'Nihil humani a me alienumputo’ ( ‘I  consider nothing 
human to be alien to me ’). See David McLellan The Thought o f  Karl Marx (London: Macmillan,
1971). The motto is taken from Terentius, the Latin playwright, from a dialogue between the 
characters Menedemus and Chremes in his play Heautontimoroumenos or The Self-Tormentor 
(London: Penguin, 1965)
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do not construct all of our principles, merely those principles that we intend to have 
certain ‘effects’ on our surroundings and on others.61 In this instance, orienting 
principles are required in order to draw together those aspects of a human life which 
are separate but connected in order to have them cohere. Walzer envisaged separate 
‘spheres’ of life but, as O’Neill remarks:
It will not be enough to approach the various spheres, segments or aspects of 
an acknowledged domain of ethical consideration relying only on a variety of 
more specific principles of more restricted scope. The segments of a full 
domain of ethical consideration can only be organized if some inclusive 
principles cover the entire scope of acknowledged ethical consideration, and 
demarcate and link the restricted segments and spheres of life within which 
more specific principles are to serve. Hence those who lead their lives in the 
contemporary world will need at least some inclusive basic principles whose 
scope is more or less cosmopolitan.
Universal principles do more than cover ethical judgements in a particular domain, to 
which we feel only a limited connection at times. They do not simply ground the 
validity of cross cultural moral judgements. They may in fact be central to the 
orienting and organising of our multifaceted moral commitments. And, in a world 
characterised by a complex plurality of interconnected and interdependent agents, the 
significance of this need for orientating principles is most apparent.
61 Jerry Cohen is referencing Robert Nozick here. See G.A. Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’ in 
Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol.31 (2003), pp.211-245 at (s), p.240
62 See again Michael Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice: A Defence o f  Pluralism and Equality (New York: 
Basic Books, 1983)
63 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p. 156
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Universalism and Ethnocentrism
A commitment to universalism is grounded in first principles that reflect the 
judgement that ‘being human’ has an invariable normative significance that places 
moral limits on the kind of society fit for people to inhabit.64 In a plural world, that 
normative significance means that we must retain a universal domain of moral 
concern. While a commitment to the normative significance of human beings is not 
dependent on the factual claims of complex pluralism, the constructed regulatory 
principles which are universal are fact-dependent. Pluralism, then, demands that our 
first principles be developed and built upon in certain ways and certain of those first 
principles demand specifically universal characteristics in the regulatory principles 
constructed from them. Universalism is dependent both upon the factual 
considerations of complex pluralism and upon our basic, considered normative 
commitments.
Universalism, then, is the product of certain moral predispositions which 
have been established as valid. Constructive procedures are employed because it 
quickly becomes clear that the considered responses to pluralism are alone 
inadequate for addressing problems of violent conflict that threatens individuals, 
societies and pluralism itself. In order to affect these issues, regulatory principles that 
have universal characteristics are required. Onora O’Neill states:
the first step towards a substantive account of justice must be to establish 
some inclusive principles of justice. The most elementary principles of justice 
must be inclusive and must provide basic orientations, by which more 
restricted and specific principles, and hence indirectly also some institutions,
64 See also Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification’, p.76
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practices and acts conceived of in specific, ‘thick’ terms, and their special 
obligations and rights, can be shown as justifiable and others unjustifiable.65
This draws together many of the claims that orient the ‘universal’ dimension of the 
project. Thin universalism is an important step in regulating our affairs. If morality is 
to be an important aspect of that regulation, we will need to establish some regulatory 
moral principles that are universal in reach. In responding to complex pluralism, it is 
easy to understand how and why universal principles still have a role to play. They 
provide means of and set terms for engaging in moral discourse in order to arbitrate 
and delimit the consequences of violent conflict between agents. They also serve to 
connect, order and cohere more specific principles.
Nonetheless, universalism, even so constructed, remains confronted by a 
number of potentially pervasive problems. While arguments in favour of 
universalism may be convincing, the suspicion remains that universalism -  or, at 
least, the universalism of which the kind I am advocating here is a subset66 -  is the 
product of a Western liberal system. This is problematic because universalism 
intends its reach beyond that of Western liberal peoples. The suspicion remains, then, 
that universalism is still, half a century after decolonisation, nothing more than a 
renewed attempt at Western imperialism. On this account, ‘universalism’ is and can 
only ever be the product of set of norms which are culturally particular. As such it 
will never be valid in its intended cosmopolitan domain.
Is universalism ethnocentric? The issues surrounding this question have been 
in vogue for some time now, but the question itself has only recently been made
65 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p. 157 (The cited passage refers to ‘justice’ rather than 
‘morality’, but its point is not lost)
66 That is, the kind o f universalism that might be described by Michael Walzer as ‘covering law 
universalism’ -  a description with which I disagree in the most part. See Michael Walzer, ‘Nation and 
Universe’ in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order: The 
Challenge o f  Diversity (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 10-41 at pp. 10-11
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fnexplicit. This concern needs to be taken seriously, if the universalism that is to be 
constructed is truly a product of construction and not simply a form of 
comprehensive universalism, the likes of which have been around for centuries. A 
defence of universalism must take seriously what motivates the charge that it is 
ethnocentric. To do so requires a characterisation of ethnocentrism. Alfred Kroeber 
states that ethnocentrism is the ‘tendency ... to see one’s in-group as always right 
and all out-groups as wrong wherever they differ.’69 Now, for universalism to be 
ethnocentric in this way would take a rejection of many of the characteristics of 
pluralism outlined in chapter two, and hence many of the arguments that go into the 
construction of universalism. The notion of societies and cultures as ‘open systems’, 
which are not hermetically sealed but plural, porous and multifaceted, calls this kind 
of suggestion into question. Herodotus may be correct: when asked to select the best 
of all the customs and principles in the world, most people would select their own.70 
Again, this is only problematic if those customs and principles are to apply to a wider 
domain. In such instances, ethnocentrism becomes moral or cultural imperialism. 
Many universal principles fall prey to this critique, not least because in numerous 
past instances universal value judgements have been accompanied by acts of empire- 
building, justified on the grounds of (inter alia71) religious salvation of the conquered 
or the importance of civilising ‘savage’ peoples.72 If there is or was such a thing as
67 See Martin Hollis, ‘Is Universalism Ethnocentric?’ in Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes (eds.), 
Multicultural Questions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.27-43 at p.36. And, following 
that, Steven Lukes, ‘Is Universalism Ethnocentric?’ in his own Liberals and Cannibals, (London: 
verso, 2002), ch.2. See also Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, ch.2 which also appeared in Lukes and 
Joppke, Multicultural Questions.
68 Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, p. 12
69 Alfred Kroeber, Anthropology, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1948), p.266 quoted in Lukes, Liberals 
and Cannibals, p. 12
70 Herodotus, Histories (London: Penguin, 1996), Book III
71 Because it would be foolish to pretend that ‘empire’ was little more that an attempt to universalise a 
particular set o f value judgments.
Edward Said, o f course, grounds this imperialistic ethnocentrism firmly in the cultural past o f the 
West. See Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism, (London: Vintage, 1993)
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‘the West’, and if it has or had at any point a homogeneous coherent value structure, 
then one can point to many historical and contemporary examples of empire-building 
which would seem to solidify the concerns of universalism’s detractors.
‘Western’ Enlightenment universalisms, when led down this line of 
reasoning, begin to look more and more incapable of accounting for the world in 
which they find themselves and it has experienced something of an ‘epistemological
7^crisis’ in the last century. Universalism starts to look objectionable according to 
both external critique and to its own considered judgements. Confronted by complex 
pluralism’s fundamental challenge to its core values, universalism in its traditional 
senses seems incapable of confronting or accounting for the world which it is 
designed to analyse. Moral descriptions thick with cultural specificity -  ethnocentric 
universals -  can no longer account for the undeniable diversity of views in the 
modem world. A state of crisis seems inevitable.74 This has led, in the past, to the 
expectation on the part of some that pluralism was an ‘ephemeral, even an 
epiphenomenal incident’ that would dissipate given enough time, and the right level
n c
of rationality. Change is forced on a tradition in crisis by an alternative capable of 
explaining why the crisis has arisen and why the presuppositions of the conceptual 
scheme prevent the tradition from overcoming it.
In spite of this damaging characterisation of Enlightenment universalism, 
there remain two ways to counter its critique. Firstly, to recap arguments highlighted 
earlier: Such a claim assumes that Western, Enlightenment-influenced thought can be
73 See Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narration and the Philosophy of 
Science’ in TheMonist, Vol.60, 1971, pp.433-472. See also, Kelvin Knight’s ‘Introduction’ to his 
edited volume, The MacIntyre Reader (Oxford: Polity, 1995), p. 17.
74 Bellah et al alluded to just such a crisis in American social and political life. It was suggested that 
modem America was ‘trying to live by the Lockean language o f individualism in an instrumental 
world it can no longer describe.’ See Robert N. Bellah et al, Habits o f  the Heart (London: University 
of California Press, 1985)
75 See John Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, p.65. This was not just the case with liberal thinkers, but 
with Marxists too, who foresaw the overcoming o f those same differences for the sake o f class 
solidarity.
-189-
t_onsirucung Keguiatory rrincipies
regarded as coherent, systematised and homogeneous, rather than the densely layered 
and polyvocal system of interactions that it is. This is accompanied by a 
homogenising perception of all other cultures; there is ‘the West’ and then ‘everyone 
else’, from whom the West is radically different.76 Moreover, there is the suggestion 
that it is only Western liberal societies that conceive of moral principles in universal 
terms and that somehow all other cultures perceive of their moral codes as nothing 
more than relative to their own systems.77 Very few cultures are relativist, and many 
religions, nationalisms, ethical, political and philosophical doctrines believe that they 
have solved the problem of how to live justly, rightly or virtuously and that those 
solutions are universally valid.
Secondly though, the universalist might seek to take on board and adapt to 
the ethnocentrism critique rather than simply deny it. The universalist might look to 
an altered conceptual scheme capable of overcoming the fundamental ‘problems’78 
which led to the epistemological crisis faced by universalism in the first place. The 
question becomes: How does one go about establishing an ethnocentrically and 
pluralistically enlightened universalism? Only a universalism that takes seriously the 
concurrent considerations of socio-cultural sensitivity -  only a thin universalism -  is 
equipped to give proper regard to the complex pluralism of the modem world, and 
hence is capable of deflecting the claims of ethnocentrism.
Thinness
In spite of this, accusations of ‘ethnocentrism’ and ‘imperialism’ may be troubling. 
Firstly, because the concern for persons encoded into the first principles which are
76 See Benhabib, The Claims o f  Culture, pp.24-25
77 See, again, MacIntyre, ‘Moral Relativism, Truth and Justification’, p.204
78 The scare quotes here indicate that complex pluralism is a problem for universalism, rather than for 
‘humanity’ or for ‘society’.
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valid starting points for construction demand de facto rejection of any regulatory 
principles that can be shown to be imperialistic on the grounds that uniformly 
impressing all of ones values on others scarcely shows ‘respect’ towards them. 
Second, because even i f  universal principles are constructed from valid starting 
points on the basis of acceptable facts about the world, it still appears that nothing 
more than principles with local or limited force are constructed.
Furthermore, the broader the scope of applicability, the more divergent and 
pluralised the points of view under consideration become. And the more regulatory 
principles we ask a diversity of people to consider, the greater the likelihood that 
some will have reason to reject them. This prompts further questions about how to 
secure agreement to those principles, which generates further concern over coercion 
and respect for persons. Principles must seemingly accept their own limitations of 
scope and applicability or risk imposing comprehensive values on others. There 
seems little scope for constructing universal principles, morally or practically. 
However, this leaves unexplored the second dimension of construction that draws on 
the respect for pluralism inherent in our first principles, and which leads us to be 
‘thin’.
‘Thinness’ emerges in part from the dichotomy between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’, 
though they were not coined in the same context at the same time. In fact ‘thinness’ 
emerged some time later. ‘Thickness’ first emerges in the work of Bernard Williams 
who notes, critically, the tendency to favour general ethical concepts such as 'good, 
right, ought, and the rest’. Williams characterises a distinction between these general 
expressions and more specific ones. He describes those more specific ethical 
concepts as ‘thicker’ than the general ethical expressions and suggests their use is in 
part determinate on fact:
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those ‘thicker’ or more specific ethical notions ... such as treachery and 
promise and brutality and courage ... seem to express a union of fact and 
value. The way these notions are applied is determined by what the world is 
like (for instance, by how someone has behaved), and yet, at the same time, 
their application involves a certain evaluation of the situation, of persons or
79actions.
‘Thick’ ethical notions express a ‘union of fact and value’ in that they embody an 
evaluative element in conjunction with an empirical element. An act, Williams 
suggests, is frequently described as being of a particular character as a matter of fact, 
and acts of that particular character are evaluated as being acceptable or 
unacceptable. Allan Gibbard frames the term thus: ‘A term stands for a thick concept 
if it praises or condemns an action as having a certain property.’80 ‘Thickness’ 
therefore suggests a measure of context dependence, a greater degree of specificity 
and a lesser degree of generality, and a stronger relation to concrete circumstance.81 
Thick terms are, broadly speaking, culturally specific or particular in their evaluative 
meaning.
It is worth considering Gibbard again for a contrast between Williams’ use of 
‘thickness’, and ‘thinness’ in this context. He notes that, where thick concepts are 
used, they ‘work quite differently from “thin” normative concepts like right and 
good". By this seems to be implied two ways in which thick and thin concepts are
79 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f  Philosophy (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1985), p.129
80 Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f  Philosophy, pp. 129-130; Allan Gibbard, ‘Thick Concepts and 
Warrant for Feelings’ in Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume LXVI (66), 
1992, pp.268-9. While Gibbard is critical o f the notion of thick concepts, he also notes a contrast with 
‘thin’ normative concepts, but this discussion has not quite reached that point yet.
81 And it must be made clear that this coinage o f  the term overlaps with, but is not identical to 
Williams’ use o f the term.
82 In spite o f  its chronological irregularity, a more intuitive narrative o f the evolution o f the term can 
thus be constructed.
83 Gibbard, ‘Thick Concepts and Warrant for Feelings’, p.269
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incongruous. First, the evaluative features of thin concepts lack the culturally 
embedded qualities of thick terms. Their descriptive task is, in some way, different to 
thick concepts, in that they have a different relationship to the agents or action they 
describe. This does not, however, mean that thin terms cannot be fact-responsive. 
And second, by contrasting terms like right and good with terms like treachery and 
courage there is a difference in the degree of generality between thick and thin 
concepts, (which is not to say that thick concepts can simply be collapsed into thin 
ones).
For Stuart Hampshire, ‘thinness’ takes on the more normative, less 
descriptive form relevant to this thesis, a form similar to the second point of note 
concerning Gibbard’s analysis. Hampshire refers to ‘a thin notion of minimal 
procedural justice’ embodied in minimal but universal principles which inherently 
underdetermine moral discourse, and which allow for a variety of divergent 
outcomes depending on the various contexts of that discourse.84 This sense in which 
principles can be ‘thin’ by legitimating a wide diversity, and not a single social, 
cultural and political form through underdetermination of the full moral character of
Off
those forms, is echoed by Haddock, Roberts and Sutch.
Hampshire captures an element of thinness implied by Williams’ description 
of thickness and establishes a now common coinage of the term within analytic 
philosophy. He draws a close association between thinness and moral minimalism, 
stating:
84 Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (London: Penguin, 1989), p. 14 and ch.2, especially 
pp.72-78
Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch, ‘Introduction’ in Haddock, Roberts and Sutch (eds.), 
Principles and Political Order, pp. 1-9 at p.2
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There is a basic level of morality, a bare minimum, which is entirely 
negative, and without this bare minimum as a foundation no morality directed 
towards the greater goods can be applicable and can survive in practice.
The association that can be drawn between this minimalism and the notion of 
thinness to which Williams alludes is clear. A thick moral term is culturally specific 
or particular, while a thin moral term is more general, derived from something not 
particular to a single context. The generality of thin concepts suggests that their 
deployment is intended for a scope wider than those of thick concepts. Furthermore, 
when understood in the context of a ‘bare minimum’, thinness begins to look far 
more like the kind of concept which is a direct response to concerns over the 
ethnocentric and culturally imperialistic universalisms, with which thin universalism 
is intended to be a break.
Thin regulatory principles bear certain key characteristics. They are first of 
all thin in the sense that they represent nothing more than a ‘bare minimum’ set of 
principles. They are thin in that they are limited in number, rather than in their scope 
or applicability (as thin universalism couples principles that bear the feature of being 
limited in number with the feature of being universal in scope or applicability). 
Following Evans, thinness can be characterised as
a rather sparse set of principles (where ‘principle’ denotes a general directive 
or regulative ideal for how agent’s ought (not) to act), substantive enough to 
establish some fundamental norms for human coexistence but not so thickly 
determinate as to be completely insensitive to the concrete particular and the
• 87possibilities of variable interpretation.
86 Hampshire, Innocence and Experience, pp.72, 78
87 Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justice’, p.77
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Thinness fundamentally wHfiferdetermines the full moral character of any set of 
social, cultural or political interactions. All forms of life, including liberal forms of 
life, will therefore be underdetermined by the content of thin principles. Thin 
regulatory principles amount to the most basic of standards that must be met in order 
for a regime, way of life, or set of cultural, social and political institutions to satisfy 
conditions of meaningful human existence.
Constructing Thinness
Thinness is an outcome of construction. Constructed principles will bear the 
characteristic of thinness so described because of those facts and first principles that 
go into construction. In chapter three I suggested that an examination of complex 
pluralism illuminates fact-independent principles characterised by, alongside respect 
for human beings, respect for the plurality of human values, cultures, societies and
Q Q
belief systems. This principle was unpacked to demonstrate fact-independent 
commitments to value human socio-cultural creations, to respect the integrity and 
autonomy of human societies through non-interference and self-determination, and to 
peaceful coexistence.
These first principles recognise that, while it frequently leads to heightened 
social conflict and even violence, pluralism is the norm. Rawls was correct to take 
seriously the ‘fact of pluralism’ and its dissipation should not be anticipated for the
QQ
foreseeable future. Even if pluralism were something eliminable, to do so would 
most likely be through a violation of those first principles. Even though many find it 
troubling, pluralism is here to stay. Taken further, these principles recognise the 
claim that pluralism has the potential to aid in the development of self-understanding
88 Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” of Justice’, p.76
89 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p.xvi
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and a ‘wider’ view of the world. This may require affirmation and proliferation of 
pluralism and complexity and, though this thesis remains neutral on that score, it may 
be only in so doing can a space for pluralism be secured.
Thinness is the product of first principles considered in light of the facts of 
complex pluralism. Just as universalism can be defended on the grounds that it is 
constructed from facts and first principles, thinness can be similarly defended. Given 
both our first principles and the practical concern to elicit agreement around 
principles intended to be applicable to a complex plurality, the more principles that 
we assert the less people are likely to connect with them. The more we ask of people 
the more problematic the construction becomes, both practically and morally.
Pragmatically, of course, it is a statistical probability that a plurality of agents 
with different views is more likely to agree on one thing than two, and more likely to 
agree on two things than twenty. Thinness in thin universalism reflects this pragmatic 
concern: the more principles we ask others to agree to, the fewer of those others will 
be inclined or able to agree. The more people to whom we appeal, the fewer 
principles over which that appeal is made, the more likely we are to find a point of 
agreement. This is the political dimension to thinness, which is reflected in later 
Rawlsian political liberalism. Rawls is ‘thin’ here in two specific ways. The first is 
carried over from A Theory o f  Justice: the only object of ‘justice as fairness’ is the 
basic structure of society arrived at through the decision mechanism of the original 
position. 90 Second, ‘political liberalism’ limits the object of ‘justice as fairness’ to 
the political and not the metaphysical.91 In this way Rawls pursues the distinctly 
political project of political constructivism towards an explicitly ‘political conception
90 See John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 7-11; Political 
Liberalism, pp. 11 -12
91 See John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Vol. 14 (3), 1985, pp.223-251
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of justice’ which seeks ‘to avoid opposing any reasonable comprehensive doctrine’ 
that citizens of a society might hold.
But this political, pragmatic dimension to the construction of thinness is 
underpinned by a more fundamentally moral imperative. It would be simple to 
assume that thinness emerges as an outcome of construction because of the need to 
generate consent around principles that we seek to advocate as universal. Rawls’ 
political construction aims entirely not to contradict comprehensive moral doctrines 
in order to establish an overlapping consensus which citizens generally can affirm. 
However, it is not solely due to a pragmatic suspicion that thicker universalisms will 
be unable to generate the popular support they might require to be regarded as valid 
that drives thinness.
Thinness is a moral construction grounded in the first principles surrounding 
the imperative to respect pluralism. In considering first principles such as respect for 
diverse social forms, respect for the legal autonomy of other societies and the value 
of peaceful coexistence it becomes clear that thinness is not just about garnering 
consent for universal regulatory principles, it is also about cashing out first principles 
in an appropriate way. The source of the thinness and the universality of regulatory 
principles is our first principles. Both amount to more than simply pragmatic, tactical 
or functional directives with only the minimal aim of ‘getting things done’ in mind. 
But thinness does not simply respond to first principles concerned with respect for 
pluralism, but also with those concerned with respect for persons (unpacked from the 
first of the two general principles). The imposition of thick universal regulatory 
principles, which bear specific cultural traits and are evidently ethnocentric, not only 
violates a commitment to respect human cultures, but also violates the very
92 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 11-15, 95
93 Rawls, Political Liberalism,^.95
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commitment to respect persons which those universal regulatory principles are 
intended to safeguard. Where pluralism has not been respected -  in historical 
instances of colonialism, imperialism, and mishandled ‘missionary’ work, modem 
intmsions of industrialism and capital into rural economies, or of values such as 
‘liberal democracy’ and ‘human rights’ into potentially incompatible regimes94 -  
persons have not been respected also. Such instances are failures by the standards of 
many of the first principles illuminated by considering pluralism.
Thinness and universalism are inextricably linked. It is problematic to discuss 
universalism apart from the concerns that motivate thinness, and similarly, the 
coherence of thinness so understood is dependent on its motivations being cashed out 
in a universal context. While they do not make claims about what can be considered 
‘valuable’, they do posit that, given the plurality of values and judgements, there are 
certain minimal standards that all social arrangements must meet in order to meet 
basic human needs.95 Thinness and universality can only properly be understood 
together as thin universalism: a regulatory ‘bottom line’, applicable to all and 
minimal in content. Thin universalism seizes the valuational concept, of a ‘moral 
minimum’, draws it into the regulatory sphere and establishes its form and content 
through a process of construction.
Further, it is ultimately both the facts of pluralism and a set of fact- 
independent first principles that underlie and shape thin universalism. Just as it is the 
underlying rock that provides the canvas, upon which act the forces of nature that 
shape a landscape. The mountains and valleys are carved by the elements: by the ice,
94 Typically, strands o f Muslim and Confucian thought have been cited here which may be 
fundamentally ‘moral’ and ‘decent’ but which do not appear immediately compatible with democratic 
values. ‘Democracy’ is now such an ‘empty signifier’ that to suggest that something is undemocratic 
is now often mistakenly taken to mean immoral, wrong, apolitical or similar.
95 It may well be that very few societies actually meet this standard, liberal societies included (given 
some o f the more disconcerting truths about capitalism). Thin Universalism, therefore, far from ends 
the practical or theoretical tasks of politics and morality, but rather fully engages and challenges them.
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wind, and rain, and their form and nature come from both the rock and the elements. 
Different rock, different canvas, different landscape; different elements, different 
impact, different landscape. Just as the rock sets the terms by which a landscape may 
be sculpted, so our first principles shape the values at the end of a procedure of 
construction. Just as the elements carve and sculpt the rock to produce those 
mountains and valleys, so the facts sculpt our first principles into specific and 
applicable regulatory principles.
But does thinness do enough to overcome the crisis in universalism, bringing 
its assumptions into line with a complex plural world and render it useful again? A 
thin universalism certainly evades the more damaging problems associated with 
accusations of ethnocentrism and imperialism. Because thinness is constructed in 
accordance with the facts of complex pluralism, it is particularly sensitive to those 
aspects of cultural particularity which drive these charges. In this way thin 
universalism can weather the storm of criticism in a way the previous, thicker 
religious, metaphysical and rationalist universalisms cannot. In fact, only a 
universalism that is so sensitive to pluralism is capable of overcoming accusations of 
imperialism. Because of the way it understands complex pluralism, because of the 
way it evaluates and responds to the problems that complex pluralism engenders, 
because of the extent to which it is sensitive to and permits a wide diversity of social 
formations, and because it seeks to underdetermine the full moral content of any 
given set of social structures, a thin universalism is not hampered by the same 
objections as its thicker counterparts. Thus, the epistemological crisis of universalism 
is not a terminal decline; but it is a serious issue that must be addressed. The 
‘problem’ is not in complex pluralism, but in universalism itself, and thinness in our 
practical principles goes a long way to rectifying that problem. While traditional,
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comprehensive, thick universalisms face a world that they cannot explain, thin 
universalism is poised not only to confront the world as it stands, but to work 
effectively within it as a means of resolving violent conflict through a broad basis of 
consent to general regulatory principles.
Regulatory Political Principles
Previous chapters have discussed the distinction between first principles and 
principles of regulation, and within that discussion alluded to the character of 
regulatory principles beyond the focus on their constructed character and fact- 
dependence. I have suggested that the outcome of construction is political principles, 
rather than simply moral principles; a distinction requiring further substantiation.
Analytic philosophy tends to maintain an important distinction between ‘the 
moral’ and ‘the political’. That distinction permeates not only into understandings of 
what ‘the moral’ and what ‘the political’ might be, and what comprises them and 
makes them distinct, but also how they are studied and how they are utilised. The 
result is further distinctions between ‘moral philosophy’ and ‘political philosophy’, 
and ultimately ‘moral principles’ and ‘political principles’.
It is this final distinction that is of importance to the thin universalist project. 
Both moral and political principles can pertain to constructed regulatory principles, 
yet they are distinct. Moral principles can be the product of constructivism which 
results in a set of principles oriented towards a particular aspect of morality. Moral 
principles offer guidance on what one ought to do, given relevant circumstances and 
considerations. Moral principles can respond to facts of the world and to other 
principles, and hence they can be constructed and they can be thin and universal. 
Indeed, thin universalism is a moral project; its orientation is towards a specific
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normative response to the fact of complex pluralism understood in a particular and 
equally normative way. What draws constructivism towards thin universal 
conclusions is its moral underpinnings of respect for persons and for pluralism; what 
motivates the concern for justification and for consent is these moral imperatives.
The outcome of thin universalism is indeed a set of moral principles. But it is 
more than that; it is also a set of political principles. The term ‘political principles’ is 
here understood in a particular, though not uncommon way. Political principles are 
those principles that can be, or ought to be imposed by the state or other justifiably 
empowered body. Given the nature of thin universal regulatory principles -  they are 
constructed with the basic facts about pluralism and human beings in mind, in order 
to address serious issues which are the subject of shared concern -  it seems logical to 
assert that they are not only moral principles, but enforceable political principles 
also.
But this leads to some concerns. Constructing regulatory principles may be 
all well and good, but concerns may remain about the implicit intentions behind the 
construction. We may wonder just how free from traditionally problematic 
conceptions of the source and authority of moral rules construction truly is. We may 
be reassured by the construction, rather than the discovery of these principles. They 
emerge from  us, from our own knowledge and sentiments. But we might be slightly 
concerned about how they do so. For, thus far, I have demonstrated little more than a 
new procedure for determining and, seemingly handing down moral predicates from 
above. This chapter has been concerned with demonstrating how a set of regulatory 
principles might be constructed from the facts of the world as we confront them, and 
our first principles which an examination of those facts bring to light. The argument 
thus far is insufficient to fully dispel fears of ethnocentricity and imperialism. What
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follows in chapter five is an attempt to allay these concerns through the assertion of a 
second dimension of construction, directly concerned with the role of the complex 
plurality of agents in the procedure.
- five -
Constructing Consent
The previous chapter concerned what I referred to in chapter one as the ‘object of 
construction’, being a set of regulatory principles which, given the ‘materials of 
construction’ -  the facts of complex pluralism and the first principles which a 
consideration of those facts made apparent -  are thin and universal in character. But 
one might suspect that the spirit of those first principles has become somewhat lost, 
and engagement with that complex plurality of agents is absent within a procedure 
intended both to respect them as individual human beings and to respect their 
collective cultural creations and endeavours. This is seemingly at odds with the remit 
to secure a ‘pluralistically enlightened universalism’, or a ‘principled pluralism’.1
This chapter as such asserts that the construction of regulatory principles is 
but the first of two interconnected constructions, upon both of which the validity of 
thin universal principles rests. The first, the construction of the principles 
themselves, conducted through a philosophical engagement with points of view, 
arguments, ideas and controversies is only part of the full story. A further, ‘public’, 
construction is required where the regulatory principles developed in the first 
construction are subjected to public opinion and revision. It is only in the context of 
both procedures, and the checks that they provide for one another, that fact- 
dependent, regulatory principles can be considered legitimate. Regulatory principles
1 See Seyla Benhabib, The Claims o f Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002), p.36; Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch. ‘Introduction’ 
in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order: The Challenge 
o f  Diversity (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1-9 at p. 2
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which struggle to elicit consent start to look at best alien, and at worst like absolutist 
dictates. But neither are regulatory principles simply those that can most easily be 
‘sold’ to the public.
While it might not be possible to demonstrate empirically the process of 
constructing consent to thin universal regulatory principles, it is possible to sketch 
the kinds of considerations, arguments, and strategies that might be employed in 
order to realistically model the nature of consent and to outline what it is to construct 
consent to thin universal principles. The conditions and requirements under which 
consent might be constructed must be examined. This chapter, therefore, considers 
the notion of these two distinct yet powerfully interdependent constructions at work 
within the thin universalist project, considering how and why consent to thin 
universal regulatory principles might be secured. That consent, it will emerge, must 
also be constructed on the basis of both facts and principles.
The chapter considers arguments typically deployed by constructivist 
accounts of moral principles. It examines firstly the debate concerning the criterion 
of ‘acceptability’, rooted in the broadly Kantian tradition from which this variety of 
constructivism is derived. This acceptability criterion is most commonly presented as 
the “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” formulation. Secondly, it considers critically other ideas, 
including ‘bootstrapping’ and ‘redescription’ which, I suggest, must be adapted in 
order to engage sufficiently critically with their target disputants to avoid lowest- 
common-denominator approaches to regulatory principles or ‘unconstructive’
2 1 draw specifically upon an article by Julian Baggini which draws distinctions between the variously 
formulated relationships between ‘ought’ and ‘can’. See Julian Baggini, ‘Bad Moves: Ought without 
Can’, Butterflies and Wheels ('http://www.butterfliesandwheels.com/badmovesprint. php?num=46 
January 14th 07)
3 See Barbara Herman ‘Bootstrapping’ in Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.) Contours o f  Agency: 
Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2002), pp.253-274.
Richard Rorty, Contingency Irony and Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
p.9
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procedures.4 It also considers several dimensions to the consent which it might be 
plausible to construct around thin universal principles, including the extent of 
agreement, which agents are to agree and how agreement is most acceptable. 
Ultimately, thin universalism does not seek simply to minimise the controversy 
generated by universal moral principles. The task of a thin universalism is not merely 
to meet those minimum standards of morality found in the plurality of real world 
viewpoints, but to challenge and reform views through political debate.
Two Constructions
I begin with a more detailed consideration of this ‘two-dimensional’ constructive 
procedure. The construction of regulatory principles is closely connected to questions 
of consent. If the principles that emerge from construction are to be applicable to a 
cosmopolitan yet pluralized audience, and if those principles are to hold validity for 
that audience, questions of how they might elicit consent must be addressed. It is 
therefore important to understand construction as consisting of two closely connected 
but distinct and properly ‘constructive’ procedures.5
Seizing upon a more ‘critical’ approach to justification,6 the construction of 
regulatory principles must be developed partly as a defence against the criticisms 
which that procedure and those principles are bound to face, especially when 
confronted with complex pluralism. This defence is partly conducted in an initial
4 And, which in fact end up looking more like ‘redecoration’! I am grateful to Mark Evans for helpful 
discussion o f this extended building metaphor!
5 They should not, it is important to note, be confused with Peri Roberts’ distinction between 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ constructivism which he uses to demarcate construction within and 
construction without ‘foundations’. His conclusion, it seems, is that what he calls ‘primary 
construction’ is akin to the kind of construction at work in the early Rawls o f A Theory o f  Justice. 
‘Secondary construction’ on the other hand has a more particular grounding and is dependent on 
construction o f the first kind. My thanks again go out to Peri Roberts for his helpful discussion of  
these ideas.
6 See Carl Wellman, Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics (London: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1971), p. 171. See also chapter three, above.
-205-
constructing consent
‘theory design’ phase where hypotheses, moral ideas and judgements, and 
surrounding metaethical debates, are scrutinised, problematised, defended and altered 
in light of new facts, arguments and objections. This procedure features many 
considerations from real people living real lives. But construction must also be 
conducted dialogically, in a second process between actual human agents,7 in the 
forum of public debate, where actual ideas are defended from critique and 
opposition.
In Rawls’ ‘two stages of theory formation’, the first stage of the formation of 
a theory of justice is the selection of principles of justice through reasoning within 
the veil of ignorance in the original position. Following this, ‘the principles justified 
at the first stage must be exposed to public discussion at the second stage.’8 
Construction is a two-stage process akin to this: The first stage in the development of 
thin universal regulatory principles concerns the examination of facts and first 
principles and the construction of regulatory principles that adequately reflect them. 
Here conceptual and normative materials and considerations can be identified, 
clarified and justified. The content for the thin universal regulatory principles is 
worked out with the aim of making them logically coherent and morally acceptable, 
a process which appeals constantly to actual practices, beliefs and ideas. The first 
stage begins to shape the thinness and universality of regulatory principles.
At this stage, it would be implausible to assert that those principles could be 
worked out through a cosmopolitan dialogue between plural social groups. It would 
be unacceptable not to hold a conception of this dialogue in mind, but the dialogue
7 Again, be they individual people, cultural units, races, nations, states, religions or any faction or 
fragment thereof.
8 Rawls identified this in his exchange with Jurgen Habermas following the publication o f Political 
Liberalism See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993);
Jtirgen Habermas, ‘Reconciliation Through the Public Use o f Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’ 
Political Liberalism’ in The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol.92 (3), 1995, pp. 109-131, at p. 121; and John 
Rawls, ‘Reply to Habermas’ in The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol.92 (3), 1995, pp. 132-180
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itself does not happen here. It does happen at the second stage, where strategies for 
generating a basis of acceptance towards thin universal regulatory principles can be 
outlined and criticisms addressed. While one construction is conducted through 
careful and reasoned philosophising, the other can only be achieved through debate 
over and exchange with the constructed principles. It is concerned with a more public 
justification, making thin universalism morally and politically workable, and 
working towards the construction of consent to thin universal regulatory principles. 
Importantly, the first stage of construction will take into account information 
pertinent to the second: about people and the values that they hold, and the social 
circumstances in which they find themselves. The two stages, while distinct, are not 
disconnected, and the back and forth between them is central to both.
Neither construction takes precedence as their roles are interdependent and 
both must be in place for constructed principles to be valid. The reasons for this are 
also grounded in the facts of complex pluralism and in first principles. Morally and 
pragmatically, constructed regulatory principles that simply court popular opinion 
will be inadequate. They are likely to represent a Towest-common-denominator’: 
principles too thin to be of any great effect, crippled by their inability to tackle moral 
questions, or principles so hopelessly permissive that they must take the values of the 
Buddhist and the Nazi as equally valid. Justified regulatory principles are not simply 
those that can most easily be sold to the court of public opinion. Similarly, principles 
which are carefully constructed to be logically coherent and morally robust, but 
which pay no heed to who will be subject to them, and which cannot be consented to 
in any foreseeable circumstance will be invalid.9 Consent to universal principles of
9 Indeed, this is what tends to lead arguments against utilitarianism. Many o f its conclusions often 
seem so counter-intuitive that they appear to bear no relation to us as people. It often appears forced to 
sanction problematic courses o f action such as permission o f  suffering, potentially massive 
inequalities and human rights violations for the sake o f the ‘greater good’. We must all ‘walk away
-207-
Constructing Consent
regulation is important, but equally important is full reflection on the circumstances 
of that consent, in order to fully grasp its terms.
If social agents do not accept the principles of a thin universalism, this does 
not necessarily mean that the principles themselves need to be altered. It may simply 
be the case that the arguments in their favour need to be altered. Construction is 
open-ended, but the process is not properly underway until the second stage of 
construction is established. Even then, regulatory principles will always be open to 
revision in accordance with the non-foundational nature and transience of the starting 
points of construction.
The analytic philosopher is not the lawmaker, or Rousseau’s legislator, and 
certainly not ‘God’. However, given that even the most empirically-minded study of 
morality could not engage with every agent whose input or consent is desired,10 the 
role of the philosopher, as a practitioner of political and philosophical arguments, is 
to filter and reflect upon arguments relevant to the issue. He or she must examine the 
past and the present, the politics and ethics of the situation, other cultures, 
perspectives, philosophies, and quantitative and qualitative data, testing the 
consequences of a theory in the confined environs of the academy. Therein evidence 
can be weighed, arguments tested, thought experiments conducted and conclusions 
drawn. The philosopher’s position remains subject to the powerful checks provided 
by public discourse, and need not feature prominently at all. The philosopher may 
simply reflect on patterns of discourse and relationships of power and influence, 
offering critique and argument where possible. As such, Rawls’ ‘first’ and ‘second’
from Ornelas’ because the basis for its acceptability is so alien to us. See Ursula K. Le Guin, ‘The 
Ones Who Walk Away from Ornelas’ in The Wind’s Twelve Quarters (London: Harper Perennial, 
2004)
10 Even if  this were an anthropological study designed to find an empirically verifiable ‘thin’ 
commonality between cultural frameworks, it would not be possible to gather first person evidence for 
this in all cases -  especially not in a project limited in the manner o f PhD thesis.
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stages suggest a privileged role for the philosophical stage which thin universalism 
rejects in order to properly respect pluralism. It is a two-stage process; neither stage 
precedes the other, causally or normatively.
These constructions are never fixed. Philosophical constructions will always 
be open to alteration by dialogue and consent-based judgments will always be open 
to the reflection of the individual philosopher, citizen, or group within society 
generally. Judgements made by academic, political or social bodies, by popular 
approval, or by other mechanisms and procedures of democratic society will always 
be open to challenge and critique from other sectors, including the judgements and 
principles of a thin universalism. This dimension of construction is retained from the 
Rawlsian account of reflective equilibrium. As Norman Daniels states, ‘there are no 
judgements on any level of generality that are in principle immune to revision’ and if 
any principles or judgements are to be regarded as valid in any given instance this 
can only be the outcome of an ongoing reflective process and not decided at the 
outset.11 The task of construction is fluid and all judgements are open to critical 
reflection and revision. Thus far, then, my focus has been on the first construction of 
regulatory principles, on what Rawls called ‘the production of objects.’12 I turn my 
now to the second, the construction of consent
Why Construct Consent?
Why might one seek to construct consent to regulatory principles? In the first 
instance consent is practically important; it provides regulatory principles with a
11 See Norman Daniels, ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics’ in The 
Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol.76 (5), 1979, pp.256-282 atpp.258-259. This paragraph, however, follows 
Peri Roberts’ thoughts on this matter. See Peri Roberts, ‘’Identity, Reflection and Justification’ in 
Bruce Haddock and Peter Sutch (eds.), Multiculturalism, Identity and Rights (London: Routledge, 
2003), pp. 142-157 at pp. 151-153.
12 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp.91-94
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degree of stability and authority. Without consent, nothing but force remains to 
provide that stability and authority, which raises questions about the validity of the 
principles themselves. The thin universalist project is confronted by a complex 
plurality of agents at every social level, which it is committed to respect according to 
its first principles. While coercion on the part of the state may be a necessary part of 
the enforcement of any political principles instantiated into law, the simple 
imposition of those principles by force in the first place surely violates those first
1 'X •principles. Regulatory principles so established may lack authority and may require 
excessive force to maintain. The rumblings of discontent within the satellite states of 
the Soviet bloc, and the almost unequivocally positive response to the overthrow of 
the Soviet regime are testament to the instability of principles imposed and 
maintained coercively. Practically, principles that do not seek the consent of those 
concerned are, by their very nature, more unstable, and lacking in the authority 
required to be effective.
This pragmatic concern is also grounded in the construction of the regulatory 
principles themselves. Thin regulatory principles are intended to generate consent at 
a universal level and ‘thinness’ is partly a product of the need to minimise 
controversy in light of complex pluralism. The idea behind this is simply that the 
thicker, more substantive or culturally particular principles are, the more limited their 
potential audience. Thickness is inversely proportional to scope. Constructed 
regulatory principles are thin precisely because we want them to be universal; if they 
were not thin, universality would be out of the question. It is therefore tempting to 
suppose that the sole purpose behind constructing consent (and construction 
generally) is practical and pragmatic, to seek the least controversial standards that
13 Though the enforcement o f those principles is not quite so troubling.
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regulatory principles can demand. Both construction and thinness pursue and tend 
towards a lesser degree of controversy than more substantial and culturally specific 
‘universalist’ moral claims. The virtues of this ‘tactic’ are clear: one stands a far 
greater chance of having one’s most fundamental beliefs respected if they are 
justified from a minimal (and consequently less controversial and more acceptable) 
starting point.14
As such, the lineage of constructivist thin universalism can in part be located 
within the social contract tradition.15 The emphasis placed on the consent of those for 
whom the principles are to be binding would seem to imply that the authority of the 
principles is created or bestowed, not assumed. Regulatory principles are political 
and intended to be enforceable and as such a binding contract is being proposed here. 
The links between the idea of a social contract and the idea of construction are strong 
and in places there is a significant overlap. Within contract theory principles are 
created by the contract,16 and in an important way thin universal regulatory principles 
are created by both philosophical construction and construction through public 
discourse. The consent of the affected parties, where constructivism comes close to a 
‘contract’, in part creates the thin universal regulatory principles. The construction of 
consent also plays a vital role in the validation of the regulatory principles, and once
14 This, it has been argued, is especially the case when it comes to universal human rights. See 
Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
See also Joshua Cohen, ‘Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?’ in The 
Journal o f  Political Philosophy Vol. 12 (2), 2004, pp. 190-213, for a rebuttal o f the minimalist 
argument.
15 Typically the terms contractarianism and contractualism are used, and used interchangeably, but 
there is a subtle distinction between them. The Stanford Encyclopaedia o f  Philosophy entry on the 
subject states that ‘contractualism ... holds that persons are primarily self-interested [and this] will 
lead them to act morally.... Contractualism ... holds that rationality requires that we respect persons, 
which in turn requires that moral principles be such that they can be justified to each person.’ As such 
we can see Hobbes and Gauthier as the key figures in the contractarian tradition, while Kant, Rawls 
and Scanlon form the pillars o f the contractualist variant. See Ann Cudd, ‘Contractarianism’ in 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopaedia o f  Philosophy, Summer 2005 Edition 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractariaism/ May 1st 2005)
16 See for the most prominent example, Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). See also David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986)
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more, both constructions are equally weighted, neither fully makes sense without the 
other, and the constructed regulatory principles are only fully justified through both 
constructions.
Moreover, the touchstones of this thesis have been the relationship between 
facts and principles, the need to recognise complex pluralism, and the value of 
construction. This trajectory is grounded in more than a pragmatic need to persuade 
others to agree. Consent is about more than the practical task of getting people ‘on 
board’ with a particular set of judgements. It is about the moral demands that an 
analysis of complex pluralism makes. It is about ensuring that the first principles that 
such an analysis brings to light are followed through in such a way as to ensure 
reflective coherence. It is an explicitly moral concern that pushes us to construct 
regulatory principles, and to concern ourselves with consent for them.
Thinness and consent are clearly intertwined on a number of levels. While 
thinness does help to generate consent to regulatory principles intended to be 
universal, and while thinness is indeed intended in part to have such a pragmatic 
effect, it is more importantly intended to fulfil a moral requirement. Consent is an 
important result of the first principles that an examination of complex pluralism 
illuminates. The thinness of constructed principles is a result of the moral concern to 
respect persons and their social and cultural creations, rather than a mark solely of 
the need to have people agree. Without consent, claims that thin universal regulatory 
principles are so respectful seem meaningless. How can one claim to hold such 
respect if one blithely imposes ones own values on others? The authority of 
regulatory principles is derived more from this moral maxim than from the pragmatic 
need for consent.
constructing consent
If it is moral reasons that drive the need for consent, it is presumably a similar 
set of moral reasons that drive the need to construct consent. I have established that it 
is problematic to defend regulatory principles as manifestly ‘out there’ waiting to be 
discovered by human beings. They are constructed by them in order to have certain
1 7effects upon the world. It follows that consent requires similar construction, as a 
pre-existing basis of consent for constructed regulatory principles does not 
necessarily already exist, though the potential for such a basis may be available 
within already existing value systems. Furthermore, it is problematic to ground thin 
universal regulatory principles in a single set of religious or metaphysical claims 
(which may be particular to a single group). Because an examination of complex 
pluralism illuminates first principles requiring us to respect persons and to respect 
pluralism, the consent of a complex plurality of groups and individuals cannot be 
presumed and would need to be ‘constructed’, if those first principles are to be 
observed.
For Richard Rorty, political philosophy is entirely about the construction of 
consent, whose chief task is a matter of making our own ‘human rights culture’, 
which he considers to be genuinely ‘superior’, ‘more self-conscious and more 
powerful’. He suggests that
The most philosophy can hope to do is summarize our culturally influenced 
intuitions about the right thing to do in various situations. The summary is 
effected by formulating a generalization [which] ... is not supposed to ground 
our intuitions, but rather to summarise them. John Rawls’s “Difference 
Principle” and the U.S. Supreme Court’s construction ... of a constitutional 
“right to privacy” are examples of this kind of summary. ... [They increase]
17 Though, o f course, this does not imply that all principles are not so discovered, merely that 
regulatory principles, being dependent on facts and further principles are not so discovered but are, as 
I make clear, constructed.
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the predictability, and thus the power and the efficiency of our institutions, 
thereby heightening the sense of shared moral identity that brings us together 
in a moral community. 18
He suggests that political philosophy is ‘the ethnocentrism of a ‘we’ (in his case ‘we 
liberals’) which is dedicated to enlarging itself, to creating an ever larger and more 
variegated ethnos. ’19 Bringing the world into sympathy with one’s own beliefs sets 
political philosophy the task of establishing consent to a human rights culture. His 
essentially ‘groundless’ approach is oftentimes beguiling. What happens when 
political philosophy fails is not always clear, and Rorty’s arguments are not always
O C isatisfactory. Bruce Haddock notes that Rorty advocates ‘the de facto extension of a
human rights culture globally, without supplying the arguments that might justify 
0 1that enthusiasm.’ Rorty’s approach denies many of the argumentative and 
justificatory resources we might find valuable in dialogues with others. Without 
those reasons and resources, consent slips further and further away and what remains
is Norman Geras’s critique that Rorty’s approach leads to a ‘strange humanism’, a
00‘strange human rights’.
Detached from construction and from first principles, concern with consent 
seems empty. Without supplying the arguments for why we might want to construct 
consent and without recognising and acknowledging the deeper moral commitment 
which underlies the pragmatic necessity, the need for consent is lost. We need to
18 See Richard Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’ in Truth and Progress: 
Philosophical Papers Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 167-185, at pp. 170- 
171
19 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
p. 198. Steven Lukes confronts this argument in Liberals and Cannibals, p. 19
See Mark Evans, ‘Pragmatist Liberalism and the Evasion o f Politics’ in Mark Evans (ed.), The 
Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 
pp.148-161 atpp.156-157 
See Bruce Haddock, ‘Practical Reason and Identity’ in Bruce Haddock and Peter Sutch (eds.), 
Multiculturalism, Identity and Rights (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 10-24 at p.21-22
22 See Norman Geras, Solidarity in the Conversations o f  Humankind: the Ungroundable Liberalism o f  
Richard Rorty (London: Verso, 1995). See again, Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals, p. 19
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regard the world in a certain way in order to identify the problems we need to 
address. Practicality is simply one concern: a starting point for asking these deeper 
questions. Consent requires a constructive approach for the sake of validity. But how 
does one go about attempting to construct it?
Acceptability: “‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’”?
The construction of consent implies the constructions of principles that those to 
whom they are to apply can on some level follow. Questions of construction are 
often connected to questions of ‘acceptability’, what makes a principle ‘acceptable’, 
and what characteristics an ‘acceptable’ principle possesses. They are often 
addressed towards the ‘Kantian’ maxim of “‘ought’ implies ‘can’”.23 Put simply, this 
is the imperative that if we insist that someone morally ought to do something it must 
at least be possible for them to do it. As Julian Baggini points out, how can one have 
a duty to do what is impossible?24 While it might seem at first glance to be a 
fundamental, even obvious requirement for a coherent thin universalism which 
claims to be motivated by a concern to respect persons and cultures, it is not clear 
what ‘can’ refers to. The character of possibility is contested and ambiguities may be 
problematic for constructivism conceived in certain ways.
Most variants of constructivism are premised on some version of the “‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’” formula. Onora O’Neill’s constructivist position demands that an 
account of practical reasoning should ‘at least aim to be follow able by others for
23 The statements origin within Kant is somewhat ambiguous, but he is generally attributed with its 
origin. He refers to some notion o f ‘“ought” implies “can”’ in several places o f his work, too many in 
fact to warrant listing them in full here. However, Robert Stem provides an authoritative list o f 11 key 
passages from Kant, several o f which are from the Critiques, where the formulation is employed. See 
Robert Stem ‘Does “Ought” Imply “Can”? And Did Kant Think it Does?’ in Utilitas, Vol. 16 (1), 
2004, pp.42-61 at pp.53-55
24 See Julian Baggini, ‘Bad Moves: Ought without Can’
-215-
Constructing consent 
0 ^whom it is to count as reasoning. ’ For O’Neill, a reason to act in a certain way is 
not a reason at all unless it is oriented by the capacity of the recipient to follow it. 
Similarly, for Thomas Scanlon, ‘an act is wrong if its performance under the 
circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation
of behaviour which no-one could reasonably reject as the basis for informed,
0(\unforced general agreement’. The inability to reasonably reject general rules of 
behaviour is key to their validity. For Rawls, ‘it is only by affirming a constructivist 
conception ... that citizens generally can expect to find principles they can all 
adopt.’27 Constructivism asserts that the legitimacy of principles of social 
cooperation is established through the ability of those principles to be followed by 
those to whom they are to apply. At a seemingly fundamental level, to posit an 
‘ought’ at the same time implies a ‘can’. One cannot be obligated to do that which is 
impossible. It is therefore incoherent of me to insist that you ought, at the same time, 
to endorse two contradictory moral ideas. To do so would be logically impossible. It 
is further incoherent of me to insist that you ought to be nine feet tall. To do so is to 
demand of you the physically impossible. As Baggini points out, these two seem to 
be corollaries of the same basic principle: that one cannot be expected to do what one
9o
simply cannot do.
Importantly however, constructivism is premised on an adjunct of this 
principle, and not simply on a corollary of it. It is premised on a version of “‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’” which is far more indistinct. Typically, constructivist arguments 
revolve around the insistence that, in order to be considered ‘reasoned’, ‘objective’, 
‘right’ or ‘true’, a principle must be accessible to those to whom it is to apply in such
25 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.51, also, more generally, pp.49-53 [Author’s emphasis]
26 T.M. Scanlon ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ in The Difficulty o f  Tolerance: Essays in Political 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 132-133 (emphasis added)
27 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp.97-98.
28 Baggini, ‘Bad Moves: Ought without Can’
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a way that they are able to follow it. Whatever it is deemed that they ought to do, it 
must necessarily follow that they can do it. But how are we to define what an agent 
can or cannot do, beyond the physical and logical limitations imposed by the most 
basic understanding of the “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” rule? While it is certainly true that 
a principle that demands that all citizens be nine feet tall, or believe logically 
contradictory ideas, is incoherent as these are physical and logical impossibilities, it
OQis unclear how one forms an idea of what is realistically possible. There is a gap 
between what it is logically and physically possible to do and what it is realistically 
possible to do. While it is not logically or physically impossible for certain courses of 
action to be pursued, ‘real world’ conditions might prevent the realistic pursuit of 
that action. This is especially so in the political arena where objectives might be 
logically and physically attainable while their achievement might be politically, 
economically or morally impossible. What is more, where political, economic and 
moral limitations are discarded, where the logically or physically possible are 
pursued unrestrained, politics tends to lapse, at best into invective and at worst into 
absolutism. It might, for example, have not been physically or logically impossible 
for backbench and opposition MPs to prevent the Labour cabinet from taking the UK 
to war in Iraq in 2003, to do so may well have contravened politically and morally 
realistic courses of action, rendering them ‘impossible’. What is realistically possible 
is very different from what is logically or physically impossible and when “‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’” is applied, a characterisation o f ‘can’ is essential.
At first glance this focus on “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” seems like a natural 
consequence of construction from the fact of pluralism: basic standards of reason- 
giving must surely be met to ensure the validity of constructed regulatory principles.
29 Baggini, ‘Bad Moves: Ought without Can’
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As Evans points out, this, one might suppose, is simply a natural consequence of 
being rigorously respectful of pluralism.
The problem is that excessive emphasis on acceptance leads to an intellectual 
malaise at the limited possibilities presented by what others could accept. It is 
therefore liable to lead to favouring of the status-quo over superior alternatives. It 
also veers dangerously towards a lowest-common-denominator approach to 
construction of consent. If concern is simply with constructing principles which can 
appeal to as broad an audience as possible, constructivism remains in danger of 
having to incorporate perspectives that deny those first moral responses to pluralism 
that orient construction. Inflated concern with acceptability precludes the possibility 
of critical engagement with those who disagree with us. In such cases all we need do 
is find principles that others can accept, rather than engage with those others in 
critical dialogue and exchange, in order to secure standards which actually follow 
through on our first principles. Focus solely on acceptance does not do the critical 
work necessary, and leaves us wondering whether we ought to change how we go 
about constructing our regulatory principles in order to incorporate the unrepentant 
Nazi and the paedophile. How one balances the importance of acceptability and the 
implications of ones first principles is essential for the legitimacy of constructed 
regulatory principles.
How one defines the parameters of “‘ought’ implies ‘can’”, and how one 
defines what is meant by ‘can’ is therefore central to establishing principles that are 
genuinely ‘acceptable’. Does the term ‘can’ cover anything more than the 
intelligibility of the communication? It would certainly be a violation of “‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’” if one insisted upon a set of obligations expressed in a different
30 Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” of Justification’, p.78
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language, for example. But this is perhaps too minimal to stave off concerns of 
coercively imperialistic ‘moralising’ . Telling someone what to do, but doing so in 
their own language and in a way they can understand, is still telling someone what to 
do. It precludes only the most incoherent attempts at communication, and hence only 
the most culturally insensitive ‘thick’ universalisms could be critiqued according to 
its terms. Simple ‘intelligibility’ is therefore excessively permissive of doctrines that 
avowedly deny, oppose and have historically attempted to eradicate complex 
pluralism. The consent of such doctrines to thin universal regulatory principles 
brings the principles themselves into question.
Could ‘can’ be applied to the metric of value by which an obligation is 
potentially measured? Appeal to God’s will, or to some transcendental metaphysical 
principle would likely contravene what one ‘can’ do if one did not recognise them as 
sources of value or authority. This concern with ‘applicability’ is similar to 
‘intelligibility. If we take O’Neill’s point, that we must reject as unreasoned 
principles we know cannot be followed by those who are to follow them on the 
grounds that they appeal to unacceptable, inapplicable, foreign, or alien metrics, it 
becomes clear that this too is but a minimal condition for the giving of coherent 
reasons. Appeal to a relevant authority or metric is alone also insufficient to 
construct consent to a set of regulatory principles.
Arguments that do not meet these basic criteria need not be accepted, for if 
they do not it can truly be said that they cannot be followed. If ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ 
then what follows in converse terms is that ‘cannot’ implies ‘need not’. To
31 Intended here in its negative sense, where ‘moralising’, ‘moralism’ and ‘moralistic’ and are used as 
pejorative terms. See for some interesting examples, C.A.J. Coady (ed.), What’s Wrong With 
Moralism? (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006)
32 See O’Neill, Towards Justice and virtue, p.51
33 And perhaps even ‘ought not’, though this may be pressing the point too hard as it might be 
conceivable that while one might recognise that one need not act in a certain way because o f a lack of
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genuinely have a duty one must be able to perform that duty. If one cannot perform 
that duty, one cannot have that duty. Similarly, one might return to Baggini’s point 
and insist that logical coherence and physical possibility also be minimal criteria of 
consent.34 There is no obligation to accept arguments that fail simple tests of logic. 
Those that demand blatantly contradictory behaviour cannot logically be acted upon 
and hence can be scrutinised and ultimately discarded. Similarly, predicates that are 
physically impossible -  that we ‘solve the problem of world poverty by dinner-time’ 
-  can be discarded as equally incoherent.35
Could ‘can’ be applied to the actual physical, social and psychological ability 
of all relevant persons to adopt the principles on offer? O’Neill suggests that some 
principles could not be adopted universally for the simple reason that such an 
adoption would be logically and physically impossible. For example, one cannot will 
oneself into slavery and will that such a maxim be universal because if we were all 
slaves, there would be no slave-owners to whom to be enslaved.36 It is reasonable to 
insist that we need only appeal to those that can fulfil these criteria and this, in turn, 
provides some guidance on what an ‘acceptable’ principle might have to look like 
and exactly to whom it would have to be ‘acceptable’.
Further familiar problems arise where it is claimed that the substantive 
content of a set of principles must be thinned to such an extent that they cover all
justification, this does not bind one to an obligation not to act in the required way if, for example one 
realised that it was in one’s interests or in the interests o f ‘acting morally’ to so act.
34 For an alternative perspective here see Harry G. Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral 
Responsibility’ in The Journal o f  Philosophy, Vol.66 (23), 1969, pp.829-839; see also Frankfurt, 
‘What We are Morally Responsible For’ in The Importance o f  What We Care About (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988); and David Widerker, ‘Frankfurt on “Ought Implies Can” and 
Alternative Possibilities’ in Analysis, Vol.51 (4), 1991, pp.222-224
35 Baggini, ‘Bad Moves: Ought without Can’
36 See here, Onora O’Neill, ‘Consistency in Action’ in Constructions o f  Reason: Explorations o f  
Kant’s Practical Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1989), pp.81-104 at p.96. See, 
for other examples, Onora O’Neill, ‘Kant: Rationality as Practical Reason’ in Alfred J. Mele and Piers 
Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook o f Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2004), pp.93- 
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plausible thick valuational viewpoints, and all first principles of every kind.37 In 
order to be fully acceptable to all, thin universal principles would have to be 
hopelessly permissive. The moral pitfalls of a lowest-common-denominator approach 
are clear, not least because it would force us to accept doctrines which are clearly in 
violation of the first principles which motivate constructivism and thin universalism 
in the first place.
So how and in what circumstances could people genuinely be expected to 
consent to thin universal regulatory principles? Consent is important to the concern 
to respect pluralism and individual persons. Care must therefore be taken over what 
is posited as ‘acceptable’ to a complex plurality of agents. However, if we seek more 
than a set of empty guidelines that do not in any sense actually guide action, we may 
need to alter our understanding of “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” and develop a more 
pluralised approach to acceptability and consent.
Bootstrapping and Redescription
In reconsidering what an altered “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” actually entails for 
construction, I now consider some of the key strategies of discourse and 
argumentation which might be of use to the constructivist in pursuit of a basis of 
consent. I begin with the concept of ‘bootstrapping’ and Rorty’s notion of 
‘redescription’.
Complex pluralism renders the construction of consent problematic at best.
How one goes about persuading others of the validity of thin universal principles
must take pluralism into account. An argumentative strategy often associated with
construction and which is cited as valuable tool for addressing this problem, and in
37 Including, presumably, those that Berlin, Galston and Gray would want to argue are precluded by 
an account o f value pluralism. Again, see chapter two on the distinction between value pluralism and 
complex pluralism o f actually-held world views.
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philosophical discourse generally, is the notion of ‘bootstrapping’. The Oxford 
English Dictionary definition of the term runs thus:
bootstrap, v. trans. 1. To make use of existing resources or capabilities to 
raise (oneself) to a new situation or state; to modify or improve by making
T O
use of what is already present.
Barbara Herman defines philosophical bootstrapping as follows:
The attraction of bootstrapping is that you use a bit of what you already have 
to get some place you haven’t been before, but need to go. As a strategy of 
argument, it is environmentally neutral. No new resources -  new entities or 
capacities -  are called for; little of what you start with is wasted.39
When valuational and non-valuational frameworks -  through which agents, situated 
within complex pluralism, processes courses of action -  are analysed carefully, 
external challenges to those frameworks or complexities within them often arise. 
These may threaten the capacity of those frameworks to properly account for the 
facts of the world in which they operate.40 For example, complex pluralism may well 
pose an external challenge to, or reveal an internal complexity of frameworks which 
deny that plurality by asserting maximal or thickly universal principles. A challenge 
or complexity may also be revealed in frameworks which deny the interconnection 
and hybridity of those frameworks by asserting a strong particularism or relativism 
of social, cultural and moral arrangements.
38 Oxford English Dictionary Online, Second Edition, 1989, at (http://www.oed.com January 11th 
2007). See Barbara Herman, ‘Bootstrapping’ in Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (eds.) Contours o f  
Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt, (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2002), pp.253- 
274 at p.253
39 Herman, ‘Bootstrapping’, p.253. Also referenced by Mark Evans in ‘Thin Universalism and the 
“Limits” o f Justification’, p.85
40 In a similar manner to the ‘epistemological crisis’ identified by Alasdair MacIntyre, mentioned in 
the previous chapter.
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A bootstrapped argument is one which, in order to address those complexities 
or challenges, makes an appeal to nothing more than that which the recipient of the 
argument already accepts. A procedure intended to address complex pluralism and 
elicit consent to thin universal regulatory principles is ‘bootstrapped’ if it firstly 
demonstrates how a framework is challenged or compromised by its denial of 
complex pluralism or of framework-transcending criteria of judgement. 
Bootstrapping continues where the procedure seeks to sufficiently rearrange and 
develop the materials within those value frameworks to demonstrate how the 
incorporation of thin universal regulatory principles into that framework can help to 
overcome the challenges posed by complex pluralism to its original configuration of 
principles.41
One could appeal to the arguments presented earlier pertaining to 
interconnectivity, globalisation, or the significance of moral language in order to 
construct consent from the particularist or relativist. The bootstrapping move is made 
where those arguments seek only to rearrange the judgments that the agent already 
holds in order to construct that consent. When the appeal is to principles or other 
materials already contained within a moral framework, but which need simply to be 
viewed slightly differently, an argument is ‘bootstrapped’. Conversely, a 
bootstrapped argument might seek to rearrange the materials of a thick universalism 
in light of the facts of complex pluralism with the aim of proposing more 
characteristically thin universal regulatory principles. Such a procedure might 
suggest that much of what was perceived to be ‘universal’ within the original account 
is in fact far more historically contingent and culturally particular upon re­
examination.
41 This is a heavily modified version o f Herman’s account, making use o f language more closely 
related to the subject matter at hand. See Herman, ‘Bootstrapping’, p.253
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If the construction of consent through bootstrapping requires nothing more 
than that which can already be found within a valuational viewpoint, this provides 
bootstrapping with a powerful appeal. This appeal is valuable for the constructivist 
who is concerned with the pragmatic need to secure consent, and with the moral 
issue of respecting persons and the plurality of worldviews to which they actually 
adhere. Thus, the constructivist might surmise that one can attempt to ‘pull others up’ 
to a new moral perspective by their own bootstraps, to construct a shared viewpoint, 
using nothing more than premises already available to them from their own 
worldview. One could, therefore, bootstrap adherents of a plurality of thick, 
culturally particular, perspectives up to a single, thin, minimal, moral point of view. 
In this way, the task seems simply to make an appeal to the content of each thick 
moral viewpoint which resonates in the content of the thin universal regulatory 
principles. This would, in theory, provide all the materials necessary for the 
construction of consent to take place. But Herman asserts that bootstrapping is an 
ontologically and theoretically abstemious, if not abstentious, philosophical 
manoeuvre,42 and this might lead one to wonder whether bootstrapping really 
constructs anything substantially new or different.
In order to supplement these arguments, the constructivist might follow 
Richard Rorty and employ ‘redescription’. Similar to, but conceptually and 
genealogically distinct from bootstrapping, it might be possible to construct consent 
by seeking to ‘redescribe’ the content of thin universal regulatory principles in such a 
way as to appeal to a given audience on its own terms, making construction
42 While this provides bootstrapping with broad appeal and a robust remit, Herman refers to it as 
‘prestidigitation’, or ‘sleight o f hand’, suggesting that a less-than-honest move is being made when 
one ‘bootstraps’. Herman, ‘Bootstrapping’, p.253
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possible.43 Regulatory principles free from religious or metaphysical content may be 
redescribed to be more palatable to different audiences. This may mean providing 
them with theistic content compatible with a given religious doctrine, or making use 
of the language of a philosophical doctrine. This technique has a certain resonance 
with discourse theorists, among others. Jurgen Habermas, for example, suggests that 
religious groups may need to ‘translate’ their views in order to make them accessible 
at the level of public debate.44 The construction of consent through redescription 
might require the reverse: the ‘selling’ of the thin universal regulatory principles in 
such a way that adherents of religious and philosophical doctrines can find them 
‘acceptable’. By selling principles in a variety of ways, the nature of complex 
pluralism is not denied, hidden, or corroded by principles that are universal in scope. 
Forcing all social groupings to adopt a mode of public discourse which is potentially 
alien to them is both practically problematic and morally questionable. To what 
extent could constructed regulatory principles be considered respectful towards 
persons and pluralism if they insist that public discourse be conducted in such a way 
as to supersede the already existing discourses of each particular value framework? 
Moreover, if principles are redescribed, as much of the onus is on the thin 
universalist as is on the adherent of a particular doctrine to demonstrate how it 
adequately accounts for the world to which it is addressed.
That said, bootstrapping and redescription alone begin to look somewhat 
vague as methods of ‘construction’ when one considers what they involve, and the 
potential gap between that and what ‘construction’ is intended to denote. If 
bootstrapping seeks simply to rearrange already existing views, and if redescription
43 See here Richard Rorty’s account o f philosophical ‘redescription’ in Contingency Irony and 
Solidarity, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.xvi, 9, and elsewhere
44 See Jurgen Habermas, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere’ in European Journal o f  Philosophy Vol. 14 
(1), 2006, pp. 1-25
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seeks to alter the way they are conveyed, we may wonder how and in exactly what 
way they are ‘constructive’. Surely the idea behind the construction of consent is not 
simply to change the way principles are expressed or arranged in order to get people 
to agree to them, but to persuade others that those principles are worth holding and 
sometimes even superior to ones they already hold. Both redescription and 
bootstrapping might look like little more than telling people what they want to hear -  
more like ‘redecoration’ than ‘construction’!
Bootstrapping seeks to construct solely from agents’ already-held views, and 
so appears to be a robust means of bringing about new states of affairs. But the 
constructivism of this project has sought to emphasise not simply the pragmatic 
necessity of getting people to agree, but also the importance of taking adequate 
account of both persons and pluralism in accordance with our first principles. 
Bootstrapping and redescription struggle to engage in a sufficiently critical way with 
agents who would be hostile to thin universal regulatory principles. The task, when 
dealing with the Nazi or the paedophile is not simply to redescribe or rearrange their 
beliefs in order to draw them towards a shared viewpoint. We might find any number 
of ‘universal’ and ‘thin’ value judgements within their networks of principles, but 
many, perhaps all, of them will be in violation of the first principles which form the 
starting points for construction. Without further considerations or procedures, these 
tactics will not lead to a form of consent compatible with the moral conditions upon 
which thin universalism is predicated.
But with some alteration both bootstrapping and redescription may be of 
greater use than this critique suggests. Beyond simply modifying how a principle is 
presented to an audience, redescription may also prompt a conceptual change which 
could genuinely be considered constructive. Indeed, when we look for a shared
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perspective between divergent cultural frameworks it is frequently necessary to alter 
the way in which we view that culture. This change may lead to a different 
conception of or way of viewing that cultural system that neither we nor the culture 
itself had previously recognised. In redescribing, it is possible to come to recognise 
how a set of arguments or terms, or a vocabulary,45 can be altered to make them 
more coherent and accessible to us. Redescription, then, is another valuable tool 
available to the constructivist to secure consent. Alone, it might be too weak to 
construct the basis of consent of a complex plurality of agents, but when used 
alongside other techniques it may have sufficient leverage to construct the consent of 
certain audiences.
Bootstrapping may also yield substantively different outcomes from the
initial content of the materials; it need not simply prosaically rearrange existing
ideas. Evans suggests that one could employ a more critical bootstrapping technique
by pursuing a reformation of the beliefs of a ‘justifiee’ (such as to fulfil the necessary
critical role required) through primarily their own beliefs only adding new premises
or critical engagements where necessary. Relevant new premises perform the
reformative role lacking in the standard bootstrapped argument, and allow a
particularist viewpoint to be ‘pulled up’ to the constructed thin moral perspective.
Abstraction may be a valuable tool in this kind of bootstrapped argument. It isolates
concepts and ideas, providing scope for re-evaluation. As a part of bootstrapping or
redescription, it throws a concept into a new light, allowing it to be reviewed and
regarded differently. It isolates, for instance, what a plurality agrees upon, allowing
other beliefs to be brought to cohere through argument where possible. This allows
the constructivist to hold the first principle to respect persons without being forced to
45 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, pp.8-9. See also Keith Topper, ‘Richard Rorty,
Liberalism and the Politics of Redescription’ in The American Political Science Review, Vol.89(4), 
1995, pp.954-965 atp.954
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adopt a lowest-common-denominator approach to the construction of consent. Evans 
refers to this as a ‘bootzipping’ or, in more complex cases, ‘bootlacing’ 
justification.46 In this way, bootstrapping arguments, while potentially insufficient on 
their own, can provide the framework for a more complex set of arguments where 
only one new premise is required in order to make the agents already existing beliefs 
more coherent and more able to address the challenges of pluralism. This lifts an 
‘acceptable’ argument into an argument that can be accepted. It lifts an abstracted, 
reasoned construction to a point of actual acceptance.
Construction demands a re-evaluation of the nature of consent that can, and 
ought to be pursued in a world marked by complex pluralism. If it takes something 
more than simply that which agents already accept in order to construct consent to a 
set of thin universal regulatory principles, what is required in order to do so? 
Construction also requires a heightened awareness of the many ways in which moral 
arguments must vary if consent is to be adequately constructed. If it is not plausible 
to construct consent through a single justification, but according to a plurality of 
argumentative tactics what is now required of the constructivist account of consent?
‘Patchworking’
Consent premised on strict yet critical acceptability demonstrates the willingness of 
the thin universalist to engage with others on terms other than their own. It also 
demonstrates an ability and willingness to revise one’s own sentiments, should 
reason to do so be found. It avoids the insistence that criticisms against it must be 
levelled in its own terms. It is concerned to engage not in lawmaking, but in critical 
discourse, not to assert dogmatic claims to truth or transcendent metaphysical ideals,
46 Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification’, p.85
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but ideas which are reasoned, and dependent on the facts of pluralism. The criticism 
that universalisms are ‘rebranded’ variations on past imperialistic moral projects, or 
that they remain ethnocentric,47 can in part be circumvented by the thin universalist’s 
commitment to these practices.
This pragmatic, flexible and contingent approach to justificatory philosophy 
and moral discourse, together with the basic commitments of construction provide a 
significant feature of the justificatory arguments used by the thin universalist project. 
Much of the secondary literature on constructivism and thin universalism has pointed 
towards the availability and necessity of what is referred to as a ‘patchwork’ of 
justifications and arguments when addressing complex pluralism.48 Not only must we 
recognise a complex plurality of audiences for our arguments, but we must also 
recognise that our relationships with those audiences vary greatly. This also impacts 
upon how thin universal regulatory principles, and their background and justification 
must be conveyed. It is probable that the argumentative strategies of a constructivist 
thin universalism will need to be as pluralised as its audience. And given that its 
audience potentially extends to the whole of humanity, whose interactions are 
characterised by complex pluralism, it seems likely that a discourse over thin 
universal regulatory principles will be enormously varied, and always open to 
renegotiation. This is not of concern to the thin universalist, concerned to see 
regulatory principles respond as fully and as appropriately as possible to the facts of 
the world.
Redescribing and restructuring ones arguments, offering a variety of 
justifications, and critically engaging with existing beliefs, in order to draw a plural
47 Who, we will remember, described ethnocentrism and the unreasoned favouring of ones own in­
group over all others -  as seeing yours as ‘right’ and all deviation by out-groups as ‘wrong’ -  as 
Herodotus noted, a common attribute indeed.
48 See here Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification’, p.85 and Roberts, ‘Why Thin 
Universalism Needs Conceptions o f Society and Person’, p. 116
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audience up to a shared thin viewpoint is something the thin universalist not only 
needs to be aware of, but also to embrace and celebrate. Only then can construction, 
and the character of thin universal regulatory principles, properly reflect their basic 
commitment to respect persons and to respect pluralism.
A single universal justification is simply not called for in this situation. While 
one might hope to generate universal acceptance for a set of regulatory principles 
intended for a plural world, this does not commit one to a single justificatory 
argument or construction. This is both difficult and undesirable. Peri Roberts notes 
that Rawls’ acknowledgement of pluralism leads him to offer a variety of 
conceptions of society and the person, depending on context. Starting points may 
vary and we need to select the correct ones in order to construct a justifiable set of 
principles. Justifications will also vary. Different justifications will be appropriate for 
different audiences, not least because our relationships with different audiences will 
similarly be different. Our reasons must fit a plurality of political and social worlds.49 
O’Neill recognises that ‘audiences for reasoning are multiple and diverse, so if the 
scope of some practical reasoning is to be inclusive, it must be followable on the 
basis of minimal assumptions about the characteristics of those for whom it is to be 
followable’.50 It must at least be possible for others to follow the reasons that we 
offer to them. They may well not follow them, as Roberts points out, but it must be 
possible that they will.51 The intention is to use diverse justificatory arguments to 
draw a diverse audience towards a single conclusion.
49 This perhaps echoes strongly Walzer’s ‘spheres’ o f justice and this is a means by which they can be 
respected. See Michael Walzer, Spheres o f  Justice: A Defence o f  Pluralism and Equality (New York: 
Basic Books, 1983)
50 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.57
51 Roberts, ‘Why Thin Universalism Needs Conceptions o f Society and Person’, p. 116; See also 
O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.57
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Justificatory arguments are therefore contingent and shifting, not 
foundational; their procedures are heuristic guidelines not strict algorithmic rules. 
The arguments at the disposal of the thin universalist are inherently tied to time, 
place and circumstance and will inevitably vary according to these factors. This 
yields few, if any, inherent problems for thin universalism, which is sensitive to the 
necessity of such techniques. ‘Patchworking’, Evans suggests, may be the best way 
(and perhaps even the only way) to draw a diverse audience to a single conclusion. 
Bootstrapping, abstraction and redescription provide only some of the required tools 
to achieve its task. “
Dimensions of Consent
What remains for construction to address is the nature of the consent that it seeks. 
While the emphasis on consent suggests that concrete agreement is sought, the extent 
to which it could be constructed theoretically or hypothetically, remains unclear. 
Constructivism has traditionally asserted that, while the plausibility of a complex 
plurality of agents agreeing universally to observe the regulatory principles that issue 
from construction is perhaps slim, construction must be premised on the notion that 
they at least can observe them and can respond to the justifications and arguments on 
offer.53
Once we recognise that it is a plurality of justificatory procedures that 
construction must employ, other requirements of a morally and pragmatically 
acceptable consensus around thin universal regulatory principles become clear. First 
and foremost is the recognition that, even with a patchwork of justificatory 
arguments, the consent in practice of all concerned will be impossible. Some
52 Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” of Justification’, pp.85-86
53 See again, Peri Roberts, ‘Why Thin Universalism Needs Conceptions o f Society and Person’, p.l 16; 
See also Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.57
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individuals or groups will be utterly unswayed by any justificatory arguments while 
others will be unable to engage in coherent argument. But there are ways in which 
legitimate limiting factors can be placed on the conditions of agreement.
Construction need not rely solely on the actual consent of every party to the 
construction. Consent of this extent is impossible. The constructivist would be forced 
to accept that no such principles could be constructed, or to accept every conceivable 
moral viewpoint, however despicable, rendering constructed regulatory principles 
devoid of any moral or practical value (not to mention excluding those decent people 
of all cultures, perturbed by the content and permissiveness of any principles to 
which the Nazi could readily agree). Consent, then, might plausibly be in some cases 
‘hypothetical’, while in others offered by proxy, and in others simply not required.
There are several groups often regarded as of special ethical status when it 
comes to moral and political deliberation. Children are perceived to have all the basic 
rights of adults, but are denied just as many political, economic and social rights on 
the grounds that they are not fully capable of making use of them. Other groups, such 
as coma patients, possess these rights but lack the faculties to use them. Premising 
agreement on the consent of those persons who simply cannot give it seems 
counterproductive and pedantic. Who is to be included in the second construction, 
then, is an important and unavoidable question.
Alongside these issues is a further question. Equally important in 
understanding the consent pursued by construction, is the extent of the consensus we 
need to construct, given the pragmatic and moral remit of the thin universalist 
project. What kind of consensus must construction pursue? There is a conceptual 
continuum of consensus, where agreement over moral and political principles can 
range from ‘substantive consensus’, where all but the most personal and private
constructing consent
issues are to be agreed upon, to outright cultural and moral relativity, where universal 
consensus on anything is regarded as impossible and undesirable. In between lie 
several degrees, advocating agonistic conceptions of politics, consensus around core 
values, constitutions or religious principles. The extent of the consent to thin 
universal principles sought by construction lies somewhere on this continuum. I draw 
the themes of this chapter together by considering these observations about the 
nature of the consent that constructivism needs to seek.
Acceptance and Acceptability
Firstly, I consider the difference between ‘acceptance’ and ‘acceptability’. Is 
acceptance the aim of the construction of consent, or merely acceptability? How far 
can consent be abstracted from actual acceptance in order for it to function 
practically? As I have suggested, “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” is a particularly vague 
maxim which is perhaps premised too strongly on a worryingly uncritical notion of 
acceptability. The difficulty, of course, is that the more ‘real’ we demand that 
consent be, the more likely we are to be left wanting. Positing that validity can only 
come from the acceptance of all agents involved in a cosmopolitan domain seems 
excessively demanding, even morally problematic. We seem forced to defend either 
a set of principles that not all can accept, or a set of principles so thin that they would 
be absurdly permissive.
Typically, this problem is overcome by suggesting an alternative to Evans’ 
“‘outright actual agreement’” , which is often a ‘little-more-than-notional conception 
of “what one might accept under some counterfactual ideal condition.’” 54 Most 
constructivist accounts fall somewhere between these two points, drawing on
54 Evans, ‘Thin Universalism and the “Limits” o f Justification’, p.78
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modelled conditions under which we can or could consent to regulatory principles. 
Constructivism has long enjoyed close ties with social contract theory, which also 
seeks to examine the conditions of unforced agreement to regulating ideas. Rawlsian 
constructivism uses a familiar thought experiment -  the veil of ignorance within the 
original position -  in order to model what agents would reasonably consent to in a 
hypothetical and counter-factual scenario where particular interests and knowledge 
are withheld.55
In spite of this, contractualism has been criticised as excessively reliant on 
actual agreement, making consent unlikely and its procedures and principles too thin, 
a problem opponents of traditional contract theory have also encountered. The 
empirical search for existing commonalities of response, found in Walzer and other 
convergence theories, seems equally unlikely to yield universal principles. And even 
if it does, those principles are likely to be so thin as to be hopelessly permissive. It is 
often suggested that, rather than an insistence on an impossible level of actual 
consent by all real people that some form of hypothetical consent might be more 
realistic. That, rather than rely on what people might actually believe, which may be 
based on incomplete knowledge, error, or a lack of agency, we can grasp what it 
takes for principles to be followable or acceptable hypothetically. While hypothetical 
consent may be based on counterfactual conditions, the motivation behind it is based 
in the urgency of the need to find a basis upon which action in order to address the 
conflicts engendered by complex pluralism can proceed. Indeed, for William James, 
the will to believe stems in part from the urgency of the moral dilemmas we face.
55 See Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, pp. 17-21, ch.2, particularly pp. 136-141; Political Liberalism, 
pp.22-28, ch.2, particularly pp.72-80
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Intervention in a systematic genocide would seem to be a prime case of this kind of 
judgement.56
But this view is also fraught with concerns. Acceptability (rather than 
acceptance) is a de facto ‘thin’ argument, but in a particular sense. It seeks to address 
pluralism by reducing the substance of the agreement which we might require in 
order to give principles their authority. But acceptability also demonstrates implicitly 
thick tendencies. O’Neill suggests that construction ought to reject attempts to 
answer the question, ‘what principles would a plurality of agents, with imperfect 
rationality and indeterminate capacities for mutual independence choose to live
57by?’ Instead it can inform an answer to the question, ‘what principles can a 
plurality of agents, with imperfect rationality and indeterminate capacities for mutual 
independence choose to live by?’58 O’Neill is here making a case for the kind of 
consent it might be possible to construct. But in doing so it gives significant ground 
to the pragmatic urge to secure consent, and so opens the door to smuggle in far more 
substantive content that many would not accept, but, it claims, they could, if 
circumstances were different. This significantly increases the tendency towards 
unacceptably culturally particular principles, which it is claimed that others could 
accept, though they certainly would not, and perhaps even could not.
‘Acceptability’, while thin in one respect, and while it perhaps increases the 
probability of developing a coherently constructed basis of ‘consent’, alone 
undermines the thin universalist project’s commitment to respect pluralism. While it 
might appear more demanding, the thin universalist project seeks actual acceptance. 
It must not settle for acceptability, for acceptability points to thickness where
56 See William James, ‘The Will to Believe’ in The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular 
Philosophy (London: Longmans, 1917), p.39
57 And by ‘hypothetical’ she is referring to the Rawlsian question posed in A Theory o f  Justice.
58 Onora O’Neill, ‘Constructivism in Ethics’ in Constructions o f  Reason: Explorations o f  Kant’s 
Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.212-213
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acceptance does not. Acceptability implies that we have not constructed truly 
universal principles, but rather particular principles, dressed in universal attire. 
Actual agreement -  acceptance, not acceptability -  must be the aim, even where in 
all cases it may not be possible.
In some cases, substantive actual agreement will be possible. In many 
Western democracies this ‘substantive acceptance’ is present on numerous issues. 
The ‘constitutional consensus’ in the United States is a good example. While there 
may be debate about its interpretation, there is broad acceptance of the constitution 
itself as a platform for legislative, executive and judicial action. Substantive 
acceptance is actual agreement on numerous issues; not just plausible or reasonable 
expectation of agreement, but actual agreement. In most cases, however, substantive 
acceptance will be improbable, unnecessary and problematic. It would almost 
certainly violate respect for pluralism to push for a cosmopolitan transposition of a 
‘constitutional consensus’, which equally casts doubts on the viability of its 
realization and it is further clear that substantive consensus is not required to address 
the problems raised in this project. As such a far thinner basis of acceptance is 
required.
Complex pluralism may well result in a healthy scepticism about what kind 
of acceptance we can expect. Indeed, universally we may be inclined to wonder if 
actual agreement is possible at all, even on seemingly basic judgements, like 
prohibition of murder. We may sometimes therefore seek not acceptance, but 
acceptability. Now, we should not be surprised that through a patchwork of 
justifications, a patchwork of approaches to acceptance may be required. In situations 
addressed to the Nazi and the paedophile, the seriously mentally ill, the coma patient 
and the very young, acceptance will be physically, practically, or logically
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impossible. Here ‘acceptability’ is a valuable tool. For those whose role in the 
constructive process is already curtailed, it cannot be assumed that acceptance is 
appropriate. For those morally ‘beyond the pale’, or matter-of-factly unable to 
participate in construction, the demands of acceptance are weaker. The justification 
for this lies in part within the first construction of the regulatory principles 
themselves and within the characteristics that it constructs: thinness and 
universalism. They are constructed to respect persons and their cultural creations; 
this provides the key starting point from which consent can be constructed. It is 
precisely because principles are thin and universal, and it is precisely because they 
are so for pragmatic and moral reasons that they can be deemed ‘acceptable’ where 
necessary.
In other cases, acceptance by actual people, leading actual lives and engaged 
in actual relationships of interdependence and conflict will be the only acceptable 
and truly ‘thin universal’ means of consent. Respect for persons and for pluralism 
demands that we do not subsume certain differences into a false account of what is 
‘acceptable’ in unacceptably counter-factual circumstances. The thin universalist 
project must pursue thin acceptance, and not thicker acceptability as its aim, even if, 
in some cases, it is only the potential for eventual agreement that we can see.
The Consent of Whom?
If construction is premised on an altered conception of “‘ought’ implies ‘can’”, what 
is then required is an account of whose consent can be constructed. And, conversely, 
it is important to establish the impact on the legitimacy of a thin universalism of 
those whose consent cannot. There are two interrelated questions at work here. The 
first is whether the construction must attend to every valuational perspective. This
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restates the recurring problem: is the validity of constructed regulatory principles 
dependent upon the consent of the Nazi and the paedophile, and those unable to give 
their consent? There are many groups categorised in the literature on this subject, 
such as the ‘unreasonable’, ‘irrational’, ‘amoral’, ‘fanatical’ and ‘mad’.59 All form 
part of the complexity of pluralism. Below John Rawls’ and Joshua Cohen’s 
‘reasonable pluralism’, which accounts for the ‘reasonableness’ of diversity,60 there 
lies a ‘simple’ and undeniable plurality of views which must be addressed by any 
theory which identifies pluralism as an unavoidable feature of thinking about 
morality.
Do constructed regulatory principles require the consent of these groups in 
order to be valid? What reasons could we offer to those others, in answer to the 
question of why we should consent to principles of regulation, and why we should 
have such principles in the first place? What can you say to someone who doesn’t see 
the need to be moral? Does construction bind us to incorporating the values of the 
racist, the terrorist, and the hate-monger, and must we be responsive to the ‘rogue 
state’ and the fanatical religious sect? Many people might seek in some way and for 
various reasons -  and not just because they are unreasonable, irrational, amoral, 
fanatical or mad -  to ‘opt-out’ of universal regulatory principles. We must answer 
the question of why be moral.
59 See, for examples, Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp.xvi-xvii; Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Amoralist’ in 
Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997); Jonathon Quong, ‘The Rights o f Unreasonable Citizens’ in The Journal o f  Political 
Philosophy V ol.l2(3), 2004, pp. 314-335; Marilyn Friedman, ‘John Rawls and the Political Coercion 
of Unreasonable People’ in Victoria Davion and Clark W olf (eds.), The Idea o f  a Political 
Liberalism: Essays on John Rawls (Oxford: Rowman ad Littlefield, 2000), pp. 16-33; and Joshua 
Cohen, ‘Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus’ in David Copp, Jean Hampton and John E. Roemer 
(eds.), The Idea o f  Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 270-291; R.M. 
Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), especially ch.9 on ‘Toleration and 
Fanaticism’, pp. 157-185.
60 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp.xvi-xvii; Cohen, ‘Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus’,
p.281
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The response to these issues within analytic political philosophy, and within 
constructivism, has been somewhat inarticulate and occasionally problematic. Rawls 
and O’Neill have suggested that there may be little to say to the religious fanatic or 
the genocidal maniac. Rawls struggles to address the challenge of the religious 
fundamentalist within the parameters of his political liberalism. He retreats to a 
‘comprehensive liberalism’ in order to deal with those unwilling to pursue their 
interests through ‘reasonable’ means.61 Richard Rorty has basked in this admission, 
suggesting that we would never secure consent from such people, whatever 
arguments we were to offer. The ‘madman’ is, after all, mad! For Rorty, our efforts 
are better spent elsewhere, in the persuasion of those who could conceivably consent 
to our position.
If we are to construct a broad basis of consent for thin universal regulatory 
principles, certain perspectives may indeed have to be scrutinised and perhaps 
excluded. But it must be made clear why such groups are or ought to be excluded 
from this dialogical construction. After all, is constructivism not premised on the 
notion that all could consent to the constructed thin universal regulatory principles? 
To deny or ignore this question of how to address the issues posed by those who will 
not or cannot consent to thin universalism is to fail in a project intended to construct 
universal principles for a complex plurality of social actors.
The key problem facing the constructivist here is that even if we rely on a 
very thin conception of consent, some individuals and groups will still be unable or
61 See here the somewhat infamous ‘pages 152-153’ o f Rawls’ Political Liberalism for this problem.
62 See Richard Rorty, ‘The Priority o f Democracy to Philosophy’ in Richard Rorty, Objectivity, 
Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers Vol.l (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
pp. 175-196. See also Mark Evans, ‘Pragmatist Liberalism and the Evasion o f Politics’ in Mark Evans 
(ed.), The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2001), pp. 148-161 at p. 156
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fk 'Xunwilling to accept thin universal regulatory principles. We might therefore 
justifiably seek to limit consent to a group which excludes those unable or utterly 
unwilling to do so. But the narrower the scope of consent gets, the more problematic 
(and the less universal) thin universal principles become. Furthermore, the 
construction of a thin universalism is supposed to set those limitations, through the 
articulation of a set of regulatory principles. It might also be the case that the 
perspectives of some of these people are able to tell us things about the kind of social 
world that produced them, which is extremely valuable to the procedure of 
construction.64 So, how do we decide who to include in what Marilyn Friedman calls 
the ‘legitimation pool’?65
How does the constructivist determine who is to be included, and how some 
can legitimately be excluded? The first concern is that, in order to determine the 
parameters of the legitimation pool we must resort to a set of fact-based principles 
about which doctrines are acceptable, whose moral frameworks must be party to 
construction, and whose consent must be secured. The problem of course being that 
such a reasoned set of principles is what is being constructed. This results in the 
circular claim that that the best way to determine who should be party to the 
construction of a thin universalism would be to apply the principles of that thin 
universalism itself. We cannot, therefore, apply regulatory principles to the 
determination of the legitimation pool, because the relevant regulatory principles are 
not sufficiently independent of the outcomes of the procedure to avoid the petitio 
principii fallacy.
63 This is adapted from Marilyn Friedman, ‘John Rawls and the Political Coercion o f Unreasonable 
People’ in Victoria Davion and Clark Wolf (eds.), The Idea o f  a Political Liberalism: Essays on John 
Rawls (Oxford: Rowman ad Littlefield, 2000), pp. 16-33 at p.21
64 Friedman, ‘John Rawls and the Political Coercion o f Unreasonable People’, p.18
65 Friedman, ‘John Rawls and the Political Coercion o f Unreasonable People’, p.19
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Similarly, appeal to first principles will also leave the constructivist wanting. 
The exclusion of all perspectives that do not endorse the first principles of respect for 
persons and respect for pluralism would leave out many crucial moral, political, 
religious and social groups, many of whom do not share the constructivist’s 
predilection for the complexities and benefits of pluralism.66 Many groups deny the 
importance of respect for persons outside of their own particular groups; many more 
deny respect for pluralism. What basis can be used, then, to establish a legitimation 
pool that excludes the worst of what some human beings consider to be morally 
acceptable, without excluding the majority of humanity’s many somewhat insular, 
confrontational, even outwardly intolerant groups?
It is worth noting firstly that the problem of who to include in the legitimation 
pool highlights the potential limitations of this kind of project. The constructivist, the 
thin universalist, and the philosopher more generally do not hold all the answers to 
these questions. Far from undermining the project, however, this helps to 
demonstrate the strength of thin universalism’s claims. It points towards the 
flexibility and contingency of the procedure of construction and of the constructed 
and fact-dependent thin universal regulatory principles. Those concerned about 
universalist philosophies, however ‘thin’ they are, can find some reassurance that 
thin universalism does not profess to hold the answers to all our moral problems. It is 
not an all-encompassing account of the world and how we should act within it, like 
many universalisms have been, and have proudly professed to be. These limitations 
add weight to the claim that construction is ongoing, that the tasks of the 
constructivist and the thin universalist will never fully be done, and that the
66 In chapter two I suggested that the thin universalist takes regard o f complex pluralism, rather than 
value pluralism, as the latter requires burdensome metaphysical evidence that adherents o f many 
moral frameworks would find inaccessible or unacceptable.
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outcomes of construction, the thin universal regulatory principles themselves, are 
not, and can never be realised as fixed, transcendental, moral algorithms.
Nonetheless, the argument about limitations may not alone be terribly 
satisfactory. Further insight might be found by considering the significance of 
consent. Consent to thin universal principles is constructed from the commitments 
within our first principles to respect pluralism and to respect persons; consent is what 
is morally required. It is required precisely because there is a sense in which we 
simply have to live together peacefully. The world is a finite, bounded sphere from 
which there is little means of ‘escape’. It is almost impossible to opt out from social 
life entirely. Thin universalism proceeds from the assumption that we have to find 
some way to live together peacefully, and that it is plausible to do so according to 
certain politically enforceable principles. The project proceeds according to the belief 
that those principles must be constructed according to the facts, that they must 
therefore bear certain characteristics, and that the legitimacy of those principles is in 
part premised on consent to them by those to whom they are to apply. Construction 
proceeds on the understanding that there might be sufficient others who agree with 
this minimal idea of peaceful coexistence. It recognises that while different 
frameworks may radically vary, there is a sufficiently powerful compulsion towards 
the need for peaceful coexistence in order for individuals and societies to flourish. 
John Gray claims that ‘nearly all ways of life have interests that make peaceful
•  • f\1coexistence worth pursuing.’
67 See John Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism (Oxford: Polity, 2000), p. 135. In this way, the thin 
universalist project differs from John Gray’s account o f modus vivendi in as much as Gray never seeks 
to move beyond the idea o f peaceful coexistence. It is not always clear how Gray would seek to 
address those who reject the idea (aside from his commitment to a moral ‘bottom line’ in accordance 
with Berlin’s value pluralism, which as I have asserted leaves the question o f  justification with which 
I am concerned unaddressed). See again, Two Faces o f  Liberalism, ch.4; see also Enlightenment’s 
Wake, ch.6, pp.80-85
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The thin universalist project begins with this ‘primordial’ commitment simply 
to the idea of living together. Fundamental opposition to this extremely thin starting 
point of continuing peaceful coexistence is deeply problematic and provides some 
guidance as to who might be included in the legitimation pool. Inability to accept any 
notion of peaceful coexistence surely renders a worldview sufficiently problematic as 
to legitimate its exclusion from the construction of consent to regulatory principles 
designed to allow a complex plurality to live together peacefully. Living together is 
central to this notion: groups, be they ethnic, social, economic or religious 
encompass modes of living. This allows us to see relatively clearly certain cases of 
whose consent the constructivist might be seeking and whose consent the 
constructivist might not. Groups or individuals who reject the notion of a mode of 
living, advocating instead death -  the suicide bomber, the genocidal maniac -  make 
the decision about their inclusion for us.
We may be unable to engage in a procedure of construction with many of 
those who lack full moral agency. We may not need to include children under a 
certain age in construction, for example. Similarly, while coma patients and the 
seriously mentally ill are possessive of all the rights and benefits that ‘being human’ 
entitles one to, they lack the full moral agency to participate in construction. It may 
therefore be less important to gamer their consent to thin universal regulatory 
principles. We might not be able to engage in construction with such agents, but we 
can coexist peacefully with them. The case of the violent racist, religious 
fundamentalist or suicide bomber may be different. Where agents utterly lack the 
impulsion to pursue peaceful coexistence of any kind, there is little cause for concern 
at the exclusion of them from the constmction of consent. We cannot live with the
Constructing Consent
suicide bomber or the warmonger because they are unwilling to live with us. How 
can they participate in the negotiation of terms of shared, peaceful coexistence?
What constructivism urges, however, is the importance of engagement with 
such agents in the first instance. Construction is not committed to a de facto rejection 
of these problematic worldviews without any discussion of the matter. The 
recognised contingency and openness to renegotiation of thin universal regulatory 
principles mean that engagement with frameworks that reject peaceful coexistence is 
positively encouraged. It is urged that such tactics are periodically revisited. But such 
groups can legitimately be excluded from the legitimation pool precisely because 
their frameworks preclude the idea of peaceful coexistence, which we are in no way 
committed to accept.
The ‘Limits’ of Consensus
Central to a thin universalism is the idea that there are definite limits to the consensus 
that we can, and indeed ought to seek. The point of a thin universalism in this context 
is to show that we only need consensus around a limited number of fundamental 
moral regulatory principles. Beyond that, consensus and the pursuit thereof has only 
contingent and limited value. So what is the extent of that consensus? Where are its 
‘limits’?
The thin universalist project is, in a very significant way, about consensus. In 
one respect, the whole project is about redrawing the boundaries of universal 
consensus in light of the facts of pluralism. It asks where the legitimate limits of 
consensus lie, and ought to lie, given our experience of a complex plurality of social, 
moral, cultural and political viewpoints, not all of which coincide in any significant
68 In terms o f their importance, rather than their epistemic status.
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way with our own. Conversely, it asks where the limits of that complex plurality 
might be found, and where perhaps they ought to be drawn. But ‘consensus’ can 
denote a variety of perspectives ranging from a deep-rooted social homogeneity to 
near-relativism. Where the limits of our constructed consensus lie, and the extent of 
the consensus that we ought to seek, is located firstly within the facts and first 
principles of construction. Consensus is determined by complex pluralism, and our 
response to it; how one views complex pluralism will determine in part the full 
extent of the consensus one pursues.
For thin universalism, complex pluralism is not localised or temporary, it is 
not inert or benign, nor is it destructive and corrosive. Importantly though, while the 
fact of pluralism cannot be denied, which would require countering overwhelming 
empirical evidence, universal recognition of its value would be highly unlikely. 
Pluralism is widely challenged on various levels; many, perhaps even a vast 
majority, of the actors in a plural world believe that ‘their way’ is the ‘right way’. 
Construction is committed to respect pluralism, but in so doing it is also committed 
to the recognition that not every political, religious, cultural and social framework 
possesses a similar respect. An adequately constructed consensus therefore will have 
to properly reflect the realities of complex pluralism.
Consent can be positioned somewhere upon a continuum or typology which 
also ranges from ‘thick’ to ‘thin’, with relativism as the thinnest extreme and social 
conformism or radical social homogeneity as the thickest. Moving from thin to thick, 
relativism sits on the thinnest edge. I suggested in chapter two that relativism is 
premised on a single, extremely thin yet absolute assertion that all practices, or 
truths, or principles are relative to the cultural, social or historical context out of
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which they arise.69 A relevant ‘popular’ expression of relativism might be that we 
can agree on nothing more than ‘to disagree’.
A close counterpart of ‘absolute’ relativism is what Benhabib refers to as 
‘framework’ relativism, which she identifies with Richard Rorty’s notion of
70competing vocabularies and with Jean-Francois Lyotard’s concept of the
71differ end. Both place ‘context’ or ‘framework’ at the forefront of accounts of 
human communication.72 Notions of ‘the universal’ are not precluded, but are cast 
into serious doubt, along with universal consensus. Framework relativity would 
produce a deeply pluralised account of consensus, which some would claim is too
7*3deep and therefore too thin.
Beyond these relativist accounts, which are scarcely concerned with 
consensus at all, strong pluralism and pluralisation come into sharper focus. These 
include accounts of political and ethical life which reject the pursuit of consensus 
advocating instead the need to pursue dissensus, difference or pluralism itself as 
political and moral goals. Many such accounts attack thicker conceptions of 
consensus on the grounds that they seek to preclude political discourse and pursue 
extensive falsified metaphysical agendas.74 Less thinly-conceived are accounts of 
agonism, urging against a perceived overwhelming Enlightenment trend towards the 
eradication of cultural and social differences. Agonism warns of the dangers of 
insisting on consensus beyond what Isaiah Berlin referred to as ‘minimal standards
69 The literature here is vast. For a good summary see Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thompson, 
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Cambridge MA: Blackwell, 1996) and David B. Wong, 
Moral Relativity (Los Angeles, University o f California Press, 1984)
70 See Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity
71 See Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1988)
72 Though neither would be eager to endorse the notion o f ‘principles’ at work here.
73 Benhabib, The Claims o f Culture, ch.2, particularly pp.29-33
74 Again, the literature here is burgeoning. See, o f particular note, Nicholas Rescher, Pluralism:
Against the Demandfor Consensus (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1993) and William Connolly, 
Pluralism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005). See also Connolly’s Why I am Not a 
Secularist (Minneapolis: Universality o f  Minnesota Press, 1999)
-246-
constructing consent
n c
of moral decency.’ Typically, what flows from agonism is a concern to establish a 
modus vivendi which secures no more than peaceful relations between social actors.76 
Within agonism and modus vivendi, little consensus is demanded above the bare 
minimum conditions of decent conduct, be they formulated as human rights or other 
standards. Problematically though, most accounts of agonism neglect the workings of 
this basic minimum, and how its standards are arrived at is often left unaddressed.
Closely related to these accounts, though thicker still, can be found pluralistic 
notions of consensus, where agreement is premised on a few minimal standards 
which find different expression and justification depending on context but which are, 
nonetheless, ‘universal’ in scope. Many tenets of a constructed thin universalism may 
find themselves amongst this cluster of ideas. Consensus over such regulatory 
principles must be pluralistic and minimalistic.
The key alternative to this approach is the thicker, Rawlsian notion of 
‘overlapping consensus’. As a result of the free exercise of human reason over time, 
Rawls argues, it is likely that a variety of comprehensive religious and moral 
doctrines will emerge -  Rawls’ ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’. This in turn poses a 
‘problem’ for theories such as justice as fairness. Rawls's answer to this problem is 
based on the idea that divergent moral and religious conceptions of the good could 
converge on some common ground. Citizens who hold a plurality of religious and 
moral beliefs can nonetheless agree on the basic principles necessary for a society to 
satisfy the demands of justice as fairness. This means that different citizens, be they 
Catholics, Protestants or secular humanists, can consent to the same principles from
75 See here Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, ch.6. See also Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber o f  
Humanity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), ch.4
76 See here John Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2000)
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different perspectives. Although a deep consensus might be impossible, an
77‘overlapping consensus’, Rawls argues, is possible.
Beyond overlapping consensus can be found thicker accounts of consensus 
ranging from ‘constitutional’ and ‘universal’ consensus over the key institutions of
70
the basic structure of society, to thicker consensus over the ‘good life’ found in 
religious moral frameworks, or comprehensive social philosophies. Presumably the 
thickest form of consensus is totalitarianism, which insists upon an Orwellian level 
of consensus and unanimity within all aspects of public and private life.
Rawls’ overlapping consensus, the key contemporary account of consensus, 
struggles to adequately account for complex pluralism. The outcome is non-, even 
anti-pluralistic because its procedural approach continues to insist upon the 
construction of consent based upon a single public language. Because of the 
‘patchworked’ argumentative strategies of a constructive approach as I have sought 
to establish it, thin universalism rejects the notion that all could accept its regulatory 
principles, however thin they may be, on the same basis. Patchworking provides for a 
far more plural approach to the acceptance of universal principles.79 Overlapping 
consensus is unable to provide such a pluralistic approach.
In his critique of Rawls, George Klosko offers an alternative method of 
determining moral principles from the ‘convergence’ of comprehensive views in 
society. The aim of convergence is to minimise controversy over these fundamental 
principles thus generating a genuine consensus based on the actual views of citizens
77 Rawls, Political Liberalism, Introduction, ch.4
78 Which we find in Rawls’ earlier work, typified by A Theory o f  Justice. And in certain comparable 
examples such as the constitutional consensus o f George Klosko. See his ‘Political Constructivism in 
Rawls’ Political Liberalism’ in The American Political Science Review, Vol.91 (3), 1997, pp.635-646
79 And, indeed, the idea o f a patchwork o f justification allows for potentially wide variances in how 
regulatory principles can be expressed and implemented. There are limitations to this variation, which 
will also be explored.
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within a given society. Klosko likens his view to that forwarded by Kurt Baier, of a 
‘constitutional consensus’, an interpretation of the prevailing view within modem 
American society whereby general agreement on procedures of law provide stability 
and civic virtue, performing the same function as overlapping consensus.81 Rawls’ 
position, he suggests, is difficult to defend because it lacks convincing evidence for 
its plausibility. Nonetheless the success of convergence is dependent upon 
widespread agreement, and while Klosko maintains that such agreement can be 
empirically verified, it remains doubtful, given complex pluralism, that such 
agreement is possible without leaving further work to be done. Global constitutional 
consensus suffers from just that same problem of plausibility that it levels against 
Rawls’ overlapping consensus. Convergence is also dependent upon a modem liberal 
democratic context and is therefore open to claims of ethnocentricity and is hence 
potentially unsuitable to adoption on a wider or higher level. On this count, the idea 
of convergence seems irretrievably ‘thick’ in its cultural particularity. The kind of 
convergence we might seek, while it might not be possible only in liberal 
democracies, will suffer from a limited practical scope.82
Nonetheless, convergence recognises that consent is necessary to provide 
validity and form to our constmcted principles. What is also apparent is that different 
forms of consent have roles to play in the construction of consent to thin universal 
regulatory principles. This plurality of forms is connected to the distinction drawn 
between agreement upon a set of principles and agreement to a set of principles. 
Seeking agreement upon a set of principles involves finding principles that all who 
agree to them actually hold. Seeking agreement to a set of principles involves 
securing agreement to abide by those principles without the need for the holding of
80 Klosko, ‘Political Constructivism in Rawls’ Political Liberalism’, pp.635-646
81 Klosko, ‘Political Constructivism in Rawls’ Political Liberalism’, pp.638-639
82 See O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, pp.52-53
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those principles on the part of all concerned. While many universal moralities strive 
for agreement upon a set of principles, a constructive thin universalism need only 
pursue and, in line with the moral considerations of the project, is morally committed 
only to pursue agreement to a set of thin universal regulatory principles.
This, in turn, allows for a plurality of forms of consensus which include 
agonistic relationships, strong pluralization, and modus vivendi. Modus vivendi, for 
example, has many applications in cases where a principled consensus is thoroughly 
impracticable. It is likely that, thin as thin universal regulatory principles may be, 
some moral frameworks, cultural systems or political regimes will only consent with 
deep reluctance. The expectation of agreement upon thin universal principles by such 
systems is pragmatically unlikely and morally problematic. But agreement to those 
principles may, in the fashion of a modus vivendi, provide a means of getting others 
on board whose consent is valuable, but whose values diverge strongly from our 
own. A good example might be North Korea, or other states that have sought to 
exempt themselves from international and cosmopolitical systems. Other, more 
localised agreement might be implausible if their basis is ‘upon’ rather than ‘to’ 
regulatory principles. The relationship between Israel and its Arab neighbours might 
never progress if it is explicit consensus upon a single set of principles which is 
required or desired. Many violent conflicts are between groups simply not interested 
in principled agreement. Modus vivendi might be the most we can ask for, and the 
most morally acceptable means of securing consent in such cases. And as a result 
construction further pluralises political and moral discourse.
Constructing Consent
Towards Consent
Consent is fundamental to the form, legitimacy and application of regulatory 
principles constructed to have an impact on the interactions of a complex plurality of 
agents. It is insufficient to premise consent simply on acceptability, nor is it enough 
to assume that one can pull a complex plurality up to a shared thin viewpoint using 
nothing more than the beliefs agents already possess. A more critically constructive 
approach is required which makes use of a variety of justificatory strategies and 
which recognises the practical and moral constraints which any doctrine that takes 
consent seriously must face.
Given that many of the motivations of a thin universalism are strongly 
political, the mechanisms and procedures of a thin universalism cannot be purely 
moral in content. The need to apply standards in justificatory argument, to approach 
pluralism sensitively, to incorporate participants into the mechanisms of construction 
and the initial instinct that thicker conceptions of universalism are inappropriate in a 
plural world, all point to political as well as moral motivating features of this project. 
And, indeed, it is the intention of the constructivist that there be something in a set of 
thin universal regulatory principles that is available to everyone. But it is important 
to remember that the purpose of construction is not simply to have people agree. It is 
also to ensure that certain minimal standards, determined by our first principles to 
respect persons and to respect pluralism, are met. Neither is met without 
construction. Construction is therefore a two stage process. Each contributes to the 
form and legitimacy of thin universal regulatory principles, and any such principles 
will be found to be lacking if either construction is defective or deficient. It is 
through construction, therefore, that thin universalism is provided with its key 
features.
Constructing Consent
I go on now to consider the nature of an international political culture which 
draws upon the notions and ideas of thin universalism. I look at what attitudes might 
best represent the thin universalist project, and how that project might best be 
followed through. I seek to utilise the most powerful and potent popular ideas which 
can most plausibly be grounded in both constructed thin universal regulatory 
principles, and in a constructed consensus: those of ‘human rights’ and ‘toleration’. 
What I suggest in the next chapter is that a conception of human rights offers an 
acceptable, legitimate and powerful means of expression for a set of thin, universal, 
fact-dependent, regulatory principles. It considers these features and how we might 
engage with the current trends in human rights discourse in order to render them 
more coherent, more powerful and more able to respond to the requirements of 
complex pluralism in the modem world.
The Role of 
Thin Human Rights
Thus far, the thesis has explored the causal relationships between the various stages 
of construction within thin universalism: from the object of construction in chapter 
one, the materials of construction in chapters two and three, to the construction of 
regulatory principles and the construction of consent in chapters four and five. Each 
stage has built on those that preceded it and has yielded a case for a set of thin 
universal regulatory principles. In chapters six and seven I consider the character of 
those thin universal principles. In this chapter I propose a thin conception of human 
rights as a plausible and persuasive expression of thin universal principles, while in 
chapter seven I propose a conception of toleration and its limits. While they overlap, 
their substantive content reveals distinctly different dimensions to how thin 
universalism can be cashed out.
This chapter concerns itself with the connection and engagement between 
thin universal regulatory principles and a conception of human rights. Its purpose is 
to define, characterise and justify that connection, demonstrating what thin 
universalism might look like in practice. Why might the language of human rights be 
suitable for the expression of thin universal principles? What might a constructed 
‘thin universal’ conception of human rights look like? What sets the thin universalist 
conception of human rights apart from others?
Human Kignts
The chapter begins by connecting thin universalism with a conception of 
human rights. Just as constructed regulatory principles cannot be regarded as ‘first’ 
principles, neither can human rights. They are themselves responsive to facts and 
other, more basic moral considerations. They need not be a response to a metaethical 
plurality of values, but can be regarded as responsive to a complex plurality of 
social, political, moral and cultural systems. This, however, leaves important issues 
unaddressed. For instance, even if my account of thin universalism has been 
acceptable thus far, many will still doubt the validity of rights as a means of its 
expression. Indeed, Onora O’Neill proposes that we overhaul the concept of rights in 
favour of an account of obligations, their importantly asymmetrical corollaries.1 
Further, and more damning critiques of rights have also emerged, such as those of 
David Chandler, who critiques rights discourse as being little more than the abstract
a
philosophising of liberal elites. The chapter acknowledges these issues but asserts 
that, if a conception of human rights is grounded in construction, it can demonstrate a 
reflexivity, sensitivity and self-awareness which overcome them. Human rights have 
a powerful moral and philosophical appeal, as well as political and practical 
leverage, and they continue to grow in terms of their international prowess and their 
argumentative sway.
Nonetheless, human rights are deeply problematic, in how they are codified 
within international legal structures and in their role within academic and popular 
discourse. Human rights have frequently fallen prey to many of the problems which 
have beset attempts to establish universal principles. Many accounts are 
unacceptably ethnocentric and hence not universal at all. Many grossly misrepresent
1 See Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f  Practical Reasoning 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch.5
2 David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (London: 
Pluto, 2002), ch.4 in particular.
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other cultural and moral systems, insisting that the values of one culture, ‘our 
culture’, are either superior to others, or so sufficiently similar as to co-opt them into 
the realm of authority of a set of principles which are alien to them. Many more have 
been accused of outright moral imperialism and of the frequently disastrous 
consequences that flow from it. Only a conception of human rights that can 
overcome these difficulties can assist in arbitrating and alleviating violent conflict 
within a complex plurality. What I propose in this chapter, then, is a thin human 
rights or a human rights minimalism as an expression of constructed thin universal 
regulatory principles.
In so doing, the chapter addresses three key objections to such a conception 
of human rights. The first being that the account of principles outlined thus far 
proposes nothing more than disconnected, abstract principles which exist only in the 
discussions of the academy and which have no bearing on the actual conflicts and 
suffering of real people. The second being that a culmination of the thin universalist 
project in a conception of rights amounts simply to a defence of the status quo in 
theory and in practice. Thin Universalism must be more than a new defence for 
traditional human rights doctrine; more than a conservative approach to a system 
desperately in need of reform. The third being that minimalism strips all substantive 
content out of human rights, leaving nothing to defend but a desire to pursue peace at 
any human cost.
Human rights are, I argue, an extremely useful way of expressing a thin 
universalism in its most explicit sense. I close the chapter by taking up a further 
theme of the thesis: to draw a thin universalism from a deeply abstract account of the 
nature of ‘principles’, into an increasingly explicit expression of thin universal
3 See Richard Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’ in Truth and Progress: 
Philosophical Papers Vol.3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 167-185
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regulatory principles. Thin human rights are one such expression; the other is a 
clearly drawn conception of toleration. These bicameral notions are the outcomes of 
construction, and the answers to an important set of moral questions, but they also 
inform questioning about a number of other moral and political problems. I begin by 
considering the connection between fact-dependent thin universal regulatory 
principles and a conception of human rights.
Thin Universalism and Human Rights
‘Human rights’ are one explicit expression of thin universalism. Thin human rights 
are part of the final distillation of ideas which began with an account of the nature of 
construction and the relationship between facts and principles, progressing through 
the materials and procedures of construction. The narrative created by considering 
the thin universalist project in this increasingly specific way has sought to show how 
analytic philosophy of this kind can draw a deeply abstract, even metaethical account 
of features of the world towards controversies which engage with powerful currents 
in political debate. This demonstrates how consideration of general moral principles 
need not lack a sense of connection with the ‘real’ world and ‘real’ people. The use 
of human rights and toleration are themselves deeply significant with this in mind.
The primary concern of the chapter is thus how one understands the 
relationship between regulatory principles and a conception of human rights. What is 
the nature of that relationship? Are rights the outcome of construction? Is it that thin 
universal principles can be expressed as rights? Are rights thin universal principles 
redescribed in the language of a particular moral culture?
What human rights are is a particularly useful way of expressing and 
articulating, and a particularly forceful way of seeking to instantiate, constructed thin
Human Kignts
universal regulatory principles. They are a useful vehicle for their packaging, 
presentation and achievement in the complex plural world to which they are a 
response. They are a most persuasive form for principles intended to have universal 
scope.
In chapter four I suggested that the thin universal regulatory principles that 
emerged from construction are, in fact, political principles. They are moral principles 
of a particular kind which lent heavily to their pursuit and enforcement by the state, 
or other relevant authority. Rights, and particularly human rights, by their very nature 
suggest themselves as those aspects of our moral and social interactions that we turn 
to the state, or other authority to enforce. A set of thin human rights, as expressions 
of thin universal regulatory principles present themselves as the most compelling 
moral principles we might want to see enforced politically.
Of course, the very notion of rights ascribable to all human beings is formally 
universal in the sense that they extend to all persons, and characteristics such as race, 
sex, religion, social position and nationality are irrelevant to whether one possesses 
them.4 Human rights have on occasion even been used to express thin universal 
sentiments.5 This debate over thinness has been a part of the more general debates on 
human rights since they were conceived, but has become particularly prominent 
since the inception of the United Nations Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights in 
1948. Thin universalism finds powerful modes of expression, within ‘Western’ 
political discourse and Anglo-American philosophical discourse, when formulated as 
human rights.
4 Here I paraphrase James Nickel, though this notion o f universality extends across most accounts of 
human rights. James W. Nickel, Making Sense o f Human Rights, Second Edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2007), p.9
5 As I sought to show in my review of current literature on this topic. See my introductory chapter.
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But the ostensibly ‘Western’ character of human rights means that 
universalism about human rights shares the problematic history of other 
universalisms. As such, human rights debates have frequently been accompanied by 
attention to issues of justification and questions of scope. It is notable that I 
established the dilemma, recognised by Onora O’Neill, posed to universalism by 
pluralism in terms of right: ‘On the one hand we want to respect cultural diversity ... 
On the other hand ... we want to insist that all people of whatever background and 
wherever they are have certain basic rights.’6 Other expressions have used human 
rights language to defend a set of moral ‘fundamentals’ or ‘basics’ for a meaningful 
human existence. Henry Shue argues that human rights claims are ‘everyone's 
minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity’.7 Rex Martin makes a 
similar case in favour of what they both call ‘basic rights’ and Michael Ignatieff 
makes a case for what he calls ‘human rights minimalism’.8 Joshua Cohen suggests 
that the practical role of human rights
... is to provide a broadly shared outlook, across national boundaries, about 
the standards that political societies ... can be held to with respect to the 
treatment of individuals and groups; and correspondingly, the treatment that 
individuals and groups can reasonably demand, and perhaps enlist assistance 
from outside in achieving. Or, if not a shared outlook, at least a broadly 
shared terrain of deliberation about the standards to which political societies 
can reasonably be held, and when they are appropriately subject to external 
criticism or interference. Because [international] society comprises adherents 
to a wide range of distinct ethnic and religious outlooks ... minimalism ... is
6 Onora O’Neill, ‘Kantian Universalism in a Culturally Diverse World’, speaking on the BBC World 
Service in May 1999, Cambridge University Website (http://www.phil.cam.ac.Uk/u grads/Tripos/ 
Ethics/course material/ la  kant s ethics 05.pdf November 1st 2004)
7 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), p. 19 (emphasis added)
8 See Shue, Basic Rights, Introduction; See also Rex Martin, A System o f  Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), esp. chs.2 and 4; Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001)
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an intuitively plausible desideratum. And its point is not simply to avoid a 
fight where none is necessary; the point is to embrace the value of toleration.9
A conception of ‘thin’ human rights must be sufficiently sensitive to complex 
pluralism to offer the kind of respect encapsulated by the first principles outlined in 
chapter three. But it must also offer a genuine standard by which human societies can 
be deemed fit to support the worthwhile existence of human beings, in both their 
individual and collective endeavours, prompting action in circumstances where such 
standards are not met.10
Human rights, however, do not provide a blank canvass onto which thin 
universal principles can be painted; human rights have a long history, with strong ties 
to Judeo-Christianity and the Natural Law tradition. They are instantiated into 
international covenants, declarations and laws and hence a thin universalism that 
seeks expression through human rights must engage with an already bourgeoning 
body of normative and empirical literature. There are numerous conceptions of 
human rights; many are strong, comprehensive lists of what every society owes its 
citizens. The Universal Declaration, which codified the concept of human rights into 
international covenant, provides just such a list, ranging from the strong civil and 
political rights to life and liberty, to more complex social and economic rights to 
education, social participation and leisure time.11
9 Joshua Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We can Hope For?’ in The Journal o f  
Political Philosophy, Vol. 12 (2), 2004, pp. 190-213 at p. 194
10 Action o f course, should not be limited to armed intervention -  humanitarianism surely begins with 
aid and the provision o f means for a society to support itself. ‘Action’ therefore, is not limited to 
coercive measures.
11 See United Nations Department o f Public Information, Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights 
(New York: United Nations Department o f Public Information, 1948). Article 3 o f the Universal 
Declaration outlines the ‘fundamental’ rights to life, liberty and bodily integrity, articles 4-21 outline 
what have come to be known as the ‘first generation’ of civil and political rights, articles 23-27 outline 
the ‘second generation’ o f social, economic and cultural rights.
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By a different metre, further conceptions of rights take a more or less 
substantive approach, asserting more or less human rights, or placing them more or 
less central to discussions of international ethics. Other conceptions of, or claims to 
respect human rights reinterpret and redescribe non-rights-based discourse in human 
rights terms. Many proponents of Asian and African conceptions of human rights 
have sought to do this with the aim of demonstrating these cultures’ ability to 
embrace what is becoming a human rights hegemon.12 Joshua Cohen uses Confucian 
and Islamic texts to demonstrate how what he refers to as ‘the terrain of human 
rights’ can be traversed by doctrines that are not founded on, or embrace, human
• 17rights. Cohen seeks to ‘construct’, through techniques similar to bootstrapping and 
redescription, means by which proponents of diverse doctrines who must share a 
bounded world can do so. He does not seek to show that Confucianism and Islam 
contain conceptions of human rights where they do not, merely that each contains the 
materials required to engage in a debate over them.14
There are ways of elaborating a moral outlook that is fundamentally non­
liberal in its conception of the person and political society, which is consistent with a 
conception of minimal standards to which political societies can be held. It is not that 
we can ‘find’ a conception of human rights in moral traditions that do not affirm 
them,15 simply that a two-way process of redescription, bootstrapping and other
12 See Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice Second Edition (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), pp.71-83. It is worth noting that Donnelly himself is not persuaded 
by these assertions, asserting that while they respect the basic conditions o f human existence, they are 
not rights claims which in turn leaves them open to abuse, circumvention and arbitrary violation and 
withdrawal.
13 Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We can Hope For?’, p.203. Part o f achieving 
this is in establishing the distinction between ‘agreement upon’ and ‘agreement to’ a principle or idea, 
covered in the previous chapter.
14 Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We can Hope For?’, pp.203-210
15 As we might suspect is the project under way in Walzer’s minimalism and his notion o f ‘reiterative 
universalism’. See Michael Walzer, ‘Nation and Universe’ in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts and Peter 
Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order: The Challenge o f  Diversity (London: Routledge, 2006), 
pp. 10-41 and Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University of
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techniques can create a ‘terrain of deliberation’ about those standards accessible to a 
complex plurality of traditions.16 Many normative stances in international politics 
may be able to engage with the discourse of human rights. Implicit recognition of 
them in the denial of their violation, by dictators and democratic governments alike, 
only serves to strengthen their discursive dominance.17
Thin universalism can help to sort through these various conceptions of, and 
claims to respect human rights, separating out the genuine from the fallacious. Its 
sensitivity to cultural, social and political pluralism means that a great deal of 
diversity in conceptualising human rights can be permitted without concern. But the 
concern to respect the normative significance of persons means that thin universalism 
can inform how much variation in the interpretation of human rights doctrine can be 
tolerated. This allows the thin universalist to assure the Serb soldiers (featured in 
Richard Rorty’s account of their acts of sexual sadism upon Muslim prisoners) that 
they, in fact, were violating human rights, in spite of their insistence that Muslims
• i o
were not human beings. A thin universalism must be able to distinguish between 
genuinely differing conceptions of rights and those that deny them all together.
Human rights are used for powerful practical and moral reasons. They do a better job 
than many other forms of expression here, and they capture how regulatory 
principles ought to be recognised and realised. The case for expressing constructed
Notre Dame Press, 1994), particularly chapter 1. See also the literature review in my introductory 
remarks.
16 Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We can Hope For?’, pp. 194, 207
17 For example, Saddam Hussein’s persecution of the Kurds, Marsh Arabs, Shias and Kuwaitis 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s were all denied in rights-based language -  they were rejected as 
abuses o f  human rights. For a counter example, ‘mistreatment’ o f prisoners in Camp X-Ray at 
Guantanamo Bay is also address using rights-based language. It is denied that human rights are being 
abused, because the prisoners fall outside o f the Geneva Conventions and other human rights statutes.
18 See Richard Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’ in Truth and Progress: 
Philosophical Papers Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 167-185 at pp. 167- 
168
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thin universal regulatory principles as human rights is strengthened when one 
considers the powerful status that human rights claims have, both academically and 
politically. Amartya Sen notes:
Few concepts are as frequently invoked in contemporary political discussions 
as human rights. There is something deeply attractive in the idea that every 
person anywhere in the world, irrespective of citizenship or territorial 
legislation, has some basic rights, which others should respect. The moral 
appeal of human rights has been used for a variety of purposes, from resisting 
torture and arbitrary incarceration to demanding the end of hunger and of 
medical neglect.19
The appeal of human rights is all too apparent. The language of rights is everywhere 
and they hold true to how many people view their own moral commitments. The 
culture of human rights, and its proliferation even provides reason to think that the 
construction of consent is, and has for a long time, been at work on precisely this 
issue. The construction of consent to human rights could be said to be well under 
way. Like ‘universality’ itself, ‘rights’ can comport comfortably with the way we 
think moral principles should be expressed. They have a more personal, 
psychological appeal. Rights are something that many people may well want to have, 
unlike duties, which may be considered irksome. They serve to protect us from harm 
or loss and ask no more of us than of others.
However, rights have been problematised from beyond and within the 
constructivist tradition. For O’Neill, preoccupation with rights is in part responsible 
for the disengagement between theorists of justice and theorists of virtue, which her 
own project seeks to repair. Because rights and obligations tend to be regarded as
19 Amartya Sen, ‘Elements o f a Theory of Human Rights’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.32,
(4), 2004, pp.315-356 atp.315
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corollaries, the focus on rights is typically asserted to be unproblematic. But, O’Neill 
claims, some obligations present themselves within social relationships without 
corresponding rights and that some special relationships, such as that of parent and
90child, present obligations without corresponding rights. This leads her to an 
‘obligation-centric’ account, where the structure of our ethical interactions is
91focussed not on what we are owed, but on what we owe. She argues that:
The most significant structures of ethical concern can be expressed in linked 
webs of requirements, which are better articulated by beginning from the 
perspective of agents and their obligations rather than of claimants and their 
rights.22
But this too readily does away with the powerful rhetorical sway that human rights 
hold. Even those who would deny human rights to many still implicitly acknowledge 
their existence. Whether they set much store by that is of course another matter. But 
the moral language at work within thin universalism, and especially the language of 
human rights is far more accessible for many people than the language of duty and 
obligation. Of course, duties and obligations come as part and parcel of the thin 
universal conception of human rights. But while ‘obligations’ can encapsulate more 
about our moral ties to others than ‘rights’, we must use caution when suggesting that 
we turn away from rights, and the language of rights in particular. Many of the 
relationships O’Neill discusses as being characterised by duties that lack corollary 
rights are those to which the concerns of a thin universalism are not addressed. They 
are of course important, but they are similar to those ‘natural’ relationships identified
20 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue pp. 136-137
21 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p. 141
22 O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, p.4
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by Rorty as not requiring principles to morally bind us.23 As such, the focus of a thin 
universalism on human rights is intended to be more outward-looking; moving 
beyond those ties to the more complex and sometimes tenuous relationships beyond 
familial, social and national ties which must surely be recognised in the modem 
world.
Furthermore, human rights can deflect related accusations that regulatory 
principles of this kind are excessively individualistic. Human Rights are 
individualistic in that they conceive of individuals as primary rights-holders and they 
offer a defence of the interests of those individuals. But human rights theory is not 
committed to seeing individuals as the spontaneous originators of their thoughts and 
desires. It recognises the constituent nature of social context and the contingency of 
historical circumstance.24 Human rights can be thought of as conditions for fulfilling 
the obligations associated with human relationships. They are part of what Rawls 
called ‘an associationist social form’ which regards persons as members of groups. 
‘As such members, persons have rights and liberties enabling them to meet their
• • 9^  •duties and obligations.’ Violations of human rights, such as threats of slavery, 
torture and arbitrary arrest, poor health and education, and deprivation of sufficient 
economic means will impair the ability of people to enjoy the benefits of living in a 
society, but also to fulfil the obligations that flow from their relationships. People can 
demand a certain level of treatment as a condition for fulfilling the obligations that
9 fkthey are deemed to have.
23 Richard Rorty, ‘Ethics without Principles’ in Philosophy and Social Hope (London: Penguin, 1999), 
pp. 72-90
See, for more, J.L. Mackie, ‘Can there be a Right-Based Moral Theory?’ in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), 
Theories o f  Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 179
25 John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), p.68
26 Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We can Hope For?’, p.205
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Human Rights and Thin Universal Regulatory Principles
‘Thin universal human rights’ bear a number of characteristics; some are generic to 
conceptions of human rights, and some are not, but will be familiar to those who 
have followed the narrative of the thesis thus far. I now consider the characteristics 
that human rights must bear if we come to regard them as expressions of thin 
universal regulatory principles.
Firstly, they are not expressions of what I refer to, with G.A. Cohen, as ‘first 
principles’. In chapter one I characterised first principles as those principles ‘that 
inform our more substantive choices whilst remaining unaltered in light of changing
9 7empirical circumstance’. First principles remain ultimately independent of factual 
considerations. Human rights, however, are expressions of what I have referred to, 
again with Cohen, as ‘principles of regulation’, established and adopted specifically 
to regulate our affairs. They represent ‘a certain type of social instrument to be 
legislated and implemented, whether by a government itself or within social
98consciousness and practice.’
In this way, human rights are consciously adopted by social agents, be they 
individuals, groups, societies, clubs, religions, or states, in order to have a desired 
impact on the world. A human right is therefore a regulatory device, which is 
adopted or rejected in light of an evaluation of its likely and intended effects and, 
therefore, in light of the facts of the world, understood in a particular normative
90way. They are not the basic principled responses which arise from tracing our 
judgements about specific instances through a chain of reasoning, though they may 
become apparent somewhere along such a chain. Human rights will always fall
27See here Cohen’s account o f ‘facts and principles’. G.A. Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’ in Philosophy 
and Public Affairs Vol.31 (2003), pp.211-245, (d), at p.214, fii.5. See also chapter one, above.
28 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (s), p.241
29 Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (s), p.241
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within the regulatory sphere. They are designed in order to secure, politically, basic 
standards of treatment in an imperfect world.
Secondly, therefore, human rights will always be fact-dependent. The very 
existence of ‘human rights’ is contingent upon factual conditions. They are 
dependent upon the factual existence of violent conflict, in conjunction with a 
specific normative response to that conflict -  our fact-independent first principles. 
Dealing with violent conflict in a particular way is dependent upon those fact- 
independent principles. In a world without violent conflict we need not construct 
principles to be expressed as human rights. Particular human rights are also adopted 
in response to facts about the world in order to have certain effects upon it. Human 
rights will always have a certain degree of factual content within their justification. 
Consider the following example, grounded in the procedure outlined in chapter one.30
Let F  equal the factual claim that in order to lead a meaningful life, one 
requires access to such basic goods as food, shelter and good health. Without such 
goods any kind of life would be impossible. Call this the fact of the necessity of basic 
subsistence. On the basis of this factual necessity, it is possible to affirm principle P, 
namely that everyone should have access to sufficient food, shelter and good health. 
Call this the human right to subsistence. P is a ‘human’ principle because it is 
required by any notion of ‘human existence’. In this sense it is universal. Because it
30 We will remember that the logic o f the procedure is as follows:
1. Let F  equal a factual claim
2. On the basis o f F, I affirm principle P
3. It is then reasonable to ask: Why does F  affirm PI
4. Any answer to why F  affirms P  will include the affirmation o f a more ultimate principle Pi
5. Pi holds regardless o f whether P  holds
6. Pj also holds regardless o f whether F  is true
7. Pj is therefore insensitive to F
8. Pi may, however, be sensitive to other facts, hence
9. Pj may be sensitive to factual claim F}
10. But Fi only support P } in light o f more ultimate principle P2
11. P2 may not be grounded by fact
12. If it is, the process recedes until a more ultimate principle than all that precede is revealed, be it
P3, P j o r P ,,,30
See chapter one p.51 and Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’, (e), pp.215-6
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is a necessary, but clearly not a sufficient principle by which it is possible to live a 
meaningful human existence, it underdetermines the full content of that existence. It 
is, in this sense, a thin principle.
A regulatory principle expressed as a human right can thus be derived from a 
consideration of fact. But how can such a principle necessarily be derived from fact 
in all cases? Because the factual considerations of the necessity of food, shelter and 
good health (as well as certain freedoms and securities) are so basic, no human rights 
principles could emerge without consideration of those facts. This may be the case, 
but it does not fully demonstrate the necessity of the factual content of human rights. 
This is shown by following Cohen’s logic through to a second stage, which 
demonstrates that all regulatory principles expressed as human rights are also derived 
from further, more basic principles which are not dependent on facts. By showing 
this, it becomes clear that human rights are necessarily fact-dependent because they 
will always respond to more basic fact-independent principles as well as the facts 
themselves. They cannot be ‘first principles’.
To continue, ask: why does the fact of the necessity of basic subsistence (F) 
affirm principle P, the right to basic subsistence? Any answer to why the fact of the 
necessity of basic subsistence (F) affirms a right to basic subsistence (P) will include 
the affirmation of a more ultimate principle Pi, namely that we ought to facilitate the 
living of meaningful lives wherever possible, or that we ought not to scupper the 
living of meaningful lives through direct action or neglect. The notion that we ought 
to facilitate meaningful lives (Pi) holds regardless of whether the right to basic 
subsistence (P) holds. The notion that we ought to facilitate meaningful lives (Pi) 
also holds regardless of whether the fact of the necessity of basic subsistence (F) is
Human Rights
true. The notion that we ought to facilitate meaningful human lives is therefore 
insensitive to the fact of the necessity of basic subsistence, while the human right to 
basic subsistence is dependent on that fact, for were it not a fact, there would be no 
cause to affirm such a principle.
Of course, the notion that we ought to facilitate meaningful lives may be 
sensitive to other facts, perhaps pertaining to the integral importance of meaningful 
lives for individuals and societies, but these facts only support the principle in light 
of further, higher principles, concerning the value of those individuals and societies. 
This process can again be shown to recede until a principle is reached which is not 
ultimately dependent on fact. Such a principle will not be what we recognise as a 
‘human right’. Regulatory principles expressible as human rights will always have 
both factual content and normative content in their justification. Human rights are 
rightly described as ‘fact-dependent’, but they are not solely dependent on fact. 
Cohen’s thesis demonstrates that human rights cannot be determined purely by 
reference to the facts, but that they must too be determined by reference to fact- 
independent first principles. Facts alone cannot move us to assert human rights. This 
is crucial to the proper understanding of them.
Thirdly, human rights are essentially constructed. They need not enjoy a kind 
of objective existence in the realist sense, waiting ‘out there’ to be discovered.33 
Human rights can be constructed by human beings in order to have certain effects on 
the world. Human rights do not need to be understood as fixed algorithms grounded 
in a priori moral categories. They are dependent on the factual conditions of that
31 Even if  we could not conceive o f circumstances where it might not be true.
32 See Cohen, ‘Facts and principles’, (c) and (e), pp.213,215.
33 If realism is as follows: MR: (1) There are moral facts or truths, and (2) these facts or truths are 
independent o f the evidence for them (where MR represents the formulation o f moral realism). See 
David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations o f  Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), p. 17
-268-
Human Rights
world and on the first principles that motivate responses to it. They are also 
dependent on changes and developments both of the factual conditions of the world 
and of those principled responses. They are therefore far more reflexive and 
contingent than many of their detractors would be willing to concede. Human rights 
can be rightly referred to as expressions of ‘constructed fact-dependent regulatory 
principles’. At the same time, advocates need not deny that human rights could be 
grounded objectively, and exist externally of how we come to regard them.
In order to fulfil their practical and moral remit, constructed regulatory 
principles expressed as human rights must speak both to people who are not 
committed to their objective existence, and, importantly, to those who are. Human 
rights that are constructed are, and must be, compatible with realist and religious 
perspectives.
The character of the facts and first principles to which human rights are a 
response leads to two further characteristics, which are central to how we ought to 
regard human rights. First, the first principles outlined in chapter three result in 
expressly universal principles that can be regarded as human rights. It is not my 
intention here to return to the arguments of chapter four in order to make the case for 
‘universality’, but they offer justifications sufficiently robust to bring a conception of 
rights that apply to the category of ‘human’ into our moral deliberations. First 
principles, which ask that we respect persons and we respect pluralism, prompt the 
construction of regulatory principles that are in this way universal. Because human 
rights are an expression of constructed regulatory principles, their universality is 
inherently tied to the universality of the principles that ensue from the construction.
Second, the facts as identified in chapter two refer to the facts of complex 
pluralism. Again, I will not retread ground already covered within chapter four, but it
n  uman Kigms
is the facts of complex pluralism which feed into the construction and which lead to 
human rights bearing thin characteristics. The thinness of rights expresses their 
minimal content. Human rights are minimal standards; they do not attempt to 
describe an ideal social or political world. They leave most political decisions to 
other decision-making bodies, and personal decisions to the individual or group.34
This is not an exhaustive account of the characteristics of a thin universalist 
account of human rights. Other, more immediately familiar characteristics remain 
present. Human rights can and still do bear a force that does not require their 
expression in enforceable law, for example. They are particularly urgent 
requirements of what Joshua Cohen and Amartya Sen call ‘political morality’.35 
They are not ‘absolute’, but they are stronger than James Nickel wishes to 
characterise them, as ‘high priority norms’.36 They are strong enough to win over in 
all but exceptional cases when they compete with other considerations. I now 
consider the specific features of a ‘thin universalist’ account of human rights.
Minimalism about Human Rights
At the close of Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry Michael Ignatieff states:
We may not be able to create democracies or constitutions. Liberal freedom 
may be some way off. But we could do more than we do to stop unmerited 
suffering and gross physical cruelty. That I take to be the elemental priority 
of all human rights activism: to stop torture, beatings, killings, rape and
34 Nickel, Making Sense o f  Human Rights, p. 10
35 See Joshua Cohen, ‘Is there a Human Rights to Democracy?’ in Christine Sypnowich (ed.) The 
Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour o f  G.A. Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
pp.226-248 at pp.229-230; Amartya Sen, ‘Elements o f a Theory o f Human Rights’ in Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, Vol.32, (4), 2004, pp.315-356
36 Nickel, Making Sense o f  Human Rights, p.9
-270-
Human Kignts
assault and to improve as best we can, the security of ordinary people. My 
minimalism is not strategic at all. It is the most we can hope for.37
Ignatieff s objective is to clear away the misrepresentation of human rights as a 
‘secular religion’. His concern is that the fervour and ease with which human rights 
are furnished with potentially problematic metaphysical backing, far from securing 
for human rights a guaranteed basis of consensus, merely adds to their contestation. 
Minimalism seems again to be a ‘strategic’ issue; the idea that ‘you cannot impose 
human rights values: they will not take hold if you do.’38 Ignatieff s project shares 
the thin universalist’s pragmatic disposition, overlaying it with the discourse of 
human rights. He states that
shared belief in human rights ought to be compatible with diverging attitudes 
concerning what constitutes a good life. In other words a universal regime of 
human rights protection ought to be compatible with moral pluralism ... The 
universal commitments implied by human rights can be compatible with a 
wide variety of ways of living only if the universalism implied is self­
consciously minimalist. Human rights can command universal assent only as
a decidedly ‘thin’ theory of what is right, a definition of the minimum 
conditions of any kind of life at all.
His project is motivated by similar concerns to those of thin universalism. Universal 
principles still have a role to play in our political and philosophical discussions but, 
for pragmatic and moral reasons, those principles must be ‘thin’. For Ignatieff human 
rights matter because they protect each individual’s basic agency -  their capacity to 
act to achieve ends. Thin human rights, like all expressions of thin universal
37 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001), p.173
38 Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, p. 170
39 Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, pp.55-56
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principles, must necessarily underdetermine those ends and the full moral character 
of any society in which they apply.
But in spite of the near-hegemonic status of human rights in international 
political discourse, the contestation surrounding them, as well as their form, content 
and scope is fierce. In fact, because the increasing prowess that human rights 
doctrine has held since the Second World War, it ‘is now so powerful, but so 
unthinkingly imperialist in its claim to universality, that it has exposed itself to 
serious intellectual attack’.40 What Ignatieff refers to as ‘rights inflation’ forms the 
core of that attack:
Those who insist that civil and political rights need supplementing with social 
and economic ones make a claim that is true ... [but] the tendency to define 
anything desirable as a right -  ends up eroding the legitimacy of a defensible 
core of rights. That defensible core ought to be those that are strictly 
necessary to the enjoyment of any life whatever.41
The more rights we might want to argue for, the more problematic those arguments 
become. We must focus our concern, therefore, on a minimal core of human rights 
claims, and distinguish these from more expansive statements about the content of 
human rights which might extend the core beyond that minimum. This implies an 
‘instrumental’ minimalism, suggesting further that if we could argue for more human 
rights, we probably would and should do so. But thinness is not simply an 
instrumental concern. Though it forms part of the motivation, it is not the case that 
thin principles are pursued because it is all that we think we could get others to agree 
with. Thinness is pursued in accordance with the demands of the first principles of
40 Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, pp.57-58
41 Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, pp.89-90
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the project; with powerful moral, not just pragmatic, urgency. It is a specifically 
moral commitment that drives the ‘thin’ project forwards.
These moral and pragmatic aims dovetail without difficulty. Respect for the 
moral integrity of cultural systems, and the construction of a set of regulatory 
principles, share common materials, procedures and aims. Joshua Cohen suggests 
that what he calls ‘justificatory minimalism’, the presentation of a conception of 
human rights in such a way as to be responsive to a pluralised world, is premised on 
an acknowledgement of pluralism and a commitment to toleration.42 A constructive 
thin universalism is ‘justificatory minimalist’ in this respect and employs similar 
normative materials: recognition of complex pluralism, and the first principles that 
animate our response to it.
Given these considerations, some form of minimalism about principles, and 
about human rights, is an appealing and powerful idea. There are a number of further 
arguments for resisting more demanding sets of rights.43 Firstly, more demanding 
lists threaten to sap resources from the monitoring and enforcement of human rights 
generally. Secondly, it is unlikely that thick, maximal, or substantive lists of rights 
could be fully realised because they are too ‘costly’, both in terms of financial and 
political capital, to implement. We may suspect that they are not therefore ‘rights’.44 
Thirdly, many more expansive rights have a problematic and asymmetrical 
relationship with any corresponding obligations which could be placed on others 45 
This may be acute in the case of some social and economic rights in societies where
42 Joshua Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We can Hope For?’, in The Journal o f  
Political Philosophy, Vol.12 (2), 2004, pp.190-213 atpp.192, 199
43 This list is a modified version o f that offered by Cohen in ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The 
Most We can Hope For?’, p. 193
44 Though this does not preclude us from asserting more substantial lists o f universal principles as 
aspirational goals. I consider this in more detail below.
45 For more here see Onora O’Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f  Practical 
Reasoning, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), ch.5
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resources may be insufficient to fulfil them. Fourth, more expansive lists risk 
negating political deliberation, replacing it with a ‘liberal legalism’ where ‘rights’ are 
not debated or questioned, simply applied.46 Fifth, more expansive accounts of 
human rights also threaten to do away with political self-determination and 
sovereignty in favour of an ‘interventionist’ human rights ‘culture’.47 ‘Thicker’, 
maximal, or more comprehensive, expansive, or substantive conceptions of human 
rights are unlikely to be validated through the construction of consent outlined in 
chapter five. But at the same time, thicker conceptions of human rights are also likely 
to find themselves in violation of the first principles of the thin universalist project. 
In order to remain valid in a plural world, human rights can be cast as expressions of 
thin universal principles, rendering them more accessible and morally acceptable.
The potential to truly regard human rights minimally may come from an 
examination of their negative corollary, the concept of ‘human wrongs’. Ken Booth 
notes:
the argument for a universalist approach to human rights rests upon the 
universality of human wrongs; the latter are universal social facts that derive 
from our animal nature and social character to date.48
What Booth, along with Nicholas Wheeler, Robert Falk and others stress is that a 
normative discussion of international ethics is animated by a discussion of human 
rights, importantly contrasted with a notion of human wrongs. Their objective in the 
late 1990s was to establish a normative dimension with which to study international
46 On ‘liberal legalism’ and the risk o f precluding politics by encoding moral principles within devices 
such as law see, for example, Roberto Alejandro, ‘What is Political about Rawls’ Political 
Liberalism?’ in The Journal o f  Politics, Vol. 58, (1), 1996, pp. 1-24
47 Indeed, this final suspicion is aired by David Chandler in the closing pages o f chapter four of his 
book From Kosovo to Kabul. See pp. 114-115
48 See Ken Booth, ‘Three Tyrannies’ in Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler (eds.), Human Rights in 
Global Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.31-70 atp.64. See also Chandler, 
From Kosovo to Kabul, p.89
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relations, placing the ‘mitigation or elimination’ of these wrongs centrally to its 
aims.49 The validity of using rights language in conjunction with a conception of 
human wrongs helps both to capture accurately the nature of the thinness of the thin 
universalist project and to provide a common ground upon which divergent 
approaches to rights, and to thin universal principles more generally, can meet.
Human wrongs capture the ‘thinness’ of thin universalist project. The project 
itself is animated by a sense that some actions cannot be permissible in any context 
and in all circumstances human beings should be treated with a certain level of 
respect. It is in response to this impulse that construction is mobilised in order to 
determine a set of universal regulatory principles. At the same time it is recognised 
that, in a complex plural world, substantive agreement on what positive principles 
best ‘mitigate and eliminate’ those categories of action will be hard to find. Again, it 
is to this issue that construction is addressed. We may, then, find ourselves in 
agreement with Mary Midgley’s eloquent summation that ‘whatever doubts there 
may be about minor moral questions and whatever respect each culture may owe its 
neighbours, there are some things that should not be done to anybody anywhere’.50
Through a focus on human rights in contrast to human wrongs, it is easier to 
illustrate how construction is intended to underdetermine the moral character of the 
societies in which it is applicable. A conception of ‘the wrong’ or ‘the bad’ allows 
for a strong and careful underdetermination of ‘the right or ‘the good’. A thin 
universalism will look to what must always be excluded from a conception of a 
decent society, as well as what must always be included within it.
49 See Robert Falk, ‘The Challenge o f Genocide and Genocidal Politics in an Era o f Globalisation’ in 
Dunne and Wheeler (eds.), Human Rights in Global Politics, pp. 177-194 at p. 191; Chandler, From 
Kosovo to Kabul, p.91.
50 Mary Midgley, ‘Towards an Ethic o f Global Responsibility’ in Dunne and Wheeler (eds.), Human 
Rights in Global Politics, pp. 160-174 at p. 160; Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul, p.96
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As Booth, Midgley and others point out, a conception of human rights 
underpinned by a universal conception of human wrongs is likely to be thinner and 
therefore more sensitive to pluralism than a conception of rights alone. Wrongs may 
generate broader and more powerful agreement in the first instance, providing a 
valuable starting point for the construction of rights. If those who would dissent can 
be shown the universality of wrongs then the task of constructing rights designed to 
mitigate and eliminate those wrongs will seem far less alien that they might 
otherwise do. A pluralistic, patchworked approach to rights could even be used to 
tackle the same wrongs in a variety of different ways.
The identification of rights and wrongs helps to fulfil the thin universalist 
commitment to properly respect persons and pluralism, holding constructed 
regulatory principles in line with the first principles out of which they are 
constructed. This internal coherence lends further weight to the plausibility of the 
claim that rights can adequately express a thin universalism. But the fact that the 
identification of human wrongs necessarily underdetermines the full content of a 
conception of rights equally acknowledges that when we become lacklustre with 
what we seek to assert universally we not only risk the commitment of the like 
minded within a complex plurality, but we also jeopardise the coherence and moral 
validity of our own arguments. Where this occurs, where rights are inflated beyond 
the mitigation and elimination of human wrongs, a different dynamic is actually 
invoked.
numan Kignis
Rights and Aspirations
In The Law o f Peoples, Rawls describes human rights as a ‘proper subset’ of the 
rights embraced by, and of the reasonable view of justice for, a democratic society.51 
There are good reasons for thinking that standards of human rights should in some 
sense differ from, and be less demanding than, the standards of justice or morality 
that we endorse for our own society. In other words there are good reasons for 
endorsing the Rawlsian ‘proper subset view’, and the idea that human rights (and 
thin human rights in particular) should underdetermine the full moral character of 
any society, even our own. “ Perhaps, concern with thinness and universalism leads 
to what Joshua Cohen refers to as ‘substantive minimalism’, which is the further 
assertion that the content of human rights claims should be limited to protections of
* Onegative liberty. It may indeed be tempting to endorse this substantive minimalism 
from the constructivist perspective and a thin universal conception of human rights 
might be the best scenario that constructivism can realistically aspire to.
Cohen rejects this, arguing that it is simply not the case that substantive 
minimalism is ‘the most we can hope for’. Rather we can hope that different 
traditions can find resources for fresh elaboration that support a conception of human 
rights. This is a plausible common standard of achievement with global reach, even 
if we might not expect this to be the case. Indeed, he suggests that ‘wide acceptability 
is something we may reasonably hope for, consistent with a theoretical knowledge of 
human pluralism and a moral commitment to respecting it.’54 And, therefore,
the world that the minimalist imagines -  a world without torture and with 
genuine assurances of bodily security for all -  is no small hope ... But I do
51 See John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp.78-81
52 Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We can Hope For?’, p.210
53 Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We can Hope For?’, pp.192, 211
54 Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We can Hope For?’, p.213
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wish to dispute the idea that human rights minimalism is ‘the most we can 
hope for’. Minimalism may be more than we should ever reasonably expect. 
But hope is not the same as expectation. And human rights minimalism draws 
the boundaries of hope too narrowly.55
The danger of human rights minimalism, therefore, is that it expects too little and 
aspires to little more. It suggests that there is almost nothing we can hope for or 
aspire to beyond that which we construct as rights. Thin universalism is rightly 
concerned about how ‘thick’ contemporary human rights doctrines are, and the 
extent to which they present the values of a particular, Western culture as universal. 
But does it not leave too little scope for actually seeking to secure the standards for 
properly just social relations? Similarly, while thinness might rightly be regarded as 
an important moral and pragmatic position, does it not leave many things of moral 
concern open to systematic disregard, even abuse?
Conversely, when we turn our attention to contemporary human rights 
doctrines, the force and validity of genuinely universal concerns to secure basic 
conditions of life are sapped by the universalisation of unashamedly particular, 
ethnocentric content; content which tends overwhelmingly to be Western in 
character. Upon only a cursory glance at the Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights 
much of its content seems very much oriented towards particular kinds of society, 
particular norms of personal and social behaviour, and particular modes of economic 
organisation. Encoded within it are norms pertaining to family life (‘The family is 
the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by 
society and the State’56), norms pertaining to modes of economic organisation 
(‘Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of
55 Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We can Hope For?’, p. 191
56 See Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights, (New York: United Nations Office o f Public 
Information, 1948), Article 16 (3)
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working hours and periodic holidays with pay’57), and norms pertaining to the 
organisation of government (‘Everyone has the right to take part in the government
ro
of his country’ ). There is therefore cause to suspect that contemporary human rights 
doctrines do not fulfil the demands of thinness as required. The substantive content 
of doctrines such as the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants on 
Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights59 is 
expressive of thicker conceptions of rights than a constructed thin universalism could 
sanction. Indeed, as David Beetham points out, much of what is contained with the 
more expansive sets of rights within the Covenants ‘ confuse [s] the fundamental with 
the merely desirable or with that which is specific to the advanced economies’.60 
Many accounts suffer from Ignatieff s ‘rights inflation’; they fail to take seriously the 
charges of ethnocentrism and imperialism that animate critiques of universalism. 
However, there is much within those doctrines which we might rightly hope could be 
universal, but which falls outside of the remit of a thin universalism.
A critique of contemporary human rights doctrines that also aims to secure a 
thin set of constructed human rights must, therefore, distinguish between three 
categories of claim which all claim status as human rights. The first is those claims to 
‘human rights’ that are truly ‘human’ and truly ‘rights’. These are determined by 
their full correlation to constructed, fact-dependent regulatory principles. They are 
substantively thin and universally applicable, and are designed to secure the
57 See Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, Article 24
58 See Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, Article 21 (1). I shall return to this particular set of 
norms in due course.
59 See United Nations Office o f Public Information, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, United Nations Website (http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html May 19th 2007) and 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, United Nations Website 
(http://www.hrweb.org/legal/escr.html May 19th 2007)
60 See David Beetham, Democracy and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p .l 16. Cited in 
Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul, p.l 10
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minimum conditions required to live a worthwhile human life: security of the person, 
basic freedoms and sufficient food, shelter and resources to live.
Claims that fall within the second category are not candidates for the title of 
‘human rights’; in fact, they are perhaps unsuitable for categorisation as ‘human’. 
They are, rather, misguided attempts to codify as universally human the civil, 
economic and political rights of a particular culture, class or society. They may make 
the kind of assumptions found in the Universal Declaration which normalise 
particular modes of personal, social, cultural, or economic organisation, presenting 
them, erroneously, as universally applicable.
But there is a third category, falling between the first two and concerning 
those claims that are perhaps ‘human’, and may even be ‘rights’ but are not ‘human 
rights’ as such. Claims that fall within this third category are better classed as 
‘human aspirations’ because they may well be in some sense unrealisable as rights 
within the universal, human domain. We cannot, for example, construct a human 
right to paid holiday. But this, in turn, does not mean that a realist about human 
rights who does believe in a right to paid holiday has an inherently flawed 
conception of rights The thin universalist and the realist alike may have cause to join 
Cohen and suggest that we can perhaps hope that such principles may one day have 
universal credence, but their attainment is too deeply problematic, morally or 
pragmatically to refer to them both as ‘human’ and as ‘rights’ here and now. They 
may be encoded into the ‘rights’ of a particular society and that society may 
understand them as a part of their own human rights, but their genuine universal 
applicability may well be beyond the remit of a constructed thin universalism. 
Human aspirations are perhaps also unlike rights in that we do not perceive them to
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be enforceable political rights, at least not universally. They do, however, have a 
certain moral weight, and remain moral concerns.
Human rights are thin, but this does not rule out the possibility that other 
commitments we might have can also be universal. Thin universalism need not be 
the only universalism we hold and many liberals within the constructivist tradition 
have suggested or implied that there can be more to one’s universalism, derived from 
one’s comprehensive commitments. We can hold these commitments as aspirations, 
reserving the stronger language of rights for those constructed regulatory principles 
outlined in this thesis. Such principles cannot be merely aspirations.
These considerations bear strongly upon the thin universalist concern with the 
established ‘thick’ human rights doctrines I have been discussing. The Universal 
Declaration was designed to be freestanding upon its inception, making no reference 
to God, or to specific religious-philosophical viewpoints. This left the task of 
understanding the relationship between a substantive philosophy of the good life and 
an account of human rights to the adherents of the philosophies themselves. Thus, 
significantly, the Universal Declaration was, in its presentation, also intended to 
underdetermine the full moral content of those societies for whom it could be a 
standard. However, a thin universalist critique of the Universal Declaration can be 
animated by the distinction between thin universal human rights and thicker 
universal aspirations. While the content of doctrines such as the Universal 
Declaration may be comprised of things we would wish to regard as universal, they 
are not made up solely of things we ought to regard as rights. They are made up of a 
combination of rights and aspirations61 and as such serve to summarise both those
61 And the Universal Declaration is also comprised of some things that are neither rights nor 
aspirations.
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constructed fact-dependent regulatory principles we wish to express as rights, and 
other principles which we might aspire to see observed universally.
There is a tendency to suggest that only negative rights to bodily integrity can 
be secured if this commitment is to be honoured. But this may leave us slightly 
perturbed about the conditions attached to certain positive rights, such as a potential 
right to means of subsistence. The language of rights is a useful way of expressing 
thin universal regulatory principles, but it is not the only way, nor the only useful 
way of expressing them. They are not solely accessible through the language of 
rights; they can be accessible through the language of duty or obligation, or 
toleration or multiculturalism. In a plural world, what a right is, and what a right 
looks like can and must vary from context to context. Construction can show which 
conceptions of rights are truly conceptions of rights, which encompass inflated 
aspirations, and which are neither. Human rights, so understood, are political 
concerns; they are expressions of moral principles that are politically enforceable. In 
many cases, we may not have worked out who owes them to us, or how they can be 
enforced. The correlative duties may not always be clear, as in the case of positive 
rights, such as to a basic level of subsistence. Who precisely is responsible for 
fulfilling the rights owed to us will, unsurprisingly, be as pluralized as the groups to 
whom they are owed. While negative rights such as to bodily security can be shown 
to be owed to all by all, positive rights are less obviously demarcated. We can say 
that there is a right to subsistence without necessarily having to answer the question 
of who owes us that right, or how it might be honoured. Human rights are political 
concerns, but they also remain fundamentally moral, because they are incomplete 
and the product of an ongoing and reflexive process.
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The ‘most we can hope for’ is not a matter of what we believe can result from 
the construction of regulatory principles and as such it is less concerned with the 
practical problems of constructing consent to thin universal human rights. Rather, 
what we can hope for is constrained predominantly by moral limitations that impose 
thinness in the first place. We can aspire to many things beyond those constructed 
thin universal regulatory principles, within the constraints of what it means to respect 
persons and to respect pluralism. While they may be universal, these aspirations 
perhaps do not carry with them quite the same strength of conviction as do human 
rights.
Is Democracy a Human Right?
I now turn my attention to a question that is still only emerging in the literature on 
this topic, that of whether there exists a human right to democracy. The issue is 
complex, not least because the conception of human rights discussed thus far is 
firmly grounded in an account of thinness that does not necessarily advocate 
democracy as a universal value. Joshua Cohen suggests that, while plausibly 
desirable in itself, democracy cannot be the object of a human right.
In making this assertion Cohen considers the distinction between Rawls’ 
accounts of ‘justice as fairness’ and of the Taw of peoples’. Justice as fairness 
includes a right to participate in the processes of authoritative collective decision­
making. Rawls states in A Theory o f Justice that ‘all citizens are to have an equal 
right to take part in, and to determine the outcome of, the constitutional process that 
establishes the laws with which they are to comply’ A clear right to democracy is 
on display here. In The Law o f Peoples, however, Rawls outlines only a short list of
62 Joshua Cohen, ‘Is there a Human Right to Democracy?’ in Christine Sypnowich (ed.) The 
Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour o f  G.A. Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
pp.226-248 at p.228; John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.194
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ffXhuman rights which does not include a right to participation in political processes. 
The justification for this more limited account of rights is that a ‘decent hierarchical 
people’ -  that is, a state, society, or cultural system which respects human rights, 
possesses a developed sense of the rule of law, and embraces consultation within 
government that permits a plurality of views including dissenting views, but which is 
nonetheless avowedly not democratic -  ought not to be subject to interference from 
international society.64
The claim that there is a human right to democracy represents a distinctive 
normative case for democracy. For the thin universalist, this amounts to 
demonstrating that, in constructing a set of universal regulatory principles that 
establish those fundamental conditions required for the living of a meaningful human 
life, one would need to include a right to participation in formal decision making 
procedures. This would involve establishing that a society which lacks proper 
structures of democratic participation fails to facilitate meaningful lives. This, 
presumably, is refuted in the Rawlsian case by the existence of meaningful human 
lives lived in thoroughly undemocratic conditions. For the thin universalist, a case 
for a universal principle of democratic participation (at a cosmopolitical level, or 
based on an account of democracy within bounded states) would need to be a 
constructive one, as the case for thin human rights must be. While the case for the 
inclusion of democracy within a set of thin universal regulatory principles must be 
constructive, the case for democracy in a particular society may be far less
63 Cohen, ‘Is there a Human Right to Democracy?’, p.228; John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp.78-81
64 Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples, pp.59-61
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problematic and as a consequence may, but just as easily may not, require 
constructive procedures.65
So, is there a case for asserting a human right to democracy? Can democracy 
be an aspect of constructed, fact-dependent, thin universal regulatory principles 
expressible as human rights? Cohen identifies two accounts of rights: ‘maximalist’ 
and ‘minimalist’. Maximalist accounts suggest that human rights are coextensive 
with an account of liberal justice, of which democratic participation is a key element. 
Democracy is therefore a requirement of human rights and by extension a human 
right itself. On the other hand, minimalism, exemplified in Michael Ignatieff s 
account of human rights minimalism discussed earlier, confines human rights to the 
protection of bodily security, thus denying a human right to democracy.66 It would 
seem to follow that, as it is avowedly thin, thin universalism must reject the idea of a 
human right to democracy as part of its constructed principles. Thin universalism 
must indeed reject the idea that democracy could feature within its tenets, but on 
what grounds? And, if there is a prima facie case for rejecting a thin human right to 
democracy, what remains to be said here?
Two key objections underpin the thin universalist rejection of a human right 
to democracy. The first is that democracy often requires such vast institutional and 
social reform that it is practically unattainable. Democracy is a positive right: by 
whom is it owed? Whose responsibility is it to instantiate democracy where it does 
not presently exist? Who is responsible for the construction or rehabilitation of the 
vast apparatus of democratic government and participation, which extend from the 
apparatus required to run an election, to basic transport and communications
65 In cases where, for example, democracy is well established, or where ‘local’ values are close 
enough to those o f democracy to allow an easy transition.
66 See Cohen, ‘Is there a Human Right to Democracy?’, p.230; Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics 
and Idolatry, p.56
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infrastructure? If we are owed democracy universally, as a matter of human rights, 
upon whom does the obligation to provide it fall? The viability of democracy is 
certainly not universal. But, as I have suggested, this ambiguity does not necessarily 
undercut the status of a right. Human rights possess a force that does not require their 
entrenchment in law, and the practical difficulties of determining a correlative duty 
does not mean that a rights claim fails. G.A. Cohen also notes that ‘it is not a 
constraint on a sound conception of justice that it should always be sensible to strive 
to implement it, whatever the factual circumstances may be.’67 As with economic 
rights, a positive right to democracy may still be a human right. Even if we don’t 
know upon whom the obligation to provide democracy (like a basic level of 
subsistence) falls, it may still be a human right.
This leaves a second, more powerful, objection. Democracy is a highly 
demanding aspect of political morality. It requires certain entrenched conceptions of 
the person and society, not shared by all systems of social, cultural and political
ASorganisation. Many of those systems are recognisably and powerfully just. The 
recognition of democracy as a human right is not about establishing its objective 
‘truth’ value. To do so, Cohen notes, would be objectionably intolerant,69 and 
contrary to the ideas of construction. This is the kind of difference-blindness that a 
universalism sensitive to complex pluralism must strive to reject. But we can 
nonetheless distinguish between what is true and what it is reasonable that we can 
expect people to believe. Far from being an objective ‘truth’, we have grounds to 
suspect that a human right to democracy or to direct political participation is simply 
not something that we can expect a complex plurality on a global level to believe in.
67 G.A. Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs V ol.31 (2003), pp.211-245 (t), 
p.244
68 And, while many are not, it must also be noted that many recognised democratic, and not just quasi- 
democratic systems fa il to be so just.
69 Cohen, ‘Is there a Human Right to Democracy?’, p.243
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A human right to democracy is not necessarily something we should expect people to 
agree upon, nor is it even something we should expect them to agree to.
The standards to which we hold all societies accountable, expressed as thin 
human rights, must, by definition, be less demanding than the standards of 
substantive morality or justice one endorses. Those standards of morality or justice 
are thicker, more maximal, more culturally specific and historically contingent. 
Minimal standards we expect to apply universally will, to reiterate, fundamentally 
underdetermine the full nature of morality or justice in any given society. Thin 
universal principles do not constitute all of what we expect of a conception of 
morality. An account of how political power is conferred and political obligation 
legitimated falls within a more substantive account of morality. It falls outside of the 
thin universalist project. It would seem therefore unreasonable to insist upon the 
instantiation of democracy in all places right here and how, an insistence we may 
make for human rights.
We should, Cohen suggests, therefore resist the inclusion of democracy 
within an account of human rights. For some further insight into why this is the case, 
it might be worth considering that it is precisely because human rights have a 
particular urgency which transcends the urgency that surrounds the considerations of 
thicker, particularist moral concerns, or the considerations of ‘morality’ or ‘justice’ 
more generally.70 The recognition of human rights as compelling universal principles 
which constitute standards that all societies must meet in order to facilitate the living 
of meaningful human lives demands their pursuit and instantiation here and now. 
Democracy cannot be such a human right. It can, however, be an aspiration. It may 
be that democracy could improve the lives of many millions of people, as Cohen
70 Cohen, ‘Is there a Human Right to Democracy?’, p.233
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suggests, but that while this is a worthy aspiration, while we may be justified in
71hoping for such a scenario, it cannot be demanded as a matter of right. A human 
right to democracy, or at least a consideration of the nature of political participation, 
is a justifiable concern for any substantive conception of morality. Such a right is not 
a constitutive part of a thin universalism. But because thin universalism does not 
exhaust the possibilities of morality for us and human rights are not the only moral 
concerns we have, this does not require us to reject the possibility or the desirability 
of democracy.
Nonetheless, once democracy is established, or where it is already 
established, it may be possible to assert that a right to it emerges. We might be 
justifiably cautious to suggest that we can demand that a society radically overhaul 
its social structures and adopt democracy as a matter of human rights. We may, 
however, be far more comfortable to assert that the denial of democratic participation 
to a people or society where it is established constitutes a violation of the human 
rights of the members of that society. In such circumstances, this would most likely 
constitute an egregious violation of first principles demanding respect for pluralism 
and for persons, violations that would likely prompt action of some kind. While there 
may not be a human right to democracy, we might envisage a human rights case for 
democracy.
Rights, Morality and Toleration
Human rights are a powerful tool in cashing out thin universalism and, while they are 
clearly liberal in their origin, construction can furnish them with a genuine 
universality. It has been suggested by Evans that ‘human rights -  fluid though their
71 Cohen, ‘Is there a Human Right to Democracy?’, p.246
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iterations have been -  are arguably the liberal tradition’s greatest bequest to the
79human race.’ And this reaffirms what the thin universalist project insists upon: that 
we should not discard in the universal domain all that is characteristic of our own 
context-dependent moral frameworks. There may be many valuable facets to it that 
have some resonance within a broader context, and human rights, if constructed 
appropriately, might just be one such facet.
Human rights form part of a set of ‘conclusions’ to a procedure of moral 
discourse. John Gray maintains that human rights are not foundations for a 
conception of morality, but rather that they are the culmination of long chains of
7Treasoning. And, indeed, they appear to be part of the culmination of this account of 
thin universal regulatory principles. They constitute minimum standards of political 
legitimacy, to be applied to all regimes.74 They are not first principles; nor are they 
immutable truths, though they may take on many characteristics thereof. This may 
help them to retain a broadly ‘realist’ character, which is important for their stability 
and credibility. What it is possible to assert most strongly, though, is that human 
rights can be a set of enforceable conventions, framed to give protection against the 
injuries to human interests that make worthwhile lives impossible, Gray’s ‘human 
evils’, or Chandler’s ‘human wrongs’.75 A regime whose continued rule is dependent 
on the infliction of these evils or wrongs is illegitimate. Many types of regime, not 
just liberal regimes, fulfil the minimal requirements of legitimacy; many more, 
including many liberal regimes, do not. Such human rights standards are not simply
72 Mark Evans, ‘Pluralising Liberalism, Liberalising Pluralism’ in Res Publica, Vol. 10 (4), 2004, 
pp.449-460 at p.453
3 John Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism (Oxford: Polity, 2000), pp. 84-85
74 Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism, p. 106
75 Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism, p.66; Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul, p.96
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‘liberal values writ large’. This can, nonetheless, only be so if those rights are thin 
universal regulatory principles which are the product of construction.
Thin human rights provide a set of access points to other political and moral 
debates but they do not exhaust what we can say with regard to those debates. What 
the discussion of rights and aspirations further demonstrates is that ‘morality’ as we 
conceive of it is not composed entirely of ‘rights’. While the thin universalist is 
committed to a set of constructed fact-dependent regulatory principles expressible as 
human rights, the possibility that there is more to a conception of morality than those 
rights is left open. Because thin universalism is a response to first principles which 
are committed to a respect for complex pluralism, and which lead it to 
underdetermine the moral character of actual societies, the content of that thin 
universalism does not comprise the whole of morality. As such, human rights are 
only a part of how we frame our moral commitments to others and, like thin 
universal principles, what these commitments actually are will remain open, 
reflexive and contingent. Human rights provide a terrain of ‘deliberation and 
argument about appropriate norms ... not a determinate and settled doctrine awaiting 
acceptance or rejection.’77 If human rights bear the characteristics of thin universal 
regulatory principles then they too are simply ‘provisional fixed points’, in the 
Rawlsian sense. It is important to remember, after all, the point of the whole project:
If people are not aware of the historical and contextual nature of human rights 
and are not aware that human rights become realized only by the struggles of 
real people experiencing real instances of domination, then human rights are 
all too easily used as symbolic legitimizers for instruments of that very 
domination.78
76 Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism, pp. 109-110
77 Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We can Hope For?’, pp. 194-195
78 A. Belden Fields and Wold-Dieter Narr, cited in Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul, p.l 12
-290-
Human Kignts
We can argue for changes to the content of human rights directives, using reasoned 
discourse to critique over-inflated and excessively ‘thick’ human rights conceptions 
and, it must not be overlooked, adding to accounts of human rights where the need 
arises.
As this is the case we can, further, resist the complete collapse of complex 
pluralism into a form of relativism, or a preference-driven emotivism. If morality 
was made up entirely of human rights derived from constructed thin universal 
regulatory principles then we may well find ourselves facing something very close to 
them. If the only things morality concerns itself with are those actions that are so 
egregious as to warrant action with potentially far-reaching international 
consequences the conceptual space for non-moral actions is immense. But, because 
the thin universalist recognises that morality can accommodate thicker moral 
conceptions, particularist viewpoints and contextually-dependent moral frameworks 
it is not committed to saying that everything but genocide boils down to a matter of 
taste. Thicker concepts have a place in morality, but not in a thin universalism. Not 
all of morality is constructed. Not all of morality is encapsulated within human 
rights.
In the next chapter I consider the relationship between thin universal 
regulatory principles and concepts of toleration. I do not argue that “‘toleration’ plus 
‘rights’ equals ‘morality’”, which would undermine the work done in this chapter. If 
human rights are not all that there is to morality, it is unlikely that a conception of 
toleration will fill in all of the blanks. I do want to suggest, however, that toleration 
is particularly suited to a discussion of thin universalism and that the thin universalist 
may have a great deal to contribute to contemporary discussions on toleration and 
how its limits can be determined. The purpose of a discussion of rights and
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toleration, then, is not to show which parts of morality thin universalism can help us 
with, though this is true. Rather, rights and toleration help to illuminate the 
implications of a thin universalism, demonstrating where it fits into contemporary 
moral debate. They show precisely what thin universalism is concerned with, and 
help to justify that concern.
‘Thin human rights’ is one of two expressions of thin universal regulatory 
principles which have established reference points in popular moral and political 
discourse. This increasingly specific idea, which I have been tracing throughout the 
project finds one set of its conclusions in the idea of human rights. It comes to rest 
here precisely because, from the abstract consideration of construction laid out in 
chapter one, human rights provides that discussion with a point of leverage into more 
substantive academic and popular debate. The debate over human rights, which 
helped to frame the terms of the project in my introduction, is, for a great many 
people, the key way that they frame debates about moral problems. While we may 
find the universalisation of a thick set of rights deeply problematic, their role in 
global politics is growing. Attempts to find expressions of human rights that do not 
bear the trappings of Western liberal democracy are emerging at a phenomenal rate. 
Declarations of human rights are emerging in South East Asia, the Persian Gulf, 
Africa and South America. All of which have sought to cast off the avowedly 
Western character of the Universal Declaration whilst at the same time embracing 
the idea of rights as a dimension in the underpinning of a stable and just political 
society. Thin universal regulatory principles, when expressed in the form of human 
rights, can connect to popular patterns of discourse both in those places where the 
concept of rights is well established, and in the cosmopolitical arena, where its force 
is growing. Similarly, toleration provides a point of access into popular ‘real-world’
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debates for what began as distinctly abstract discussions of the relationship between 
facts and principles. And it is this debate with which my final chapter is concerned.
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The Role of 
Toleration and its Limits
A useful and persuasive expression of thin universal regulatory principles can be 
found in a set of thin human rights, which I discussed in the previous chapter. This 
seventh and final chapter considers a different expression of those principles, which 
captures and promulgates them in the language of a different debate within popular 
and academic discourse. This is the debate over ‘toleration’ and its relationship with 
universalism. It is through this debate that I close the thesis and, further, through an 
investigation into its limits and its contemporary theoretical and philosophical critics, 
explore further means of examining and critiquing thin universalism.
The chapter begins with a more substantial characterisation of a thin 
universalist conception of toleration, moving from a classical view of what it means 
to tolerate, to consideration of how a conception of toleration emerges within the thin 
universalist project. Part of this discussion concerns the relationship between 
toleration and thin human rights, and the role they play together in the expression of 
thin universal principles. The chapter considers the relationship between construction 
and toleration and the impact of the facts of complex pluralism and our first 
principles on the latter. I suggest that toleration is a pragmatic, ‘political’ practice 
intended to accommodate and facilitate complex pluralism, and that it is a powerful 
moral ‘ethos’, motivated also by compelling moral arguments.
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Thin universalism is a doctrine that embraces toleration; the thin universalist 
is deeply tolerant. Thin universalism can contribute to debates concerning toleration, 
and its relationship to similar concepts. It can offer valuable perspective on where the 
parameters of toleration can be drawn within a universal context. It offers an account 
of where the limits of toleration, legitimate diversity and complex pluralism itself can 
be established, and subsequently, what we can and ought to tolerate within a 
cosmopolitan domain. This can be contrasted with accounts of toleration within more 
restricted contexts in order to provide, like rights and aspirations, the possibility that 
there may be more to an account of toleration than that which we need not tolerate 
anywhere, at any time. Much of what an account of toleration is concerned with lies 
outside of the remit of a thin universalism. In what way and on what level do we 
engage with those practices we are reluctant to tolerate, and with those who practice 
them? Given the severity of the cases addressed by thin universalism, what options 
are available in the face of seemingly intolerable practices?
The second half of the chapter contrasts this conception of toleration with 
other approaches to this dimension of difference. I firstly contrast thin universal 
toleration with a more classically liberal conception, as espoused by John Rawls and 
Rex Martin. If toleration is prized equally by the thin universalist and the liberal, 
what is there to set them apart? I also ask whether there is a difference between a thin 
universalist and a thin liberal, and suggest that toleration may be key to disentangling 
them. I secondly contrast thin universal toleration with Charles Taylor’s ‘politics of 
recognition’, which communitarians, and those outside Anglo-American justificatory 
philosophy have advocated as a plausible means of negating accusations of 
relativism which often accompany the rejection of universalism. I suggest ultimately
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that the politics of recognition is too thick to be operationalised universally.11 thirdly 
contrast thin universal toleration with William Connolly’s rejection of toleration in 
favour of a more expansive ‘ethos of pluralization’. I ask whether toleration is too 
overtly judgemental about those practices that are alien to it. Should we not pursue a 
more positive approach to complex pluralism, given that it is central to moral 
deliberation in such a diverse world?
The chapter provides a closer look at the idea that morality is composed of 
more than human rights, of more than simply thin universal principles. It shows how 
thin universalism can help to orient and frame other dimensions of our moral 
deliberation, without superseding or displacing them. As such, this chapter not only 
offers a more substantive outline of the limits of toleration, but also of the limits of 
the thin universalist project itself.
The Concept of Toleration
Toleration, and an examination of ‘tolerance’ and ‘intolerance’, is explicitly 
concerned with which forms of expression, action, principle, behaviour, and which 
situations and circumstances, ought to be permitted and which ought to be curtailed. 
In homogeneous societies, with little or no diversity, the function of toleration is 
seldom apparent, and in practice is often limited to localised issues. Problems and 
issues of toleration tend to arise, and tend to be acute in conditions of complex 
pluralism, wherein competing and incompatible principles and practices must exist 
together. Some will be tolerable; others will be intolerable. The broad concerns of the 
thesis resemble closely debates within the broader literature on toleration. The 
connections between toleration and complex pluralism, pluralism and the limits of
1 Though I make no claims that Taylor would object to this conclusion per se.
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that toleration, and between toleration, its limits and the thin universalist project are 
clear if complex.
I distinguish here between the concept of toleration, and the various 
conceptions of it. The concept of toleration, what toleration is, what it involves and 
how it is understood, must be distinguished from the particular conception of 
toleration offered by thin universalism and construction. ‘Toleration’, the act of 
‘tolerating’, and the state of ‘being tolerant’ or intolerant are often conflated; the 
Oxford English Dictionary makes no distinction and they are often used 
interchangeably.2 However, the fact that toleration is a kind of action, and tolerance 
is a state of being, implies that one could tolerate something in a practical sense, 
without having to take on extensive re-evaluation of the integral aspects of ones self. 
This suggests that there is less ontological and epistemological baggage in making an 
appeal to toleration, the way we would want people to act, rather than tolerance, the 
way we would want them to be.
Toleration is broadly understood to contain a conjunction of three 
circumstances and attitudes. The first component is objection. Where beliefs or 
actions are ‘tolerated’ they are the subject of disapproval; they are considered 
objectionable, incorrect, bad or wrong in some way. This disapproval can range from 
simple displeasure to utter disgust. If those actions are not the subject of disapproval 
it is not ‘tolerance’ towards them of which we speak, but rather ‘indifference’.
The second component is power. It must at least be possible to act on ones 
disapproval and one must therefore have the power to do so. Where one lacks the 
power to actually prevent the practice of the act that is the subject of disapproval, the 
act is not truly ‘tolerated’. Its performance is accepted because there is no choice but
2 See The Oxford English Dictionary Online, Second Edition, 1989, (http://www.oed.com June 4th 
2007)
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acceptance. In these cases ‘weakness’, ‘cowardice’, ‘powerlessness’ or ‘lack of 
agency’ are mistaken for toleration. Toleration therefore requires a degree of 
freedom or agency in order to be properly enacted.
The final component is choice. The disapproving and empowered agent must 
deliberately choose to refrain from preventing or negating a practice of which they 
disapprove and in which they have the power to interfere. This choice may be 
practical or moral, and an account of the justifications and motivations underlying it 
will vary according to the specific conception of toleration. In this ‘negative’ way, in 
choosing not to negate, toleration differs from ‘positive’ affirmation.3
To be tolerant is to take upon oneself a disposition which recognises, with 
construction, the powerful impact that pluralism has upon moral thinking whilst at 
the same time maintaining the importance of establishing reasoned limits to 
acceptable diversity. At its core toleration is an ‘ethos’, a virtue, a disposition 
possessed by those who hold a certain understanding about the importance of certain 
features of the world.4
A Constructivist Conception of Toleration
The significance of toleration arises from the concerns of the thin universalist 
project: respect for complex pluralism, and respect for persons. Why one tolerates,
3 This account is an amalgamation o f various positions o f what is involved in the practice of 
‘toleration’. See, Preston King, Toleration (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1976), pp.44-54; Rainer 
Forst, ‘Toleration’ in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy, Winter 2003 
Edition, (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/toleration June 30th 2007); Andrew Fiala, ‘Toleration’ in 
James Fieser and Bradley Dowden (eds.) The Internet Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy, 
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/t/ tolerati.htm June 11th 2007)
4 Richard Rorty refers to tolerance as ‘rationality3’ -  the ability not to be disconcerted by difference 
and not to respond aggressively to it. Rorty distinguishes rationality3 from rationality! -  ethically 
neutral ‘technical reason’, skill at survival or adaptability, and rationality2 -  ‘humanity’, the added 
ingredient which separates us from animals. Toleration may embody a willingness to change, to 
reshape oneself for particular reasons. It embodies a reliance on persuasion rather than force and 
allows for peaceful coexistence between peoples and individuals and is often considered to be quasi- 
synonymous with a form of freedom. See Richard Rorty, ‘Rationality and Cultural Difference’ in 
Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
pp. 186-201 at pp. 186-187.
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and why one ought to be tolerant can and, indeed, must be central concerns for the 
thin universalist project. The key themes of the project help to substantiate a ‘thin 
universalist’ conception of toleration. First, this account of toleration is grounded in 
construction and is therefore in the facts of complex pluralism and first principles of 
respect for persons and for pluralism. The thin universalist conception of toleration, 
and not the concept of toleration itself, is what is constructed. Second, toleration is a 
consequence of powerful moral requirements and of practical necessity. Toleration is 
a pragmatic consideration; diverse practices are often tolerated to allow for a basis of 
agreement and we are tolerant because we seek consent. But toleration is also a 
fundamentally moral commitment, grounded in the conditions stipulated by first 
principles advocating respect for persons and for pluralism. We are tolerant because 
our first principles require it, not simply because the pursuit of consent requires it. 
The conception of toleration that follows reflects these consideration and those of the 
project thus far.
Toleration is an expression of an essential aspect of the thin universalist 
character. It demonstrates recognition of an underlying social, moral and political 
validity to pluralism. It demands our respect for it. It captures the affirmation that 
pluralism rejects conformity as an ideal, that intolerance implies conformity and 
threatens pluralism, and that we should therefore practice toleration in order to secure 
pluralism. Constructed regulatory principles ought to reflect that respect, and thin 
universalism is therefore a tolerant doctrine because of its respect for pluralism. The 
thin universalist is virtuous because he or she is tolerant.
Toleration can and ought to be understood in the same terms as a constructive 
thin universalism. Construction concerns those actions, principles and practices 
which fall beyond that which we can tolerate. We construct, as regulatory principles,
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means of engaging with, and in extreme cases, dealing with those who cannot be 
tolerated. We construct limits to toleration and, in so doing, a conception of 
toleration itself. What we can and cannot tolerate is directly specified by the 
constructed thin universal principles established in chapters one to five, and the thin 
account of human rights offered in chapter six. Violation of thin human rights cannot 
be tolerated, but this is not all that can be said on the subject of tolerance from the 
thin universalist perspective. Toleration is not simply what we do in all cases not 
covered by a thin universalism. Nor is toleration an afterthought to thin universalism, 
it is integral to the project. Toleration and how we come to draw a conception of 
toleration is ultimately what the project is about.
Thin universalism asserts first and foremost that its conception of toleration is 
the product of construction and therefore of deliberation over facts and principles. 
This may lead to the supposition that toleration can be constructed according to the 
facts alone. Albert Weale suggests the following:
Quite often the fact that different forms of life exist within a community is 
taken to be a reason for tolerating those forms of life. Individual differences 
are taken to imply social toleration. The commonly heard saying that one 
should live and let live expresses this viewpoint, as does the equally common 
view that individuals should be allowed to do what they like provided they do 
not harm others.5
But, of course, ‘the fact that different forms of life exist within a community’ or ‘the 
fact of complex pluralism’, is not by itself cause to endorse any principled claim and 
the need for toleration cannot arise out of the sheer fact of complex pluralism. But
5 Albert Weale, ‘Toleration, Individual Differences and Respect for Persons’ in John Horton and 
Susan Mendus (eds.), Aspects o f  Toleration: Philosophical Studies (London: Methuen, 1985), pp. lb- 
53 at p. 16
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toleration will nonetheless be fact-dependent.6 It will respond to the facts of complex 
pluralism, without which we may find little need for toleration, but it will also 
respond to the first principles of the thin universalist project, which animate the 
‘tolerant’ response to complex pluralism. Without those first principles, there would 
be no cause to tolerate that with which we disagree and are able to negate. Rainer 
Forst notes that:
toleration is a normatively dependent concept. ... It needs further, 
independent normative resources in order to have a certain substance, 
content, and limits -  and in order to be regarded as something good at all. In 
itself, therefore, toleration is not a virtue or value; it can only be a value if 
backed by the right normative reasons.7
Where does this conception of toleration fit into thin universalism? In the previous 
chapter I suggested that, far from being the ‘be all and end all’ of how we need to 
think about morality as a whole, thin universalism, and human rights in particular, 
are designed to deal with one domain as a response to specific concerns. This allows 
the thin universalist to maintain that there is a great deal of room within moral 
deliberation for other dimensions to ‘morality’. These include further, more 
particular dimensions as well as further, potentially universal dimensions which do 
not make the same kinds of claim as those made by human rights. Toleration can be 
a part of our moral thinking without being a part of a thin universalism. But at the 
same time, the interactions between the content of a thin universalism and the 
content of a conception of toleration are fundamental.
6 See also G.A. Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol.31 (2003), pp.211- 
245 (d), p.214
7 Forst, ‘Toleration’
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Toleration concerns both the thin content of constructed regulatory principles 
and the ‘thick’ space outside the remit of those principles. How the thick relates to 
the thin and vice versa is key to grasping this conception of toleration. Central to the 
distinction is the extent to which practices can or cannot be tolerated. Thin universal 
human rights establish, through construction, a thin but universal category of 
practices which cannot be tolerated anywhere in any context. By contrast, in more 
local contexts, in less-than-universal domains, in more particular frameworks, thicker 
accounts of toleration and perhaps greater restrictions on what is tolerated can and 
will be applicable. The reasons behind this will themselves be deeply pluralised, 
being political, social, moral, economic, and cultural in character. Thin universalist 
toleration specifies what is intolerable universally; it will not show how toleration 
operates locally. Just as thin human rights underdetermine the full moral content of 
any given society, so thin universal toleration underdetermines the full extent to 
which practices are tolerated in a specific local context.
But how do we negotiate those situations where thickly context-grounded 
toleration places pressure on the thin universal account given here, and vice versa? 
What happens where locally tolerated practices are in violation of a thin 
universalism; where what is tolerated is, by the standards set by constructed 
regulatory principles, intolerable? What follows attempts to navigate those tensions.
Toleration is not simply a thin universal principle; it does not emerge only 
when the most far-reaching moral questions are considered, though it certainly does 
emerge in those circumstances. Where there are a plurality of human societies 
entrenched in inegalitarian power relations there will always be cause for the more 
powerful to tolerate the practices of the less powerful. Toleration in this domain is 
frequently pushed to its limits. It is often taken too far for the sake of economic or
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diplomatic relations, or other values or interests, and it frequently fails. Its presence, 
however, is undeniable in this universal domain, both as a part of a ‘thin’ moral 
minimalism, and in deliberation about others in ‘thick’ contexts.
Toleration arises most prominently in particular contexts. It frames a key 
principle of liberal impartiality and features in numerous other political and religious 
ideologies. Toleration is most prominent in those particular instances where practices 
which are disapproved of are allowed to continue unencumbered due to a conscious 
and principled, and moreover, context-dependent decision not to interfere. Such 
practices may vary widely, from treatment of animals in slaughter to compulsory 
protective clothing for certain activities. The crucial point here is that attendance to 
these practices is unlikely to be found within a set of thin universal principles. A thin 
universalist conception of human rights will want to say almost nothing about kosher 
or halal butchery, or the rights of Sikhs not to wear crash helmets whilst riding 
motorcycles.8 While it may be reasonable to regard things like animal rights and 
safety procedures as universal aspirations, it is certainly not sensible, or moreover 
morally acceptable to assert that all Sikhs must as a matter of upholding a set of 
constructed universal principles, discard their turbans in favour of approved safety 
headgear. Such issues are matters for thickly conceived particular values. These two 
examples are specific to the UK, where Jewish and Muslim butchers are excused 
from certain aspects of humane slaughter law and Sikhs are exempt from the wearing 
of crash helmets. These are thick practices of toleration and important moral 
questions. But they are not necessarily universal; toleration has a great deal to say 
within the realm of the particular.
81 borrow both o f these examples from Brian Barry, Culture and Equality, (Cambridge: Polity, 2003)
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Further, just as thin universalism does not insist that all animals are 
slaughtered ‘humanely’ or that all people must wear motorcycle crash helmets, so it 
does not prohibit arranged marriage or, for example, the practice of dog fighting.9 
Thin universalism does not find arranged marriage intolerable; it tolerates it in the 
name of respect for complex pluralism, according to its first principles. Similarly, 
thin universalism tolerates dog fighting, again out of respect for pluralism, but more 
pragmatically in order to avoid excluding those cultures where it remains an 
acceptable practice. However, in more local contexts, arranged marriage and dog 
fighting may be ruled out as tolerable practices and rejected as inappropriate on 
particularist grounds. This secures the integrity and complexity of pluralism by 
establishing the distinction between toleration in the thin universal domain and the 
thick particular domain. It is far from incoherent, however, to suggest that we can 
aspire to an end to such practices universally. To say that we can aspire to a world 
where marriages are not arranged, or where dog fighting is illegal, or where all 
animals are subjected to humane slaughter remains a possibility. Thin universalism is 
thinly judgemental about these things; it permits them in the name of respect for 
pluralism, but this does not necessarily dampen its capacity for disapproval of them. 
Negotiating thick and thin accounts of toleration is complex and I move on to a 
discussion of the limits of toleration, where the interplay between thick and thin 
becomes clearer in light of John Stuart Mill’s distinction between speech and action.
The Limits of Thin Universal Toleration
In his consideration of human rights, Joshua Cohen cites a central dilemma of the 
minimalist:
9 These practices are thoroughly inequivalent - 1 do not wish to equate legitimate and well-established 
religious and cultural practices with blood sports -  they both, however, serve illustrative purposes.
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We can be tolerant of fundamentally different outlooks on life, or we can be 
ambitious in our understanding of what human rights demand, but we cannot 
... be both tolerant and ambitious10
In describing this dilemma, Cohen also provides insight into the relationship between 
thin universalist conceptions of human rights and toleration. In many respects they 
must be weighed against one another and yet they also describe flip sides of the same 
coin; different dimensions to the same set of moral problems. Both illustrate the role 
of thin universal principles, as reflecting the friction between the moral demands we 
can make universally and how we ought to follow through on the commitment to 
respect complex pluralism. The resultant balancing act between a set of forceful thin 
human rights on the one hand, and a robust, yet limited conception of toleration on 
the other, is framed by construction. How deep does complex pluralism go? Where 
should a line be drawn under that pluralism? Where we draw that line is the focus of 
construction. What falls beneath it is intolerable anywhere and everywhere 
prohibited, and is consequently addressed under the remit of thin universalism and 
human rights. Above it, a characterisation of toleration and its many complex and 
plural dimensions and limits can be found.
What of these limits? Initially, it seems intuitively wrong to suggest that 
someone who claims to be tolerant, and yet refuses to tolerate child abuse is speaking 
incoherently or hypocritically. And there is nothing inherent within sensitivity to 
complex pluralism that insists that we treat toleration as open-ended. In fact, one of 
the core claims of the thin universalist is that toleration cannot be open-ended. To 
suggest as much would contradict the project thus far, and would fly in the face of
10 Joshua Cohen, ‘Minimalism about Human Rights: The Most We can Hope For?’, in The Journal o f  
Political Philosophy, Vol. 12 (2), 2004, pp. 190-213 at p. 192
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our lived experience, and the social history of that experience. The most horrific 
events of the twentieth century -  genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, suicide 
bombing, as well as famine, pestilence and AIDS -  are clear cases where we ought to 
draw the line under toleration. Thin human rights are intended to specify that just 
such events, crimes and practices must not be tolerated anywhere.
But matters are complicated when we consider the variety and complexity of 
expressions, actions and situations to which toleration can be applied; many are 
considerably less serious. It seems somewhat more difficult to claim to be tolerant 
and at the same time to refuse to tolerate, for example, religious hate speech. The 
issue is complicated further when epistemological questions are raised, for example 
when we claim to be tolerant and yet seek to assert an account of ‘truth’ or ‘the good’ 
which insists that all other such accounts are objectively incorrect.11 This complexity 
results in a pluralized account of toleration; that which we find intolerable will not 
always be met with the same response. We can construct limits to toleration, but our 
responses to some things we might find intolerable must vary greatly according to 
what they are.
Construction concerns the point at which toleration becomes objectionable, 
when it becomes a greater evil than that which is being tolerated. It concerns where 
the line is to be drawn under complex pluralism, and what determines that which is 
to be tolerated. What are these limits and how are we to engage with those whose
19practices or attitudes lie beyond them?
11 As many argue is the case, for example, with Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London:
Bantam, 2006). And, indeed, secularism in general has long since had to counter the claim that it has 
an undercurrent o f intolerance which is deeply embarrassing. See, for example, Alister McGrath, The 
Twilight ofAtheism: The Rise and Fall o f  Disbelief in the Modern World, New Edition (London:
Rider and Co, 2005), chapter 9, pp.230-236
12 Here see Jonathon Quong, ‘The Rights o f Unreasonable Citizens’ in The Journal o f  Political 
Philosophy Vol. 12(3), 2004, pp. 314-335; Marilyn Friedman, ‘John Rawls and the Political Coercion 
o f Unreasonable People’ in Victoria Davion and Clark W olf (eds.), The Idea o f  a Political 
Liberalism: Essays on John Rawls (Oxford: Rowman ad Littlefield, 2000), pp. 16-33; and Joshua
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We are simply not required to tolerate practices which violate thin universal 
principles. Violations of bodily security, attacks upon whole ethnic groups, acts of 
genocide, torture and abuse demand outright condemnation in all instances and 
mandate action wherever possible. Such acts ought to be, and often are, legally 
prohibited. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily follow that we must tolerate all 
practices which do not violate thin universal principles. The dynamic of thick and 
thin conceptions of toleration negates this claim. Thin universalist principles stipulate 
what we cannot tolerate universally; not what we must or must not tolerate in more 
specific contexts. Were this the case, we would be left with far more to tolerate than 
could be mandated by practical acceptability or our first principles. There are many 
categories of action which fall outside of the remit of a thin universalism but which 
should not necessarily be tolerated unquestioningly.
We may well feel deeply conflicted by the problems posed by the likes of 
‘hate speech’. While John Stuart Mill informs us that we must tolerate hate speech,13 
we may feel that it is something so powerfully troubling that we would never affirm 
that we are prepared to do so. As such, our response to hate speech may not be legal 
prohibition, but a commitment to engage those who perpetrate it; hate speech seems 
in many ways to demand response or counterattack. And while such counter attacks 
may fall upon deaf ears, we might be equally pessimistic about the impact that even 
legal prohibition has on hate-mongery.14 The thin universalist, who advocates 
coercive action against violations of thin human rights, need not shy away from other 
kinds of action when impositions on universal aspirations, for example, are
Cohen, ‘Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus’ in David Copp, Jean Hampton and John E. Roemer 
(eds.), The Idea o f  Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 270-291. See also 
Joseph Raz, ‘The Amoralist’ in Garret Cullity and Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), pp.369-398
13 Except for that which perhaps calls directly for violent action, which Mill does not want to permit.
14 My thanks here go to Alex Jakle, whose discussion of this matter has helped me to greatly clarify 
my position.
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threatened. Thin universalism is not confined to an ‘intervention or inaction’ 
dichotomy and, given the nature of complex pluralism, it is unsurprising that our 
responses are often multiple, diverse and shifting.
Rival accounts of truth will motivate some of the strongest calls for 
toleration. Where conceptions of what is ‘true’ contrast strongly, toleration becomes 
operative in order to prevent difference escalating into violent conflict. Where no 
serious, egregious, widespread or systematic harm is being inflicted, the toleration of 
rival viewpoints is an essential feature of thin universalism. Because it is committed 
to recognising only the observable fact of complex pluralism, and not the valuational 
claim of value pluralism, a principle of toleration that issues from thin universalism 
will remain epistemologically abstinent with regard to rival truth claims. But because 
it is intentionally ‘thin’, it does not preclude a concurrent pursuit of truth on the part 
of its adherents, provided those truths comport with the minimal demands of the 
constructed regulatory principles. It may be the case that there exist one or many 
gods, or that there is a single ordering principle informing all our moral decisions. 
Thin universalism agrees that these possibilities are just that: perfectly possible. The 
purpose of the constructive project is to allow those who anticipate them to be more 
than possibilities to have access to the principles that it yields.
This is directly linked to the explicit recognition of complex pluralism which 
underpins the thin universalist project. Complex pluralism, understood in light of 
first principles, provides materials out of which are constructed principles that are 
deeply tolerant in their attitude towards the various epistemological and valuation 
rivalries which exist within the world. Moreover, the contingency and reflexivity of 
those principles mean that what is to be tolerated, and how we are to respond to that
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which we choose not to tolerate, are never permanently fixed. They must undergo 
constant scrutiny and revision by those who are party to the constructive process.
It follows, then, that the thin universalist must confront those with whom 
consent cannot be constructed: the /^tolerant. This issue is often presented as a 
‘paradox’ within toleration. How can we be tolerant and, at the same time, 
adequately confront the intolerance that surrounds us? Are we forced to say, with 
Bernard Williams that ‘we need to tolerate other people and their ways of life only in 
situations that make it very difficult to do so. Toleration ... is required only for the 
intolerable. That is its basic problem’?15
The claim of a paradox within toleration is premised on an open-ended 
commitment to it which is precluded by the thin universalist project. Karl Popper 
argues that we are simply not required to tolerate the intolerant. He recognises the 
paradox:
If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are 
not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the 
intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them... I do 
not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of 
intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument 
and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be 
unwise. But we should claim the right to suppress them if necessary even by 
force; for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the 
level of rational argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to rational 
argument, because it is deceptive, and teach them to answer arguments by the
15 Bernard Williams, ‘Tolerating the Intolerable’ in Susan Mendus (ed.), The Politics o f  Toleration: 
Tolerance and Intolerance in Modern Life (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), pp.65-75 
at p.65
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use of their fists or pistols ... We should therefore claim, in the name of
tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant.16
One might even suggest that to be tolerant of all viewpoints, including the 
fundamentally intolerant, is in fact, passive approval of intolerance, and not therefore 
tolerance at all. For action which permits the oppression of tolerance, in the name of 
tolerance, condones its rejection. If it does so in the name of tolerance it is incoherent 
also.
Further consideration of what we might be called upon tolerate -  beliefs, 
principles, thoughts, expressions, actions or situations -  is now required. Classically 
a distinction is drawn between toleration of the expressions of an agent and toleration 
of the actions of an agent. This distinction is important to any discussion of 
toleration, and specifically toleration of the intolerant, and it is particularly important 
for the thin universal conception of toleration.
Questions of toleration, and when we ought and ought not to interfere with 
the liberty of others, are central to Mill’s On Liberty. Mill’s ‘harm principle’ -  ‘the 
only purpose for which power can be exercised over any member of a civilised 
community, again his will, is to prevent harm to others’ -  is in part an attempt to
1 7demonstrate the limits of toleration. It attempts to define a category of action to 
which others should not be subjected, exposing in turn a domain of action governed 
by law-like principles. However, central to the work is a strong distinction between 
liberty of thought, conscience and speech on the one hand, and liberty of action and 
association on the other. The former
16 We can ‘claim, in the name tolerance, the right not to be tolerant o f the intolerant’. See Karl Popper, 
The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. /, p.265, fn.4 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971)
17 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin, 1974), p.68
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comprises first the inward domain of consciousness, demanding liberty of 
conscience in the most comprehensive sense, liberty of thought and feeling, 
absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or 
speculative, scientific, moral, or theological.18
This evidently covers an unlimited freedom of thought and conscience, as 
instantiated in the Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights19, but he continues:
The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a 
different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual 
which concerns other people, but, being almost of as much importance as the 
liberty of thought itself and resting in great part on the same reasons, it is 
practically inseparable from it.
Freedom of speech is as essential to individual and social well-being as freedom of 
thought and conscience. For this reason, Mill claims, they should be considered 
together. There is almost no justification for silencing opinion, be it of a single 
individual, a group, or the whole of mankind. The pursuit of truth is dependent on 
this freedom, and silence can only hinder it. Opinions known to be false must not be 
negated, as ‘complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very 
condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action’.21 But Mill 
makes a crucial distinction between expression and action, and he asks ‘whether the 
same reasons do not require that men should be free to act upon their opinions’.22 
Mill’s insistence on an almost unlimited freedom of thought, conscience, discussion
18 Mill, On Liberty, p .71
19 See The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights (New York: United Nations Office o f Public 
Information, 1948), Article 18: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom o f thought, conscience and 
religion’
20 Mill, On Liberty, p.71
21 Mill, On Liberty, p.79
22 Mill, On Liberty, p .l 19 [Emphasis added]
-311-
1 oleration
and expression is counterbalanced by a careful elucidation of what must be observed 
in the conduct of members of a society, to which the harm principle is central.
This conduct consists first in not injuring the interests of one another, or 
rather certain interests which, either by express legal provision or by tacit 
understanding, ought to be considered as rights; and secondly, in each 
person’s bearing his share ... of the labours and sacrifices incurred for 
defending the society or its members from injury or molestation.23
Going further, he states that acts injurious to others ‘are fit object of moral 
reprobation and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment.’24 While, for 
Mill, there are almost no limits to what we ought to tolerate with regard to the speech 
and expressions of others, there are clear, powerful, and moreover legally 
enforceable limits to what we ought to tolerate with regard to their actions. Freedom 
of action, while it provides means of accessing truth also provides enormous capacity 
for causing harm to others. Speech is less ambiguous, allowing the pursuit of truth 
with more limited potential to cause genuine and direct ‘harm’.25
However, as with the example of hate speech above, while racism, sexism, 
homophobia and such need not be tolerated, our responses to them need not be 
confined to simply making such prejudices illegal. Intolerance, like hate speech, but 
perhaps unlike full-blown violations of thin human rights, prompts engagement with 
the proponent. This plurality of demands placed upon us by a commitment to 
toleration is again unsurprising. Practising toleration will seldom require a single 
course of action for those things we choose to tolerate and another course for those
23 Mill, On Liberty, p. 141
24 Mill, On Liberty, p. 145
25 And, while it may be protested that speech can cause social and cultural harm to certain groups 
within society -  for example to minority cultures, ethnic groups or sexualities -  on Mill’s account, the 
falsity and damage o f these claims can only be negated through further discussion.
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we choose not to. It may not be a case of claiming a right to suppress intolerant 
attitudes, but a thin universalism must be aware of the social power that intolerance 
can wield.
Arguments for toleration cannot, therefore, show that all of what Kant called
9 A‘private uses of reason’ must be tolerated. Some deeply intolerant doctrines may, in 
their ‘private’ discourse hinder broader ‘public’ moves towards greater tolerance. 
There are strong reasons not to tolerate such doctrines, and it is not necessarily 
intolerant not to tolerate the intolerant. T.M. Scanlon goes so far as to suggest that it 
may, in certain contexts, be appropriate to enforce toleration, and even to teach it in
97 •schools. This, however, remains a question for local contexts, where issues beyond 
those of thin universalism are more prominent. To insist upon universal toleration 
education may demand a thicker set of commitments than respect for pluralism can 
countenance. To demand such a deep commitment to toleration is perhaps an 
unattainable approach to the issue, both practically and morally. Nonetheless, we 
might agree with Scanlon that to unreservedly accept deep social intolerance is to 
demand an equally unattainable attitude:
If a group maintain that I and people like me simply have no place in our 
society, that we must leave or be eliminated, how can I regard this as a point 
of view ... that is equally entitled to be heard or considered in our informal
90
(or even formal) politics?
Intolerance is incompatible with thin universalism because of the corrosive effect it 
has on the practices of discourse that help to construct, establish and validate it.
26 See Immanuel Kant, ‘An Answer to the Question “What is Enlightenment?’” in Hans Reiss (ed.), 
Kant’s Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp.54-60 at pp.55-56
27 He suggests that, provided it is voiced with caution, the apothegm ‘In Tolerance We Trust!’ See 
T.M. Scanlon, ‘The Difficulty of Tolerance’ in The Difficulty o f  Tolerance, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), pp. 187-201
28 Scanlon, ‘The Difficulty of Tolerance’, p.197
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Conversely, a spirit of accommodation, what Scanlon calls ‘the spirit of tolerance’,29 
a desire to find a framework of principles that others could also be asked to accept, is 
one of the key characteristics of thin universalism. Without toleration, an account of 
action-guiding principles, and the basis for their justification is somewhat 
incomplete. Toleration is not just a political virtue or a simple practice within a just 
polity, it is a key matrix within which a plurality of social, political, religious, 
philosophical, economic, ethnic and national groups can constitute the full authority 
of their own shared judgements and so be able to debate how the universal and the 
particular are to interact in a given context.
It is not the case that toleration succumbs to paradox when faced with 
intolerance. While intolerance provides new dilemmas, we need not say with 
Williams that we need toleration only in intolerable circumstances. Toleration is 
required in circumstances that arise long before a situation becomes intolerable, and 
our actions concerning what we tolerate and what we do not will rarely be the same. 
It is therefore essential that the limits of what we are prepared to tolerate are as 
reflective and contingent as the principles that we construct.
Toleration: Classical Liberal or Thin Universal?
But we may wonder whether, in its approach to toleration, thin universalism does not 
strongly resemble precisely that from which it seeks to break. I draw the discussion 
towards its conclusion with a series of contrasts between the thin universalist 
conception of toleration and three rival accounts of how we might dispose ourselves 
within complex pluralism. These contrasts address the relationship between a more 
substantive, traditional liberal conception of toleration on the one hand, and more
29 See Scanlon, ‘The Difficulty o f Tolerance’, p. 198
30 Onora O’Neill, ‘The Public Use of Reason’, in Constructions o f  Reason: Explorations o f Kant’s 
Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.28-50 at p.50
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pluralistic and postmodern conceptions on the other. I begin with a consideration of 
thin universal toleration in contrast with ‘classical’ liberalism.
Given that the thesis has culminated in thin universalist accounts of human 
rights and toleration, and given that these are equally powerful components of 
liberalism, it is pertinent to ask: is a commitment to toleration likely to lead to 
anything that is not still ‘liberalism’ in terms of its substantive content? An answer to 
this can be found by examining how thin universalism and liberalism differ in their 
content, character and starting points. This is valuable, if only because the thin 
universalist project emphasises aspects of its own character which are inherently 
problematic when enshrined within a more substantively liberal universalism. In this 
section, I respond to the suggestion that thin universalism is unworthy of such close 
consideration and that toleration simply leads back to liberalism by examining the 
differences between thin universalism and liberalism.
If one suspects that a thin universalism expressed through the discourses of 
human rights and toleration and which seeks to respect complex pluralism is simply 
liberalism, this suspicion tends to emerge as one of two objections. The first 
objection is that any universalism, but particularly one cashed out as human rights 
and toleration, still shows strong Western bias and will return to past imperialist 
tendencies. The second objection is that a specifically thin universalism represents an 
‘anorexic’ form of liberalism and is as such too thin or weak. The tenets of liberal 
‘right’ are so regardless of context and therefore to offer a ‘thin’ version of it simply
i
weakens our commitment to right.
The first objection is overcome through thinness. A thin universalism, in its
thinness, is able to deflect the suggestion that it contains excessive Western liberal
31 Rex Martin, ‘Rawls on Human Rights: Liberal or Universal?’ in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts and 
Peter Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order: The Implications o f  Diversity (London: Routledge, 
2006), pp. 192-212 at p.202
-315-
1 oleration
bias to render it inapplicable in a complex plural world. Just as Rex Martin notes that 
Rawls’ doctrine of human rights in The Law o f Peoples contains no universal 
commitment to democracy, more expansive list of rights, or any procedure for their 
implementation, so a thin universalism resists attending to these more substantive 
projects. However, this objection has been addressed throughout the thesis and 
further attention to it will not yield different or more illuminating conclusions.
Attendance to the second objection has not really been touched upon, and so 
becomes my focus here. It is addressed by examining the distinction between 
universalism and liberalism and, by extension, the distinction between thin 
universalism and thin liberalism. Initially, it could be argued that thin universalism 
and liberalism are equivalent, both in terms of their character and their ‘thickness’. 
On this account, the procedures of construction that hold for a thin universalism 
would hold equally for liberalism. Thin universalism is not a less substantive, weaker 
or watered-down version of liberalism, because liberalism itself is intentionally 
minimalist. Here, procedural accounts of liberalism spring to mind, where a morally 
acceptable outcome is sought only, for example, in the means by which social
^9conflicts are arbitrated. However, I have juxtaposed thin universalism with 
liberalism, suggesting that liberalism can be shown to have far more substantive 
content. The critics cannot be satisfactorily answered by asserting that thin 
universalism and liberalism are one and the same: substantively thin and universal in 
character. It does a disservice to liberalism to assert this strong thinness, and it does a 
disservice to the distinctiveness of thin universalism to simply brand it as 
‘liberalism’.
32 Here I refer most notably to the work o f Stuart Hampshire. See his Justice is Conflict (London: 
Duckworth, 1999); and Innocence and Experience (London: Penguin, 1989), pp.54-62
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A more promising counter argument is to assert that universalism is simply 
not the same as liberalism. While a universalism constructed from within a liberal 
framework will invariably bear liberal characteristics, and while liberalism contains 
strong universal dimensions, they are not equivalent. I begin to draw the distinction 
using a ‘canonical’ characterisation of liberal society, as the conflation of 
universalism and liberalism arises in part due to mischaracterisations of the latter. 
The work of John Rawls is paradigmatic here, for whom a liberal society bears the 
following characteristics:
1. Liberal societies will subscribe to a conception of fundamental rights and 
liberties (often codified in a bill of rights or a covenant on rights)
2. Those rights are assigned special priority and they will ultimately override 
such other considerations as the general good (as in communitarianism, 
socialism etc) and aggregate well-being (as in utilitarianism)
3. They try to assure for their citizens ‘adequate, all-purpose means’ which 
allow for effective use of those rights and liberties.33
These form part of Rawls’ core characterisation of ‘liberal society’ found in Political 
Liberalism. They form the basis for his affirmation of a politically constructivist 
approach and the subsequent political liberalism that emerges. In the Law o f Peoples 
Rawls adds the following conditions, the latter of which comports with the debate 
concerning the human right to democracy:
4. Liberal societies behave peacefully towards one another, and towards other 
peaceable societies.34
5. Liberal states will be democratic in their fundamental formation.35
33 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), introduction, 
especially p.6
34 See John Rawls, The Law o f  Peoples (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp.44-54
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Martin considers the plausibility of a global liberal society, grounded in a 
cosmopolitan Rawlsian original position that Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz and Brian 
Barry and others have sought to advocate, but which Rawls himself has not. For 
Martin, a set of substantive liberal principles would fail the crucial Rawlsian test of 
reflective equilibrium, if implemented globally.36 If reflective equilibrium is the 
bringing into harmony of our considered judgements and the outcome principles of 
reasoning in the original position,37 then it will be possible to show how the initial 
considered judgements of many people who do not already belong to liberal societies 
will be unlikely ever to fall into harmony with a set of outcome principles derived 
from original position reasoning and which are substantively liberal in content. As 
Martin points out,
there are many, many persons in the world whose settled moral convictions 
would be in deep disharmony, perhaps irreconcilable disharmony, with what 
amounts to principles for a liberal global order.38
Similarly, a set of substantive liberal principles intended for the global arena would 
fail many of the challenges that have been addressed throughout this project. It 
would likely fail many of the moral requirements of our first principles, and would 
almost certainly fail to gamer substantial consent, even if a patchwork of procedures 
were employed effectively. Thin universal regulatory principles are thin and 
universal because of strong pragmatic and powerful moral considerations. Thin
35 Rawls makes this case in Political Liberalism', also. See also Joshua Cohen, ‘Is There a Human 
Right to Democracy?’ in Christine Sypnowich (ed.) The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays in Honour o f  
G.A. Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.226-248; as well as chapter six of this work. 
This simple codified account o f ‘Rawlsian’ liberalism I owe to Rex Martin. See his ‘Rawls on Human 
Rights: Liberal or Universal?’, pp. 192-193
36 Martin, ‘Rawls on Human Rights: Liberal or Universal?’ pp.203-4
37 See John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) pp.48-51
38 Martin, ‘Rawls on Human Rights: Liberal or Universal?’ p.204
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principles are far more likely to pass tests of reflexivity than their thicker, more 
substantive counterparts.
Because liberalism is an explicitly thick, comprehensive, historically 
contingent, and contextual account of how to organise a particular kind of (albeit 
plural) society, it contains too thick an account of how to live to be acceptable 
globally. Liberalism is replete with strong background assumptions about 
institutional arrangements, the nature of participation, the character of the judicial 
system, the rule of law and the limits of acceptable conduct, for the governors and 
the governed. This conclusion is unsurprising. Concern for complex pluralism 
globally surely implies that any substantive account of morality or justice will be 
inappropriate. A substantively liberal global order will be deeply inappropriate, 
practically unattainable and potentially morally indefensible both in the eyes of 
others and according to the first principles of the project. This too is unsurprising.
A more perplexing challenge comes from the charge that thin universalism is, 
in fact, a thin liberalism rather than a global comprehensive, substantive or thick 
liberalism. There are two responses to this charge. The first is that there are 
significant differences between thin universalism and thin liberalism. The second is 
more decisive, and demonstrates how the very idea of a ‘thin liberalism’ is 
incoherent. The first is achieved through disentangling those ideas that apply to 
liberalism and those that apply to universalism, and those that apply to both. For 
Rawls this difference between liberalism and a universal moral and political order 
lies in the substantially different formulations of the original position in the domestic 
and international domains. As Martin notes, Rawls ‘does not subscribe to the agenda 
of original position cosmopolitanism ... because he holds to a decidedly different 
characterisation of the normative foundations and the resultant principles that should
-319-
1 oleration
I Q
have “universal reach” in the international community.’ The grounds upon which 
we conceive of a thick conception of how to organise a society will be different from 
the grounds upon which a thin universalism is constructed.
For the constructivist thin universalist these differences are clear. Thin 
universal principles are constructed on the basis of the fact of pluralism and first 
principles concerning respect for persons and respect for pluralism. Complex 
pluralism differs between the domestic and international sphere,40 and how we act 
upon a respect for that pluralism and for persons will also differ domestically and 
internationally. Most importantly, the role that thin universal principles are intended 
to perform is quite different from the role of more substantive principles intended to 
cover a more limited scope. They are constructed on the basis of facts pertaining to a 
global shared environment, whose internal boundaries are constantly shifting, 
overlapping, fracturing and reforming. They are formulated on the basis that there is 
little in the way of shared ground for constructing global regulatory norms, or for 
constructing consent to them. It proceeds, in true constructivist fashion, from what 
cannot be denied about global society: that it must function peacefully in order to 
avoid destruction.
In the domestic sphere, however, those regulatory principles are accompanied 
and offset by, and must compete with numerous other principles, institutions and 
cultural mores. A vast amount of more substantive presuppositions go into domestic 
regulatory principles. Religious commitments, philosophical and political practices 
and institutions established over thousands of years, shared bonds, old animosities, 
social psychologies, conceptions of the good or right, and vast and powerful 
historical experiences all go into shaping how a society is organised and the kind of
39 Martin, ‘Rawls on Human Rights: Liberal or Universal?’ p.205
40 See chapter two, above.
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relationship it has with thin universal regulatory principles. Liberalism is one such 
order with which thin universalism must have a relationship.
This also highlights a further point. Thin universal principles are not pre­
existing liberal principles with the substantive, normative content cut away. They are 
not liberal rights and commitments slimmed down, more abstract than ever before 
and with their particular content taken out. Just as John Gray remarked that human 
rights are not simply liberal rights writ large,41 thin universal regulatory principles, 
expressed as human rights and toleration, are not simply liberal values trimmed, 
stretched and extended to broaden their relevance. The construction of the validity of 
thin universal regulatory principles is conducted through the debate and interchange 
of liberal and Muslim, Muslim and socialist, socialist and Christian, Christian and 
American, American and utilitarian, and so on.
This, in turn, points to the second claim in defence of a thin universalism, 
namely that to posit a ‘thin liberalism’ is incoherent. Initially the idea of a thin 
liberalism seems not only plausible, but sensible and even desirable. It implies a 
liberalism that retains its liberal character but is less substantial in order to meet the 
demands of a pluralised world. On closer consideration, however, it starts to look 
more problematic. Liberalism is a political ideology, not simply a moral philosophy. 
Like other ideologies it is a collection of ideals, doctrines and principles on how a 
society should work which offers, at the same time, some guidance on how to 
achieve those goals. It contains, alongside powerful moral dimensions, political, 
economic, social and cultural doctrines which bear a distinct history and which have 
a core of common content centred on individual liberties42 Assuming that the
41 John Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), pp. 109-110
42 To quote Maurice Cranston, ‘a liberal is a man who believes in liberty’. See Maurice Cranston, 
‘Liberalism’ in Paul Edwards (ed.) The Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy, (New York: The Free Press,
1967), pp.458-461 at p.459. See also Gerald Gaus and Shane D. Courtland, ‘Liberalism’, in Edward
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organisation of other ideologies, as well as other moral, political, social, economic, 
cultural, religious and ethnic viewpoints are not constructed around a similar core of 
individual liberties, it is reasonable to presuppose that a thin version of liberalism, in 
order to be ‘universal’, would have to shed or significantly weaken its commitment 
to many of those liberties.
We might, then, wonder whether a thin liberalism would still in fact be 
‘liberal’, as the ideological content would almost certainly have to be stripped from it 
in order to make it morally and practically universalisable. Would a thin socialism 
still bear any of the characteristics of a truly socialist ideology? Would the 
redistribution of wealth according to need have to be abandoned in order to render it 
universally applicable and acceptable? If so, is it still ‘socialism’? We might 
therefore wonder whether any of the frameworks and identities mentioned above 
could be ‘thinned’ in order to make them truly universalisable. A thin Christianity 
may be implausible, not least because, we would have to presume, thinning 
Christianity may require removing reference to God! Liberalism, like socialism and 
Christianity adds to an account of morality provided by a thin universalism. This 
does not, of course, mean that they are built out of a common thin universal ‘core’, 
but thin universalism leaves many blanks which can be filled for a comprehensive 
account of morality to emerge. Thin universalism is not itself a comprehensive 
account and we might ultimately wonder whether the objection that thin universalism 
is the same as liberalism holds any water at all.
Thin universalism’s conception of minimalist human rights and its emphasis 
on toleration are simply characteristics of moral and political discourse, 
interpretations of which can be found within liberalism, and within many other
N. Zalta (ed.) The Stanford Encyclopaedia o f  Philosophy, Winter 2003 Edition, 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2003/entries/liberalism/ September 10th 2007)
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political and moral systems. This is not the claim that thin universalism constitutes 
an empirically identifiable ‘core’ of beliefs common to most political cultures, but 
rather that constructed thin universal standards have a resonance which extends 
beyond their application in a thick liberal context. They emphasise something that 
speaks to many other political and moral doctrines whilst at the same asserting that 
many of them, including some conceptions of liberalism, must strive harder to meet 
the standards that they require. Thin universal principles cannot be context- 
dependent principles thinned down in order to ‘free’ them from that context- 
dependency. They cannot be derived from any single established set of 
comprehensive religious, moral or philosophical doctrines. Rather, they are, as the 
thin universalist project advocates, the outcome of constructive procedures which are 
not independent of, but amount to more than a simple thinning down of particular 
comprehensive viewpoints. They do not amount simply to a thinner version of 
liberalism, or imply that we all are or want to be liberals, deep down. Rather, 
liberalism shares with many other modes of political organisation both the capacity 
to ensure that basic respect for persons and pluralism is achieved, and the 
understanding that many societies, ‘liberal’ or otherwise, have a long way to go to 
meet these standards.
Reintroducing the language of toleration highlights further differences. At 
first glance it seems that a thin universalism that is committed to a set of human 
rights, and which is deeply tolerant, can say very little of significant difference to a 
liberalism, which is also so committed. Liberals, and particularly ‘comprehensive’ 
liberals, will have a great deal to say about societies that fail to be properly liberal. 
They will have many more resources at their disposal to make substantive and 
powerful moral judgements about those practices which violate liberal principles.
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This is where liberal toleration emerges; in practice liberalism is a deeply tolerant 
doctrine. It acts on only rare occasions to guarantee its commitments globally, while 
domestically, its comprehensive values are maintained.43 Internationally, though, 
liberalism is highly tolerant of illiberalism at work.
The thin universalist can say far less about much of this illiberalism. With its 
regulatory principles, expressed as human rights, thin universalism is concerned to 
speak only to violations of those principles. It does not assert that this is all that any 
one person or society can say with regard to moral matters, but it does ultimately 
advocate a form of tolerance influenced by the demands of complex pluralism. In 
practice thin universalism is deeply tolerant also; perhaps only slightly more so than 
liberalism, if perhaps more deliberately and noticeably so in principle. But this in 
itself is significant. Because thin universalism seeks to say less than liberalism, 
because it is more tolerant in principle, it is, and appears to be, far less judgemental 
in its regard for other societies and cultures. It is in this respect that a thin 
universalism succeeds fully in realising its first principles of respect for the complex 
plurality of social and cultural systems and the people who create, renew and inhabit 
them. Constructed thin universalism, more than any other, is aware of its own 
contingency, provisionality and limitations. It is acutely aware of the process by 
which it is constructed and validated and does not insist upon its own transcendental 
purchase.
At the same time, thin universalism avoids many of the troubling pitfalls of 
traditional liberalism, which are in no small part due to the incongruence between its 
own powerful historical contingencies and its universalist, transcendentalist and
43 One could further maintain that liberalism is, in many such instances, not nearly as ‘impartial’ as 
some o f its detractors suggest.
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occasionally monistic and ‘unitarian’ views about the good society.44 Coupled with 
the economic and global-political dominance of Western liberal states, this leads on 
the one hand to great resentment at the eagerness with which liberalism exports its 
comprehensive political values of democracy and rights, and to a suspicion of ‘moral 
judgementalism’ in situations where non-liberal peoples struggle to see the value in 
liberal institutions. In the same instance, the frequent failure of political institutions 
to live up to these values, in those contexts where they have been exported or 
imposed, and in their liberal homelands results in resentment towards otherwise 
promising intuitional arrangements. Liberalism can offer valuable ideological 
resources to the world, and human rights may indeed be liberalism’s ‘greatest 
bequest to the human race’.45 But it all too often takes an all-or-nothing approach to 
its institutional arrangements, which often results in failure and backlash against 
those arrangements and their advocates. There are numerous examples of economic 
liberalism advancing without the accompanying expansion of political participation. 
Liberty can be respected without capitalism; human rights can exist without 
democracy. While we might aspire to such values universally, the extent to which we 
have the practical and moral leverage to insist upon them as something akin to 
universal human rights, and to refuse to tolerate their absence, is limited.
Thin universalism is less judgemental than liberalism. It embraces a similarly 
tolerant approach but it is less likely to be the recipient of the resentment which 
accompanies liberal toleration. This is a product of construction, and of thinness. It is 
perhaps unsurprising; liberalism is a comprehensive doctrine, and its thinner variants
44 See William Connolly, Pluralism (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2005), pp.3-4, 65
45 Mark Evans, ‘Pluralising Liberalism, Liberalising Pluralism’ in Res Publica, Vol. 10 (4), 2004, 
pp.449-460 at p.453
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still embrace comprehensive views of social organisation.46 Thin universalism 
simply does not represent a comprehensive view of morality, justice, the right, the 
good, or how a society should be organised; it represents only a small part of what 
we call ‘morality’. The constructed regulatory principles expressed as human rights 
are not the ‘be all and end all’ of our moral concerns, commitments, or thinking. 
Thin liberalism represents, however implausibly, a comprehensive doctrine thinned 
down to make it more applicable, forcing its adherents to be more tolerant for the 
sake of social order. Thin universalism is a separate doctrine constructed from a 
consideration of the facts of the world in light of those principles we recognise to be 
independent of those facts. As such it is not a slimmed down doctrine -  it is not 
‘moral anorexia’ -  but rather it is thin of its own volition, for reasons that are 
pragmatic but quintessentially moral. The thin universalist is not cynically tolerant of 
all of which he or she disapproves, following through on respect for persons and 
pluralism by embracing tolerant principles with recognisable, reasoned and 
acceptable limits with intuitive appeal. Thin universalism is not tolerant because it 
must be; it is so because it chooses to be, more actively and with greater sensitivity 
than any doctrine prior to it.
Attempted thin liberalisms can only allow what Ronald Dworkin refers to as 
‘interpretive variation’47 within how liberal principles can be pursued. This is 
perhaps why Rawls himself backed away from a thinner liberalism, towards a thin 
universalism in his later writings on international justice. Ultimately, we are 
reminded of Rex Martin’s speculative conclusion: that the only universalism
46 And about how those who choose to opt-out o f the processes by which that occurs are treated. I am 
thinking here once again about Rawls’ inability to deal with purveyors o f violence from within his 
political liberalism. His resort to a comprehensive view o f liberalism in order to demonstrate why 
violence represents an unacceptable pursuit o f ones goals, and o f conflict, demonstrates nicely why it 
is a thin universalism, and not a thin liberalism that we must seek to construct here.
47 See Ronald Dworkin, Law ’s Empire (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), chapters 1- 
3; see also Martin, ‘Rawls on Human Rights: Liberal or Universal?’ p.206 fii.43
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appropriate to Rawls’s international position is ‘a sort of “thin” universalism.’48 The 
law of peoples itself constitutes a form of thin universalism and, as Martin asserts, it 
has been critiqued as not sufficiently liberal (or indeed Rawlsian) in character. But, 
just as the interpretation of Rawls’s law of peoples resonates in one way in certain 
contexts, and differently in certain other contexts and will allow Dworkin’s 
interpretive variation, a thin universalism too places great emphasis on the extent to 
which its principles will vary according to context. Thin universalism is most 
comfortable alongside the very late Rawls, because this is where he recognises and 
realises his thinnest universalism yet, and one that is not grounded solely in 
comprehensive liberalism. Its construction is separate from that of the construction 
within liberal societies themselves, which are simply one interpretation that could 
justifiably flow from his minimal ‘preinterpretive’ list of human rights.
Strong liberals like Barry and Pogge will continue to insist that without a 
more substantively liberal preinterpretive stage, many of those interpretations will be 
flawed and potentially dangerous.49 Similarly, the thin universalist will assert that 
there are clear limits to the valid interpretive diversity of a set of thin universal 
regulatory principles. Claims to adhere to thin universal principles which clearly do 
not do so, in cases of ethnic cleansing or the like, cannot be regarded as valid 
interpretations of the principles. Thin universalism sets limits on interpretive 
disagreement, but allows a greater degree of illiberal interpretation. Thin 
universalism, as such, seeks to be more tolerant and less judgemental. This, some
48 Martin, ‘Rawls on Human Rights: Liberal or Universal?’ p.205
49 They would be what Barry and Pogge would call unjust. This assertion would require an 
examination justice in the context o f thick and thin, and what constitutes ‘justice’ thickly and thinly 
conceived and the contrast and tensions between them. I do not have the capacity to enter this debate 
here but, speculatively, we might regard them as following the same lines as thick and thin accounts 
of morality. We might further surmise, therefore, that a thin account o f justice does not exhaust what 
justice is or what it can do and we need not be excessively worried by liberal concerns o f the supposed 
‘injustice’ o f illiberal forms o f social organisation.
-327-
i oleration
critics suspect, it fails to do by employing the language and values of toleration in the 
first place. These critiques are addressed in what follows.
Toleration, Recognition and Respect
Those sceptical of universalist projects might here raise the concern that toleration is 
harmful towards, or insufficient to safeguard the integrity of pluralism or the 
‘difference’ identified therein. The suggestion emerges that we must transcend 
misplaced notions of ‘toleration’ in order to properly demonstrate our commitment to 
complex pluralism, and to individual human beings; acceptable pursuit of our first 
principles may demand it. For theorists of multiculturalism and ‘difference’, 
‘toleration’ will involve far more than the account thus far has provided for. For 
Charles Taylor, social identities are formed in dialogue with ‘significant others’ and 
social ‘recognition’ is therefore key to the development of identity. The denial of 
recognition, and of equal recognition, can be deeply damaging for group identity.50 
For Taylor, ‘toleration’ lacks an adequate account of recognition to properly fulfil its 
role.
The ‘politics of difference’ and the recognition of a complex plurality of 
unique social groups with unique identities underpins this idea -  that true respect for 
pluralism demands more than simply tolerating those whose practices differ from our 
own.51 A politics of recognition therefore claims that we can only give due 
acknowledgement to what is universal, the respect owed to all human beings, 
through recognising what is peculiar to each. It is only through recognition of 
pluralism, its constituent agents and its complexities that we are able to fulfil the
50 Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’ Amy Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.27-73 at pp.34-36. The term ‘significant others’ is taken from 
G.H. Mead.
51 See Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad  (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), p.ix. See also Taylor, ’The Politics o f Recognition’, pp.37-38
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commitment to respect others. We must recognise the equal value of different 
cultures, let them survive, and acknowledge their worth. Due recognition is needed 
for the hitherto excluded and to negate images of inferiority inculcated by the 
dominant. The starting hypothesis from which we should approach the study of any 
culture should be grounded in equal respect and the recognition that all cultures have 
something important to say about human beings.
Recognition theorists suggest that emphasis on general principles within 
universalist approaches forces people into a mould which is neither ‘universal’ nor 
‘neutral’, but rather particular and, moreover, white, Western, often male and liberal 
in its particularity. The result is a universalism which forces minority cultures -  ‘the 
tolerated’, rather than ‘the tolerant’ -  into forms alien to themselves.54 Genuine 
differences are dismissed and denied in a ‘homogenising tyranny’.55 This, 
recognition theorists argue, is also a failing of contemporary rights doctrines, many 
of which do offer distinctly ‘thick’ accounts of rights which allow little space for 
interpretation.56 Without close attentiveness to recognition and difference, even a 
thin universalism risks falling into the imperialist trap. Commitment to recognition 
must be the outcome of the analysis of complex pluralism and must feature in place 
of toleration alongside other expressions of thin universalism.
52 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p.39
53 It is important also to resist the stronger claim that the outcome o f further study must be actual 
judgements of equal worth. It makes sense to presume the equal worth o f cultures when studying 
them, but it cannot make sense to conclude that all are as valuable as each other. This kind of  
subjectivism is confused, condescending and ultimately ethnocentric -  mistaking the other for 
ourselves, and equating the two. Taylor, ’The Politics o f Recognition’, pp.66-67, 69-71
54 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p.43
55 Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p.50
56 See Taylor, ‘The Politics o f Recognition’, p.52. And, indeed, Walzer suggests that in cases where 
the ‘minimum’ is sought, that minimum itself is seldom ‘minimal’. See Walzer, Thick and Thin, p. 12. 
See also chapter six, above.
57 Though, it must also be recognised that many who would advocate Taylor’s position (though not 
necessarily Taylor himself) would perhaps reject any notion o f human rights along with their rejection 
of toleration.
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Does the challenge from recognition, which seems well disposed towards 
pluralism, undermine the thin universalist concern with toleration? Firstly, while 
recognition is perhaps a powerful tool in cross-cultural moral discourse, it fails an 
important test of universalisability, making it unsuited to the thin universalist
co
project. And, secondly, what recognition tries to capture is the inherent need to 
secure respect, but that this does not undermine a commitment to toleration, which 
secures respect equally well, without the problems that recognition presents.
Toleration must draw upon the claims of the thin universalist project to 
demonstrate its superiority over recognition. First principles of respect for persons 
and respect for pluralism are the source of thinness and universality. Is recognition 
both sufficiently thin and sufficiently universal to properly demonstrate our 
commitment to those first principles? Recognition calls upon agents to treat cultures 
with equal credence prior to further examination and study. On its own this seems 
unproblematic. But, while this sentiment is primarily addressed to a liberalism 
implicated in the West’s colonial exploitation of the southern hemisphere, liberalism 
is not the only ideology guilty of wielding a superiority complex over others. 
Adherents of a great many doctrines around the world, who hold definite views of 
other cultures in relation to their own, will be unwilling to concede prima facie 
equality when approaching other cultural systems. Few cultures are relativist in their 
outlook, notes Alasdair MacIntyre, and we cannot necessarily count on their 
acceptance of the kind of cultural egalitarianism that recognition demands.
Recognition, then, prides itself on a much thicker set of values than the thin 
universal conception of toleration. Its claim that universalism tends to force people 
into an alien mould is mirrored in its thick approach to cultural difference. It further
581 note, at the same time, however, that it is equally unlikely that Taylor would wish to endorse this 
particular application o f a politics of recognition.
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threatens the identities of those agents who do not regard identity as central to ones 
interactions and it seems likely that without significant alteration to the fundamental 
views of many groups, recognition is not something that they could easily adopt.
While this critique does not undermine the whole project of recognition, it 
does raise questions about how ‘pluralistic’ it is in practice. As a personal ethos, 
recognition insists upon deep cultural sensitivity and is therefore quite positive. 
Though it is this that is most troubling socially, focusing upon a singular core ethos 
of recognition when confronting ‘others’. We might be rightly concerned that to 
insist upon more than a minimal account of toleration is excessively demanding for 
many people, not least those to whom identity is less than central. Many ideologies 
and modes of discourse, including varieties of liberalism, fall into this category. 
Recognition is a powerful and compelling idea, but within the universal domain it is, 
at best, an aspiration. We may truly desire it to be universal, but recognise it as too 
problematic to be so.
This alone may not silence those critics concerned about the imperialist 
history of universalism. If the accusation remains that thin universalism and its 
conception of toleration still seek out an ‘other’ to ostracise, marginalise, exploit, 
enslave and ultimately destroy, what can be said in its defence? Occasionally it is 
prudent to suggest that some, whom we consider our ‘others’, really are our others. 
The ‘otherness’ of the paedophile and the Nazi is not only recognisable, but justified 
and powerful, and we should not be worried about saying so. ‘Otherness’ is further 
substantiated by a conception of thin universalism. Honour killings, for example in 
the case of the murder of Banaz Mahmod in 2006 by her father and uncle, represent
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true otherness, in the midst of a social and political culture which rejects it as 
legitimate practice.59
Other practices, which are also broadly disapproved of, such as halal and 
kosher butchery, do not generate the same sense of otherness. We may well 
disapprove on the grounds of animal welfare, but intervention and negation are ruled 
out by regulatory principles constructed out of respect for complex pluralism. The 
sense of otherness we might feel about murder but which does not extend to 
slaughter practices is characteristic of the intensity attributed to thin universal 
principles. They form what Walzer calls ‘morality close to the bone’.60 But the 
complexity of tolerating those practices not ruled out by thin universal principles 
should not be underestimated. What underlies thin universal toleration is the notion 
of respect derived directly from these principles; this conception of toleration is only 
‘thinly judgemental’ about specific cultural practices. It passes judgement, along 
with any consequences that are attached to it, to a very thin number of cases. These 
cases will include instances of honour killing, but will exclude slaughter practices. 
They will include paedophilia, but will exclude arranged marriage. Of course, 
locally, certain practices may be helped or hindered, prohibited or permitted. The 
legal status of gay ‘marriage’, for example, has recently been formally recognised in 
the UK, in the form of civil partnerships.61 A thin universalism will not mandate on 
the status of gay marriage, or on any number of other issues, which are left to local 
procedural mechanisms.
59 See BBC News, ‘“Honour Killing” Relatives Guilty’, BBC News Online, 
(http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/england/london/6722699.stm June 6th 2007)
60 See Walzer, Thick and Thin, p.6
61 The ‘Civil Partnership Act’ came into force on 5th December 2005. The Act allows for adults o f the 
same sex to enter into a legally binding civil partnership. Couples who form a civil partnership have a 
new legal status, that o f ‘civil partner’.
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Within first principles committed to respect persons and pluralism, the notion 
that one might have a duty to presume another’s culture to be of value is inherent, 
and is part of the considerations that drive the urge to be ‘thin’ in the first place. 
Traces of ‘recognition’ are therefore found in the more minimal presuppositions of 
thin universal toleration. There is little need for the more extensive and strenuous 
commitment to a full politics of recognition in order to secure respect.
Respect is thus captured fully within a thin universal conception of toleration. 
The ‘respect’ inherent in the characterisation of our first principles is carried through 
directly to constructed regulatory principles. It is far from clear that respect can only 
be cashed out within a politics of recognition, and not within an account of 
toleration. Is it really the case that toleration is ill-equipped to deal with the
ff)challenges of complex pluralism?
The language of respect is used frequently in conjunction with toleration 
within political discourse. In a 2004 speech, Job Cohen, mayor of Amsterdam, used 
the language of respect and toleration interchangeably:
Equality and tolerance are not given things, but are things that every 
generation must struggle for to achieve. Creating and ensuring respect for the 
differences between people and ensuring respect for the human rights of 
every individual are essential.
It is perhaps a more respectful society that is sought, and toleration plays a key role 
in that. In order to tolerate that of which we disapprove, a principle of respect is also 
implicitly at work. Respect, is a part of the commitments of our first principles and
62 Because, perhaps toleration was conceived in far less diverse societies than the one in which we 
currently exist? See Gray, Two Faces o f Liberalism, chapter one ‘Liberal Toleration’, p.2
63 Speech o f mayor Job Cohen ‘Speech on the occasion o f  the European Gay Cop Symposium, 
Tuesday August 5 2004’, Amsterdam Civic Website, (http://www.amsterdam.nl/gemeente 
/documenten/toespraken/cohen/inhoud/european gay cop November, 11th 2004)
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provides part of the vocabulary which draws the constructivist towards thin 
universalism. The desire to respect pluralism is what makes a thin universalism thin. 
Respect does, therefore, feature strongly within the thin universalist account of 
toleration.
For Thomas Scanlon, toleration goes further, becoming akin not only to 
respect, but recognition of common membership, citizenship or humanity that runs 
deeper than the conflicts between different groups. In this case, intolerance involves 
a denial of the full membership of an ‘in-group’ to ‘others’ by making it conditional 
upon substantive agreement with ones own values.64 Intolerance is therefore a 
procedure of alienation by individuals or groups directed at other individuals or 
groups. While this is a potentially ‘thick’ Kantian account of toleration, asking that 
everyone acknowledge a deeper membership of a community of ends or of the 
human race as a whole, it is important to recognise that toleration can be an 
expression of more than simply disapproval. And, while it is true that asking people 
to regard themselves first and foremost as cosmopolitans is more problematic than 
asking them to go beyond toleration into recognition, we can see that toleration is not 
necessarily limited in the way that its critics envisage.65 Toleration paves the way for
64 Scanlon, ‘The Difficulty of Tolerance’, pp.193-4. Membership o f certain communities may be 
premised on shared beliefs, for example communities o f religious faith. In these instances it may not 
be intolerant to deny the goods o f membership if lack o f shared belief is incompatible with 
membership.
65 Richard Rorty, o f course, denies the plausibility o f such attempts. He contends that in a world 
marked by pluralism it is o f no use to take this perspective and attempt to reconcile differences by 
asking people to relate to each other through shared ‘human’ characteristics, as followers o f many 
moral doctrines would argue, (as Rorty himself does), that no such characteristics exist. See Richard 
Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality’ in Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers 
Vol.3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 167-185 at p. 178. Instead, most people 
think o f  themselves first and foremost not simply as human beings but as certain sorts o f human 
being, defined quite often by what they are not (i.e. not black, gay, female, Muslim etc). What Rorty 
proposes instead is the use o f sentimental education, the telling o f Tong sad stories’, gives people 
enough common ground to prevent feelings of ‘difference’, which so often lead to conflict, from 
becoming overwhelming. The character of complex pluralism severely limits appeals to empirical 
commonalities, as I have sought to show, though it does not preclude the idea o f constructing a space 
in which commonalities can flourish, most notably by Michael Walzer in Chapter 1 o f his Thick and 
Thin.
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further universal aspirations. It is limited, but certainly not the ‘most that we can 
hope for’.
Nonetheless, a thin universal conception of toleration must remain more 
minimal than Scanlon’s account suggests. It does indeed acknowledge a complex 
plurality of agents and groups in the presuppositions made when acting, and it does 
not require us to cast off our familial ties and give ourselves wholeheartedly to the 
group or community.66 Nor does it require us to cast off those affiliations and give 
ourselves over to a global community of human beings. It recognises that it will 
scarcely be possible for many even to recognise the validity of the cosmopolitan 
domain. So, we must fall back on toleration as the most we can reasonably ask of a 
complex plurality of others. While it might be difficult to ask that people think 
globally, or to recognise the equal validity of others groups, we must be able to insist 
that they are at least tolerant of one another if peaceful coexistence is to prevail over 
mutual destruction.
But toleration must demand something of agents in order for it to hold even 
this minimal value. Toleration is related to communication and to public reason.67 
Kant insisted that the ‘public use of reason’ should always be free, but this requires 
more than simply non-interference in the expressive activities of others. Such an 
undemanding notion of toleration, which consigns positive action in response to the 
expressions, actions or beliefs of others to secondary consideration, devalues 
toleration. It is presented superficially as something benign and uncostly; easily
66 See here Onora O’Neill, Towards justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account o f  Practical 
Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.99-113
67 For the genealogy o f  the term ‘public reason’ as used in this context see Kant, ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’ pp.55-56; Onora O’Neill, ‘The Public Use o f Reason’; Rawls, Politics Liberalism, 
pp.212-254
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given, and, we might suppose, equally easily denied. However, toleration plays a 
more challenging role in moral deliberation than this implies.68
The significance and complexity of toleration for thin universalism becomes 
clear when the self-expression of others is recognised as a form of communication. 
For Onora O’Neill, the toleration of self-expression takes a ‘weak’ position with 
regard to, for example, the taste-oriented expressions of others, which, we may feel, 
we can take or leave at our leisure. Other expressions however are more ‘public’ and 
are not simply expressions of taste but forms of communication. Doing nothing in 
response to such communications may then convey hostility towards, disapproval of, 
or even rejection of another’s point of view, signalling that what they are doing is not 
communicating, rendering the communication a failure. Toleration itself is a form of 
communication, which embodies minimal symbols of respect and we therefore do 
not tolerate others’ communications if we are simply passive or non-interfering.69
Toleration is only minimally demanding, but it is demanding nonetheless. It 
demands a sense of respect towards those from whom we differ. This is a part of 
what Scanlon calls the ‘difficulty of tolerance’. Toleration and the conditions that 
give rise to it are not limited to the ‘formal politics’ of participation, voting, and 
party membership, they permeate our everyday lives to an enormous degree and 
extend into the realm of ‘informal politics’. Consider Scanlon’s example of a 
religiously plural state. The legal enforcement of a single official state religion may 
generate fears of formal intolerance of other religions, or of special privilege in 
public matters for the official faith. However, such concerns may legitimately extend 
beyond formal institutionalisation and into the informal, social sphere. The social 
predominance of a particular religion -  where, for example, all but a small group are
68 O’Neill, ‘The Public Use of Reason’, pp.30-31; Scanlon, ‘The Difficulty o f Tolerance’, p. 188
69 O’Neill, ‘The Public Use o f Reason’, p.31
70 Scanlon, ‘The Difficulty o f Tolerance’, pp.191-192. Atheism is not excluded from this potential.
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devout followers of a particular religion -  means that it will inevitably come to 
dominate social discourse, potentially making life for those who do not believe very 
difficult.70
This, of course, reaffirms the important and valuable role of social pluralism, 
and pushes further the claim that we ought to respect and nurture it. Given that no 
societies but the very small and isolated are completely homogeneous, a plurality, 
even a ‘complex’ plurality, can be a valuable safeguard against tyranny.71
At the same time, as Taylor himself points out, its commitment to 
universalism has meant that liberalism has always been a fighting creed and this is 
equally true of thin universalism. There will always be a line drawn somewhere,
H*)however minimal the content beneath the line is. There will always be a drive to 
sort the genuine human rights claims from the universal aspirations and the various 
bogus claims to rights. As societies become more multicultural and more porous, the 
need to address citizens who belong to different cultures without compromising our 
basic principles become more and more important. In an attempt to avoid the 
accusation that thin universalism is morally and culturally imperialistic, it is tempting 
to introduce the concept of recognition to ensure respect for pluralism is upheld. But 
attention to complex pluralism and to our first principles demands only a robust 
conception of toleration, and not more demanding alternatives.
Conflict is always likely to arise on some level and to some degree in modem 
plural society, whether that society is a small rural community, a large metropolitan 
area, a politically and legally defined sovereign state or the entire planet. Toleration 
imposes limitations on how that conflict can be pursued. We do not need to tolerate
71 Indeed, such arguments are forwarded by those opposed to notions o f cosmopolitan governance.
See, for example the work o f Hannah Arendt, particularly Origins o f  Totalitarianism (New York: 
Harcourt, 1966)
72 Taylor, ’The Politics o f Recognition’, p.62
-337-
i oleration
terrorism, for example, as it is clearly an unacceptable pursuit of conflict. 
Accordingly, toleration performs part of the function of thin universalism. It is a 
framework in which moral and cultural conflict can be arbitrated, though neither can 
necessarily provide a framework in which all violent conflicts can be resolved. 
Resolution need not always be the ultimate objective of toleration, per se, though it 
might be hard to envisage any other means by which resolution could be achieved. It 
might be enough simply to suggest that disagreement and conflict need to be 
conducted within such a framework for them to be ‘acceptable’ in that they are 
subject to certain norms of conduct, expression and discourse in which certain means 
are rejected as unacceptable. Toleration can provide this framework.
Toleration and the ‘Ethos of Pluralization’
I close this discussion by contrasting thin universal toleration with William E. 
Connolly’s, ‘ethos of pluralization’. For Connolly, ‘pluralism’ denotes more than the 
basic background conditions in which we act; it is more than a state or condition.73 
For Connolly, pluralism captures a way of being, of viewing the world, of working 
upon ones self, as part of the cultivation of a virtuous character. Pluralism, and a 
commitment to pluralize, takes the form of an ‘ethos’.74
Connolly places the concept of ‘time’ central to social questions. While 
Taylor provides a distinctly fixed  conception of identity, which demands recognition, 
Connolly’s notion of identity is far more fluid. His focus is not simply upon ‘being’, 
on what ‘is’, where the present state of affairs is a ‘closed’ system, but on 
‘becoming’, where ‘being’ is mobile, contingent, changing and open. In the political 
and social arena, many groups find themselves falling just outside of accepted
73 Nor is it, it is important to remember, for thin universalism.
74 See William Connolly, Pluralism (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2005). See also The Ethos 
o f  Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996)
-338-
i oierauon
political norms, and within what Connolly calls ‘a netherworld below the register of 
positive acceptance, identity, legitimacy, or justice’. In becoming, a move is made 
from this ‘netherworld’, to a state of recognition on one of these registers.75
A contrast between thin universal toleration and the ethos of pluralization is 
interesting because Connolly uses the language of thick and thin to draw us into his 
discussion of becoming: ‘The new demand [in Connolly’s example, the demand for 
the right to doctor assisted suicide] is not derived from a thick set of principles 
containing it implicitly all along’, he states. Rather, ‘it will be pressed and negotiated 
into being by an assemblage of insurgents ... aided by the fatigue of erstwhile
7 f%opponents’. Connolly posits a different kind of project to that offered by thin 
universalism, with a very different account of toleration, critical both of classical and 
thin universalist conceptions due to their shared characteristics.
While tolerance is herein described as the virtue of the thin universalist, the 
ethos of pluralization, attuned to the issues of becoming, prides itself on similar yet 
contrasting traits. Key amongst these is the notion of ‘agonistic respect’, whereby 
pluralized social actors recognise within one another their radically different sources 
of ethical value and as such express modesty with regard to the ultimate 
universalisability of the sources of their own such values. For Connolly, the 
distinction between liberal tolerance and agonistic respect forms the basis of his 
critique, framed thus:
Agonistic respect is a kissing-cousin of liberal tolerance. But liberal tolerance 
is bestowed upon private minorities by a putative majority occupying the 
authoritative public centre. You may have noticed that people seldom enjoy 
being tolerated that much, since it carries the onus of being at the mercy of a
75 Connolly, Pluralism, p. 122
76 Connolly, Pluralism, p. 121
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putative majority that often construes its own position to be beyond 
question.’77
There are two familiar objections to proposing toleration here, both of which are 
potentially damaging to the account of toleration within the thin universalist project. 
First, for Connolly, ‘tolerance’ is the watchword of a particular and dominant public 
core. It fails to meet the needs and expectations of a pluralized world. Perhaps more 
damagingly though, toleration also risks failing to meet the standards set for it by 
thin universalism; it veers dangerously towards self-contradiction. Construction, 
keen to enter into dialogue, to redescribe itself and to offer pluralised access to its 
principles, fails if it adopts uncritically the language of toleration. But, for Connolly, 
this failure is symptomatic of something more troubling. Second, therefore, 
‘toleration’ is an expression of deep misgiving about the doctrine of another; the very 
definition of toleration incorporates an undeniable notion of disapproval. This 
critique is worth exploring further, because it can help to address a key criticism not 
only of thin universalism, but of Anglo-American justificatory moral and political 
philosophy generally.
The disapproval within toleration is, for this broadly post-structuralist 
critique, symptomatic of the tendency within conceptions of ethics or politics that
<70
place their focus upon general, universalisable ‘rules’, to fail to recognise the 
contingent authority of those rules. This leads to a tendency to define the authority of 
those rules as absolute for oneself and others, and to proclaim the doctrines of faith, 
political institutions, the state or nation that form the foundations of those rules to be 
under threat until all others share their authority. This is what Connolly calls the
77 Connolly, Pluralism, p. 123
78 What Walzer called ‘covering-law universalism’. See Michael Walzer, ‘Nation and Universe’, p.l 1
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‘temptation to evil within faith’79 and leads to the more general concern over the 
resultant tendency to act to ‘punish, correct, exclude or terrorise’ those who do not or
fincannot fall into line.
When we merely tolerate those who do not conform, we have not taken 
sufficient action to discount the possibility that we might, at any time, return to 
punishment, correction, exclusion and terror. Even when this is not the case, 
toleration remains saturated in the expression of disapproval, which deeply 
patronises non-liberal practices. The ethos of pluralization offers a way of looking at 
these issues in a different light and of overcoming the problems Connolly perceives 
to be apparent within doctrines that proclaim ‘tolerance’.
The following example highlights the dispositions to which Connolly refers. 
A broadly ‘tolerant’ doctrine might be ‘heteronormative’, in that its adherents are 
heterosexual and embrace heterosexual practices as the norm. It instantiates 
institutions, rituals and practices, such as an institution of ‘marriage’ and a concept of 
‘family’, which reflect that heteronormativity. Members of the group are not 
homosexual, and homosexuality is, by and large, not compatible with the teaching of 
the doctrine. In fact, homosexuality is flatly disapproved of, but the doctrine does not 
profess that homosexuality should be eradicated or that homosexuals should be the 
target of persecution. The leaders of the group reject the pursuit of an anti­
homosexual policy while remaining silent on the obvious heteronormativity of the 
doctrine itself. The doctrine tolerates homosexuality in that it disapproves of the 
practice and, assuming that it has the power to act to negate it, chooses not to 
interfere with those who practice it.
79 Connolly, Pluralism, p. 18
80 Connolly, Pluralism, p. 19. For the ‘post-structuralist position’ -  such as there is a unified position 
here -  on the subject o f punishment and related concepts see, most notably, Michel Foucault,
Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f the Prison (London: Penguin, 1991)
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However, the ethos of pluralization will suggest that it fails in important ways 
to fulfil -  returning to the language of thin universalism -  a commitment to respect 
persons and to respect pluralism simply by ‘tolerating’ alone. While the commitment 
to toleration embodies a formal commitment not to interfere in the practices of a 
homosexual community who must share the same territory as the above doctrine, the 
deeply unresponsive and largely negative regard paid to it by both the political 
leadership of the doctrine and, plausibly, many of its practitioners has a potentially 
socially negating effect on that homosexual community.
Key constructivist thinkers have not been blind to this potential. Scanlon has
Q 1
expressed a similar sentiment from a different perspective. While toleration is 
presented by its critics as something that costs the tolerant very little, it is a 
powerfully receptive act. As noted above, both Scanlon and O’Neill demonstrate 
how toleration can be highly demanding for the tolerant. Scanlon recognises that 
where a particular religion, philosophy or such is predominant in a society, life for 
those who are not members, or not full members can be extremely difficult, even 
where public life is avowedly neutral with regard to specific religious or 
philosophical views.82 Construction, as such, urges a ‘spirit of tolerance’, of 
accommodation and respect coupled with a desire to find a system of rights that
o - i
others within a given domain could also be asked to accept.
The ethos of pluralism makes the following point:
Many gay and lesbian activists, for instance, press in favour of a positive 
pluralization of sexual and gender identities on the same territory. The 
successful enactment of such plurality, moreover, involves a micropolitics of 
self-modification in the relational identities of straights, in which they
81 See Scanlon, ‘The Difficulty of Tolerance’, pp. 187-201
82 Scanlon, ‘The Difficulty of Tolerance’, pp.191-192
83 Scanlon, ‘The Difficulty o f Tolerance’, p. 198
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cultivate a bicameral orientation to their own practices of sensuality. You 
enact your sexual affiliation as if it were the natural way of being; but, in 
another gesture, you come to terms, viscerally and reflectively, with the 
extent to which it is neither the natural nor the universal form of sexuality.
Connolly goes on to suggest that in order to circumvent the temptation towards evil 
in faith, there is pressing need to accept that ones own identity is neither fixed nor 
eternal; its stability is always in a sense at risk. Any identity, any doctrine, is thus 
opened up to dispute and debate by other groups whose ultimate sources of value and 
identity differ. As such, he summarises that
the most noble response is to seek to transmute cultural antagonisms ... into 
debates marked by agonistic respect between the partisans, with each 
acknowledging that it’s highest and most entrenched faith is legitimately
Of
contestable by others.
The most ‘noble’ response for the heteronormative doctrine is to engage with its own 
practices, to ‘work upon itself, ultimately granting the contestability of its own 
heteronormative presuppositions. Such a procedure reflects far more than a ‘simple’ 
act of toleration, and perhaps even more than a bootstrapped -zipped or -laced 
argument could ever hope to yield. The concession of the ultimate contestability of 
ones own faith is the mark of the ethos of pluralization.
But this is not unproblematic. In chapter two I drew a strong contrast between 
pluralism as a higher order account of value (‘value pluralism’) and pluralism as an 
observable diversity of practices, customs and doctrines. I drew this distinction 
because it quickly becomes apparent that the former was itself a deep source of 
pluralization. It seemed unlikely that an account of value pluralism would be
84 Connolly, Pluralism, pp.30-31
85 Connolly, Pluralism, p.46
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accessible to a large percentage of the people to whom a thin universalism was to be
O f
addressed. I rejected value pluralism, in favour of a complex plurality of observable 
practices as the factual basis for a thin universalism. With the ethos of pluralization 
we have come full circle; conceding the ultimate contestability of ones own faith is 
equivalent to an acceptance of a form of value pluralism.
The thin universalist project rejects the need to accept the ultimate 
contestability of ones own faith as too ‘thick’ a demand to place upon many people. 
We may have good cause to suspect that many will refuse to accept our invitation to 
call into question the ultimate nature of their beliefs. Accepting that what one 
believes in most deeply -  Walzer’s ‘morality close to the bone’87 -  to be powerfully 
contestable seems to significantly underestimate the seriousness with which people 
take their most deeply held beliefs.
Similarly, Connolly suggests that pluralization can disperse the assumption 
that societies organised around a shared doctrine, philosophy or faith occupy a 
central public core which tolerates the existence, and to an extent the activities of, 
minorities. He suggests that, following the ethos of pluralization, ‘the national image 
of a centred majority surrounded by minorities eventually becomes transfigured into 
an image of interdependent minorities of different types connected through multiple 
lines of affiliation.’88 But is such a transfiguration not an excessively thick demand to 
place on such a majority? The extent to which many would resist such efforts may 
well be huge and it would not be unrealistic to posit that it might take several 
generations for such transfigurations to occur peacefully if, in some cases, they are 
possible at all.
86 Whilst at the same time suspecting its truth value.
87 See Walzer, Thick and Thin, p.6
88 Connolly, Pluralism, pp.61-62
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Moreover, in his challenge to thin universalism’s minimalist, pluralistically 
sensitive covering-law universalism, Connolly pushes for an understanding of 
‘morality’ which ‘is not understood in the first instance to be derived from apodictic 
recognition of its law-like form but rather taken to be inspired in the first instance by 
a love of the world or attachment to the complexity of being that infuses it’.89 Of 
course, while it is not impossible to expect that such a view is viable, it again seems 
likely that the expectation is too great for many moral doctrines. Many conceptions 
of morality take on rule-like characteristics, especially those that have long histories.
Overall, then, pluralization demands a great deal, not least the radical 
restructuring and reordering of the ethical priorities and social norms of those to 
whom it is addressed. This at once seems practically problematic, and not wholly in 
accordance with the spirit of pluralism, toleration and thin universalism. Liberals 
have been called ‘boutique multiculturalists’; of accepting ‘difference’ but 
understanding that difference as little more than skin deep, embracing diversity by 
eating Indian food and little more.90 But if proponents of the ethos of pluralization 
think that, of the many people to whom it addresses itself, it will be a majority who 
can see the value in acknowledging the contestability of their ultimate beliefs, it is 
they who do not take seriously the genuine and irreconcilable differences that exist 
within complex pluralism.91
Connolly suggests that ‘pessimists’ might be an appropriate label for those 
who doubt the extent to which the contestability of ultimate beliefs could be
89 Connolly, Pluralism, p .l 16 (author’s emphasis)
90 See Stanley Fish, ‘Boutique Multiculturalism, or Why Liberals Are Incapable o f Thinking About 
Hate Speech’ in Critical Inquiry, Vol.23 (2), 1997, pp.378-395 at pp.378-380. It is far from clear, 
however, the extent to which multiculturalists could ever do much more than ‘sample’ other cultures 
in this way.
91 Connolly refers to it as ‘deep pluralism’ throughout his work, but specific instances can be found at 
Connolly, Pluralism, pp.30 and 59-67
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adopted.92 This he says, is where ‘public intellectuals should lead the way in setting 
an example, rather than decrying the refusal of others’, perhaps in the same way that 
Rorty assigns philosophy and philosophers the task of making their own 
commitments more powerfully persuasive.93 And Connolly may be correct; it may be 
a form of ‘pessimism’ that prompts concern over whether accepting essential 
contestability is a plausible objective for ethical projects such as a thin universalism.
We are reminded of William James and his insistence that we have a right to 
believe in what we would will to be the case, even without sufficient evidence.94 In 
this respect perhaps we do risk being overly ‘pessimistic’ in resisting the suggestion 
that we cannot expect others to undertake to reform their own beliefs to the extent 
Connolly suggests. After all, no small amount of ‘faith’ goes into the underpinnings 
of the thin universalist project itself; we have faith in our judgements about the 
world, which lead us to identify our first principles. And, as Connolly points out, ‘if 
James can be taken to mean that concerted and long-term action based upon the 
assumption of a pluralistic universe can help to bring into the open features of the 
world that would otherwise remain in the shadows’ then perhaps we do not have 
cause to be so sceptical.95
But the concerns over the excessively thick requirements of accepting 
essential contestability, as well as the seemingly extensive work that holders of faith 
are required to do upon their own structures of belief are not simply pragmatic. The 
suggestion that it is not simply practical, but also fundamentally moral concerns 
which underpin the tentative approach to what we can expect others to adopt, again
92 Connolly, Pluralism, p.47
93 Connolly, Pluralism, p.47. See Richard Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality’ in 
Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
pp.167-185
94 See William James, ‘The Will to Believe’ in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular 
Philosophy (London: Longmans, 1917)
95 Connolly, Pluralism, p.81
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makes its presence felt. The concern that to insist upon agonistic respect and the 
recognition of essential contestability is too thick a demand to make of many people 
reflects the moral commitments implicit within the first principles of the thin 
universalist project. We are reminded once more that thinness is a moral imperative, 
derived from first principles, and not simply a practical directive generated by the 
importance of consensus on certain moral questions.96
We might rightly wonder, more strongly, whether the kind of character 
change he pursues has an dwtf-pluralistic effect. If we all come to adopt an ethos of 
pluralization and we all come to accept essential contestability and agonistic respect, 
this would seem to entail, if not demand, a character change which would surely sap 
part of the essential character of pluralism. In fact, we might wonder whether is has 
more monistic and Unitarian tendencies than any kind of pluralistically sensitive thin 
universalism, which demands only tolerance of differences. To assume that the only 
chance we have to bring the mass slaughter and moral catastrophe of the twentieth 
and early twenty first centuries to an end is by undergoing a massive change in our 
moral character, seem far more pessimistic than a healthy scepticism.
Though, perhaps it is down to pessimism that I endorse a thin universal 
conception of toleration over an ethos of pluralization. Perhaps it is the radically 
different backgrounds out of which the two ideas emerge. Perhaps there is more 
ground between them on which they can meet than I give credence to here. After all, 
thin universalism talks endlessly about pluralism, and the ethos of pluralization 
cannot help but refer to itself as tolerant, even if it does not preach ‘tolerance’. But
96 We will remember that this concern has reared its head throughout this latter half o f the project as a 
constant reminder that while consent is an important practical question, it is a powerful moral 
underpinning that underpins the whole thin universalist project. It is the moral commitment to respect 
persons and to respect the pluralism inherent in their cultural, social, moral and political creations.
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the ethos of pluralization is far more comprehensively minded than it lets on, and this 
is where tolerance is better situated in complexly pluralised world.
The Limits of a Thin Universalism
Toleration is a challenging disposition. It does not make scant demands upon those 
who look to practice it and insists that critical engagement with others and ourselves 
is a necessary part of ethical life. Where pluralism is neglected or ignored, where the 
agents who act within it are not accorded the respect required to properly follow 
through on our first principles, toleration fails. Because of this the thin universalist 
conception of toleration is both more demanding than liberal toleration but at the 
same time more easily universalisable.
The classical liberal conception of toleration fails to show this level of 
commitment to respect for persons and for pluralism and therefore unsurprisingly 
comes across as the kind of doctrine which simply ‘puts up’ with those with whom it 
disagrees, rather than seeking to engage or properly communicate with the actors in a 
pluralistic society. A doctrine which simply puts up with that with which it disagrees 
still bears all the hallmarks of the tired Enlightenment dogma that regards pluralism 
as a diversion on the path to pure reason. Classical liberal toleration veers 
dangerously close to a properly monistic and Unitarian moral doctrine that is 
interested in little more than preventing social chaos.
It takes a long time to navigate the terrain of toleration. It takes great care and 
effort to negotiate between thin universal principles and thicker, more contextual 
principles. This poses challenges to the thin universalist project. With the 
heteronormative religious doctrine, and the striking of a balance between that 
doctrine and gay rights, inconsistencies can be played out by a thin universalism with
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its conception of toleration. Issues of group or minority rights can be left for local 
communities, societies and states to work through. What to tolerate, what to endorse 
and what to prohibit cannot be determined by thin universalism alone. To prescribe 
how a society should do so is to violate a fundamental thin universalist commitment 
to respect for persons and pluralism, and it is therefore important to be tolerant in the 
first instance.
Toleration does not operate without limits however, and a conception of 
toleration is directly derived from a carefully constructed thin universalism which 
takes seriously the demands made upon it by an observable diversity of social, 
economic, cultural and ethnic groups. The limits of toleration within a global domain 
are drawn by a thin universalism and they are not open-ended.
What they can tell us, however, is that a thin universalist project is a limited 
project. Indeed, it is a project that is well aware of its own limitations. It does not 
look to be a holistic account of the universe, of morality, or of social and political 
interaction. In fact, practices of toleration illuminate clearly just how much there is to 
morality and politics that lies beyond a thin universalism. Just as clearly, though, 
practices of intolerance show why we might need a thin universalism in the first 
place.
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A Principled Pluralism?
This is a thesis about principles. Not any, nor all principles, but a specific set of 
principles, conceived with a particular purpose and scope, and with a particular 
audience and readership, in mind. It is not a comprehensive account of our moral 
commitments, or of what they ought to be, nor is it an exhaustive analysis of the 
nature of ethico-political interaction. This much should, by now, be clear. What this 
thesis is, is an account of how we might arrive at, and defend, a set of principled 
judgements which hold their validity across a complex plurality of social, cultural 
and political actors.
This is also a thesis about pluralism. Not as an account of value, but as a 
complex feature of our social lives. A feature which is terrifying and uplifting, 
challenging and rewarding, ineradicable yet immensely fragile, dangerous and 
endangered. What this thesis is, is an attempt to secure for pluralism sufficient public 
space to ensure its survival and proliferation. It is a defence of pluralism.
I began with an account of pluralism as an observable diversity of social, 
political, cultural and economic groups which, due to its many layers of interaction 
and renegotiation, I described as ‘complex’. I began with pluralism as fact, as a 
statement about the world, the evidence for which is universally accessible. I 
conclude with a defence of pluralism, and its normative significance for individuals 
and groups within it. Pluralism, as one of my premises, emerges also as one of my 
conclusions. Thin universalism seeks to develop principles that are robust in such a
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way as to be properly responsive to the conditions of the social worlds in which they 
operate. Such principles must be sensitive to complex pluralism; they are so precisely 
because they play a role in preserving it. They help to carve out the space in public 
and political life that allows a plurality of societal agents (and a plurality of societies) 
to continue to exist, thrive and interact. Thin human rights and toleration are not ends 
in themselves, they are tools -  what Gray refers to as enforceable conventions1 -  
which help to forge and maintain that space. Those tools, like the space itself, are 
forever reinventing and reinvigorating themselves -  always redrawn by changing 
facts and fact-independent principles.
But pluralism is not an open-ended normative agenda, as the course of this 
thesis has sought to show. Its limits can be constructed through consideration of the 
status quo, and distilled into concepts with existing political import. Thin 
universalism provides a structure within which pluralism can flourish and which sets 
limits on a justifiable plurality of moral views. Thin universalism can secure a sphere 
of pluralistic contestation that excludes the extremes of moral degradation -  it 
secures a principled pluralism?
This is, in part, an engagement that uses the distinction between the ideal and 
the non-ideal. But it is important to clarify exactly what constitutes ‘the ideal’ -  to 
what ‘ideal’ refers, and what it is to incorporate -  that is spoken of when the 
ideal/non-ideal distinction is used. At what point do we reach an ideal level of 
abstraction from the realities of the world? It is tempting to assume that projects such 
as thin universalism place pluralism on the side of the non-ideal, and as such pursue 
a world without pluralism, even if it is ineradicable in practice. Of course, monists do
1 See John Gray, Two Faces o f  Liberalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), p. 107
2 See Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts and Peter Sutch. ‘Introduction’ in Bruce Haddock, Peri Roberts 
and Peter Sutch (eds.), Principles and Political Order: The Challenge o f  Diversity (London:
Routledge, 2006), pp. 1-9 at p.2
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not deny this, claiming that error must be eradicated and that the single source of 
truth or value can be shown to be correct. Thin universalism recognises this to be the 
case, and does not contradict those doctrines that espouse such monisms. It seeks to 
bear upon the means by which they clash with one another, and with others.
Importantly, though, thin universalism need not affirm these monisms -  it is 
not committed to saying that pluralism is a part of the non-ideal world, or that it 
cannot feature in a model of how the world ought to be. Thin universal principles are 
quite compatible with both sets of claims. Though, if pushed, the thin universalist 
would probably challenge the assertion that everyone agreeing about everything 
would constitute an ideal scenario. How much richness and variety would be lost if 
we all agreed on everything? What about those parts of our identity that are formed 
through contestation and debate, and political dialogue and interaction?
That said, what remains of the cosmopolitan vision of the Stoics that has long 
since framed this kind of universalism? Where does the thin universalist project 
stand with regard to the possibility of ‘justice on Earth’? The thin universalist can 
confirm that pluralism has problematised that vision in the strongest terms. What 
constitutes it, and how and why it is pursued will now forever come under scrutiny, 
as should have been the case from the outset. But this does not make the vision itself 
obsolete, nor does the pursuit of that vision entail disregard for pluralism.
The metaethical issues at stake here cannot be sidestepped if relativism is to 
be avoided. Many postmodernist and poststructuralist critics of the thin universalist 
project will want at the same time to share in a disavowal of the absolute truth of 
relativism or emotivism. But those critics do so whilst seeking to avoid answering 
many of the metaethical questions addressed in the first half of this thesis. In so 
doing, they risk ignoring these questions, or worse simply denying that they exist.
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The fact remains that if we are to engage at all with people who do not share our 
views, we must accept that various metaethics are at work in different people’s value 
systems. These metaethics deploy structures which allow their holders to reject 
relativism, in spite of the complex plurality which surrounds them. Thin universalism 
seeks to replicate those metaethics in order to respect that pluralism. This allows the 
realist, or the religious devotee access to thin universal principles, and at the same 
time allows the subjectivist, the emotivist and the sceptic access also. In order to 
reject relativism, the metaethical questions addressed in this project cannot simply be 
circumvented.
As such, the thin universalist project does not succeed or fail (if it can be said 
to succeed or fail, given that it is engaged in such a dynamic enterprise) according to 
the acceptance by others of the first principles at work in this thesis. A disposition 
towards respect for pluralism and respect for persons cannot be and is not assumed. 
Construction is not about securing the support for the project from a plurality of 
social actors from the start. Construction is about reaching out to people on their own 
terms, communicating in ways accessible to them. I take this approach because of my 
own principles and commitments which emerge from consideration of the facts, and 
of historical and social experience. The aim of construction is to find that terrain of 
debate and negotiation, where principles can remain the subject of that debate. The 
aim is to reach out to a plurality, in a plurality of ways, with a common result, which 
is expressed and negotiated in a plurality of ways, but which secures a common 
concern.
Constructivism will always be concerned far less with the substantive content 
of the regulatory principles themselves. Construction will be far more concerned 
with the means by which those principles are reached. This is inherent in the nature
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of such a project, given its recognition that the world does not exist on a fixed final 
plane of realised reality, and nor do principles that are constructed in order to have an 
effect upon it.
This means that we need to affect a shift in how the form and purpose of 
universalism is regarded. We need to rethink, or re-imagine, what is meant by 
‘universalism’, what universalism is. It is a valid domain of ethical inquiry, which 
presents to us genuine moral issues which ought to bear upon our actions and upon 
our judgements about the actions of others. It is therefore a descriptive feature of the 
regulatory principles to which it corresponds. It describes the extent of the 
application of a given political principle within a specified domain. But we also need 
to rethink, or re-imagine, what universalism is for. The perception that ‘universalism’ 
must constitute an answer to all our moral questions -  as in the pure Kantian model 
of universalism -  is misplaced. In fact, it is pervasive and destructive to pluralism, 
and therefore a violation of the first principles of this project. ‘Universal’ premises or 
principles do not provide access to ‘higher’ knowledge or morality. There is nothing 
within ‘universalism’, semantically or ethically, which suggests an ‘elevation’ of any 
kind. Universalism is intended to address a particular domain of ethical inquiry, and 
nothing more. In many respects, thin universalism is thin in one further crucial 
respect -  it seeks to reform the role of universalism, rendering its task a far more 
modest one.
This also belies an answer to two further questions about the function and 
extent of the thin universalist project. Could we envisage a thin universal morality, 
where morality is comprised entirely of thin universal principles? Could we, in turn, 
envisage a thin universal society, governed solely according to thin universal 
principles?
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In answer to the first question, it seems clear that there could never be a thin 
universal morality. There could never be a conception of morality made up entirely 
of thin universal principles. This is so firstly because thin universalism is the result of 
construction, and construction is conducted in part by people who already hold 
comprehensive views. Thin universal regulatory principles, while not empirically 
dependent on a common core of already existing principles, could not exist without a 
complex plurality of value-creating and value-holding groups and individuals. 
Without them, there would be no imagining of a thin universal morality. It cannot 
exist without people who hold other principles to bring it into being -  to construct it. 
Furthermore, thin universalism is a conception of a particular set of principles, 
designed for a particular purpose. A ‘morality’, on the other hand, or indeed 
‘morality’ in general, may comprise many such sets of principles and judgements, of 
which thin universalism is (or may be) one set. Thin universalism can never be 
morality, holistically understood, because it looks to one particular ethical domain 
alone, that of the universal.
Nor can there be a thin universalist society. Universalism generally, but thin 
universalism specifically, contains far too few moral and political materials to render 
it functional as the only tool of deliberation within a society. The very idea of 
thinness is tied up with the underdetermination of the full moral character of any 
decent society. No society, much less a state, could be held together by thin universal 
principles alone. Moreover, thin universalism is the result of construction, and 
construction is conducted in part by people with their own comprehensive views 
which make up the more comprehensive character of political and social relations. 
Thin universalism is not a scheme for establishing new polities. It is a scheme for 
establishing the limits of political relations and arbitrating disagreement between
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already-exiting societies. Thin principles could not form the basis of a way of life, 
simply the mechanisms by which competing ways of life engage in discourse and 
attempt to reach non-violent resolutions to conflict.
But this does not mean that thin universalism simply represents ‘moral 
anorexia’; it is not ‘morality-lite’. Thin universalism is constituted by regulatory 
principles which are compatible with a complex plurality of comprehensive 
doctrines. In many respects they do not make a great deal of sense unless they are 
connected to and engaged in interactions with a comprehensive set of views. This 
may sound like nothing more than a rephrasing of Rawls’ ‘overlapping consensus’,3 
but thin universalism diverges from Rawls in several key respects. For Rawls, 
citizens relate to the political liberal core in the same way: detached from their 
particular comprehensive views. But a complex plurality can relate to thin universal 
principles in a plurality of different ways. Because thin universalism reaches out to 
that plurality, instead of dictating the language and vocabulary of a public core, it 
serves pluralism more fully, whilst seeking to secure it -  and persons and groups -  
against violence.
‘Thinness’, then, does not imply ‘thinned’. It is not simply a matter of 
stripping content from thick, contextual beliefs or values. As chapter seven 
suggested, it is difficult to imagine many doctrines, such as liberalism, Christianity, 
or socialism, ‘thinned down’ for a wider audience. Such doctrines would most likely 
lack any semblance of their thicker selves, including essential commitments to 
liberty, belief in God, or outcome equality. But ‘universalism’ is not the same as 
‘liberalism’, ‘Christianity’ or ‘socialism’. It is a feature of those doctrines, not a 
comparable doctrine in itself. It lacks most of their characteristics, including
3 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), introduction
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comprehensive views about social or ethical life. Universalism contains within it any 
number of judgements and prescriptions, but prescriptions and judgements which are 
constrained by limitations of the nature of universalism itself. Thin universalism, 
therefore contains even fewer prescriptions, ones which pertain to a specific context 
(the universal) and which do not amount simply to a thinned down form of liberalism 
or Judaeo-Christianity. Thinned down forms of liberalism and Judaeo-Christianity 
could not rightly be so called. Thin universal regulatory principles exist alongside, 
and aim to be compatible with, other doctrines, speaking in the language of those 
doctrines where possible, or in accessible terms where it is not. Thin universalism is 
universalism thinned down, not liberalism or Christianity thinned down.
As such, instead of outlining a comprehensive doctrine at the outset and 
proceeding to strip away from it the thick, context-dependent, particular, substantive 
content, leaving a ‘thin’ doctrine at the end, the thesis has sought to take an abstract 
account of the relationship between facts and principles, and elaborate, elucidate and 
justify that account, constructing a ‘thin’ conception of universalism. The narrative 
created by considering the thin universalist project in this increasingly specific way 
has, I hope, shown how analytic philosophising of this kind can draw a deeply 
abstract metaethical account of the relationship between empirical and normative 
features of the world towards an account which makes use of contemporary political 
debate. The intention has been to show how abstract consideration of general moral 
principles need not lack a sense of connection with the real world and real people. 
The use of human rights and toleration are themselves deeply significant with this in 
mind and further study could fully draw out the role of thin universalism in these 
debates
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Similarly, taken further, thin universalism could be used to confront other 
moral doctrines. Rawls did just this with his theory of justice, comparing it to 
classical Kantianism and utilitarianism. But, at heart, these doctrines are deeply 
abstract and neither is particularly closely adhered to by real people in their everyday 
lives (though tenets of both creep into ‘ordinary’ or ‘common’ morality4). Again, 
further study could produce deeper critical expository work on thin universalism, 
confronting it with challenges and obstacles pertinent to a more fully worked-out thin 
universalism, that emerges as an outcome of this thesis.
In other circumstances, further work could explore what thin universal 
principles might bring to actual case studies. It may well be plausible to identify 
those ‘real-world’ situations where a thin universalism might have something to say. 
There are surely many situations -  global situations, perhaps -  across the world, and 
within our own societies, where we feel morality is necessarily invoked. In bringing 
a thin universalism into our approach to the issues of the day we may find that it 
yields new conclusions and spins debates, such as those between pacifism and 
interventionism, statism and humanitarianism, democracy and justice, and 
sovereignty and human rights, in new and fruitful directions. In many such 
circumstances, we may find ourselves hanging onto a universalism -  a thin one -  in 
the face of the facts of complex pluralism. We may find we take universalism very 
seriously indeed.
Thin universalism even has the potential to take on the character of a more 
pluralistically enlightened and minimal ‘ethos’, and further work could turn to the 
development of our own thin universalist sentiments in ourselves, and what that
4 See Bernard Gert, Common Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004)
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might mean. Because thin universalism evokes moral responses ‘close to the bone’,5 
thin universalist sentiments may require a certain amount of restraint, as well as 
cultivation. It is the fighting spirit of moral doctrines such as liberalism, socialism, 
Christianity and the like that that pushes them towards universalism in the first place. 
Temperance, therefore, may also be part of this cultivation, lest we see a return to 
patterns of coercion, punishment and domination.
The urgency of many moral questions is certainly powerful, even pervasive. 
There is often precious little time to ‘stop and wait and see’ when it comes to the 
issues with which constructed thin universal regulatory principles are concerned. We 
may be truly unable to suspend our moral judgements or our political procedures. 
Thin universal regulatory principles can be built within and used to reform current 
social, economic and political mechanisms. That we must in some way wait and see 
provides for us no answers whatsoever. This is a project that can begin in the here 
and how, that can build on existing dialogues and accords, that can celebrate existing 
differences and strive to ensure that they are not subsumed under false consensus, 
and that can allow pluralism to flourish by placing reasoned moral limits on the 
nature of the conflict that ensues from it.
But again, the thin universalist must not be hasty. Do my conclusions 
ultimately imply that the use of coercion and violence to enforce thin universal 
regulatory principles would always be justified? Would a war in the name of thin 
universal regulatory principles, or in the name of human rights, always constitute a 
‘just war’? Does a state which violates thin universal regulatory principles lose its 
moral and consequently its legal status? Must self-determination and sovereignty on 
the part of those whose rights are being violated be assumed to be insufficient?
5 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad  (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1994)
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No. Thin universalism is not a line, which we wait for others to cross, in 
order to pounce on them. It is not a warrant for justified violence. It is not a vehicle 
for exporting values by force. Used in this way, thin universalism falls back into old 
traps, into hard fought habits of the last century. Used in this way thin universalism is 
nothing more than a moral empire, spreading a totalising, homogenising brand of 
moral conformism. Used in this way, the thin universalist project is an abject failure 
-  both objectively speaking, and from its own point of view, by its own standards 
and remit.
But with its explicitly moral underpinnings thin universalism need not fall 
into these traps; nor is it bound to repeat the mistakes of universal doctrines in the 
past. Its acute sensitivity to pluralism and its heightened self-awareness, particularly 
of its own reflexivity, contingency and historical situation provide it with greater 
tools than any previous universalism to overcome the challenges to it. Thin 
universalism need not lapse into uniformity or rigid legalism.
But this does not exclude the possibility that thin universalism can 
countenance action where action is needed. While it must resist responding with 
force to every transgression, it does not rule force out as a means of preventing 
escalating violence or moral catastrophe. What thin universalism asserts is that 
intervention, sanctions, coercion, invasion, violence, and war are last resorts which 
must come from the international community -  parties to the construction -  as a 
whole. Conventions of proportionality in response and conduct are designed to 
constrain, alongside the existence of formal international institutional mechanisms, 
such as the United Nations, the processes of which cannot be foregone. What thin 
universalism does is forbid unilateral coercive action on the part of single segments
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of the international plurality. Thin universalism is intended to powerfully scrutinise 
the conditions for action in any given case.
The road to the realisation of the thin universalist project is a long one. 
Without radical reform, present international institutions and power arrangements 
provide enormous roadblocks which must be overcome. But with the increasingly 
complex interdependence of the modem system, the universal remains a parameter 
within which we must work on some level. We are colliding with one another on a 
more and more frequent basis. Some might lament this but I join with Isaiah Berlin 
in quoting John Stuart Mill:
It is hardly possible to overrate the value, in the present low state of human 
improvement, of placing human beings in contact with persons dissimilar to 
themselves, and with modes of thought and action unlike those with which 
they are familiar ... Such communication has always been, and is peculiarly 
in the present age, one of the primary sources of progress.6
Berlin suggests we substitute ‘progress’ with ‘knowledge’, and we might perhaps 
add too ‘richness’, ‘hope’ and ‘celebration’. While we may be cautious with how we 
go about using the language of thin universalism, for, unless it is equipped with the 
language of toleration and tempered by recognition of thin universal human rights, 
we may mistake it for mere permissiveness. On the other hand, without an acute 
awareness of complex pluralism, it starts to look more like paternalistic 
judgementalism. But where respect for persons and respect for pluralism inform the 
principles we adopt via construction, and where they determine what we are prepared 
to tolerate we may well find that steering a path between the two is difficult. We may
6 John Stuart Mill, Principles o f  Political Economy, book 3, ch. 17, section.5 in The Collected Works o f  
John Stuart Mill (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1963-1991), vol.3, p.594; Isaiah Berlin, The 
Crooked Timber o f  Humanity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p.90
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also find that no two paths are the same. With pluralism I end, just as I began; for 
Connolly is right, pluralism truly is the philosophy of a messy universe.
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